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1 Introduction: in search of EU standards for
asylum procedures
This introductory chapter starts with sketching the field of investigation and
the nature of the issues to be scrutinised. This will result in the formulation
of a research question and the outline of this book.
1.1 ADEQUATE AND FAIR ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN THE EU: STATE OF THE ART
Adequate and fair procedures are a precondition for the effective exercise of
rights.1 In the context of EU law it is generally recognised that the rights
granted by EU law to individuals would become useless if they cannot be
enforced in national administrative proceedings2 and in particular before
national courts.3 The importance of procedural rights is acknowledged by
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (henceforth also:
the Charter), as it has accorded fundamental rights status to procedural rights,
such as the right to an effective remedy and the right to good administration
on an equal footing with substantive rights.4
In asylum cases a lack of procedural guarantees may undermine the EU
rights usually claimed by asylum applicants: the right not be expelled or
extradited to a country where they face the risk of being subjected to human
rights violations (the principle of non-refoulement)5 and the right to asylum.
The need for fair asylum procedures is recognised both in the light of the
1 See for example ECtHR 10 January 2012, G.R. v the Netherlands, no 22251/07, where the
ECtHR ruled that the extremely formalistic attitude of the Dutch authorities deprived the
applicant of access to the competent administrative tribunal and prevented the applicant
from seeking recognition of his arguable claim under Art 8 of the Convention.
2 Ponce states that ‘administrative procedures make fundamental rights work’. Ponce 20
05, p 577. Schwartze derives from the Court of Justice’s case-law that the protection of
fundamental, constitutional rights is inextricably linked to correct administrative procedure.
Schwartze 2004, p 97.
3 Accetto and Zlepnig for example contend that procedure is essential for the effectiveness
of EU law because ‘the substantive legal regime greatly depends on the national procedural
and institutional framework to develop its full effect’. Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 380. See
also Kañska 2004, p 301.
4 Kañska 2004, p 302. Procedural rights can also be seen as an end in themselves. They aim
to ‘protect an individual and to ensure fairness of proceedings’. Ponce 2005, pp 552-553,
Kañska 2004, p 301.
5 Wouters 2009, p 1.
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‘grave consequences of an erroneous determination for the applicant’6 and
the vulnerable situation in which asylum applicants often find themselves.7
Taking a careful asylum decision is not easy. The task of assessing fear
of persecution and future risk of certain harms poses unique challenges, which
as Costello remarks, ‘requires both sensitive communicative approaches and
objective risk assessment’.8 This is to a large extent due to the fact that in most
asylum cases there is a lack of documentary evidence and that therefore the
asylum applicant’s statements may be the only evidence available. Thomas
even states that:
There can be little doubt that asylum decision-making, involving an assessment
of future risk for the claimant often on the basis of limited information, is amongst
the most problematic, difficult and complex forms of decision-making in the modern
state. Decision-makers may feel pulled in different directions in light of both the
considerable evidential uncertainty and a complex combination of facts pointing
both ways in favour of awarding or refusing international protection.9
The examination of the credibility of the asylum applicant’s asylum account
plays a central role in many asylum decisions.10 As a result rules regarding
(judicial review) of the evidentiary assessment of asylum claims are crucial
for the outcome of the case. Furthermore factors such as the quality of the
personal interview, the speed of the asylum procedure and the asylum appli-
cants’ (lack of) access to legal aid and interpretation services may increase or
decrease an applicant’s chances of success. This study examines which pro-
cedural guarantees are required by EU law in asylum cases.
Rights claimed by asylum applicants: the prohibition of refoulement and the right
to asylum
The prohibition of refoulement, explicitly laid down in the United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention, also often
referred to as the 1951 Geneva Convention) and the UN Convention against
Torture (CAT) and recognised under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), is the cornerstone of international refugee and asylum law.11 The
fundamental nature of the prohibition of refoulement is stressed in particular
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its case-law. In the ECtHR’s
view the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
6 See EXCOM Conclusion no 30 (XXXIV), 1983, sub (e).
7 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva
1979 (reedited in 1992) (UNHCR Handbook), para 190.
8 Costello 2006, p 2.
9 Thomas 2006, p 84.
10 Noll 2005, pp 1-6, Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, p 261.
11 Art 33 Refugee Convention, Art 3 CAT, Art 3 ECHR and Art 7 ICCPR.
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ment guaranteed by Article 3 ECHR enshrines one of the fundamental values
of democratic societies. Protection against the treatment prohibited by Article
3 is absolute. As a result that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite
or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk
of being subjected to such treatment. According to the ECtHR there can be no
derogation from that rule, not even if the person concerned acts undesirably
or dangerously.12 The principle of non-refoulement requires that a State assesses
a person’s claim that he is in need of international protection, in particular
if this State intends to expel or extradite this person.13
The prohibition of refoulement is also recognised as an EU fundamental right
in Article 19 of the Charter which provides:
No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment.14
According to the Court of Justice the issues at stake in the assessment of the
extent of the risk of refoulement relate ‘to the integrity of the person and to
individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the
Union’.15 In Elgafaji the Court of Justice considered that the fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 3 ECHR forms part of the general principles of EU
law, observance of which is ensured by the Court.16 The Court recognised
in Schmidberger that the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment laid down in Article 3 ECHR is absolute. The ECJ con-
sidered:
[U]nlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the right
to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the
freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be
viewed in relation to its social purpose.17
EU law not only provides for a prohibition of refoulement but also for a right
to asylum in Article 18 of the Charter. This right is reflected in Directive 2004/
83/EC (the Qualification Directive or QD), which provides that a person who
12 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, paras 137-138. Also the prohi-
bitions of refoulement guaranteed by the CAT and ICCPR are absolute, see HRC 15 June
2004, Ahani v Canada, no 1051/2002, para 10 and ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden,
no 233/2003, para 13.8. The Refugee Convention does allow for exceptions to the prohibition
of refoulement, according to Art 33 (2).
13 Staffans 2010, p, 275, Wouters 2009, p 164. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem 2003, p 118.
14 The principle of non-refoulement is also recognised in Art 21 (1) QD.
15 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 90.
16 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 28.
17 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003], para 80.
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qualifies as a refugee or is eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with
the directive, should be granted a refugee status or a subsidiary protection
status.18 The right to asylum is not absolute. A refugee may be refused a
refugee status, amongst others where there are serious reasons for considering
that he has committed a serious crime outside the country of refuge,19 if there
are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of the
Member State, or if he constitutes a danger to the community of that Member
State.20 A person who is in need of subsidiary protection may be refused an
asylum status on similar grounds.21 Balancing of interests may thus take place
in cases in which only the (refusal of) an asylum status is under dispute.
International treaties such as the ECHR do not provide for a right to asylum.22
Lack of harmonisation of standards for asylum procedures on the international level
Although the importance of fair asylum procedures for the effective exercise
of the prohibition of refoulement is widely recognised, the level of
harmonisation of standards for such procedures on the international level is
strikingly low.23 Most importantly the Refugee Convention does not contain
any standards for refugee status determination proceedings. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Executive Committee of the
Programme of the High Commissioner (EXCOM) have adopted guidelines
regarding asylum procedures.24 However these guidelines are not binding
and provide only limited guidance, as they take the freedom of States to choose
their own procedural system as a basis.25 The ECtHR has set important require-
ments for procedures in which claims based on the prohibition of refoulement
are assessed, in its case-law under the right to an effective remedy recognised
in Article 13 ECHR. However it is not possible to derive a comprehensive set
of standards from this case-law, as it only addresses a limited number of
18 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004]
OJ L 304/12. See Artt 13 and 18 of the directive. A.G. Maduro stated in para 21 of his
opinion in Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009]: ‘The Directive pursues the objective of developing
a fundamental right to asylum which follows from the general principles of Community
law which, themselves, are the result of constitutional traditions common to the Member
States and the ECHR, as reproduced, moreover, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union [..].’
19 Art 12 (2) QD. It concerns crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
serious non-political crimes outside the country of refuge prior to his admission as a refugee
and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
20 Art 14 (4) and (5) QD.
21 Art 17 QD.
22 See for example ECtHR 20 July 2010, A v the Netherlands, no 4900/06, paras 152-153.
23 See also Costello 2006, p 3.
24 See for example UNHCR Handbook and EXCOM Conclusion no 8 (XXVIII), 1977, Deter-
mination of Refugee Status.
25 Noll 2005, p 5.
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procedural issues and still leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Also the (non-
binding) views of other supervising bodies such as the Human Rights Commit-
tee (HRC) and the Committee against Torture (ComAT) only provide very
limited guidance.
As a result of the lack of international standards, asylum procedures
adopted by States vary considerably.26 Costello notes that governments have
taken this leeway granted by international law ‘and manipulated asylum
procedures in order to pursue manifold objectives, from deterring and deflect-
ing asylum seekers, to ensuring that failed asylum seekers will be deport-
able’.27 Indeed many States have decided to take measures in reaction to for
example large influxes of asylum applicants or the political demand for the
prevention of abuse of the asylum procedure. UNHCR in 2001 noted within
the Member States of the EU
a gradual shift of emphasis away from the identification of persons in need of
protection towards the deterrence of real or perceived abuse, if not sheer deterrence
of arrivals of asylum applicants. Concern about growing backlogs and the difficulty
of agreeing on burden-sharing formulas have resulted in policies of deflection, with
less attention paid to key issues of responsibility and international solidarity.28
Many of the measures taken by the EU Member States lead to diminishing
safeguards in the asylum procedure. Arguably, one of the most far-reaching
is the introduction of accelerated asylum procedures in many of the Member
States. Procedures in these countries have in common that applications are
dealt with within a (very) short period of time and often offer limited pro-
cedural safeguards.
EU standards for asylum procedures
The lack of harmonisation of procedural standards in asylum cases (and
migration cases in general) as well as the tendency to curtail procedural
guarantees in national legal systems was already noted by Pieter Boeles in
1997.29 At the time Boeles concluded that there was a lacuna in legal pro-
tection of immigrants at the Community level. The only measure available
26 See UNHCR Handbook, paras 191-192. It mentions that refugee status in practice may be
determined under formal procedures specifically established for this purpose, within the
framework of general procedures for the admission of aliens or under informal arrange-
ments, or ad hoc for specific purposes, such as the issuance of travel documents. See also
Gorlick 2003, pp 357-358.
27 Costello 2006, p 3.
28 UNHCR’s observations on the European Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive
on minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status,
COM(2000) 578 final, Geneva: 20 September 2000, para 5.
29 Boeles 1997, Chapter 19.
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was the Council Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures
of 1995.30
Since Boeles’ research on procedural standards in immigration proceedings
has been concluded some major developments took place at the European level.
In 1999 the European Council recognised that the issues of asylum and migra-
tion call for the development of a common EU policy. In that year the European
Council decided during the summit in Tampere to work towards a Common
European Asylum System (CEAS). This system should, according to the Presid-
ency Conclusions, include ‘standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure’.
It was even decided that EU legislation should in the longer term lead to a
common asylum procedure.31 The intention to develop a common asylum
procedure was repeated in several later policy documents.32
After lengthy and difficult negotiations Council Directive 2005/85/EC on
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and with-
drawing refugee status (the Procedures Directive or PD)33 was adopted in
2005.34 This directive contains minimum standards for the examination of
asylum applications in first instance as well as in appeal. The goal of the
approximation of rules on the procedures for granting and withdrawing
refugee status was to limit the secondary movements of applicants for asylum
between Member States, where such movement would be caused by differences
in legal frameworks.35 Nevertheless the minimum set of standards laid down
in the Procedures Directive leaves much discretion to the participating Member
States, as it contains a large number of vaguely defined concepts and has failed
– due to political differences in opinion – to provide clear-cut answers to a
number of core issues in procedural asylum law. It therefore did not succeed
in effectively harmonising procedural standards.36 According to Vedsted-
30 Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures [2006]
OJ C 274/13.
31 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999 (SN 200/99),
paras 14-15.
32 See for example: The Stockholm Programme, An Open and Secure Europe Serving and
Protecting Citizens (2010/C 115/01), para 6.2.
33 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States
for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13.
34 According to Michelogiannaki the negotiations ‘were proved to be the most intense, lengthy
and difficult negotiations compared to any other that had taken place in the past, regarding
the asylum agenda’. Michelogiannaki 2008, p 21. See further on the Procedures Directive
section 2.2.
35 Recital 6 Preamble PD. See also Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament, Towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status,
valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum, 22 November 2000, COM(2000)
755 final. Gorlick states that ‘a common understanding and interpretation of the key aspects
of refugee status determination would help avoid disparate interpretation of international
standards, first and foremost, and by consequence would result in more consistent recogni-
tion and treatment of refugees and asylum seekers’. Gorlick 2003, p 358.
36 See also Vedsted-Hansen 2005, p 371.
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Hansen the Member States’ unwillingness to achieve a higher level of harmon-
isation on asylum procedures can potentially be explained by the fact that non-
compliance with administrative and procedural matters ‘will be readily dis-
covered both by the affected individuals and by those bodies controlling the
implementation of EU law’.37
Arguably the common standards on asylum procedures were also meant
to serve the general objective of CEAS, namely the full and inclusive application
of the Refugee Convention and safeguards maintaining the non-refoulement
principle.38 However, the minimum standards contained in the directive
violated, according to UNHCR and various NGO’s, international human rights
standards and reflected a ‘race to the bottom’.39
Should the attempt on the EU level to develop common standards for asylum
procedures then be considered useless or even harmful, both from a human
rights perspective as well as in the light of the aim to harmonise such pro-
cedures? In this study it is argued that it should not. In spite of its short-
comings the Procedures Directive may enhance the position of persons who
apply for asylum in one of the Member States and lead at least to some form
of harmonisation of standards on asylum procedures within the EU. This is
not only due to the fact that the Procedures Directive does provide for im-
portant safeguards in national asylum procedures. More importantly the
Directive has brought many aspects of national asylum procedures within the
scope of EU law. As a result, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and
general principles of EU law, such as the right to an effective remedy and the
principle of effectiveness, apply. These rights and principles will be used by
the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) and national
courts in order to interpret the Procedures Directive’s provisions and to test
their legality. On the basis of these rights the courts may limit the Member
States’ discretion and even require the application of additional procedural
safeguards that are not included in the directive. The Charter and general
principles of EU law also come into play because of the clear rights included
in the Qualification Directive: a right to a refugee status for those who qualify
as a refugee, a right to a subsidiary protection status for those who are in need
of subsidiary protection, and a right to be protected against refoulement. The
37 Vedsted-Hansen 2005, p 374.
38 Vedsted-Hansen 2005, p 370. He states that the fulfilment of the Tampere objectives ‘clearly
presupposes that EU standards on asylum procedures provide the necessary safeguards
to ensure correct application of the substantive protection norms’.
39 Just before political agreement on the proposed directive was reached, ten NGO’s asked
EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Vitorino to withdraw the proposal. Press
release 29 April 2004, European Council for Refugees and Exiles, Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch, available at www.ecre.org. See also UNHCR Press Release, 30
April 2004, UNHCR regrets missed opportunity to adopt high EU asylum standards,
available at www.unhcr.org.
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principle of effectiveness abolishes procedural hurdles which render the
exercise of these rights practically impossible or excessively difficult.
Via the Charter and principles of EU law the Procedures Directive may
therefore provide more procedural safeguards to asylum applicants than many
had expected at the time of their adoption. Costello explains that this ‘new
legal context and the general principles it incorporates, as well as the inevitable
intervention of another supranational jurisdiction, the European Court of
Justice, may well thwart the race bottom more than the negotiators anti-
cipated’.40 Of course, the extent to which the Court will be able to do this
largely depends on the national courts’ willingness to refer questions regarding
the interpretation of the Procedures Directive to the Court for preliminary
ruling and to interpret these directives in the light of EU fundamental rights
and general principles.
1.2 IN SEARCH OF EU STANDARDS FOR ASYLUM PROCEDURES
This study focuses on the potential meaning of EU procedural rights, in parti-
cular the right to an effective remedy and fair trial and the right to good
administration for the asylum procedures of the EU Member States. EU Courts
have developed an important body of case-law on procedural guarantees. Now
that national asylum procedures also fall within the scope of EU law, this case-
law is in principle also applicable to those procedures. Expectedly, when
applying EU procedural rights and principles to asylum cases, the Court of
Justice will be inspired by relevant international treaties and the judgments
and views of the bodies supervising those treaties. This study aspires to derive
from EU legislation and (the case-law regarding) EU fundamental rights and
general principles a set of EU procedural standards for several important issues
in national asylum procedures.
1.2.1 Protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order
Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, funda-
mental rights, including the right to an effective remedy, have mainly be
protected in the EU as general principles of EU law by the Court of Justice.41
In its case-law the Court of Justice has developed an ‘unwritten charter of
rights’.42 Many of the most far-reaching decisions of the Court of Justice in
40 Costello 2006, p 6.
41 See for the history and development of EU fundamental rights and general principles of
EU law for example De Witte 1999, pp 859-897, Craig 2006, pp 484-486, Murray 2008, pp
531-550.
42 Craig 2006, p 484.
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the field of fundamental rights have been the result of preliminary references
by national courts.43
Murray states that the Member States have so far actively endorsed the
Court of Justice’s approach with regard to human rights protection, amongst
others by including provisions requiring respect for human rights in successive
treaties.44 Article 6 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in general
that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute
general principles of the Union’s law.
Many of the fundamental rights recognised by the Court of Justice were
incorporated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The Charter’s Preable states:
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and
for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European
Court of Human Rights.
The Charter thus made EU fundamental rights, including general principles
of EU law more visible.45 The Procedures Directive states in its preamble that
it respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in
particular by the Charter.46
Although until 1 December 2009 the Charter had no binding force, it did
play a role in the EU Courts’ case-law. The Court referred to the Charter mainly
in order to reaffirm the existence of a general principle of EU law.47 Since
the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the Charter has become bind-
ing.48 The Court of Justice has in its case-law referred to the binding force
43 Murray 2008, p 535. He states that national courts play a very important role in the develop-
ment of EU law including the protection of fundamental rights. See also Lenaerts &
Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1635.
44 Murray 2008, p 536, see also Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1633.
45 According to the preamble to the Charter ‘it is necessary to strengthen the protection of
fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and
technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter’. See also
Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1656, who state that the Charter brings clarity as to how
fundamental rights are protected at the EU level.
46 Recital 8 Preamble PD.
47 See for example Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], para 37 where the Court considered that
the principle of effective judicial protection had been reaffirmed by Art 47 of the Charter.
See also Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007], para 46 and Case C-450/06, Varec
[2008], para 48.
48 Art 6 (1) TEU states that the EU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in
the Charter, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
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of the Charter.49 In some cases however it still only mentioned the Charter
in order to reaffirm an existent general principle of EU law50 or used it to
support its textual interpretation of a provision of an EU directive.51 In other
cases the Court attached much more weight to the Charter. In DEB for example
the Court of Justice considered that the principle of effective judicial protection
is enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and focused on the interpretation of
this provision (instead of that of the principle).52 It may be expected that the
Court will in the future more often or maybe always base its interpretation
on the Charter instead of a general principle if it has the choice.
General principles of EU law recognised by the Court of Justice
In literature various lists can be found of the general principles recognised
by the Court of Justice.53 These include amongst others: the principle of equal-
ity, the principle of proportionality, the non bis in idem principle, the principle
of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, the right to effective judicial
protection and the principle of good administration. Many of these general
principles of EU law can be considered relevant in the context of asylum
procedures.
Rights included in the Charter
The Charter consists of five chapters: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity
and Citizen’s rights. Some of the core rights of the ECHR are included in the
Charter, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, the
right to respect for private life and the freedom of religion, expression, assem-
bly and association. The Charter furthermore contains economic and social
rights, such as the right to education and the right to social security and social
assistance.
The Charter lists many rights, which may be of particular relevance for
asylum cases, such as the right to asylum (Article 18) and the prohibition of
refoulement and collective expulsions (Article 19). With respect to asylum
procedures Article 47 of the Charter, which lays down the right to an effective
remedy54 and Article 41 on the right to good administration are particularly
relevant.
49 See for example Case C-555/07, Kücüdeveci [2010], para 22 and Case C-578/08, Chakroun
[2010], para 44.
50 See Case C-555/07, Kücüdeveci [2010], paras 21-22 and Joined Cases C-317/08, C-318/08,
C-319/08 en C-320/08, Alassini [2010], para 61.
51 Case C-403/09 PPU, Detiček [2010], paras 53-59.
52 Case C-279/09, DEB [2010], para 33 and further.
53 For a list of procedural guarantees see Kerse 2000, p 208. See for a comprehensive discussion
on the most important principles Tridimas 2006 and Groussot 2006.
54 In this study the terms ‘right to and effective remedy’ and ‘right to effective judicial
protection’ are used interchangeably and both refer to Art 47 of the Charter.
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1.2.2 Scope of application of the Charter and general principles of EU law
For the purpose of this study it is necessary to know when the Member States
should abide by the Charter and general principles of EU law. Are they only
bound by EU fundamental rights and principles when implementing the
Procedures Directive or also when taking individual asylum decisions which
fall within the scope of this directive or other provisions of EU law?
According to Article 51 (1) of the Charter the provisions of the Charter
are first of all addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
Union. Furthermore the Member States are bound by the Charter ‘only when
they are implementing Union law’. The EU institutions and the Member States
shall ‘respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application’
of the Charter in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the
limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.
The question rises when Member States are exactly ‘implementing Union
law’. In N.S. the Court of Justice interpreted the term ‘implementing Union
law’. It was asked whether a Member State’s decision to examine an asylum
claim which is not its responsibility on the basis of Article 3(2) of the Dublin
Regulation55 falls within the scope of EU law for the purposes of Article 6
TEU and/or Article 51 of the Charter. The Court answered that the discretion-
ary power conferred on the Member States by Article 3(2) of the Dublin
Regulation forms part of the Dublin system and, therefore, merely an element
of the Common European Asylum System. Thus, a Member State which
exercises that discretionary power must be considered as implementing Union
law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.56 Furthermore in Dereci
the Court of Justice considered that Member States are bound by the rights
included in the Charter if a situation is ‘covered by European Union law’.57
Both N.S and others and Dereci imply that the scope of application of the
Charter is the same as that of general principles of EU law, which bind the
Member States when they act within the scope of EU law.58 The following
categories of national measures fall within the scope of EU law and may
55 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] OJ L50/1.
56 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others [2011], para 68.
57 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others [2011], para 72. Several authors have argued that the scope
of application of the Charter and general principles of EU law should be the same. See
Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, pp 1659-1660, Oliver 2011, p 2037 and Craig 2006, pp 503-
505.
58 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/32. Some authors were of the opinion that the Charter only applies when
the Member States act as agents of the Union, for example when they implement a directive.
This would mean that the Charter’s scope of application is more limited than the scope
of application of EU general principles. See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, pp 1657-1659.
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therefore fall to be tested against general principles of EU law as well as the
Charter:59
· Measures implementing EU law60
· Measures adopted under an EU derogation in order to justify a measure
which restricts one of the fundamental freedoms protected by the Treaty61
· Measures which otherwise fall within the scope of EU law62
The Court of Justice generally seems to be rather willing to accept that a
sufficient EU law context exists.63 Nevertheless several examples can be found
in the Court of Justice’s case-law of cases where the Court considered that
the situation fell out of the field of application of EU law.64 Matters of pure
national law are not governed by the Charter and EU general principles.
For the purpose of this study it is important to note that the fact that
procedural issues are not governed by EU legislation does not mean that EU
fundamental rights do not apply. EU procedural rights and principles such
as the fundamental right to an effective remedy require that EU rights be
effectively protected in national proceedings. If a person claims a right pro-
vided for by EU law in national asylum proceedings, those rights and principles
may set requirements as to these proceedings.65 With regard to national pro-
cedural rules, the scope of EU law is therefore also determined by the sub-
stantive right claimed in the national procedure.
Since the inclusion of Title IV in the EC Treaty and the adoption of the
various directives on asylum, national measures in the field of asylum will
often fall within the field of application of EU Law. Asylum issues that the
directives (obviously) did not aim to harmonise will fall outside the scope of
59 Schermers and Waelbroeck 2001, p 36, Tridimas 2006, pp 36-42, Prechal 2010, p 8.
60 See for example Case 5/88, Wachauf [1989], para 19. ‘Implementation’ should be understood
in a broad sense. Prechal mentions that this category includes ‘the transposition of directives,
adoption of measures aimed at giving effects to regulations or other EU law provisions,
the application of EU rules and the enforcement of Union law. The fact that the Member
State enjoys discretion an the degree of discretion is irrelevant’. Prechal 2010, p 8.
61 See for example Case C-260/89, ERT [1991], para 43.
62 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1639, state that general principles are applicable where
some specific substantive EU rule is applicable to the situation in question.
63 See for example Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others [2011], paras
64-69 and Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010], paras 23-26. Tridimas notes that there is ‘a
clear and, indeed, remarkable tendency towards the broad application of general principles,
in particular fundamental rights’. Tridimas 2006, p 39.
64 Case C-299/95, Kremzow [1997], paras 16-18. In this case Kremzow claimed that Austria
infringed the fundamental right to freedom of movement for persons by executing an
unlawful penalty of imprisonment. See also Case C-144/95, Maurin [1996]. Further examples
are mentioned in Prechal 2010, p 11.
65 See also Prechal 2010, pp 11-13.
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EU law and therefore remain out of the reach of EU fundamental rights.66
Section 2.4.2 specifically discusses the scope of application of EU fundamental
rights with respect to national asylum procedures. The Procedures Directive
provides the Member States with wide discretion with respect to many issues.
Therefore in section 2.4.2 the question will be addressed whether Member
States are bound by EU fundamental rights when making use of their discre-
tionary power.
1.2.3 Function of EU fundamental rights and general principles
EU fundamental rights and general principles have been applied by the
national courts and the EU courts for different purposes. First of all, these
courts use those rights and principles to review the legality of EU legislation.
The Court of Justice considered that ‘respect for human rights is a condition
of the lawfulness of Community acts […] and that measures incompatible with
respect for human rights are not acceptable in the Community’.67
EU fundamental rights and general principles can be invoked under Article
263 or Article 267 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
(TfEU) to obtain the annulment of an EU Measure. An individual may attack
the legality of an EU measure before a national court on grounds of infringe-
ment of EU fundamental rights and general principles. If the national court
considers that an EU measure may be in invalid on this ground, it should make
a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.68 The Court of
Justice has in several cases declared a provision of secondary EU law invalid
because it infringed a provision of the Charter69 or a principle of EU law.70
Section 2.4.1 examines the question whether minimum standards, such as those
included in the Procedures Directive are capable of infringing EU fundamental
rights and general principles. This question is relevant because, arguably
66 National rules concerning special protection policies for unaccompanied minors or human-
itarian cases (who are not refugees and do not need subsidiary protection) will for example
fall outside the scope of the QD. Battjes also mentions the example of the prohibition on
expulsion based on Art 3 ECHR for humanitarian (medical) reasons, which is not included
in the QD. Battjes 2006, p 88.
67 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 284. See also para 285.
68 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987], paras 17-20. See also Tridimas 2006, pp 31 and 35. See more
extensively section 2.5.1.
69 See for example Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others
[2011], para 32.
70 See for example Case C-25/02, Rinke [2003], para 27, in which the Court of Justice stated
that a provision of a directive adopted by the Council in disregard of the principle of equal
treatment for men and women is vitiated by illegality. In Case C-120/86, Mulder [1988]
the Court of Justice held that a Community regulation on additional levy on milk was
adopted in breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.
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Member States are never forced by those minimum standards to violate EU
fundamental rights, as they are generally allowed to introduce or maintain
more favourable provisions than those minimum standards.71
Secondly, the national courts of the Member States and the Court of Justice
use the Charter and general principles of EU law to interpret EU legislation.72
The Court has held that EU legislation cannot be interpreted in such a way
that it disregards a fundamental right included in the Charter.73 Furthermore
it has considered that where an EU measure must be interpreted, preference
must be given as far as possible to the interpretation that renders it compatible
with general principles of EU law.74 National rules and practice will be tested
against this interpretation of EU law.75 Finally the EU Courts have used general
principles of EU law to fill in gaps in EU legislation and to supplement the
provisions of written EU law.76
In sum EU fundamental rights and general principles may thus require
that relevant EU legislation is set aside and may set additional standards to
those explicitly included in EU legislation. In order to discover which require-
ments are set by EU law for national asylum procedures, it is therefore not
only necessary to have regard to the Procedures Directive, but also to relevant
EU fundamental rights and general principles. This study in particular tries
to define the meaning and content of the EU fundamental right to an effective
remedy and to a fair trial and related rights and general principles for the
legality and interpretation of EU legislation on asylum procedures.
1.2.4 Sources of inspiration of EU fundamental rights and general principles
Both the EU Charter and general principles of EU law have several sources of
inspiration, in particular the common constitutional traditions of the Member
States and international obligations common to the Member States.77 Further-
71 See for example Art 5 PD, which allows Member States to introduce or maintain more
favourable standards insofar as those standards are compatible with the directive.
72 The Court has interpreted provisions of secondary EU legislation in the light of the Charter.
See Case C-578/08, Chakroun [2010], para 44, Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08
en C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 54.
73 Case C-403/09 PPU, Detiček [2010], para 55. This case concerned the compatibility of a
regulation with the rights of the child set out in Art 24 of the Charter.
74 Tridimas 2006, p 29. He refers to several cases, such as Case C-314/89, Rauh [1991].
75 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1650.
76 See as to the triple function of general principles of EU law: Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons
2010, pp 1629-1631. They state that gap-filling ‘involves addressing legal problems over-
looked by the authors of the Treaties or by the Union legislature’.
77 The preamble to the Charter mentions that the Charter is based amongst others on the
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States. Art 6
(3) TEU states that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles
of the Union’s law.
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more potentially also secondary EU legislation78 and EU soft law79 may serve
as a source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights and general principles.
Both secondary legislation and EU soft law play a minor role in this study and
will therefore not be further addressed in section.80 For the purpose of this
study by far most weight is attached to international law as a source of inspira-
tion.
International law as a source of inspiration
Article 6 (2) TEU states that the Union shall accede to the ECHR. Potentially
the EU will also become a party to other human rights treaties.81 For now
however, the European Union, unlike its Member States, is not a party with
human rights treaties, such as the ECHR or the ICCPR.82 The EU is therefore
not directly bound by human rights treaties. Although the wording of their
case-law sometimes suggests differently, the EU courts therefore have generally
not directly applied these treaties.83 Instead they use human rights treaties
as a source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights and general principles
of EU law. The following standard consideration has been used by the Court
of Justice:
78 See Case T-228/02, Organization des Modhahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para
149 and Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 204. See also Kunoy & Mortansson 2010,
p 1825.
79 In Case C-322/88, Grimaldi [1989], paras 18-19, the Court of Justice considered that national
courts are bound to take account of Commission recommendations where they cast light
on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where
they are designed to supplement binding EU provisions. See also Case C-188/91, Deutsche
Shell [1993] and Joined Cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08, Alassini and
others [2010], para 40. Several Advocates General are of the opinion that the Grimaldi
obligation should also apply to the EU courts.See the opinion of A.G. Tesauro in Case
C-450/93, Kalanke [1995], para 20 and the opinion of A.G. Fennelly in Case C-76/97, Tögel
[1998], para 34. See also Senden 2004, p 399.
80 Relevant are Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum
procedures [2006] OJ C 274/13, Council Resolution of 26 June 1997 on unaccompanied
minors who are nationals of third countries [1997], OJ C 221/23 and Council Resolution
of 30 November 1992 on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum (not published in
the Official Journal).
81 The Stockholm Programme, An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens
(2010/C 115/01), para 6.2.1 mentions a possible accession to the Geneva Convention and
its 1967 Protocol.
82 In opinion 2/94 the Court of Justice held that the European Community had no competence
to accede to the ECHR. According to Groussot opinion 2/94 marked the start of an extensive
use of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and acceleration in the shaping of fundamental rights.
Groussot 2006, p 61.
83 In Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002] and Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] the Court of Justice
directly applied Art 8 ECHR. See Groussot 2003, p 199. In Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-
Werke v Commission [2001] the CFI considered however: ‘It must be emphasised at the outset
that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to apply the Convention when reviewing
an investigation under competition law, inasmuch as the Convention as such is not part
of Community law’.
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Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law the
observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspira-
tion from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from
the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signa-
tories.84
International law also inspired the drafters of the Charter. The Preamble of
the Charter states that the Charter reaffirms the rights as they result from,
amongst others, the international obligations common to the Member States
and the ECHR as well as the ECtHR’s case-law. Many of the rights included in
the Charter are clearly based (partly or in whole) on the ECHR. When inter-
preting the fundamental rights included in the Charter the Court of Justice
has relied on the ECtHR’s case-law.85
The Court of Justice has recognised several international treaties as sources
of inspiration for EU fundamental rights and general principles of EU law.86
Among those treaties are the ECHR, the Refugee Convention,87 the ICCPR88
and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)89 which play a signifi-
cant role in the context of this study. According to Article 6(3) TEU, the Char-
ter90 and the Court of Justice’s case-law, the ECHR has special significance
for the development of EU fundamental rights and general principles.91 There-
fore, in many cases in which the Court of Justice applies EU fundamental rights
or general principles, it refers to the ECHR and/or the ECtHR’s case-law. The
CAT, which will also be included in this study as a source of inspiration has
so far not been recognised as such by the EU Courts. However, it may be
expected that the Court of Justice will do so in the future as all Member States
are a party with this convention.92
84 See for example Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 35.
85 See for example Case C-279/09, DEB [2010], where the Court of Justice interpreted Art
47 of the Charter in the light of the ECtHR’s case-law concerning Art 6 ECHR.
86 The European Social Charter in Case C-438/05, Viking Line [2007], para 44 and Case 149/77,
Defrenne [1978], para 28 and the and the ILO Conventions in Case 149/77, Defrenne [1978],
para 28.
87 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], paras
51-53 and Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B. and D. [2010], paras 76-78.
88 Case C-347/87, Orkem, [1989] and Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006].
89 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], see also Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien [2008].
90 The Charter specifically states that it reaffirms the rights included amongst others in the
ECHR and following from the case-law of the ECtHR. Furthermore Art 52 (3) states that
the meaning and scope of the rights included in the Charter which correspond to right
guaranteed by the ECHR shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. Other human
rights conventions such as the ICCPR or the CAT are not explicitly mentioned by the
Charter.
91 Case C-222/84, Johnston [1986], see also Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 35.
92 See also Battjes 2006, p 85.
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Chapter 3 will further address the Court of Justice’s use of international
treaties as sources of inspiration for EU fundamental rights and principles. It
will in particular explain the (relative) weight which must be attached to these
sources of inspiration for the purpose of this study.
The constitutional traditions of the Member States
Although the constitutional traditions of the Member State may be relevant
in order to define the meaning of the EU right to an effective remedy, they
are not included in this study (see section 1.5). The reason for this choice is
that it is very difficult to identify principles which are common to the constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States. First of all in order to discover such
principles an assessment of the legislation of the 27 Member States may be
necessary, which is a complicated and time-consuming operation. This may
also be the reason why in practice, the Court of Justice does not very often
enter into a comparative analysis of the constitutions of the Member States.93
Secondly the EU Courts have not set out any criteria on the basis of which it
should be decided whether a constitution tradition is common to the EU
Member States.94
Arguably an EU general principle is common to the constitutional traditions
of the Member States if it is laid down in a treaty of which the Member States
are signatories. Groussot states that the most common approach is to let the
use of the constitutional traditions come after international law. The reason
is that international law is appraised as having a unifying potential. Inter-
national obligations are also easier to identify than the common constitutional
traditions of the Member States. Thus only if the international treaties do not
provide any guidance, the absence of an assessment of the constitutional
traditions of the Member States, may be problematic.95 In such a situation
it is not excluded that the Court of Justice will accept a (certain interpretation
93 In most cases the Court of Justice just mentions that the right is common to the constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States. See for example Douglas-Scott 2006, p 658, De Witte
1999, p 878 and Murray 2008, p 537. One example of a case in which the Court of Justice
does make an analyses of the constitutions in a number of Member States is Case 44/79,
Hauer [1979]. De Witte notes however that in the ECJ in this case examined the constitu-
tional protection of the right to property in only three of the nine Member States and did
not delve deeply into them. De Witte 1999, p 878. The Advocates General are more tended
to analyse the constitutional traditions of the Member States than the Court of Justice.
94 See also Young 2005, pp 223-224, Groussot 2006, p 50. In Joined Cases C-46/87 and C-
227/88, Hoechst [1989], para 17, the Court of Justice stated that if there ‘are not inconsider-
able divergences between the legal systems of the Member States in regard to the nature
and degree of protection’, a right cannot be recognised as a principle common to the laws
of the Member States. This seems to point in the direction of an evaluative approach and
to exclude the possibility of the minimalist approach. In Case C-144/04, Mangold [2005]
however the Court of Justice accepted a general principle, which was not obviously (or
even obviously not) common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Schiek
2006, pp 329-341. See for an overview of other critics Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010, p 1654.
95 See also section 1.5.
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of) an EU fundamental right or general principle on the basis of the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States alone.96
1.3 RESEARCH GOAL AND QUESTIONS
The purpose of the study is in general to examine the potential meaning of
EU fundamental rights and general principles for national asylum procedures
and in particular to derive a set of EU procedural standards for several key
issues of asylum procedures from EU legislation and/or EU fundamental rights
and general principles. The central research question should therefore be
phrased as follows:
What is the meaning of the EU fundamental right to an effective remedy for (1) the
legality; and (2) the interpretation of EU legislation on asylum procedures?
This question includes the meaning of EU procedural rights and principles
which are included in or strongly connected to the right to an effective remedy,
such as the right to a fair trial, the principle of effectiveness and the right to
good administration.97 More specifically the study aims to define the meaning
of the EU right to an effective remedy and these related rights and principles
for the following procedural topics:
1 The right to remain in the territory during asylum proceedings in first
instance and appeal
2 The asylum applicant’s right to be heard in first instance and appeal
3 Questions relating to evidence in asylum procedures:
· the standard and burden of proof and evidentiary assessment
· judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts
· the use of secret evidence
1.3.1 Preliminary issues (Part I)
In order to make it possible to answer the central research question and to
define the meaning of EU procedural rights for the three specific procedural
topics mentioned above, several preliminary issues should be addressed. This
will be done in Chapters 2 to 4.
96 The Mangold case may be an example of that. No prohibition of age discrimination existed
in international law. Furthermore Schiek notes that the Court chose not to refer to Art 21
of the Charter and Art II-82 of the Constitutional Treaty, which establish a prohibition of
age discrimination. By doing so, it could have showed that the Member States have estab-
lished a common constitutional accord which includes a prohibition to discrimination on
grounds of age. Schiek 2006, pp 329-341.
97 See further Chapter 4.
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Chapter 2: The Common European Asylum System and EU procedural standards
First of all it is necessary to know the potential impact and the scope of appli-
cation of EU fundamental rights in asylum cases, taking into account the
particular characteristics of the Procedures Directive. It should be examined
whether the minimum standards of the Procedures Directive are capable of
infringing EU fundamental rights. Arguably the Member States are never forced
by those minimum standards to violate EU fundamental rights, as they are
allowed to introduce or maintain higher standards. If minimum standards
are capable of infringing fundamental rights, in which circumstances should
they then be considered invalid?
Another question which should be addressed is whether Member States
act within the scope of EU law when making use of the discretion offered by
the Procedures Directive (for example exceptions to procedural guarantees).
If they are not, that means that they are not bound by EU fundamental rights.
These questions are addressed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3: International treaties as sources of inspiration for EU fundamental
rights in the context of the Common European Asylum System
Chapter 3 discusses the Court of Justice’s use of international treaties as sources
of inspiration for EU fundamental rights. In particular it examines the (relative)
weight which should be accorded to the ECHR, the Refugee Convention, the
CAT, the ICCPR and the CRC as a source of inspiration for the EU right to an
effective remedy when applied in the context of asylum procedures.
Chapter 4: Introduction to the EU right to an effective remedy and related
procedural rights and principles
Finally it is useful to select the EU procedural rights, which are relevant for
the purpose of this study and to examine their general content and meaning
before turning to the specific themes mentioned above. Chapter 4 therefore
introduces the EU procedural rights, which will be used in this study in order
to build a set of EU standards for the themes discussed in later chapters. It
shows how EU fundamental rights have limited the procedural autonomy of
the Member States. Furthermore this chapter explains how EU procedural rights
and principles are interlinked and it discusses their general content. It also
gives an overview of the specific provisions of international treaties, which
may inspire the Court of Justice when defining the meaning and content of
the EU right to an effective remedy in the asylum context. Finally three basic
notions are introduced which may be helpful to explain the Court of Justice’s
as well as the ECtHR’s case-law and predict how they will rule on procedural
issues in the future.
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Chapter 5: Preliminary conclusions and methodology used for the following
chapters
In this final chapter of Part I conclusions will be drawn as to the preliminary
issues discussed and the methodology applied in the following chapters will
be explained.
1.3.2 Key issues of asylum procedures (Part II)
Chapters 6 to 10 will examine the meaning of the EU fundamental right to an
effective remedy for the following key issues of asylum procedures.
Chapter 6: The right to remain on the territory during first instance and appeal
asylum proceedings
This chapter addresses the question whether, according to EU law, Member
States are required to allow asylum applicants to remain on their territory
during first instance proceedings and the appeal procedure. Furthermore it
examines whether the Member States must grant applicants the opportunity
to lodge an appeal against this expulsion before being expelled.
Chapter 7: The asylum applicant’s right to be personally heard on his asylum
motives
The statements of the claimant play an essential role in the assessment whether
this person runs a risk of refoulement upon return to his country of origin. This
chapter addresses the EU standards with regard to the asylum applicant’s right
to be personally heard on his asylum motives in first instance and appeal
proceedings
Chapter 8: The burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment
This chapter addresses the EU requirements with regard to the standard and
burden of proof and the evidentiary assessment in asylum cases
Chapter 9: Judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts
Chapter 9 concerns the standard of judicial review in asylum cases. It examines
in particular whether the (first instance) courts of some Member States are
allowed to pay (more or less) deference to the authorities’ decision on the
establishment of the facts or whether they are required to apply a full judicial
review to the asylum decision.
Chapter 10: The use of secret information in asylum proceedings
This chapter specifically addresses procedural safeguards applying to asylum
cases in which (part of) the establishment of the facts is based on evidence
gathered by the authorities, which is not made available to the asylum appli-
cant concerned or his legal representative.
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1.3.3 Conclusions (Part III)
Chapter 11: Towards a common and fair European asylum procedure?
This chapter recapitulates the methodology used for the purpose of this study.
It draws some conclusions as to the achievements of the Procedures Directive
up to now and the potential impact it may still have. It also contains a list
of procedural standards which were derived from the Procedures Directive
and the EU right to an effective remedy in Chapters 6 to 10. Finally this chapter
glances into the future. It addresses the proposed recast of the Procedures
Directive and the recast of the Qualification Directive. Their provisions will
be tested against the conclusions drawn in this study as to the requirements
following from the EU right to an effective remedy concerning each of the pro-
cedural topics discussed in the previous chapters.
1.4 STEP WISE APPROACH
In order to define the meaning of the EU fundamental right to an effective
remedy for each of the specific topics addressed in Chapters 6 to 10, the
following five steps are taken.
Step 1: Identification of the applicable provisions of the Procedures Directive
The first step is to identify the provisions of the Procedures Directive, which
are applicable to the procedural issue concerned. With regard to some pro-
cedural issues the Procedures Directive provides for clear standards. In such
a situation it is examined whether these standards comply with the EU right
to an effective remedy. However, with regard to most topics the provisions
of the Procedures Directive do not provide such clear standards. In such
situation the EU right to an effective remedy will be used to interpret these
provisions.
Step 2: Assessment of the existing case-law of the EU Courts concerning the
specific topic.
With regard to most of the asylum topics addressed in this study the Court
of Justice has not answered any preliminary questions yet. Most of the case-law
examined therefore regards the Court of Justice’s and the General Court’s or
former CFI’s interpretation of the EU right to an effective remedy in other fields
22 Chapter 1
of EU law.98 The procedural principles which emerge from this case-law will
be applied in the asylum context.
Step 3: Examination of the ECtHR’s case-law and other sources of inspiration
The ECtHR’s judgments and the relevant views of other supervising bodies
inspire the interpretation of the EU right to an effective remedy. Moreover they
set procedural requirements for asylum procedures specifically. They thus give
a good indication which guarantees are needed in order to establish a fair
asylum procedure.
Step 4: Conclusion as to the meaning of the EU right to an effective remedy
for the specific aspect of the asylum procedure
On the basis of the EU Courts’ case-law, the case-law of the ECtHR and the views
of the other supervising bodies the meaning and content of the EU right to
an effective remedy with regard to a specific procedural aspect is defined.
Step 5: Application to the provisions of the Procedures Directive
Finally the provisions of the Procedures Directive identified in step 1 are
interpreted in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy. If the text of
a relevant provision does not allow an interpretation in conformity with the
EU right to an effective remedy, conclusions are drawn with regard to the
legality of this provision.99
The method applied in order to find the meaning of the EU right to an effective
remedy is further explained in Chapter 5.
1.4.1 The method of selecting research material
This study was concluded on 1 October 2011. Later developments were only
taken into account in exceptional cases. Hereunder it is briefly explained how
the EU Courts’ judgments and the sources of inspiration used for the purpose
of this study were selected.
98 Although the General Court/ former CFI only rules in appeals against decision taken by
the EU Institutions, arguably their interpretation of the EU right to effective judicial pro-
tection is relevant for cases decided on the national level in which this right is involved
The CFI has for example decided that several procedural rights (among which the right
to an effective remedy) were infringed in EU sanction cases, in which crucial information
was not disclosed to the person concerned. This study takes this interpretation into account
in order to define the content and meaning of these rights in the context of asylum cases,
in which the decision is based on secret information.
99 See further with regard to the legality test sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.1.
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EU Courts judgments
The EU Courts’ case-law examined in this study was found through the search
engine of the Court of Justice on the internet100 and through literature in
which this case-law was discussed or mentioned. Procedural issues have been
addressed by the EU Courts in cases regarding all fields of EU law and under
different EU rights and principles. Furthermore the EU Courts have used various
terms for the same procedural rights.101 As a result sometimes considerations
which concern procedural issues remain hidden. This makes it very difficult
to disclose all relevant case-law. It is therefore possible that not all relevant
judgments were included in this research.
Sources of inspiration
For the purpose of this study the following judgments and views of super-
vising bodies with international treaties were examined:
· European Court Human Rights: all judgments and admissibility decisions
by the ECtHR in non-refoulement cases (notably Article 3 ECHR) and judg-
ments concerning Article 6 (1) and (3) on relevant issues.102
· European Commission on Human Rights: some relevant decisions men-
tioned in literature
· Council of Europe Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly
Resolutions: Recommendations and Guidelines specifically addressing
asylum matters or procedural issues such as the right to legal assistance
or access to justice.
· Human Rights Committee: views in individual cases concerning Articles
6, 7 and 14 ICCPR, General Comments and Concluding Observations and
Recommendations with regard to the EU Member States, other European
countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.103
· Committee against Torture: views in individual cases concerning Article 3
CAT, General Comments and Concluding Observations and Recommenda-
tions with regard to the EU Member States, other European countries,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.104
100 In order to search the data-base terms were used such as: effective judicial protection,
effective remedy, effectiveness, fair trial, equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, right
to be heard, statement of reasons, good administration, interim relief, suspensive effect,
interim protection, burden of proof, standard of proof, evidence, legal aid, legal assistance,
time-limits etc.
101 The Court of Justice has used terms such as ‘effective protection of fundamental rights’,
‘the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community
law’ or ‘requirements of sufficiently effective protection’ when addressing the procedural
rights of parties.
102 Judgments were found via Hudoc (www.echr.coe.int) and literature.
103 Individual views were found via the search engine of the UN treaty body base,
www.bayefski.com and via literature.
104 Individual views were found via the search engine of the UN treaty body base,
www.bayefski.com and via literature.
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· Committee on the Rights of the Child: General Comments and Concluding
Observations and Recommendations with regard to the EU Member States,
other European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States.
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The section will set out the scope and limitations of the study and explain
some of the choices which have been made in order to clearly define the
research topic.
Focus on EU law
As is apparent from the central research question described in section 1.3 this
study focuses primarily on EU law. Its purpose is to develop a set of EU pro-
cedural standards for several important issues in national asylum procedures.
International law (the ECtHR and other human rights treaties) are only included
in this study as sources of inspiration for EU fundamental rights. It is therefore
only in this context that the study assesses the requirements for asylum pro-
cedures which follow from those treaties.
No assessment of national law
This study does not include an assessment of the national law and practices
of the Member States. It only briefly refers to European Commission evalu-
ations and UNHCR research, which examined the implementation of the Pro-
cedures Directive in the Member States, in order to show that certain pro-
cedural aspects addressed in this study cause problems or are discussed in
practice and not only in theory. However a set of EU standards for national
asylum procedures has been developed in the abstract, on the basis of EU
legislation, the EU Court’s case-law and relevant sources of inspiration.
This approach does have at least two drawbacks. First of all, as was
explained in section 1.2.3, the common constitutional traditions of the Member
States serve as a source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights. National
asylum legislation and practice may thus influence the Court of Justice’s
interpretation of EU fundamental rights in the asylum context. It was already
pointed out in section 1.2.4. that it is difficult to identify principles which are
common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States.
Secondly the Court of Justice will often take the national asylum system
into account when deciding whether a national procedural rule infringes the
EU fundamental right to an effective remedy. As will be explained in section
4.5.2 the Court assesses the fairness of a national procedural rule not in a
vacuum but in the context of the national procedure as a whole. Therefore
in order to know what the set of EU standards developed in this study means
Introduction: in search of EU standards for asylum procedures 25
for a specific Member State, it is usually necessary to take into account the
national context.
Only asylum procedures governed by the Procedures Directive
This study only assesses which EU standards should apply to asylum pro-
cedures which fall within the scope of the Procedures Directive. According
to Article 3 PD, the Procedures Directive applies to all applications for asylum
made in the territory, including at the border or in the transit zones of the
Member States, and to the withdrawal of refugee status. Cases of requests for
diplomatic or territorial asylum submitted to representations of Member States
fall outside the scope of the directive. In 2010 all Member States except one
had put in place a single procedure in which both refugee status and sub-
sidiary protection status are determined.105 As a result in 26 Member States
the Procedures Directive applies to the determination of both statuses.106
Asylum applications governed by the Procedures Directive (procedural
standards) are also governed by the Qualification Directive (substantive
standards).107 The standards laid down by the Qualification Directive are
relevant for the purpose of this study for two reasons. First of all it defines
the content of the substantive EU rights claimed by asylum applicants: the right
to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement. National procedural rules which
render the effective exercise of these rights impossible or excessively difficult
are contrary to EU law. Furthermore it will be argued in section 4.5.3.1 that
the nature of the substantive EU rights claimed by a person defines to a certain
extent the level of procedural protection which must be offered to this person.
Secondly the Qualification Directive contains standards regarding several
evidentiary issues which are addressed in Chapter 7. The standard of proof
which must be met in asylum cases should be derived from the criteria for
qualifying as a refugee or a person eligible for subsidiary protection included
in the directive. Moreover Article 4 QD provides for standards concerning the
burden of proof and evidentiary assessment. For these reasons the Qualification
Directive is included in this study when relevant.
This study does not address the procedural guarantees applicable when
a person claims that his expulsion, extradition or transfer to another country
will violate the prohibition of refoulement in a procedure governed by another
EU measure than the Procedures Directive. A claim of a risk of refoulement may
be done in the context of a refusal of entry to the EU at the border in the
meaning of the Schengen Borders Code,108 a transfer to another Member State
105 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of Directive 2005/85/EC, 8 September 2010, COM (2010) 465 final, p 3.
106 Art 3 (3) PD.
107 See Artt 2 (b) and 3 (1) PD and Art 1 and 2 (g) QD.
108 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders [2006] OJ L105/1.
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on the basis of the Dublin Regulation or a return procedure governed by the
Return Directive.109 In such procedures, it should also be assessed whether
there is a risk of a violation of the prohibition of refoulement. Arguably many
of the standards which apply to asylum procedures governed by the Pro-
cedures Directive should also apply to those procedures. However border,
Dublin or return proceedings have different characteristics than asylum pro-
cedures, which may influence the level of procedural protection which should
be offered to the individual. In Dublin cases the asylum applicant will be
transferred to another EU Member State, which may have impact on, for
example, the burden of proof. A return procedure may follow an asylum
procedure, which may have implications for the procedural safeguards which
need to be offered. If a person first claims a violation of the prohibition of
refoulement when a decision to refuse at the border or to return him is taken,
the most logical step would be to lodge an asylum claim. From the moment
the asylum claim is lodged the Procedures Directive applies.
No questions concerning the exclusion from an asylum status and detention
This study only concerns the assessment of the question whether a person
falls within the scope of the EU prohibition of refoulement, according to the
criteria laid down in the Qualification Directive. Most persons who have a
well-founded fear of persecution or run a real risk of serious harm are not
only protected by the prohibition of refoulement but will also be granted an
EU asylum status. However some persons in need of protection will be
excluded from such a status, for example because they committed serious
crimes in their country of origin or because they constitute a danger to the
national security or community of the Member State.110
EU procedural standards applicable to the decision to refuse a person an
asylum status or to withdraw an asylum status for other reasons than that
protection against expulsion is no longer necessary, will not be examined in
this study. The reason for this choice is that the nature of the EU right involved
in such decision (the right to asylum) is different than the EU right to protection
against refoulement. While the EU right to asylum may be subject to limitations,
the EU prohibition of refoulement is absolute. Before refusing or withdrawing
an asylum status for national security reasons, the interests of the person
concerned should be balanced against the interests of the State. This has
implications for the level of procedural protection which should be offered
and specific procedural questions may arise.111 For example the burden of
proof and the required intensity of judicial review is different in case of a
109 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying
third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98.
110 Artt 12 (2), 14 (4) and (5) and 18 QD.
111 See also section 4.5.1.
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balancing test in the context of a decision whether an asylum status may be
refused for reasons of national security than in case of a decision regarding
the existence of a real risk of refoulement upon return.
Also procedural guarantees applicable to detention cases falling within
the scope of Article 18 PD will not be assessed.
Limited number of procedural topics
As was set out in section 1.3 a choice has been made for a number of key
procedural topics: the right to remain on the territory during first instance
and appeal proceedings, the asylum applicant’s right to be personally heard
on his asylum motives and several questions relating to evidence. Arguably
the way these procedural issues are regulated in a Member State determines
to an important extent the fairness of the asylum procedure.
Another reason to choose these particular topics was the assumption that
they cause problems in practice in at least part of the Member States. This
assumption was based among others on the emergence of those issues in the
ECtHR’s case-law and in legal discourse, the fact that they raised cause of
concern according to reports evaluating the implementation of the Procedures
Directive or (other) human rights reports and the researcher’s experience with
the Dutch asylum procedure.
Several important procedural topics, such as the right of access to the
asylum procedure, the right to (free) legal assistance and interpretation services,
the application of safe country of origin, first country of asylum and safe third
country concepts and the use of very speedy (accelerated) procedures, will
not be discussed in this book. This book thus does not give a complete over-
view of the potential meaning of the EU fundamental right to an effective
remedy in the asylum context. However it should be noted that the procedural
topics mentioned are also governed by the Procedures Directive and, as a
result, by the EU right to an effective remedy and related procedural rights.
The stepwise approach used to discover the meaning of the EU procedural
right to an effective remedy can therefore also be applied to these procedural
topics.112
112 See with regard to the right of access to (free) legal assistance in relation to the right of





2 The Common European Asylum System
and the applicability of EU procedural
standards
In order to be able to interpret the Procedures Directive and to test the legality
of its provisions it is necessary to know more about the context in which the
directive was adopted, its purposes, its system and the minimum character
of its norms. Therefore this chapter will introduce the Common European
Asylum System of which the Procedures Directive is part (section 2.1) as well
as the Procedures Directive itself (section) 2.2.
Relevance of the Qualification Directive
When assessing the procedural guarantees applying to the asylum procedures
one cannot ignore the importance of the Qualification Directive. This directive
defines the content of the right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement,
the substantive EU rights usually claimed by asylum applicants during the
asylum procedure. National procedural rules should not undermine the effect-
ive exercise of these rights. These substantive rights also determine to a certain
extent the level of procedural protection which should be offered.1 Further-
more the Qualification Directive contains minimum standards regarding the
evidentiary issues discussed in Chapter 8.2 Therefore this directive will be
introduced in section 2.3.
Potential impact and scope of application of EU fundamental rights
The Procedures Directive contains minimum standards and leaves wide
discretion to the Member States in designing their asylum procedure. This
raises two important questions relating to the potential impact and scope of
application of EU fundamental rights. These questions should be answered
in order to be able to define the meaning and content of EU procedural rights
for the themes which will be addressed in Chapters 6 to 10.
Testing the legality of the Procedures Directive’s provisions
First of all it should be examined whether the minimum standards included
in the Procedures Directive are capable of infringing EU fundamental rights.
Member States are allowed to introduce or maintain more favourable provi-
sions than those minimum standards, provided that those provisions are
1 See further section 4.5.3.
2 See also section 1.5 above.
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compatible with the directive. Arguably the Member States are therefore never
forced by those minimum standards to violate EU fundamental rights. Section
2.4.1 explains that the Court of Justice is competent to test the legality of the
minimum standards included in the Procedures Directive against EU funda-
mental rights and sets out in which circumstances these standards should be
considered invalid.
Applying EU fundamental rights to national asylum procedures
Secondly questions arise with regard to the scope of application of EU funda-
mental rights in the context of the Procedures Directive. The Procedures allows
numerous exceptions to the procedural safeguards which should be offered
to asylum applicants and many vague terms are used.3 Member States may
argue that they are not bound by EU fundamental rights when making use
of their discretionary power, because the national measures implementing this
discretionary power fall outside the scope of EU law. It is contended in section
2.4.2 that this line of reasoning is not compatible with the Court of Justice’s
case-law. According to the Court of Justice Member States are bound by EU
fundamental rights when making use of the discretion allowed by EU legis-
lation.
The role of the national courts and the Court of Justice
Finally it is relevant to examine how questions regarding the interpretation
and legality of the provisions of the Procedures Directive may be may be
brought before the national courts and the Court of Justice. This issue is
addressed in section 2.5.
2.1 THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM AND ITS LEGAL BASIS
2.1.1 Legal basis of EU asylum legislation
With the Treaty of Amsterdam which was concluded in 1997, asylum and
immigration was moved from the third pillar to the first pillar of the European
Union. The relevant provisions with regard to this area were laid down in
Title IV of Part Three of the former EC-Treaty (Articles 61-69). Article 63 of
the former EC-Treaty required the Council to adopt within a period of five
years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam4:
3 See further section 2.3.3
4 Measures to be adopted pursuant to points 2(b), 3(a) and 4 of Art 63 were not subject to
this five-year period. According to Art 67 of the former EC-Treaty during the initial period
of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, these measures had
to be adopted according to the consultation procedure. After this period measures based
on Art 63 EC-Treaty had to be adopted according to the co-decision procedure.
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· measures on asylum
· measures on refugees and displaced persons
· measures on immigration policy
· measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third
countries who are legally resident in a Member State may reside in other
Member States
The Procedures Directive together with the Qualification Directive is based
on Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the legal basis for EU
policies on border checks, asylum and immigration is laid down in Chapter 2
of Title V TfEU (Articles 77-80). Article 78 TfEU states that the Union shall
develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary
protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement. Like Article 63 of the former EC-Treaty, this
provision states that EU asylum policy must be in accordance with the Refugee
Convention and other relevant treaties.
2.1.2 Policy framework: the Common European Asylum System
The Procedures Directive, together with the Qualification Directive, Dublin
Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive (RCD)5 and arguably the
Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)6 are part of the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS).7 It was decided to work towards establishing CEAS
during a special meeting held on 15 and 16 October 1999 in Tampere. CEAS
was to be established as part of the European Council’s objective to develop
the European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice.8 It was agreed
that this system should include a clear and workable determination of the State
responsible for the examination of an asylum application, common standards
for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum conditions of
reception of asylum applicants, and the approximation of rules on the recogni-
5 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the
reception of asylum seekers [2003] OJ L 31/18 (Reception Conditions Directive or RCD),
based on Art 63 (1)(b) EC Treaty.
6 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting
a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the
consequences thereof [2001] OJ L 212/12 (Temporary Protection Directive or TPD), based
on Art 63 (2)(a) EC Treaty. Recital 1 Preamble TPD refers to a ‘common policy on asylum,
including common European arrangements for asylum’.
7 See the second recitals of the preambles to the PD, the QD, the RCD and the Dublin
Regulation, which refer to CEAS.
8 See the first recitals of the preambles to the PD, QD and the Dublin Regulation.
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tion and content of the refugee status. These measures had to be completed
with measures on subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate status
to any person in need of such protection. It was agreed that in the longer term,
EU rules should lead to a common asylum procedure and a uniform status
for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the Union.9 This aim was
reaffirmed in the ‘The Hague Programme’ of 200410 and ‘The Stockholm
Programme of 2009.11
In 2009 and 2011 the European Commission (henceforth: the Commission)
issued proposals for a recast of the Procedures Directive. At the time of con-
clusion of this study the amended proposal for the recast was still being
discussed.12 This also applies to the recast proposals for the Reception Condi-
tions Directive13 and the Dublin Regulation14 were introduced in 2008, 2009
and 2011.15 A recast of the Qualification Directive was adopted in 2011.16
Objectives
The main objective of the measures constituting CEAS was simply to lay down
minimum standards regarding the subject matter they address.17 The pre-
ambles of all the measures of CEAS furthermore mention that they aim to
preclude secondary movements of third country nationals.18 Differences in
protection or reception standards between Member States may encourage
9 See also recital 3 Preamble PD.
10 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security
and Justice in the European Union [2005], OJ C 53/1.
11 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe
serving and protecting the citizen [2010] OJ C 115/1, para 6.2.1.
12 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international
protection (Recast), COM (2009) 554 and Amended proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member States
for granting and withdrawing international protection status (Recast) COM(2011) 319 final.
13 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast), COM(2008) 815.
14 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (Recast), COM(2008) 815.
15 See further section 11.5.
16 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ
L 337/9.
17 Recital 5 Preamble and Art 1 PD.
18 See Preambles recital 6 PD, recital 7 QD, recital 8 RCD and recital 9 TPD. Battjes remarks
that the preamble to the Dublin Regulation refers to the Dublin Convention, which aimed
to preclude secondary movements in recital 5. Battjes 2006, p 200.
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persons to move from one Member State to another. Therefore harmonisation
of those standards is deemed necessary.
Another main objective of CEAS is to ensure respect for the fundamental
rights of third country nationals.19 In the Presidency conclusions of the
Tampere summit the European Council reaffirmed the importance the Union
and Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to seek asylum.20
The conclusions moreover state that CEAS should be based on the full and
inclusive application of the Refugee Convention, thus ensuring that nobody
is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.21
This is reflected in Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article 78 TfEU
and the preambles of the measures adopted under CEAS, which refer to the
fact that CEAS is based on respect for the Refugee Convention.22 Finally the
preambles of all these measures except the Temporary Protection Directive
state that they respect fundamental rights and observe the principles recognised
in particular by the Charter.23
Applicability to third country nationals only
The EU measures adopted under CEAS are only applicable to asylum applica-
tions lodged by third country nationals.24 Asylum applications submitted
by EU nationals thus fall outside the scope of CEAS.
Character of the norms
The level of harmonisation achieved by the directives adopted under CEAS
is rather limited, because the standards laid down in those directives are
minimum standards.25 This means that the Member States are allowed to
introduce or maintain more favourable standards, in so far as these standards
are compatible with the directive.26 Section 2.4.1 examines whether and if
so in which circumstances these minimum standards are capable of infringing
EU fundamental rights. Article 78 TfEU requires the European Parliament and
the Council, to adopt measures for a Common European Asylum System which
no longer contain minimum standards, but instead comprise among others
a uniform status of asylum and subsidiary protection for third country
nationals and common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uni-
form asylum or subsidiary protection status.
19 See also Battjes 2006, p 201.
20 See also recital 10 Preamble QD and recital 5 Preamble RCD.
21 Tampere European Council (15 and 16 October 1999) Presidency Conclusions, para 13.
22 See Preambles recital 2 PD, recital 2 QD, recital 2 RCD, recital 10 TPD.
23 See Preambles recital 8 PD, recital 10 QD, recital 5 RCD, recital 15 DR.
24 Artt 1 and 2 (c) Directive 2001/55/EC, Art 3 (1) RCD, Art 1 Dublin Regulation, Art 1 QD,
Art 2 (b) and (c) PD.
25 See Art 63 (1) and (2)(a) of the former EC-Treaty.
26 Art 5 PD, Art 3 QD, Art 4 RCD, Art 5 TPD.
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Relation between the measures adopted under CEAS
The fact that the measures adopted under CEAS are constituents of a system
implies that their provisions must be read in conjunction.27 In these measures
common definitions are used. An important example is the term ‘application
for asylum’, which can be found in the Procedures Directive, Dublin Regulation
and the Reception Conditions Directive.28 Furthermore several cross-references
can be found in the measures of CEAS. The Procedures Directive refers several
times to provisions of the Qualification Directive. Article 10 (1) (a) PD for
example, which includes the duty to inform the asylum applicant of his obliga-
tions refers to Article 4 QD. Article 4 QD imposes a duty upon the asylum
applicant to submit all elements needed to substantiate the application for
international protection.
Relation with other measures adopted on the basis of Article 63 of the former EC-Treaty
The measures adopted under the Common Asylum System are not only linked
to each other, but also to other measures adopted on the basis of Article 63
EC-Treaty. These include EU measures constituting the EU removal and repatri-
ation policy,29 such as the Return Directive (RD) adopted in 2008.30 Other
measures which have been adopted on the basis of Article 63 EC-Treaty, which
are also relevant for asylum applicants are amongst others the directives
regarding family reunification31 and human trafficking.32
2.2 THE PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE
The Procedures Directive introduces a minimum framework in the EU on
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status. According to the
Tampere conclusions these procedures need to be fair and efficient.33 The
27 Battjes 2006, p 211.
28 Battjes 2006, pp 206-207.
29 The ‘The Hague Programme’ of 2004 called for the establishment of an effective removal
and repatriation policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a humane
manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity. Brussels European Council,
Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, para 1.6.4, 14292/1/04 REV 1.
30 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying
third-country nationals [2008] OJ L 348/98. An example is Art 13 (4) RD which refers to
Art 15 PD.
31 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification
[2003] OJ L 251/12, based on Art 63 (3) (a) EC-Treaty.
32 Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are
victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate
illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities [2004] OJ L 261/19, based
on Art 63 (3) EC-Treaty.
33 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999 (SN 200/99),
para 14.
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legal basis for the directive was Article 63 (1)(d) of the former EC-Treaty. The
directive was adopted by the Council on 13 December 2005 as the last asylum
measure of the legislative programme.
The directive was the result of lengthy and difficult negotiations.34 Those
with regard to the first proposal for the directive came to a standstill and the
proposal was withdrawn. The Commission issued a new proposal in June 2002.
The process progressed slowly, as Member States wanted to adhere to the
special characteristics of their asylum procedures. Article 39 on appeal pro-
cedures and suspensive effect for example, was extensively discussed, because
the national procedures greatly differed on this point. Furthermore in several
countries national asylum policy was revised and the relation of these changes
to the proposal of the directive had to be analysed.
On 29 April 2004 a political agreement on the Directive was reached.35
After the political agreement the negotiations on the minimum common list
of safe countries of origin were continued. The directive was published on
15 December 2005 and had to be transposed in the Member States before 1
December 2007.36 Article 15 on the right to legal aid and representation had
to be transposed by 1 December 2008.
The proposal for the directive was subjected to heavy criticism. The Euro-
pean Parliament had proposed a list of 102 amendments to the directive.37
None of these amendments was taken into account by the Council.38 The
amendments regarded amongst others a right to remain in the Member State
during the appeals procedure, the right to free legal aid, detention and a duty
for the Member States to give notice of the decision on the asylum application
within a time-limit of 6 months.
Also UNHCR and several NGO’s expressed fundamental criticism on the
proposal. Just before political agreement on the proposed directive was
reached, ten NGO’s asked EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs,
Vitorino to withdraw the proposal. The organisations were concerned that
proposals to designate certain countries as ‘safe countries of origin’ or ‘safe
third countries’ and the absence of a guaranteed right for all asylum applicants
to remain in a country of asylum pending an appeal, violated EU Member
States’ international obligations.39
34 According to Michelogiannaki the negotiations ‘were proved to be the most intense, lengthy
and difficult negotiations compared to any other that had taken place in the past, regarding
the asylum agenda’. Michelogiannaki 2008, p 21.
35 See for the negotiation process: Ackers 2005 and Michelogiannaki 2008.
36 Art 43 PD.
37 European Parliament legislative resolution on the amended proposal for a Council directive
on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing
refugee status (14203/2004 – C6-0200/2004 – 2000/0238(CNS)) of 27 September 2005.
38 Michelogiannaki 2008, p 21.
39 Press release 29 April 2004, European Council for Refugees and Exiles, Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch, available at www.ecre.org.
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The European Parliament challenged the legality of several provisions of
the Procedures Directive before the Court of Justice. It asked for the annulment
of Articles 29 (1) and (2) and 36 (3) of the directive, which lay down the
procedures for adopting and amending common minimum lists of safe coun-
tries of origin (Article 29) and European safe countries (Article 36). The Parlia-
ment argued that, according to Article 67 (5) of the EC-Treaty, those lists should
be adopted and amended according to the co-decision procedure of Article
251 of the former EC-Treaty. The challenged provisions only envisaged a
consultative role for the European Parliament in adopting the lists. The Court
of Justice deemed the Parliament’s appeal well-founded and annulled the
challenged provisions in a judgment of 6 May 2008.40
2.2.1 Scope of application
The Procedures Directive applies to applications for asylum made in the
territory of the Member States and to the withdrawal of refugee status.41 This
includes asylum applications made at the border or in transit zones. The
Procedures Directive does not apply in cases of requests for diplomatic or
territorial asylum submitted to representations of Member States.42 It also
does not apply to procedures which are governed by the Dublin Regulation.43
The United Kingdom and Ireland take part in the application of the Procedures
Directive. The directive does not apply to Denmark.44
In principle the directive is only applicable to procedures in which a
person’s right to a refugee status is assessed. This follows from the definition
of the term ‘application for asylum’ laid down in Article 2 (b) PD. This term
means ‘an application by a third country national or stateless person, which
can be understood as a request for international protection from a Member
State under the Geneva Convention’. In practice almost all requests for inter-
national protection need to be assessed according to the minimum standards
of the Procedures Directive for two reasons. First of all asylum applicants are
not expected to mention which form of protection they seek. Any application
for international protection is presumed to be an application for asylum in
the meaning of the Procedures Directive, unless the asylum applicant explicitly
requests another kind of protection (such as subsidiary protection), that can
be applied for separately. Secondly where Member States have one procedure,
in which both a person’s right to a refugee status and to a subsidiary protection
status is assessed, the Member State shall apply the Procedure Directive
40 Case C-133/06, Parliament v Council [2008].
41 Art 3 (1) PD.
42 Art 3 (2) PD.
43 Recital 29 Preamble PD.
44 Recitals 32-34 Preamble PD.
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throughout the procedure.45 In 2010 all Member States but one (Ireland)
employed such a single asylum procedure. Therefore the Procedures Directive
in practice also applies to the assessment of the right to subsidiary protection
status in 26 Member States.46
2.2.2 Overview of the directive’s provisions
The Procedures Directive consists of six chapters. Chapter I contains some
general provisions on the purpose and scope of the directive and definitions.
Chapter II consists of a list of basic principles and guarantees. First of all the
right to access to the asylum procedure is guaranteed.47 Furthermore this
chapter grants some important rights to asylum applicants, such as: the right
to remain in the territory of the Member State pending the examination of
the asylum application,48 the right to be informed of the procedure to be
followed, of rights and obligations and of the result of the decision on the
application,49 the right to interpretation services50 and legal aid and assist-
ance,51 the right to a personal interview52 and the right to contact UNHCR.53
Special guarantees are provided for unaccompanied minors.54 Chapter II also
sets out requirements for the examination of and decisions on asylum applica-
tions.55 It furthermore states which obligations may be imposed on asylum
applicants, such as the obligation to hand over documents in their possession
relevant to the examination of the asylum application.56 Finally this chapter
contains provisions regarding detention,57 (implicit) withdrawal of the asylum
application,58 the role of UNHCR59 and a provision, which seeks to prevent
that actors of persecution are informed of the asylum application of an asylum
applicant.60
45 Art 3 (3) PD.
46 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of Directive 2005/85/EC, 8 September 2010, COM (2010) 465 final, p 3. Art 3 (4) PD states
that Member States may decide to apply this Directive in procedures for deciding on
applications for any kind of international protection.
47 Art 6 PD.
48 Art 7 PD.
49 Art 10 (1) (a) and (d) PD.
50 Art (1) (b) PD.
51 Art 15 and 16 PD.
52 Art 12 PD.
53 Art 10 (1) (c) PD.
54 Art 17 PD.
55 Artt 8 and 9 PD.
56 Art 11 PD.
57 Art 18 PD.
58 Art 19 PD.
59 Art 21 PD.
60 Art 22 PD.
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Chapter III sets out standards for procedures at first instance. Member
States are obliged to process asylum applications in a procedure which is in
accordance with the principles and guarantees laid down in Chapter II.61
Article 24 however mentions three kinds of situations in which Member States
may derogate from those principles and guarantees: subsequent asylum appli-
cations, applications submitted at the border and cases in which the asylum
applicant seeks to enter or has entered the territory illegally from a European
safe third country. Special standards for the examination of subsequent applica-
tions and applications submitted at the border are laid down in sections IV
and V. Chapter III furthermore covers the prioritisation and acceleration of
the examination procedure. It also sets out the conditions on which applications
may be declared inadmissible62 or unfounded.63 Chapter III finally contains
minimum standards as regards four concepts of safe countries: first country
of asylum, safe third country, safe country of origin and European safe third
country.64
Chapter IV contains rules regarding the withdrawal of refugee status.
Chapter V consists of one provision, Article 39, which grants asylum applicants
the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a negative
decision on his asylum application. Article 39 PD leaves discretion to the
Member States as to the question whether this remedy should have suspensive
effect. Finally Chapter VI contains some general and final provisions.
2.2.3 Low level of harmonisation and wide discretion
The minimum standards included in the directive allow the Member States
wide discretion. First of all, as was mentioned in the previous section, the
directive provides for a possibility to employ specific procedures may derogate
from the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the directive. Second-
ly the basic principles and guarantees themselves contain many options for
derogation. Examples are Article 12 which allows for exceptions to the right
to a personal interview and Article 15, which provides for several possibilities
to limit the right to free legal aid in the event of a negative decision on the
asylum application. Finally the derogation provisions included in the directive
contain many vague terms, which need to be interpreted by the Member States.
Article 12 (3) PD states for example that a personal interview may be omitted
amongst others where it is not reasonably practicable, in particular where the
61 Art 23 PD.
62 Art 25 PD.
63 Art 28 PD.
64 Artt 26, 27, 29-31 and 36 PD. The application of asylum applicants who came from a first
country of asylum, a safe third country or a European safe third country does not need
to be examined on the merits. See Artt 25 (2) and 36 (1) PD.
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competent authority is of the opinion that the applicant is unfit or unable to
be interviewed owing to enduring circumstances beyond his/her control.
The fact that the directive leaves wide discretion for the Member States
may have consequences for the application of EU fundamental rights. As was
set out in section 1.2.1 these EU fundamental rights and general principles of
EU law only apply to issues falling within the scope of EU law. The question
whether Member States are acting within the scope of EU law when they are
making use of the possibilities for derogation offered by the directive will be
addressed in section 2.4.2.
2.3 THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
The Qualification Directive was based on Article 63 (1) (c) of the former EC
Treaty. The directive has been described as the heart of CEAS, because of its
subject matter.65 It lays down the criteria for the qualification for two statuses:
the refugee status and the subsidiary protection status. Furthermore the direct-
ive sets out which rights should be granted to persons eligible for these
statuses. The Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and the
right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their accompanying family
members.66
The Qualification Directive was adopted by the Council on 27 April 2004
and published on 30 September 2004. It was the result of ‘intense and pro-
tracted negotiations’.67 The level of protection offered by the directive has
been criticised68 and it has been argued that some of the provisions of the
directive infringe the international obligations of the Member States.69 The
provisions of the directive had to be implemented in the Member States by
10 October 2006.
65 Battjes 2006, p 197.
66 See recital 10 Preamble QD.
67 Controversial issues were the inclusion of non-state agents of persecution, the definition
of subsidiary protection and the exclusion clauses.Peers & Rogers 2006, p 323. See for more
information on the background and legislative history of the directive Peers & Rogers 2006,
pp 326-333.
68 McAdam 2007, p 9.
69 See Peers pp 334-340 and Battjes 2006, p 275. Battjes argues that Art 7 (2) suggests an overly
wide scope of agents of protection, Art 8 (3) proposes an overly wide application of the
internal flight alternative and Art 9 (3) states overly restrictive rules on the causal nexus
with the Convention grounds for well-founded fear of persecution.
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2.3.1 Scope of application
The Qualification Directive is silent on its territorial scope of application. Battjes
argues that it is hardly likely that the Community legislator intended to
harmonise the criteria for dealing with asylum applications lodged outside
the territory of the Member States of the European Union.70 The Qualification
Directive does not apply to Denmark. Ireland and the United Kingdom do
take part in the directive.71
2.3.2 Overview of the directive’s provisions
The directive consists of nine chapters. The first chapter contains provisions
regarding the subject and scope of the directive, definitions, and more favour-
able standards. The second chapter regards the assessment of applications for
international protection. This chapter applies to the examination of both the
right to a refugee status and to subsidiary protection. Of specific relevance
for the purpose of the study is Article 4 on the assessment of facts and circum-
stances in applications for international protection. It contains important rules
of evidence, amongst others concerning the burden of proof, evidentiary
assessment and the granting of the benefit of the doubt.72
Chapter III lays down the criteria for the qualification for being a refugee,
while Chapter V sets out the criteria for subsidiary protection. It is of crucial
importance that Articles 13 and 18 QD provide that a person who qualifies
as a refugee or is eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with the
directive, should be granted a refugee status or a subsidiary protection status.
Arguably these provisions reflect the EU fundamental right to asylum laid
down in Article 18 of the Charter. Usually persons applying for asylum in
the EU Member States will claim the EU right to an asylum status. According
to the EU principle of effectiveness hurdles in national asylum procedures
which render the exercise of these rights practically impossible or excessively
difficult are not allowed.
The right to an asylum status is absolute nor permanent. Chapters III and V
contain provisions regarding cessation of and exclusion from international
protection. Chapters IV and VI provide rules for granting and withdrawing
the refugee and the subsidiary protection status.Chapter VII lists the rights
which should be granted to persons eligible for international protection.73
70 Battjes 2006, pp 209-210 and 474. See also Den Heijer 2012, pp 203-204.
71 Recitals 38-40 preamble QD.
72 Art 4 plays a crucial role in Chapter 8 on the standard and burden of proof and evidentiary
assessment.
73 It includes a right to a residence permit and to travel documents and contains rules con-
cerning access to employment, education, social welfare, health care, accommodation and
integration facilities.
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The obligation for Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement,
laid down in Article 21 QD, which arguably reflects Article 19 of the Charter,
is of particular importance for this study. Finally Chapter VIII and VIV contain
rules regarding administrative cooperation and final provisions.
2.4 APPLICABILITY OF EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In this section the following two questions are answered:
1 Is the Court of Justice competent to test the legality of the provisions of
the Procedures Directive against EU fundamental rights and if so, what
could be the result of this legality test (section 2.4.1)?
2 Are Member States bound by EU fundamental rights when making use
of the discretionary powers offered by the Procedures Directive to make
exceptions to rights included in that directive (section 2.4.2)?
2.4.1 Testing the legality of minimum standards
According to Article 263 TfEU the Court of Justice is competent to review the
legality of acts of EU Institutions, including EU legislation, such as directives
and regulations. This provision also mentions the grounds on which such an
act may be deemed illegal: lack of competence, infringement of an essential
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law
relating to their application, or misuse of powers. The Court of Justice also
has the power to test the legality of provisions of EU legislation against EU
fundamental rights and general principles of EU law.74 If the Court of Justice
concludes that an action on grounds of illegality is well-founded, Article 264
TfEU requires it to declare the act concerned to be void.
It should be examined whether the Court of Justice is also competent to
review the legality of minimum standards or provisions affording the Member
States wide discretion to derogate from the rights included in the Procedures
Directive against the EU right to an effective remedy. It may be argued that
the directive enables Member States to retain or adopt national provisions
compatible with respect for fundamental rights and thus cannot infringe EU
fundamental rights. At the same time provisions adopted and applied by
Member States which might be contrary to EU fundamental rights do not
constitute acts of EU Institutions of which the legality can, according to Articles
263 and 267 TfEU, be reviewed by the Court of Justice.75
74 Artt 51 (1) and 52 (5) of the Charter. See also Battjes 2006, p 85.
75 This was argued by the Council with regard to the Court of Justice’s competence to review
the legality of the provisions of the Family Reunification Directive in Case C-540/03,
Parliament v Council [2006], para 16.
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The judgment in Parliament v Council,76 which concerned the Family
Reunification Directive,77 shows that the Court of Justice is indeed competent
to test the legality of the minimum standards or provisions allowing for
derogation. In this procedure, which was brought by the European Parliament,
annulment was sought of provisions which are derogating from the obligations
imposed on the Member States by the Family Reunification Directive. The
Court of Justice decided that it is competent to review the legality of provisions
in the Family Reunification Directive which allow Member States to derogate
from basic rules laid down in that directive:
[T]he fact that the contested provisions of the Directive afford the Member States
a certain margin of appreciation and allow them in certain circumstances to apply
national legislation derogating from the basic rules imposed by the Directive cannot
have the effect of excluding those provisions from review by the Court of their
legality as envisaged by Article 230 EC.78
It should be observed that in Parliament v Council the Court of Justice took
into account that the provisions concerned derogated from a basic rule.79 The
Court of Justice did not give a definition of the term ‘basic rule’. Arguably
the provisions in the Procedures Directive which reflect the right to access
to asylum procedures and the right to an effective remedy, such as the pro-
cedural standards laid down in Chapter II of the directive, should be con-
sidered basic rules.80 The right to effective access to asylum procedures81 and
the right to an effective remedy82 lie at the basis of the Procedures Directive.
The observance of these rights is necessary in the interest of a correct recogni-
tion of those persons in need of protection as refugees within the meaning
76 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006].
77 Directive 2003/86/EC.
78 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 22. Art 230 of the former EC-Treaty is now
replaced by Art 263 TfEU.
79 In this case the provisions concerned derogated from the right of family reunification, which
is the basis of the Family Reunification Directive.
80 Recital 13 Preamble PD mentions amongst others the right to stay pending a decision by
the determining authority, access to the services of an interpreter during an interview, the
opportunity to communicate with a representative of UNHCR, the right to appropriate
notification of a decision, a motivation of that decision in fact and in law, the opportunity
to consult a legal adviser or other counsellor and the right to be informed of his/her legal
position at decisive moments in the course of the procedure, in a language he/she can
reasonably be supposed to understand.
81 Recital 13 Preamble PD.
82 Recital 27 Preamble PD states: ‘It reflects a basic principle of Community law that the
decisions taken on an application for asylum and on the withdrawal of refugee status are
subject to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234
of the Treaty. The effectiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the examination of the
relevant facts, depends on the administrative and judicial system of each Member State
seen as a whole.’
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of the Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive.83 It is thus conceiv-
able that the Court of Justice is, according to Article 263 TfEU, competent to
review the legality of the provisions in the Procedures Directive that derogate
from the standards reflecting the right to access to asylum procedures and
the right to an effective remedy.
Like the Procedures Directive the Family Reunification Directive allows
Member States to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions than those
laid down in the directive.84 In Parliament v Council the Court of Justice tested
some of these provisions against EU fundamental Rights. It should therefore
be derived from this judgment that the Court of Justice is also competent to
test the legality of the minimum standards included in the Procedures Direct-
ive.
Potential results of the legality test
The next question, which should be answered is whether minimum standards
or provisions allowing for derogation can be at odds with EU fundamental
rights. It may be argued that such standards or provisions are not capable
of infringing fundamental rights. Minimum standards allow Member States
to maintain or introduce more favourable standards, insofar as those standards
are compatible with the Directive.85 Member States may make use of this
possibility where the minimum standard offers a level of protection which
is lower than the level required by EU fundamental rights, in order to avoid
acting in violation with EU fundamental rights. In the same vein, Member States
are free not to make use of provisions allowing for derogation in order to
prevent that a violation EU fundamental rights occurs.
The Court of Justice in Parliament v Council indicated that it is not excluded
that minimum standards or provisions allowing for derogation infringe funda-
mental rights and should thus be considered invalid. It considered that a
provision of an EU act could in itself fall short of respecting fundamental rights
‘if it required, or expressly or impliedly authorised’ the Member States to adopt
or retain national legislation not respecting those rights.86
The minimum standards of the Procedures Directive do not require Member
States to violate fundamental rights.87 However it may be argued that mini-
mum standards which offer less protection than the standards required by
EU fundamental rights ‘expressly or impliedly authorise’ Member States to
act in violation with those fundamental rights. The same applies to provisions
that allow for derogation by the Member States of basic rights of a directive.
83 Recital 13 Preamble PD.
84 Art 3 (5) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC.
85 See Art 5 PD.
86 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 23.
87 See Battjes 2006, p 556. He concludes that for that reason minimum standards cannot be
at variance with international law.
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A reading of the minimum standards and provisions allowing for deroga-
tion, which authorises the Member States to disrespect fundamental rights
would however be in contradiction with one of the main objectives of CEAS:
ensuring the fundamental rights of third country nationals.88 This objective
is also reflected in the TfEU and the preamble and provisions of the Procedures
Directive.89 The references to international human rights treaties and the
fundamental rights laid down in the Charter show that the EU legislator did
not envisage to authorise the Member States to disrespect fundamental
rights.90
It is therefore submitted here that it is likely that the Court of Justice will
interpret minimum standards and provisions allowing for derogation in the
light of fundamental rights, thus avoiding violations of those rights. This is
what the Court of Justice actually did in Parliament v Council. The acts of the
Member States may subsequently be tested against this interpretation of EU
legislation. However if no interpretation in conformity with EU fundamental
rights is possible the Court of Justice should declare a provision void.91
2.4.2 Interpreting and filling in gaps in EU asylum legislation
In this section it is argued that Member States are bound by EU fundamental
rights when making use of the discretionary power offered by in particular
the Procedures Directive to make exceptions to rights included in that Direct-
ive.92 National legislation which is based on such discretionary power falls
within the scope of EU law and can therefore be tested against EU law by
national courts and the Court of Justice. This follows from the Parliament v
Council judgment mentioned above.93 In this judgment the Court of Justice
made clear that Member States are not allowed to infringe general principles
of EU law by making use of the possibility to derogate from the right to family
reunification. This also applies if the derogation provision contains terms which
88 See also Battjes 2006, p 201.
89 See recital 2 Preamble PD.
90 The Court of Justice in Parliament v Council also took into account the objectives of the
Family Reunification Directive in its ruling that its provisions did not infringe EU funda-
mental rights. These objectives are to promote family life and to ensure that the best interests
of the child are taken into account. Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], see e.g. paras
73 and 87.
91 See also Butler & de Schutter 2007, p, 295, where they state that ‘Community legislation
will be valid as long as it can be interpreted in conformity with the general principles’.
92 See section 2.2.3.
93 See also Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others [2011], para 69, where
the Court of Justice held that a Member State is implementing EU law and is therefore
bound by the Charter when it makes use of the discretionary power granted by Art 3 (2)
of the Dublin Regulation to examine an asylum application, which is not its responsibility
according to the criteria laid down in the regulation.
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are not defined. The Court’s considerations concerning Article 4 of the Family
Reunification Directive are most important in this regard. This provision allows
Member States to derogate under certain conditions94 from the parents’ right
to family reunification with their child, if this child does not meet a condition
for integration provided for by national legislation. The Court of Justice con-
sidered:
The fact that the concept of integration is not defined cannot be interpreted as
authorising the Member States to employ that concept in a manner contrary to
general principles of Community law, in particular to fundamental rights. The
Member States which wish to make use of the derogation cannot employ an
unspecified concept of integration, but must apply the condition for integration
provided for by their legislation […] in order to examine the specific situation of
a child over 12 years of age arriving independently from the rest of his or her
family. Consequently, the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Directive cannot
be interpreted as authorising the Member States, expressly or impliedly, to adopt
implementing provisions that would be contrary to the right to respect for family
life.95
The Member States are thus bound by general principles of EU law and in
particular to EU fundamental rights when making use of a derogation provision
and also when interpreting an undefined term included in the derogation
provision.96 This implies that the Member States’ discretion when making
use of the possibilities for derogation offered by the Procedures Directive is
limited by EU fundamental rights, such as the right to an effective remedy.97
Therefore it is very likely that national measures that fall within the scope
of a derogation provision provided by the Procedures Directive can be tested
against this right.
2.5 THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE
This section examines how questions regarding the legality and interpretation
of the provisions of the Procedures Directive may be brought before and
assessed by the national courts and the Court of Justice.
94 If the child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his family.
95 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 70.
96 The Court seems to attach more significance to fundamental rights (in this case the right
to family life) in this regard than to general principles of EU law which are not recognised
as fundamental rights by the Court.
97 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v Heylens and others [1987], see also Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou
[1991].
48 Chapter 2
2.5.1 Legality review of EU legislation
Actions on grounds of the illegality of EU legislation may be brought before
the Court of Justice by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council
or the Commission. Such action must be instituted within two months of the
publication of the measure.98 As was already mentioned in section 2.2, the
European Parliament successfully challenged the legality of several provisions
of the Procedures Directive.99
Natural or legal persons cannot challenge the legality of the Procedures
Directive directly before the Court of Justice. According to Article 263 TfEU
any natural or legal person may only institute proceedings against an act
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them,
and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not
entail implementing measures. The Court of Justice ruled in the UPA judgment
that the principle of effective judicial protection cannot have the effect of setting
aside the condition of ‘direct and individual concern’ expressly laid down in
the Treaty, without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on
the EU Courts.100
An individual should plead the illegality of the Procedures Directive before
the national courts, for example in the appeal against a negative asylum
decision.101 He may contest the legality of the provisions of EU legislation
on which the decision is based, for instance on the ground that an EU funda-
mental right has been violated. The following example illustrates how such
a situation may occur. The asylum applicant’s asylum request is rejected on
the basis of information, which is not disclosed to him or the court assessing
the appeal against this rejection for national security reasons. Such practice
is allowed by Article 16 (1) PD. The applicant argues before the national court
that Article 16 (1) PD should be considered invalid, at least as far as it permits
the determining authorities102 to withhold information underlying the asylum
decision to the national court, because it infringes the EU right to an effective
remedy.103
National courts may consider the legality of a provision of EU legislation
and reject the grounds put forward before them by the parties in support of
98 Art 263 TfEU.
99 Case C-133/06, Parliament v Council [2008].
100 Case C-50/00, Union de Pequeños [2002], para 44.
101 Art 277 TfEU states that notwithstanding the expiry of the period laid down in Art 263
TfEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by
an EU institution, body, office or agency is at issue, plead the grounds specified in Art
263 TfEU, in order to invoke before the Court of Justice the inapplicability of that act.
102 In this study ‘determining authority’ means: the quasi-judicial or administrative body in
a Member State responsible for examining applications for asylum and competent to take
decisions at first instance in such cases. This definition can be found in Article 2 (e) PD.
103 See on this issue Chapter 10 on the use of secret information in asylum cases.
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illegality, concluding that the measure is completely valid, if they consider
those grounds unfounded. However, national courts do not have jurisdiction
to declare a provision of EU law invalid. The reasons for this are set out by
the Court of Justice in Foto Frost.104 First of all this rule seeks to ensure the
unity of EU law and the principle of legal certainty. If national courts were
competent to declare an EU act invalid, this could lead to divergences between
those courts as to the legality of such acts. Such divergences would be liable
to place in jeopardy the very unity of the EU legal order and detract from the
fundamental requirement of legal certainty. Moreover Article 264 TfEU gives
the Court of Justice exclusive competence to declare void an act of an EU
Institution. The coherence of the system therefore requires that the power to
declare such an act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of Justice.
Furthermore the Court of Justice is in the best position to decide on the legality
of EU legislation, because the EU Institutions are entitled to participate in
proceedings before the Court in order to defend the legality of the acts in
question.105 This implies that the individual concerned needs to ask the
national court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on the legality to
the Court of Justice.106 According to Article 267 TfEU the Court of Justice has
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings regarding the legality of acts of EU
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.
2.5.2 Interpretation of EU law
Lower national courts as well as the highest national court may interpret the
provisions of the Procedures Directive when deciding on (higher) appeals
against asylum decisions. They may use EU fundamental rights to find such
an interpretation. The national courts decide whether national (implementing)
legislation breaches an EU fundamental right. The courts will, if they deem
it necessary, be guided, by the Court of Justice under the preliminary ruling
proceedings.107 In Samba Diouf the Court of Justice for the first time inter-
preted the Procedures Directive in the light of the EU right to an effective
remedy. It decided that the absence of a remedy against the decision to process
an asylum claim in an accelerated procedure does not constitute an infringe-
ment of the right to an effective remedy. However the Court of Justice held
that it must be possible to subject the reasons which led the competent author-
104 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987], paras 17-20.
105 Ward writes that doubt remains on the practical utility of challenging the legality of EC
measures. ‘While the Court of Justice has developed an impressive range of substantive
rules against which the legality of EC measures can be tested, they rarely result in a
declaration of invalidity in cases arising from Article 234 reference from national courts’.
Ward 2007, p 12.
106 Tridimas 2006, pp 31 and 35.
107 Tridimas 2006, p 38.
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ity to reject the application for asylum as unfounded to a thorough review
by the national court. The national court had to decide whether national pro-
cedural rules complied with this condition.108
The competence of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on
questions regarding the interpretation of the Treaty or EU legislation is laid
down in Article 267 TfEU. This competence includes answering questions
regarding the conformity with EU law of Member States’ acts which fall within
the scope of EU law. Such questions may arise for example if an individual
argues that EU fundamental rights require a certain interpretation of a provision
of EU legislation and that a national act violates this (interpretation of that)
legislation. He could state for example that Article 39 PD read in the light of
the EU right to an effective remedy a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.
A national remedy without such suspensive effect would then violate EU
law.109
2.5.3 The important role of the national courts as EU courts
Until the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 68 of the former
EC Treaty denied lower courts the opportunity to make references for prelimin-
ary rulings with regard to the measures adopted under Title IV of the former
EC Treaty such as the Procedures Directive and Qualification Directive.110
Potentially as a result of this limited role no questions regarding the legality
and few regarding the interpretation of EU measures adopted under Title IV
had been referred to the Court of Justice until 1 December 2010. The Court
of Justice’s role in assessing the legality of and interpreting measures adopted
under Title IV of the former EC-Treaty was therefore limited.
The Treaty of Lisbon repealed Article 68.111 As a result the rules laid
down in Article 267 TfEU on preliminary rulings also apply to asylum measures.
However, also in the post-Lisbon situation it is the national courts which play
in practice the most important role in interpreting the Procedures Directive
and testing its legality. Only in very few of the total number of asylum cases
pending before the national courts of the Member States a reference for pre-
liminary ruling will be made to the Court of Justice.112
108 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011]. See further Chapter 9.
109 See further section 6.3.
110 This provision presumably aimed to prevent overburdening of the Court of Justice. See
Battjes 2006, p 572.
111 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, 2007/C 306/01, 17 December 2007, Art 2 sub 67.
112 The Court of Justice has recognised the importance of the role of the national courts as
‘guardians’of the EU legal order and ‘ordinary’ courts in the EU legal order in its opinion
1/09 of 8 March 2011. See Baratta 2011.
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According to the general rule any national court or tribunal of a Member
State may request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling regarding
questions on the legality of an act of an EU institution, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. Where
any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal is required to bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.113 However it is up to the national court to decide whether
it is necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling.
National courts may be hesitant to refer questions, for example because it
involves a lot of work or because it takes the Court of Justice a long time to
answer the questions, which may lead to considerable delay of many asylum
cases in which the same question is at issue. Individuals thus always depend
on the willingness of national courts to refer a question to the Court of Justice.
If the national court refuses to refer a question, the individual does not have
a remedy against that decision.114
It should be concluded that it depends to a large extent on the national
courts whether the procedural issues addressed in this study will ever be put
before the Court of Justice. The national courts have an important responsibility
in guaranteeing the EU right to effective judicial protection and related pro-
cedural rights in asylum cases.115
113 Art 267 TfEU.
114 See also De Witte 2009, p 877.
115 See also section 11.4.

3 International treaties as sources of
inspiration for EU fundamental rights
International treaties containing human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
particular the ECHR are an important source of inspiration for EU fundamental
rights.1 Therefore in this study’s effort to define the meaning of the EU right
to an effective remedy, such treaties and the views of their supervising bodies
will play a crucial role. In this chapter a few important questions will be
addressed regarding the (potential) use of these treaties by the Court of Justice
in the context of CEAS. Furthermore the consequences of this (potential) use
for the way in which this study is conducted will be discussed.
The level of protection offered by EU fundamental rights
The first question which should be answered is whether the fact that inter-
national treaties are not directly applied by the EU Courts, but are only used
as sources of inspiration may result in EU fundamental rights offering a lower
level of protection than those treaties. It is concluded in section 3.1 that this
is generally not the case. It is possible though, that EU fundamental rights
require broader protection than that offered by international treaties. The
standards following from international treaties thus indicate the minimum
level of protection which should be guaranteed by EU fundamental rights.
The role and significance of international treaties in the context of CEAS
This study takes into account the ECHR, the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR,
the CAT and the CRC and the views of their supervising bodies. Section 3.2
will show that these international treaties have been or should be recognised
as a source of inspiration in general and in particular in the context of CEAS.
It follows from Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article 78 (1) TfEU
that EU asylum legislation must be ‘in accordance’ with these treaties. Section
3.2.7 addresses the question whether this requirement entails that international
treaties be directly applied by the Court of Justice and not only used as sources
of inspiration.
The relative weight of international treaties
Finally section 3.3 examines the relative weight which should be attached to
the treaties taken into account in this study. It is argued that in practice the
1 Art 6 (3) TEU, Artt 52 and 53 of the Charter.
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importance of a treaty for the development of EU fundamental rights seems
to relate foremost to the authority of the judgments or views of its sources
of interpretation. It will be shown that the Court of Justice attaches great
weight to the (binding) judgments issued by the ECtHR. The Court of Justice
is a lot more hesitant to base its interpretation of EU fundamental rights on
the non-binding views of other monitoring bodies. For this reasons in this
study most weight will be accorded to the ECtHR’s case-law, while the non-
binding views of other monitoring bodies will only play a complementary
role.
3.1 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES VERSUS EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
An important question, which will be addressed in this section, is whether
EU fundamental rights may offer a lower level or a higher level of protection
than human rights recognised in international treaties.
3.1.1 May EU fundamental rights provide a lower level of protection?
Both the Charter and the case-law by the EU Courts (which will be discussed
in more detail in section 3.3), show that in principle EU fundamental rights
do not provide less protection than international treaties. Article 52 (3) of the
Charter provides that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond
to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, ‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall
be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.’2 According to the
explanations with Article 52 (3) of the Charter this provision is intended to
ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR and its
Protocols.3 The meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined
not only by the text of the ECHR, but also by the case-law of the ECtHR and
by the Court of Justice. The explanations state that ‘in any event, the level of
protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed
by the ECHR’.4
2 The explanations contain a list of rights which may, without precluding developments in
the law, legislation and the Treaties, be regarded as corresponding to rights in the ECHR.
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/33-34.
3 See also the Joint communication from the Presidents of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice,
Costa and Skouris of January 2011, in which they state with regard to the relationship
between the ECHR and the Charter that ‘it is important to ensure that there is the greatest
coherence between the Convention and the Charter insofar as the Charter contains rights
which corresponding to those guaranteed by the Convention.’ In their view a ‘parallel
interpretation’ of the two instruments could prove useful.
4 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/33.
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Article 53 of the Charter provides more generally that nothing in the
Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of applica-
tion, by international law and by international agreements to which the Union
or all the Member States are party, including the ECHR. According to the
explanations with the Charter this provision is intended to maintain the level
of protection currently afforded within their respective scope by (amongst
others) international law.5
Level of protection offered according to the Court of Justice’s case-law
Some authors argue that general principles of EU law as applied by the EU
Courts by their very nature allow for balancing human rights with competing
principles in cases where the underlying provisions of international law do
not.6 However most scholars seem to be of the opinion that the indirect appli-
cation of international treaties does not result in less protection than their direct
application. Groussot states that ‘once the ECHR has been “filtered’ by the ECJ
through the general principles, the end result is much the same as if the
Community was formally bound by the ECHR’.7 Battjes notes that it is ques-
tionable that one can conclude on the basis of the mere phrasing of the Court
that the application of human rights law via general principles offers less
protection. He refers to the judgments in Steffensen and Akrich where the Court
seems to consider that human rights treaties must be complied with within
the EU legal order.8 In Steffensen the Court states:
According to the Court’s case-law, where national legislation falls within the field
of application of Community law, the Court, in a reference for a preliminary ruling,
must give the national court all the guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable
it to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights – as
laid down, in particular, in the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – whose observance the Court ensures.9
In Akrich the Court observed that the right to respect for family life as
enshrined in Article 8 ECHR ‘is among the fundamental rights which, according
to the Court’s settled case-law, restated by the preamble to the Single European
Act and by Article 6(2) EU, are protected in the Community legal order.’10
Section 3.3.1 will show that, also when actually interpreting EU fundamental
5 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/35.
6 Battjes 2006, p 92.
7 Groussot 2006, p 71.
8 Battjes 2006, p 92.
9 Case C-276/01, Steffensen [2003], para 70. See also Case C-260/89, ERT [1991], para 42,
10 Case C-109/01, Akrich [2003]. See also Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002], para 41 and Case
C-482/01, Orfanopoulos [2004], para 98.
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rights and principles, the Court of Justice complies with the standards follow-
ing from the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law.
3.1.2 May EU fundamental rights provide broader protection?
EU fundamental rights cannot offer less protection than international law, but
they may offer broader protection.11 An EU fundamental right has an auto-
nomous character and comprises more than just a sum of the rights included
in the ECHR which inspired it.12 This may be derived from Article 52 (3) of
the Charter, which states that this provision shall not prevent Union law
providing more extensive protection than the ECHR.13 In the Court of Justice’s
case-law several examples of such a broader interpretation of a fundamental
right can be found.14
3.2 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty requires the asylum measures based on
that provision, such as the Procedures Directive, to be ‘in accordance with
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967
relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties’. Article 78 TfEU
also states that the common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and
temporary protection must be in accordance with those treaties. This section
will explain that besides the Refugee Convention, to which mentioned provi-
sions explicitly refer, also the ECHR, the ICCPR, the CAT the CRC should be
considered ‘relevant treaties’ in the context of CEAS. Furthermore it shows that
all these treaties have been, or should be recognised as sources of inspiration
for the interpretation of EU fundamental rights. Treaties which will not be
addressed in this study but which may nevertheless be considered ‘relevant
treaties’ in the context of CEAS are the International Convention on the Elim-
11 The Court of Justice has held that the nature and scope of EU fundamental rights must
be determined autonomously and may thus differ from fundamental rights recognised
amongst others in the ECHR. See Murray 2008, p 538.
12 See the opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 39. Kunoy
& Mortansson state that in the Chakroun judgment the Court of Justice declined the invitation
to emancipate the Charter from the ECHR. Kunoy & Mortansson 2010, pp 1826 and 1829-
1830.
13 See also A.G. Maduro, opinion in Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 23.
14 Bronckers writes that the Court of Justice reserves for itself the possibility to give its own,
diverging interpretation of the Convention’s fundamental rights as incorporated in general
principles of EC law. Bronckers 2007, p 601. See also Van Cleynenbreugel 2012, p 344. See
further section 3.3.1.
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ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).15
The explicit requirement of ‘accordance with’ international law laid down
in Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article 78 TfEU is rather unique
in EU law.16 It raises the question whether, on the basis of these provisions,
the Court of Justice should apply the Refugee Convention and other relevant
international treaties directly, instead of using them as sources of inspiration.
Section 3.2.7 briefly addresses this question and explains why this study uses
international treaties only as sources of inspiration for the EU right to an
effective remedy and not as a separate category of norms.
3.2.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR contains a set of civil and political rights, which apply to every
person within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties irrespective of
that person’s nationality of legal status.17 According to Article 6(3) TEU, the
Charter18 and the Court of Justice’s case-law, the ECHR has special significance
for the development of EU fundamental rights.19 In the context of the Common
European Asylum System, the ECHR should also be considered a ‘relevant
treaty’ in the meaning of Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article
78 TfEU. This is due to the fact that Article 3 ECHR contains by far the best
developed prohibition on refoulement.20 Article 2, Article 1 of Protocols Nos 6
and 13 and in exceptional cases Article 6 also contain prohibitions of refoule-
ment.21 The grounds for qualification as a person in need of subsidiary pro-
tection laid down in Article 2 (e) in conjunction with 15 QD are (partly) based
on the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 2 and 3 ECHR.22 It will be argued in
15 Both the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women addressed the position of refugees. See
for example CERD General Recommendation No 22 (1996) and CEDAW General Recom-
mendation No 19 (1992).
16 Battjes 2006, p 97.
17 Wouters 2009, p 202.
18 The Charter specifically states that it reaffirms the rights included amongst others in the
ECHR and following from the case-law of the ECtHR. Furthermore Art 52 (3) states that
the meaning and scope of the rights included in the Charter which correspond to a right
guaranteed by the ECHR shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. Other human
rights conventions such as the ICCPR or the CAT are not explicitly mentioned by the
Charter.
19 Case C-222/84, Johnston [1986], see also Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 35.
20 Wouters 2009, p 187.
21 Wouters 2009, p 187. See also Den Heijer 2008.
22 There are several other ECHR provisions which are relevant in the asylum context. See
for example Art 5 ECHR, which provides for rules for the detention of asylum applicants
and Art 4 of Protocol No 4, which prohibits collective expulsion of aliens.
58 Chapter 3
section 4.3.1 that the procedural guarantees following from Articles 3, 6, 13
and 35 ECHR inspire the EU right to an effective remedy in the context of CEAS.
3.2.2 The Refugee Convention
The Refugee Convention provides the most comprehensive codification of the
rights of refugees at the international level’.23 The most important right
granted to a refugee is the right to be protected from refoulement, laid down
in Article 33 of the Convention.
The relevance of the Refugee Convention for CEAS has been explicitly
recognised in Article 63 (1) of the former EC Treaty and Article 78 TfEU.24 Also
the preamble and the texts of the Procedures Directive refer to the Refugee
Convention.25 The Refugee Convention itself does not contain any provisions
which regard refugee determination procedures.26
The Refugee Convention is most relevant for the interpretation of the
criteria for qualification as a refugee laid down in the Qualification Directive,
which are directly based on and are often exactly the same as those laid down
in the Refugee Convention.27 In particular in the last situation the Qualifica-
tion Directive should be considered to have the same meaning as the Refugee
Convention.28
According to the preamble of the Qualification Directive ‘the Geneva
Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the international legal
regime for the protection of refugees’. The Court of Justice has referred to this
recital in several cases in which it was asked to interpret provisions of the
Qualification Directive, which are directly based on the Refugee Convention.
23 See the Introductory note to the Refugee Convention by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), August 2007, www.unhcr.org and the preamble
to the Convention.
24 In the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999,
the European Council reaffirmed ‘the importance the Union and Member States attach to
absolute respect of the right to seek asylum. It has agreed to work towards establishing
a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the
Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining
the principle of non-refoulement.’ According to Battjes the reference to the Refugee Conven-
tion connected the term ‘asylum’ used in Art 63 of the former EC-Treaty closely to refugees
in the sense of the Refugee Convention. Battjes 2006, p 146.
25 Recitals 2, 7, 13 Preamble and Art 2 (a) (b) and (f), Art 3 (3), Art 21 (1) (c), Art 27 (1) (b)
and (d) and Art 36 (2) (a) and (4) PD.
26 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva
1979 (reedited in 1992) (UNHCR Handbook), para 191, refers to the fact that asylum
procedures are not specifically regulated by the Refugee Convention and that, as a result,
asylum procedures in State parties vary considerably. See also Staffans 2010, p 275.
27 See in particular Artt 2 (c), 11, 12 and 14 QD.
28 See A.G. Sharpston in her opinion with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 92.
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It considered that the provisions of the Qualification Directive must be inter-
preted while respecting the Geneva Convention.29
3.2.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a list of civil
and political rights, which apply to all persons irrespective of their nationality
or legal status, including asylum applicants and refugees.30 The Court of
Justice has recognised the ICCPR as a source of inspiration for EU fundamental
rights.31 Furthermore the ICCPR should be considered a relevant treaty in the
sense of Article 63 (1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article 78 TfEU, as it contains
prohibitions of refoulement in Articles 6 (the right to life)32 and 7 (prohibition
of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).33 With
respect to asylum procedures Article 2(3) ICCPR, which obliges the State parties
to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are
violated shall have an effective remedy is most relevant.34
3.2.4 The UN Convention against Torture
The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) seeks to ‘make more effective the struggle
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world.’35 In order to achieve this objective the Convention
contains a set of obligations for the State parties, amongst others to take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.36
The Convention against Torture has not yet been recognised as a source
of inspiration for EU fundamental rights by the Court of Justice. However it
should be expected that the Convention will be recognised as such in the
29 See for example Joined cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla
[2010], paras 52-53 and Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], paras 37-38.
30 See Art 2 (1) ICCPR, HRC General Comment No 31 (2004), CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add.13,
para 10. See also Wouters 2009, p 362.
31 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 37.
32 See for example HRC 20 October 2003, Judge v Canada, no 829/1998.
33 See for example HRC 10 November 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no 1416/2005.
34 See further section 4.3.1.
35 Nowak and McArthur point out that the CAT has following three aims: to establish specific
obligations for States parties to prevent torture and to assist victims of torture, to require
the use of criminal law and jurisdiction to fight impunity of torturers and to provide for
stronger measures of international monitoring of States’ compliance with the absolute
prohibition of torture. Nowak & McArthur 2008, p 595.
36 See also Wouters p 427.
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future, because all EU Member States are a party with this Convention. Article
3 CAT contains an explicit prohibition of refoulement37, which is guaranteed
to all individuals, including stateless persons and illegal aliens.38 Therefore
the CAT should be considered a relevant treaty in the meaning of Article 63
(1) of the former EC-Treaty and Article 78 TfEU. The CAT does not have an
‘effective remedy provision’, which is comparable to Articles 13 ECHR or 2 (3)
(a) ICCPR. However the Committee against Torture has derived a right to an
effective remedy from the absolute prohibition of refoulement laid down in
Article 3.39
3.2.5 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) contains a set of civil,
social, cultural and economic rights, which shall be ensured to each child40
within the State parties’ jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.41
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (also referred to as ComRC) has
identified four general principles of the CRC: the right to non-discrimination,
the primary consideration of the child’s best interests, the right to life and
development and the right to be heard.42
The CRC has been recognised as a source of inspiration for EU fundamental
rights by the Court of Justice.43 Furthermore it should be considered a relevant
treaty for the purposes of Article 78 TfEU and Article 63 of the former EC Treaty
for several reasons. First of all the preambles of the EU directives adopted in
the context of CEAS state that the directive respects the fundamental rights and
observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter. Article 24 of
the Charter requires amongst others that the child’s best interests be a primary
consideration in all actions relating to children. The Procedures Directive
reflects this fundamental right while stating that the best interests of the child
‘shall be a primary consideration’ for Member States when implementing the
provisions of the directive.44 The ‘best interests’ principle included in Article
24 of the Charter and the Procedures Directive is based on Article 3 CRC. Other
provisions of the Procedures Directive clearly affect children’s rights although
37 Art 3 CAT states that ‘no State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture’.
38 Wouters 2009, p 435.
39 ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden, no 233/2003, para 13.6. See further section 4.3.1.
40 According to Art 1 CRC a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
41 Art 2 CRC.
42 ComRC General Comment No 5 (2003), CRC/GC/2003/5, para 12.
43 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 37.
44 Recital 12 Preamble QD and Art 17 (6) PD.
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they are not directly based on one of the rights laid down in the CRC. Article
17 PD states for example that Member States must ensure that a representative
represents and/or assists the unaccompanied minor with respect to the exam-
ination of the asylum application. This representative must be able to inform
the minor about and prepare him for the personal interview. Arguably these
provisions should be interpreted in the light of the relevant provisions of the
CRC. Article 22 CRC specifically addresses the rights of refugee and asylum
seeking children. Moreover, the CRC contains certain provisions which should
be considered relevant for asylum procedures in particular, such as the State
parties’ duty to give due weight to the views of the child in accordance with
the age and maturity of the child (Article 12 CRC).45
3.2.6 Direct application of international treaties?
The Court of Justice normally uses international treaties as sources of inspira-
tion for the interpretation of EU fundamental rights. Arguably this should be
different when ruling in asylum cases. The text of Article 63 (1) of the former
EC-Treaty and Article 78 TfEU suggests that the Court of Justice must apply
relevant international treaties directly, instead of using them as sources of
inspiration.46 This means that the Court of Justice should test the legality of
the Procedures Directive against human rights treaties and interpret its pro-
visions in the light of these treaties. Arguably the Court of Justice may also
test national measures implementing the measures adopted under Article 63
(1) directly against the relevant treaties mentioned in Article 63 (1).47 Direct
application of international treaties by the Court of Justice could also be based
on references to these treaties in secondary EU legislation, such as the text and
preamble of the Procedures Directive, which refer to the Refugee Convention.
The Court of Justice considered in several cases that the Qualification Directive,
which also refers to the Refugee Convention, must ‘be interpreted in the light
of its general scheme and purpose, and in a manner consistent with the 1951
Geneva Convention and the other relevant treaties referred to in point (1) of
the first paragraph of Article 63 EC, now Article 78(1) TfEU.’48 Furthermore
the Court of Justice in Salahadin Abdulla and B. and D. seems to consider the
45 See further Chapter 7 on the asylum applicant’s right to be heard on his asylum motives.
46 See also Battjes 2006 pp 100-101.
47 Battjes 2006 pp 98-99.
48 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para
53 and Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B. and D. [2010], para 78. The Court based
this consideration on Art 63 (1) of the EC-Treaty and recitals 13, 16 and 17 Preamble QD.
See also the opinion of A.G. Sharpston with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 36.
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Refugee Convention and the Charter separate instruments for the interpretation
of the Qualification Directive.49
It should be noted however that it was concluded in section 3.1.1 that EU
fundamental rights guarantee that the treaties mentioned in Article 63 (1) of
the former EC-Treaty and 78 TfEU are fully respected. For this reason it is not
likely that the direct application of those treaties would result in a higher level
of protection than the indirect application of international treaties as sources
of inspiration of EU fundamental rights.50 In this study international treaties
will therefore not be treated as a separate category of norms, but only as
sources of inspiration.
3.3 THE WEIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT
OF JUSTICE
It is relevant to know whether the international treaties taken into account
for the purpose of this study all have the same weight as sources of inspiration.
What should be done if several relevant sources of inspiration or the views
of their supervising bodies contradict each other? May the interpretation of
the EU fundamental rights and general principles be based on the non-binding
view of supervising bodies alone?
Arguably it follows from the specific references to the ECHR and the Refugee
Convention in the Treaties, the Charter and EU legislation that these treaties
have special significance. Nothing can be found in those instruments as to
the relative weight which should be attached to the ICCPR, the CRC or the CAT.
It will be shown in this section that in practice the ECHR is by far the most
important source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights. Much less weight
is attributed to other international treaties. Murray states that the ECHR
has played, and was bound to play, an increasingly central role in the Court’s case
law as a source from which inspiration may be drawn in fundamental rights cases,
in comparison to which other international sources of inspiration referred to, such
as various Council of Europe instruments and those emanating from the United
Nations and the International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) have played bit parts.51
The authority of a treaty’s sources of interpretation
The importance of a treaty for the development of EU fundamental rights seems
to relate foremost to the authority of the judgments or views of its sources
of interpretation. The ECtHR’s judgments are binding and provide clear guid-
49 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B. and D [2010], para 78 and Joined Cases C-175/08,
C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla and others [2010], paras 53-54.
50 See also Battjes 2006, p 104.
51 Murray 2008, p 538.
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ance as to the interpretation of the rights included in the Convention.52 This
makes it a suitable source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights. Section
3.3.1 will give an overview of the use of the ECtHR’s case-law by the Court
of Justice.
It will be pointed out below in sections 3.3.2-3.3.4 that the EU Courts attach
much less weight to non-binding views of other bodies, such as the institutions
of the Council of Europe and the bodies supervising the Refugee Convention,
the ICCPR, the CAT and the CRC. The Refugee Convention does not have a
supervising court or any other legally binding sources for interpretation.53
Guidance for the interpretation of the Refugee Convention is provided by the
UNHCR54 and the Executive Committee of the Programme of the High Com-
missioner (EXCOM). UNHCR has given its view on the application and inter-
pretation of the Refugee Convention, including procedural issues, in the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (UNHCR
Handbook)55 and its guidelines on international protection. The EXCOM has
issued several EXCOM Conclusions regarding requirements for national asylum
procedures. UNHCR’s view56 and EXCOM Conclusions57 are not formally bind-
ing, but they do have authority.
The implementation of the ICCPR, the CAT and the CRC is supervised by
the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and the Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child (ComRC) respectively (in this study also referred
to as the UN Committees).58 The views of the UN Committees, included in
52 According to Art 46 ECHR the judgments of the ECHR are legally binding on the State
party to the case. However, the Court’s judgments are also of significant importance for
other State parties to the Convention. ECtHR (Plen) 18 January 1978, Ireland v the United
Kingdom, no 5310/71, para 154 and ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v Austria, no 40016/98, para
26. See also Gerards 2009, pp 2-3.
53 According to Art 38 of the Refugee Convention the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may
be requested to interpret the Convention. However, as to date no referral to the ICJ has
been made. There is no other body which is competent to provide legally binding decisions
on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Wouters 2009, p 37.
54 See for the supervising role of UNHCR the Preamble and Art 35 of the Refugee Convention
and Art 8 (a) of the Statute of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. See also Türk 2010.
55 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva
1979 (reedited in 1992).
56 Kälin 2003, pp 619 and 625-627, Battjes 2006, p 20. According to Hathaway there is ‘a
traditional practice of giving particular weight to UNHCR’s Handbook’. Hathaway 2005,
pp 114-116. Several authors have contended that the authority of UNHCR guidelines is
undermined because of their number, detailedness and varying objectives, formats and
discourse. Hathaway 2005, p 118, Wouters 2009, p 42
57 Hathaway 2005, p 113, Wouters 2009, pp 45-46. Courts and tribunals in a range of juris-
dictions use EXCOM Conclusions as soft law instruments as persuasive and even authoritat-
ive sources on matters of policy, legal practice or interpretation. Deschamp & Dowd 2008,
pp 22-27.
58 Art 28 ICCPR, Art 17 CAT and Art 43 CRC.
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General Comments, Concluding Observations regarding State parties59 or
rulings in individual cases60 do not bind the State parties.61 However the
Committees’ views on interpreting an application of the Convention should
be considered an authoritative interpretation.62
The following sections will examine the Court of Justice’s use of documents
issued by the institutions of the Council of Europe (3.3.2) and UNHCR (3.3.3)
and the views of the UN Committees (3.3.4). In section 3.3.5 it will be argued
that the Court of Justice should, like the ECtHR, take account of non-binding,
but authoritative views of supervising bodies in its case-law.
3.3.1 The ECtHR’s judgments
The expansion of the European Union’s areas of competence, has resulted in
the spheres of activity of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts progressively
converging on each other. Asylum law is a very clear example of an area in
which the competences of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR overlap.63 It
would be problematic if the two courts would develop diverging case-law
on similar human rights issues. For this reason the courts need to cooperate
and take each other’s judgments into account.64
The EU Courts have regularly referred to the ECtHR’s case-law when apply-
ing general principles of EU law as well as the fundamental rights included
in the Charter.65 Douglas-Scott notes however that the citation of the ECtHR’s
case-law is a relatively new phenomenon, which started in the late 1980’s with
the opinions of Advocates General and only occurred in a judgment by the
Court of Justice in 1996.66 He recognises two trends: the Court of Justice has
59 See with regard to the procedure followed by the Committees: Joseph, Schultz & Castan
2004, p 19 (HRC) and Nowak & McArthur 2008, p 648 (ComAT). See for the procedure
followed by the ComRC Rule 75 of its Rules of Procedure.
60 See the Optional Protocol with the ICCPR and Art 22 CAT.
61 See with regard to the HRC Battjes 2006 p 21, Wouters 2009 p 365 and Conte & Burchill
2009, p 37, with regard to the ComAT Nowak & McArthur 2008, p 777 and Battjes 2006,
p 22.
62 See with regard to the HRC for example Boerefijn 1999, p 300. See with regard to the
ComAT Nowak & McArthur 2008, p 12 and Wouters 2009, p 431.
63 See also Harpaz 2009, p 119.
64 See Costa 2008. The President of the Strasbourg Court stressed that there is a clear need
for a coherent and effective system of human rights protection in Europe, which requires
the Luxemburg and Strasbourg courts to cooperate.
65 See for example the extensive references to the ECtHR’s case-law in Case C-279/09, DEB
[2010], para 46 and further and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al
Barakaat [2008], paras 310-314, 344, 360-363 and 368. An example of an asylum cases is Case
C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 27.
66 Douglas-Scott wrote in 2006 that the Court of Justice had referred to Strasbourg case-law
in over 20 cases. The Advocates-General had at that moment made over 60 references and
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in recent years referred to the case-law by the ECtHR more frequently than
before. Furthermore, he states that while the earlier references to Strasbourg
case-law tended to be brief and unexpansive, the more recent references tend
to be more reliant on it as a ground of justification, especially if they are made
by Advocates General.67 He states that references to Strasbourg case-law
continue to be relatively brief, but tend to cite Strasbourg more unqualifiedly
as an authority. Scott-Douglas points at a lack of coherence and method when
the Court of Justice refers to the Strasbourg case-law.68
The ECtHR’s case-law as minimum standard
The Court of Justice has not explicitly pronounced itself on the weight which
should be attached to the case-law by the ECtHR.69 It has never explicitly
accepted that it is bound by this case-law.70 However the Court of Justice
usually ensures that the level of protection offered by EU fundamental rights
is not lower than that offered by the ECtHRá case-law.71 In some cases the
Court stressed that its interpretation is fully compatible with the ECHR, includ-
ing the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.72 The Court of
Justice strongly reacts to the Strasbourg Court’s findings as regards inter-
pretation and level of protection.73
Although the Court of Justice has shown that it does not offer less pro-
tection than the ECtHR under the ECHR, the Court finds that it is free to offer
the Court of First Instance had made about 20. Douglas-Scott 2006, p 644. See also De Witte
1999, p 878.
67 Douglas-Scott, p 645. See also Murray 2008, p 538.
68 Douglas-Scott 2006, p 656.
69 Douglas-Scott 2006, pp 649 and 651, Harpaz 2009, pp 109-110.
70 The CFI stated however in Case T-69/04, Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v Commission
[2008], para 32:’[T]here is nothing which would justify the Court of First Instance giving
a different interpretation of the principle of legality, which is a general principle of Commu-
nity law, from that resulting from the Strasbourg Court’s case-law.’ Bronckers states that
the EU Courts use the ECtHR’s case-law to ‘bolster the persuasive force of their own
rulings’. Bronckers 2007, p 601.
71 Battjes states that the EU Courts ‘quite scrupulously test against Community principles
in full accordance with the criteria laid down in the provisions of the European Convention
as well as the relevant Strasbourg case-law’. Battjes 2006, p 94. See also Douglas-Scott 2006,
p 650 and Spielmann 1999, p 770. See also section 3.1.
72 See Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 44, in which the Court stated: ‘It should also, lastly,
be added that the interpretation of Article 15(c) of the Directive, in conjunction with Article
2(e) thereof, arising from the foregoing paragraphs is fully compatible with the ECHR,
including the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 3 of the
ECHR.’
73 Gerards states that she expects an extension of the scope of the rights laid down in the
ECHR in the Strasbourg context, to be reflected in the Luxembourg case-law. Gerards 2008,
pp 667 and 672.
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its own divergent jurisprudence of EU law.74 Advocate General Maduro stated
in his opinion in the Elgafaji case that ‘Community provisions, irrespective
of which provisions are concerned, are given an independent interpretation
which cannot therefore vary according to and/or be dependent on develop-
ments in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’.75 He added
that the interpretation of the Convention by the ECtHR is a dynamic interpreta-
tion, which is always changing. He argued that it is not for the EU Courts to
determine the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR which prevails. However he
did recognise in this same opinion that
although the case-law of the Strasbourg court is not a binding source of interpreta-
tion of Community fundamental rights, it constitutes none the less a starting point
for determining the content and scope of those rights within the European Union.
Taking that case-law into account is, moreover, essential to ensure that the Union,
founded on the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, will contribute to extending the protection of those rights in the European
area.76
Similarly Advocate General considered in his opinion in Samba Diouf that
the right to effective judicial protection, as expressed in Article 47 of the CFREU,
has, through being recognised as part of European Union law by virtue of Article
47, acquired a separate identity and substance under that article which are not the
mere sum of the provisions of Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.77
The independent interpretation of EU provisions thus only seems to result in
broader (and not more limited) protection than under the ECHR.78
Several examples can be found in the Court of Justice’s case-law in which
the Court adopted a more generous interpretation of a fundamental right than
the ECtHR. Douglas Scott refers to the judgments in Carpenter79 and Akrich,80
in which the Court gave a very generous interpretation of the ECtHR’s judgment
in Boultif.81 Some commentators refer to the Court of Justice’s judgment in
Parliament v Council, in which the Court of Justice recognised a ‘right to live
74 Harpaz 2009, p 112. He states that the Court of Justice has a deferential approach, according
to which the Court relies on ECHR provisions and follows the judgments of the Strasbourg
Court.
75 Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 19.
76 The Court of Justice itself seems to suggest in Elgafaji that the interpretation of the scope
of EU provisions which correspond to rights laid down in the ECHR (i.c. Article 15 (b)
QD) does have to be carried out on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law. Case C-465/07,
Elgafaji [2009], para 28.
77 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 39.
78 This also follows from Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 28.
79 Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002].
80 Case C-109/01, Akrich [2003].
81 ECtHR 2 August 2001, Boultif v Switzerland, no 54273/00.
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with one’s close family’82 and stated that it follows from the Family Re-
unification Directive83 that applications for family reunification should be
examined with a view to promoting family life.84 Both formulations seem
to offer more protection than the standing case-law by the ECtHR under Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR.85 In the cases mentioned the Court has not given any reasons
for a broader interpretation.86
Possible situations of the Court of Justice providing a lower level of protection than
the ECtHR
Three situations may be distinguished, in which the Court of Justice has
adopted or may adopt a different view on a human rights issue than the ECtHR,
which results in a lower standard of protection. First of all the Court of Justice
may have to apply existing Strasbourg case-law to a new situation, on which
the Strasbourg court has not yet ruled. Then, the Court of Justice has to give
its own interpretation of an EU fundamental right which is corresponding to
a right laid down in the ECHR. In this kind of situations it has occurred that
the Court of Justice adopted a different, more restrictive view on the content
of such a right, than the ECtHR in later case-law.87 The Court of Justice showed
to be prepared to reconsider its own case-law in view of subsequent develop-
ments in Strasbourg.88
Secondly, the ECtHR may change its line of case-law concerning an issue
after a judgment of the Court of Justice on the same issue. As Maduro noted
in his opinion with Elgafaji that the interpretation of the Convention by the
Strasbourg court is dynamic and is changing over time.89 This is the result
of the fact that the ECtHR considers the Convention to be ‘a living instrument’,
82 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 52.
83 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification
[2003] OJ L 251/12.
84 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006] para 88.
85 Boeles 2006. Kunoy & Mortansson point out that Art 4 of the Family Reunification Directive,
by contrast to Art 8 ECHR, imposes precise obligations, with corresponding individual
rights, on the Member States, since it requires them to authorise family reunification in
certain cases without being left a margin of appreciation. Kunoy & Mortansson 2010, p 1825.
See also Case C-404/92P, X v Commission [1994], para 17, where the Court of Justice held
that the right to respect for private life, embodied in Art 8 of the ECHR and deriving from
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States includes in particular a person’s
right to keep his state of health secret. See Spielmann 1999, pp 775-776.
86 Bulterman argues that the Court of Justice has to reason why a specific human right which
can be found in the ECHR should be given a more favourable interpretation when it is
applied as a fundamental principle of EU law. Bulterman 2008, under 5.3.
87 Douglas-Scott refers to Orkem and Hoechst. Douglas-Scott 2006, p 645.
88 Costa 2008. See also Murray 2008, p 543.
89 He stated: ‘In terms of the dynamic interpretation, it must be noted that the interpretation
of Article 3 of the ECHR has not been linear and that the European Court of Human Rights
currently gives a broader content and therefore scope to that article. Moreover, it is neces-
sary for the interpretation of that provision to evolve and it should not, therefore, be fixed’.
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which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.90 It may
therefore occur that the ECtHR adopts a broader view on a certain issue than
the view of Court of Justice, which was based on the ‘old’ case-law by the
ECtHR. On the basis of Article 52 (3) of the Charter and the standing case-law
of the Court of Justice it is likely that also in this situation the Court of Justice
will reconsider its case-law to the subsequent developments in Strasbourg.
Thirdly it is possible that the Court of Justice misunderstands the ECtHR’s
case-law and as a result adopts a different view than the ECtHR. Arguably the
Court of Justice misunderstood the ECtHR’s judgment in NA v the United
Kingdom in its ruling in the Elgafaji case.91 In this case the Court of Justice
considered that the serious harm as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article
15 QD, which are based on Articles 2 and 3 ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law,
requires a clear degree of individualisation of the risk to serious harm. How-
ever the ECtHR had ruled less than a year before the judgment in Elgafaji, in
NA v the United Kingdom that Article 3 ECHR may also apply in extreme cases
of general violence, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue
of an individual being exposed to such violence on return.92 Therefore under
Article 3 ECHR in a situation of extreme general violence no ‘individualisation’
is required. Although the Court of Justice referred to NA in its judgment it
did not seem to recognise this. Errors like the one in Elgafaji, should be con-
sidered as incidents, which do not detract from the fact that in principle the
Court of Justice abides by the ECtHR’s case-law. The error in Elgafaji did not
result in a lower level of protection than that guaranteed by the ECtHR.93
3.3.2 Council of Europe documents
Texts adopted by the Institutions of the Council of Europe have played a
marginal role in the EU Courts’ case-law. The CFI referred to guidelines by
the Committee of Ministers in Sison in order to support its position that a right
to an effective remedy should be provided in particular in the context of
measures to freeze the funds of persons or organisations suspected of terrorist
activities.94 In Parliament v Council, the European Parliament invoked two
90 See for example ECtHR (GC) 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, no 46827/
99, para 121.
91 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009]. See for example Spijkerboer 2009.
92 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 115.
93 According to the Court of Justice Art 15 (c) QD does cover risks of serious harm which
result from the general human rights situation in the country of origin.
94 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], paras 157-158, see also Case T-228/02, Organisation
des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 111 and 135. In Case C-421/09,
Humanplasma GmbH [2010] the reference in the applicable EU legislation to a specific Council
of Europe document was the reason to take it account.
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Committee of Minister Recommendations in support of its appeal.95 However,
the Court did not include these recommendations in its judgment.96 The
Advocates General have referred to recommendations of the Committee of
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly in some of their opinions.97
3.3.3 UNHCR documents and Excom Conclusions
In its case-law the Court of Justice has not yet (explicitly) taken account of,
or made reference to UNHCR’s view, although it did have opportunity to do
so.98 Several cases concerned the interpretation of provisions of EU law, which
were directly based on the Refugee Convention. Furthermore in some of these
cases the applicant relied on UNHCR’s view.99 Finally UNHCR issued statements
in the context of these cases in which it set out its views on the questions
referred to the Court of Justice.100 In Salahadin Abdullah the Court of Justice
adopted a different interpretation of the cessation clauses provided by the
Qualification Directive than that proposed by UNHCR.101
The Advocates General have paid more attention to UNHCR documents
in their opinions. A.G. Sharpston considered in the Bolbol case concerning the
criteria for excluding Palestinians from refugee status that ‘the UNHCR occa-
95 Recommendation No R (94) 14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
to Member States of 22 November 1994 on coherent and integrated family policies and
Recommendation No R (99) 23 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of 15
December 1999 on family reunion for refugees and other persons in need of international
protection.
96 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006], para 33.
97 See for example A.G. Léger in his opinion with Case C-353/99 P, Hautala [2001], para 62,
A.G. Kokott in her opinion with Case C-105/03, Pupino [2005], para 55 and A.G. Jacobs
in his opinion with Case C-270/99 P, Z v Parliament [2001], para 40.
98 The Government of the United Kingdom has argued before the Court of Justice that the
UNHCR Guidelines are not binding on Member States as a matter of international law
and have not been incorporated into Community law. See the opinion with Joined Cases
C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 36.
99 See for example the opinion with Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08,
Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 32.
100 See with regard to the Procedures Directive: UNHCR Statement on the right to an effective
remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures, issued in Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf
[2011], 21 May 2010, available at www.unhcr.org.
101 The Court ruled that refugee status ceases to exist when, having regard to a change of
circumstances of a significant and non-temporary nature in the third country concerned,
the circumstances which justified the person’s fear of persecution on the basis of which
refugee status was granted, no longer exist and that person has no other reason to fear
being ‘persecuted’. According to UNHCR the cessation clauses should only apply when
the applicant is effectively protected in his country of origin, which entails more than the
absence of a fear of persecution, namely alrespect for human rights, including the right
to a basic livelihood. See UNHCR Statement on the “Ceased Circumstances” Clause of the
EC Qualification Directive, issued in Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/
08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], August 2008, para 4.1.2, available at www.unhcr.org.
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sionally makes statements which have persuasive, but not binding, force’.102
In her opinion she disagreed with the interpretation put forward by the Office
of the UNHCR because she was guided primarily by the clear text of the provi-
sion of the Refugee Convention, which has not been amended in over 50 years.
She stated: ‘In contrast, it seems to me that the UNHCR’s reading has varied
over time, reflecting the intractable nature of the Palestine problem.’103 A.G.
Mengozzi wrote in his opinion with B. and D. which concerned the interpreta-
tion of the EU criteria for excluding a person from refugee status that guidance
for interpreting provisions of the Qualification Directive which have their
origin in the text of the Refugee Convention is provided by the EXCOM con-
clusions, the UNHCR Handbook and UNHCR’s Guidelines on International
Protection. He also referred to the fact that UNHCR’s view is not always clear,
as UNHCR documents sometimes contradict each other.104 A.G. Mengozzi
in this opinion made extensive references to UNHCR documents, such as the
UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines as well as the document specifically drawn
up by UNHCR for the purposes of the case before the Court of Justice.105
3.3.4 The views of the UN Committees
The views of UN Committees have played a minor role in the Court of Justice’s
case-law.106 The Committee only ruled on the relevance of the Human Rights
Committee’s view in its judgment in Grant.107 So far the Court of Justice has
not addressed the relevance of General Comments or Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee, or of the views of the Committee against
Torture or the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its case-law. The
considerations in Grant may however also apply to those sources of interpreta-
tion.
In Grant the applicant argued before the Court of Justice that Article 119
of the former EC-Treaty, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex,
should include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.108 She
referred to a view of the Human Rights Committee in an individual complaint,
102 A.G. Sharpston, Opinion with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 16.
103 A.G. Sharpston Opinion with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 76.
104 A.G. Mengozzi, Opinion with Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B. and D. [2010], para 43.
105 In the opinions with Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin
Abdulla [2010], para 32 and Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], the A.G. did not take UNHCR’s
view into account.
106 Butler & de Schutter 2007, pp 282-283.
107 Case C-249/96, Grant [1998], paras 44-47.
108 Ms Grant was refused travel benefits for her female partner by her employer, while those
benefits were granted to persons of opposite sex, who were married or involved in a
meaningful relationship.
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according to which the term ‘sex’ mentioned in the prohibitions of discrimina-
tion laid down in Articles 2 (1) and 26 ICCPR includes ‘sexual orientation’.109
The Court of Justice reiterated first of all that the Covenant is one of the
international instruments relating to the protection of human rights, of which
the Court takes account in applying the fundamental principles of EU law.
However, it considered that the Human Rights Committee is not a judicial
institution and that its findings have no binding force in law. It furthermore
noted that the Human Rights Committee’s view did not in any event appear
to reflect the interpretation so far generally accepted of the concept of discrim-
ination based on sex which appeared in various international instruments
concerning the protection of fundamental rights. In this regard it referred to
the ECtHR’s case-law, which stated that homosexual relationships did not fall
within the scope of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR.110 Furthermore the Court took
into account that the laws of the Member States generally did not treat same-
sex relationships the same as marriages between persons of opposite sex. The
Court concluded that the Human Rights Committee’s view could not constitute
a basis for the Court to extend the scope of Article 119 of the former EC Treaty,
to include sexual orientation. Butler and de Schutter state that the Grant case
underlines the lack of faith that the Court of Justice places in the interpretations
of international human rights law issued by the monitoring bodies responsible
for supervising the correct implementation of these treaties. In their view the
Court of Justice ignores the generally accepted view that the UN monitoring
bodies’ interpretation of the treaties should be treated as authoritative.111
One may conclude from this judgment that the view of the Human Rights
Committee (or the Committee against Torture or the Committee on the Rights
of the Child) alone cannot provide sufficient basis for extensive interpretation
of a Treaty provision. However the Court did not exclude that those views
may inspire the Court in future cases.112 This could be the case especially
where they corroborate the case-law of the ECtHR and/or other treaty bodies
109 HRC 31 March 1994, Toonen v Australia, no 488/1992. The Court of Justice remarks that
the HRC confined itself, as it stated itself without giving specific reasons, to ’noting ... that
in its view the reference to ”sex” in Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as in-
cluding sexual orientation‘. Case C-249/96, Grant [1998], para 46.
110 Spielmann notes however that the Court of Justice omitted to have a close look at the
ECtHR’s case-law on Art 8 ECHR, in particular the so-called ‘positive obligations’ theory
imposing concrete action on public authorities. Spielmann 1999, p 774.
111 Butler & de Schutter 2007, pp 284-285.
112 The fact that Advocates General have referred to the views of the HRC in several opinions
may indicate that the UN supervising bodies’ views may be taken into account by the Court
in future cases. See the opinions of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer with Case C-436/04, van
Esbroeck [2006] (interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle) of A.G. Kokott with Case
C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006] (the right to family life) and the view of A.G. Mazák
with Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev [2006] (possibilities of detention of asylum applicants).
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and/or the interpretation stemming from the laws of the Member States.113
The Court of Justice may be more willing to follow the UN Committees’ views
when interpreting secondary EU legislation than when determining the meaning
of a Treaty provision.
3.3.5 Should non-binding documents be taken into account?
There are strong arguments that the non-binding views of the institutions of
the Council of Europe, UNHCR and the UN Committees should be taken into
account by the Court of Justice. The weight which should be attached to those
views depends on their quality of reasoning.114 Most importantly it would
be inconsistent for the Court of Justice to recognise a treaty as a source of
inspiration, while ignoring the views of the body supervising this treaty which
are generally considered to be an important subsidiary means of interpretation
of those treaties. Furthermore systematic interpretation of a fundamental right
may be facilitated by a comparative analyses of international or regional
human rights treaties, which include a similar right.115 An interesting devel-
opment in this regard is the current trend in the ECtHR’s case-law to use ‘soft
law standards’ as a source of interpretation.116 Potentially this may prompt
the Court of Justice to do the same, in particular when interpreting EU funda-
mental rights corresponding to rights recognised in the ECHR.
The ECtHR, when interpreting the rights laid down in the Convention takes
into account ‘any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable
in relations between the Contracting Parties’.117 In Demir and Baykara v Turkey
the ECtHR considered that in interpreting the Convention it
can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Con-
vention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice
of European States reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from
specialised international instruments and from the practice of Contracting States
113 See also Butler & de Schutter 2007, p 283. They state that it emerges from the Court of
Justice’s cases that the Court will rely primarily on the ECHR and while it may draw on
other treaties to complement its analysis, it may not draw on them where they appear to
go beyond the ECHR, except when there appears to be some support for this in the EC
or EU Treaty.
114 See Battjes 2006, p 22.
115 Wouters 2009, p 12, Nowak & McArthur, p 12.
116 See Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2010.
117 ECtHR (GC) 29 January 2008, Saadi v United Kingdom, no 13229/03, para 62. See also ECtHR
12 March 2003, Öcalan v Turkey, no 46221/99, para 190, in which the Court ‘reiterates that
it must be mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human-rights treaty and that
the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. It should so far as possible be interpreted
in harmony with other rules of public international law of which it forms part’.
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may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provi-
sions of the Convention in specific cases.
The ECtHR has mentioned many different sources which may be relevant,
including the ICCPR, CAT, CRC118 and the Refugee Convention.119 In its case-
law the Court regularly refers to non-binding documents such as views in
individual cases120 or General Comments and Concluding Observations of
UN supervising bodies.121 The ECtHR also takes into account UNHCR docu-
ments, such as the UNHCR Handbook,122 EXCOM conclusions and Guide-
lines.123 Council of Europe documents, such as the recommendations, resolu-
tions or guidelines of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary As-
sembly were taken into account in several cases, among which some asylum
cases.124 The ECtHR does not seem to have developed clear guidelines for
using non-binding documents for its interpretation of the Convention. Its case-
law does not show when such documents should be taken into account and
the weight which should be granted to them.125 The Court seems to regard
the views adopted by supervisory bodies to international treaties a relevant
consideration for the ECtHR. However, it does not always follow such views.126
118 ECtHR (GC) 12 November 2008, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, no 34503/97, paras 69-86.
119 ECtHR 28 October 2010, Fawsie v Greece, no 40080/07, para 38.
120 See ECtHR (GC) 29 January 2008, Saadi v United Kingdom, no 13229/03, paras 31-32. In
ECtHR 12 March 2003, Öcalan v Turkey, no 46221/99, paras 60-62 and 203, the ECtHR used
the view of the HRC to support its ruling that the implementation of the death penalty in
respect of a person who has not had a fair trial would not be permissible under Art 2 ECHR.
121 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 110
and 178, ECtHR (GC) 23 June 2008, Maslov v Austria, no 1638/03, para 83 jo 37-38, ECtHR
12 October 2006, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, no 13178/03, para 40
and ECtHR 10 February 2011, Soltysyak v Russia, no 4663/05, para 51.
122 ECtHR 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 73.
123 ECtHR (GC) 29 January 2008, Saadi v United Kingdom, no 13229/03, paras 34-35. The Court
rejected a narrow interpretation of Art 5 (1)(f) ECHR amongst others because such inter-
pretation would be inconsistent with EXCOM Conclusion no 44 (XXXVII), 1986, the
UNHCR’s Guidelines and a Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe.
124 ECtHR 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin v France, no 25389/05, para 58, ECtHR (Adm) 2 December
2008, K.R.S. v United Kingdom, no 32733/08, ECtHR 23 October 2008, Soldatenko v Ukraine,
no 2440/07, para 30.
125 See also Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2010, pp 834-835.
126 In ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras
110 and 178 for example the Court did not follow the HRC’s view that emergency measures
must be of a temporary nature. In ECtHR (GC) 29 January 2008, Saadi v United Kingdom,
no 13229/03, it does not seem to follow the HRC’s views regarding detention of aliens
under Art 9 ICCPR.
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3.4 THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AS SOURCES OF IN-
SPIRATION
It should be expected on the basis of the Court of Justice’s existing case-law
that, also in the context of asylum procedures, the Court of Justice will attach
by far most weight to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law when looking for
inspiration for the interpretation of EU fundamental rights. This is not only
the result of the ‘special significance’ granted to the ECHR by Article 6 (3) TEU
and the Charter. It is also due to the fact that the most important source of
interpretation of the ECHR, the judgments of the ECtHR, are binding upon the
State parties to the ECHR and constitute an extensive body of case-law. The
non-binding recommendations and resolutions issued by Council of Europe
institutions have played a marginal role in the EU Courts’ case-law.
In asylum cases the Refugee Convention also seems to have a special status
as a source of inspiration, because of its explicit recognition as a ‘relevant
treaty’ in the asylum context by Article 63 of the former EC-Treaty and Article
78 TfEU as well as the preambles and texts of the EU measures adopted under
this provision. The Court of Justice interprets EU asylum legislation and
expectedly also EU fundamental rights in the light of the Refugee Convention.
However this is difficult if the relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention
need interpretation, because the Convention lacks a supervising body, which
is competent to provide legally binding decisions on the interpretation of its
provisions. With regard to procedural issues the Refugee Convention does
not provide much guidance, as it does not contain any provisions which regard
refugee determination procedures. The Court of Justice can only rely on (non-
binding) UNHCR documents and EXCOM conclusions when examining the
procedural requirements following from the Refugee Convention. However
those documents have so far not played any visible role in the Court of
Justice’s case-law. In fact the Court of Justice itself arguably has become the
most important source of interpretation of the Refugee Convention.
The potential impact of the UN treaties on the development of EU funda-
mental rights, including the right to effective judicial protection, seems to be
limited. This is due to the fact that the Court is clearly hesitant to take into
account the non-binding views of the UN supervising bodies, which may
provide guidance as to the interpretation of those treaties. The UN Conventions
have played a minor role in the Court of Justice’s case-law. It should be
concluded from Grant and the lack of references to the non-binding views of
UN supervising bodies that the Court of Justice is not easily prepared to follow
those views. This seems to be specifically the case when this view is not
sustained by ECtHR case-law, the constitutional traditions of the Member States
or potentially non-binding views of other supervising bodies.
It should however not be excluded that the non-binding views of institu-
tions of the Council of Europe, UNHCR and the UN Committees will serve as
sources of inspiration in future (asylum) cases. It was even argued in section
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3.3.5 that the Court of Justice should take into account these authoritative views
and attach weight to them according to their quality of reasoning. Such practice
would correspond with the current trend in the ECtHR’s case-law to use ‘soft
law standards’ as a source of interpretation.
Consequences for the way this study is conducted
In this study international treaties are not treated as a separate category of
norms, which should be directly applied by the Court of Justice in the asylum
context. They are only used as sources of inspiration for the EU right to an
effective remedy. As was explained in section 3.1.1 this has expectedly no
consequences for the way the EU right to an effective remedy will be inter-
preted.
For the purpose of finding the content and meaning of the EU right to
effective judicial protection for the asylum context the following assumptions
will be used as to the relative weight which should be granted to the different
sources of inspiration included in this study.
· The ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law have most significance as a source of
inspiration for EU fundamental rights.
· Where the ECtHR’s view is corroborated by the non-binding views of other
supervising bodies, an even more solid basis for the interpretation of EU
fundamental rights is provided.
· Where the ECtHR’s case-law and the non-binding view of another super-
vising body conflict, the Court of Justice is arguably inclined to follow the
ECtHR.
The Court of Justice does not seem to be prepared to adopt a far-reaching
interpretation of an EU fundamental right on the basis of the non-binding view
of one supervising body alone.
If the views of more supervising bodies (e.g. Human Rights Committee,
Committee against Torture and UNHCR) agree, the Court of Justice may be
more inclined to follow these views.
In this study the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law will thus play a central
role as a source of inspiration for the interpretation of the EU right to an
effective remedy. Where the ECtHR’s case-law is clear on a certain issue, the
non-binding views of other (supervising) bodies will only be briefly addressed.
Where the ECtHR’s case-law does not set (clear) requirements, more attention
will be paid to such non-binding views. The weight which is attached to these
non-binding views depends on their quality of reasoning. This study will be
reluctant to base the interpretation of the EU right to an effective remedy on
non-binding views only.

4 The EU right to an effective remedy and
related procedural rights and principles
This chapter will address the scope of application and the general content and
meaning of the EU right to an effective remedy. Furthermore it will introduce
the procedural rights included in or linked to this right, such as the right to
a fair trial, the principle of effectiveness and the right to good administration
as well as the specific rights they encompass (sections 4.3-4.4). These EU rights
and principles will be used in this study in order to build a set of EU standards
for the themes discussed in Chapters 6 to 10. This chapter also establishes
which are the specific sources of international law inspiring these EU pro-
cedural rights.
The Court of Justice has so far only recognised Articles 6 and 13 ECHR as
sources of inspiration for the EU right to effective judicial protection. However
its is argued in this chapter that in the asylum context also the ECtHR’s case-law
regarding substantive provisions such as the prohibition of refoulement and
provisions regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies should be considered
relevant for the development of EU procedural rights. Furthermore expectedly
other provisions of international law, which also include a right to an effective
remedy or a right to a fair hearing, such as Articles 2 (3) and 14 ICCPR and
Article 3 CAT will serve as sources of inspiration for EU fundamental rights.1
Before introducing the EU rights to effective judicial protection and the
right to good administration two important issues will be addressed. Section
4.1 concerns the potential impact of EU procedural rights on national procedural
systems. It shows that the Court of Justice’s case-law regarding EU procedural
rights, in particular the right to effective judicial protection, has considerably
limited what is often called the principle of procedural autonomy of the
Member States. It may therefore be expected that the EU right to an effective
remedy will limit the Member States discretion to design their asylum pro-
cedures.
Section 4.2 addresses the interrelationship between the different EU pro-
cedural rights. It contends that all EU procedural rights discussed in this study
are interlinked. Therefore it is sometimes difficult to establish which procedural
right should be applied to a certain procedural issue. The EU Courts do not
give clear guidance in this respect. It is argued however that it is not necessary
1 It was argued in sectoins 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 that the ICCPR and the CAT should be considered
sources of inspiration for EU fundamental rights in the asylum context.
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for the purpose of this study to define the exact relationship between the EU
procedural rights discussed in this chapter. With regard to each of the themes
addressed in Chapters 6 to 10 the EU Courts’ relevant case-law will be ex-
amined, irrespective of the procedural right applied by these courts. EU pro-
cedural rights are thus treated as a category of rights, which overlap and
complement each other.
It will finally be explained in section 4.5 that three ‘basic notions’ emerge from
the Court of Justice’s as well as the ECtHR’s case-law regarding procedural
rights. These notions will be used as a tool to analyse the case-law examined
in the thematic chapters and to develop a set of EU procedural standards for
the procedural topics discussed in some of the thematic chapters:
1 When assessing whether EU procedural rights have been infringed (often)
interests must be balanced against each other
2 When determining whether a procedure should be considered fair, regard
should be had to all aspects and instances of this procedure: the overall
fairness of a procedure must be examined
3 The subject matter of the procedure influences the level of procedural
protection which must be offered to the applicant.
4.1 LIMITATIONS TO THE PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY OF THE MEMBER STATES
The Court of Justice when assessing national procedural rules which are not
governed by EU law takes national procedural autonomy as a starting point2
by considering that: ‘in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for
the legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals
having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law.’3 The
idea which is underlying the principle of national procedural autonomy is
consistent with the principle of subsidiarity and recognises that ‘national
procedural rules may reflect deep-seated cultural and ethical values and should
not be lightly set aside’.4 Indeed sometimes the EU Courts seem to be reluctant
to impose obligations on Member States with regard to procedural guarantees
or remedies. The Court of Justice for example refrained from imposing the
conditions for granting interim protection on the national level, when compat-
2 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 396. The Court of Justice has explicitly referred to the principle
of procedural autonomy in Case C-201/02, Wells [2004], para 67, Case C-212/04, Adeneler
[2006], para 95 and Case C-314/09, Strabag and Others [2010], para 34.
3 See for example Case C-115/09, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen [2011], para 43.
4 Arnull 2011, p 52. See also Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 395 and Delicostopoulos 2003, p 603.
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ibility of national law with EU law is concerned. It did so only for cases before
the national courts in which the legality of EU law is contested.5
Much has been written on the principle of national procedural autonomy
and it is not feasible to give an extensive overview of relevant literature in
this section.6 However it should be noted here that there seems to be a broad
consensus between scholars that as a result of the Court of Justice’s case-law
the national procedural autonomy of the Member States is in practice consider-
ably limited. This limitation is the result of the important role of national legal
systems to implement and enforce EU law.7 According to Trstenjak and Beysen
‘the concept of procedural autonomy of the Member States does not imply
the existence of a general principle of EU law, according to which each Member
State has the right to preserve a nucleus of national procedural rules with
regard to the enforcement of rights derived from EU law’.8 Schwartze states
that ‘notwithstanding national autonomy, the need for equity and effectiveness
has led to considerable Community influence on national administrative law
and procedure.9 The national procedural framework for the enforcement of
EU law must comply with several EU rights and principles such as the EU right
to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial, the principle of effectiveness
and the right to good administration. These rights and principles will be
discussed in the next sections of this chapter.
Traditionally it is thought that the principle of effectiveness must be bal-
anced against the national procedural autonomy of the State.10 Some authors
however suggest that EU procedural rights have become hierarchically superior
to that of national procedural autonomy.11 Haapaniemi suggests that ‘to speak
about national procedural autonomy is, [..] at least today, much more about
lipservice than reality.’12 Kakouris even argues that procedural autonomy
does not exist at all and that national procedural rules have become ancillary
EU law. He states that national procedural law is there to serve EU Law. ‘Its
provisions only apply insofar as they contribute to the effective application
of Community law. Where they do not they must be set aside’. According to
Kakouris therefore there is no question of balancing the principle of effective-
ness against the procedural autonomy of the Member States.13 In his view
5 See further Chapter 6 on the right to remain. Anagnostaras states that the fact that two
separate regimes of interim protection exist seems to be a concession to the national
procedural autonomy principle in an area where that may be of little practical importance
to the legal interests of individuals due to the existence of domestic law principles that
correspond generally to the Community law mandates. Anagnostaras 2008, p 597.
6 See for an overview Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, pp 395-397.
7 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 394.
8 Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, pp 98-99.
9 Schwartze 2004, p 87.
10 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, pp 397 and 401.
11 Arnull 2011, p 68. See also Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 397.
12 See for an overview Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, pp 395-397.
13 Kakouris 1997, pp 1390 and 1408.
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the Member States only have institutional autonomy, freedom in organising
their legal system, the jurisdictional hierarchy of the courts and the division
of competence between and amongst the courts.14
This study contains numerous examples of cases in which the Court of
Justice has limited the Member States discretion to design their national
procedures. In its judgment in Factortame for example, which is discussed in
Chapter 6, the Court of Justice held that the national court should be able to
grant interim relief if this is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a judgment
on the existence of the rights claimed under EU law. This applies even if the
court does not have the power to grant interim relief under national law.15
In Chapter 8 it is explained that any requirement of proof which has the effect
of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise a right
granted by EU law would be incompatible with EU law. In Danfoss and other
cases the Court of Justice made clear that the principle of effectiveness requires
a shift of the burden of proof from one party to the other if this is necessary
to ensure the effectiveness of EU law.16
In the field of asylum procedures the Procedures Directive limits the
procedural autonomy of the Member States. It was even decided that EU
legislation should in the longer term lead to a common asylum procedure.17
However as the directive does not address every aspect of asylum procedures
and contains many possibilities for exceptions to the main rules and many
vague norms, it leaves the Member States plenty of room to design their own
asylum procedure. It also follows from the directive’s preamble that Member
States have discretion in organising their asylum system and legal remedies.18
This study shows that EU procedural rights and principles will potentially set
considerable additional requirements for national asylum procedures and will
thus further limit the Member States’ discretion in laying down national
procedural rules. The principle approach taken in this study is that national
procedural rules should ensure the effectiveness of the right to asylum and
the prohibition of refoulement. In the absence of requirements set by the Pro-
cedures Directive the Member States are free to decide how they comply with
that duty as long as they do so. This approach thus resembles the approach
taken by Kakouris.
14 Kakouris 1997, pp 1394 and 1411.
15 Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990]. See section 6.3.1.1.
16 See section 8.3.1.
17 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999 (SN 200/99),
paras 14-15.
18 See for example recital 11, which states that ‘the organisation of the processing of applica-
tions for asylum should be left to the discretion of Member States, so that they may, in
accordance with their national needs, prioritise or accelerate the processing of any applica-
tion, taking into account the standards in this Directive’. See also Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf
[2011], paras 29-30.
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A first sign that the Court of Justice is, also in asylum cases, willing to limit
national procedural autonomy in favour of the EU right to an effective remedy
is the judgment in Samba Diouf.19 In this judgment the Court of Justice held
that the intensity of judicial review in asylum cases falls within the scope of
the EU right to an effective remedy.20 Furthermore it held that the time-limit
for lodging an appeal in an accelerated procedure should be set aside should
that time-limit prove, in a given situation, to be insufficient in view of the
circumstances.21 Van Cleynenbreugel writes that the Court of Justice
thus directly interferes with Member States’ discretion to adapt their national
systems in conformity with newly indentified EU adequate judicial protection
requirements. In so doing, Samba Diouf challenges the classic division of procedural
competences between the EU and its Member States.22
4.2 THE LINK BETWEEN EU PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES
The right to an effective remedy encompasses several rights and principles
such as the right to a fair trial the right to access to court and the principles
of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. Furthermore procedural
guarantees are offered by the right to good administration which in its turn
encompasses several rights and obligations such as the right to be heard and
the obligation to state reasons. All these rights and principles will be separately
addressed in the next sections. Finally the Court of Justice has also derived
procedural guarantees directly from the principle of full effectiveness of EU
law, such as with regard to the burden of proof in equal pay cases.23
In their case-law the EU Courts have addressed the same procedural issues
under different EU procedural rights.24 An example is the Court of Justice’s
case-law with regard to the right to interim relief. In Factortame the Court held
that the national court should be able to grant interim relief in order to ensure
full effectiveness of Community law25 while in Unibet it based the requirement
to grant interim relief on the principle of effective judicial protection26. The Court
19 See also Van Cleynenbreugel 2012, pp 344-345.
20 See also Widdershoven 2011, under para 3.
21 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 68.
22 Van Cleynenbreugel 2012, p 337.
23 Case C-109/88, Danfoss [1998]. See further section 8.3.1.
24 In some cases it is not entirely clear which principle is used by the Court of Justice, mainly
because it uses different terminology for the same principle. Sometimes the Court uses
the words ‘effective protection of fundamental rights’ (Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou [1991]),
‘the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community
law’ (Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990]) or ‘requirements of sufficiently effective protection’
(Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ûnal [2005]).
25 Case C-213/89, Factortame, [1990], para 21.
26 Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], para 83. See also Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, p 33.
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of Justice usually does not explain its choice to apply a certain EU procedural
right or principle. Therefore the exact relationship between certain EU prin-
ciples, in particular between the right to effective judicial protection and the
principle of effectiveness has remained unclear.27
The right to an effective remedy and the principle of effectiveness
In literature different views can be found on the relationship between right
to effective judicial protection and the principle of effectiveness. Some consider
the right to effective judicial protection to be only one feature of the over-
arching obligation on the Member States stemming from the principle of
effectiveness.28 Others see the principle of effective judicial protection as the
overarching principle of which effectiveness is one aspect.29
In the judgment in Impact the Court of Justice explains the relationship
between 1) the principle that rules of EU law must be fully effective, 2) the
right to effective judicial protection and 3) the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness:
It is the responsibility of the national courts in particular to provide the legal
protection which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure
that those rules are fully effective [..].
In that regard, it is important to note that the principle of effective judicial pro-
tection is a general principle of Community law [..].
The Court has consistently held that, in the absence of Community rules governing
the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate
the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural
rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from
Community law [..].
The Member States, however, are responsible for ensuring that those rights are
effectively protected in each case [..]
On that basis, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed procedural
rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under Community
law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
(principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively
27 See also Oliver 2011, p 2038 and Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, p 39.
28 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 388. According to Prechal and Shelkoplyas it can in general can
be said that the principle of effective judicial protection expands the ‘old’ principle of
effectiveness. Prechal & Shelkoplyas 2004, p 591.
29 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 385. Haapaniemi 2009, pp 108-109. He states that the principle
of effective judicial protection is a cardinal principle, whereas the principles of effectiveness
and equivalence, under the Rewe jurisprudence, can be seen as sub principles of it.’ See
also the opinion of A.G. Trstenjak in Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, para 161.
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difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effective-
ness) [..].
Those requirements of equivalence and effectiveness, which embody the general
obligation on the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s
rights under Community law, apply equally to the designation of the courts and
tribunals having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on Community
law.
A failure to comply with those requirements at Community level is – just like a
failure to comply with them as regards the definition of detailed procedural rules –
liable to undermine the principle of effective judicial protection.30
From these considerations it may be derived that the overarching principle
is the principle that EU rules should be fully effective in the national legal
order. This principle seeks to protect the interests of the EU. It is based on the
direct effect of EU law and promotes the effective enforcement of EU law in
national courts.31 It entails among others that Member States may not apply
rules which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued
by a directive and, therefore, deprive it of its effectiveness.32 This follows
from Article 4(3) TEU (the principle of sincere cooperation) which requires the
Member States to
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions
of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
Union’s objectives.
The right to effective judicial protection follows from the principle of full
effectiveness of EU law. Article 4 (3) TEU requires national courts and tribunals
to apply EU law in full and to protect the rights it confers on individuals.33
The national procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an indi-
30 Case C-268/06, Impact [2008], paras 42-48.
31 The Court of Justice has ruled that ‘the full effectiveness of Community rules would be
impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if indi-
viduals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of
Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible. The possibility of
obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable where [..] the full
effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and
where, consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the
national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law’. Case C-6/90, Francovich
[1991], paras 33-34.
32 See for example Case C-104/10, Kelly [2001], para 33. According to the Court this follows
from Art 4 (3) TEU.
33 Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995], para 12. See also Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, p 97.
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vidual’s rights under EU law before the national courts must comply with the
principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Other case-law however implies
another relationship between the the right to effective judicial protection and
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. In Mono Car Styling for example
Court of Justice seems to suggest that national rules on an individual’s standing
and legal interest in bringing proceedings must be tested against both the
principle of effectiveness and effective judicial protection.34 Prechal and
Widdershoven argue that this is the right approach. They point at the different
purposes of the principle of effectiveness and the right to an effective remedy.
The principle of effectiveness aims to guarantee the effective application of
substantive EU law, while the right to an effective remedy ‘is intimately linked
to the right of access to court and, ultimately, to the idea of the “Rechts-
staat”’.35 While those two interests may overlap, this is not necessarily the
case.36 Prechal and Widdershoven contend that the test applied under the
principle of effectiveness is less demanding than that applied under the right
to an effective remedy.37
The EU right to an effective remedy and the right to good administration
It follows from the case-law of the EU courts that the specific rights following
from the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial and the right to
good administration interrelate, overlap and complement each other. According
to the EU courts for example the rights of the defence and the right to good
administration are intertwined or complementary. The Charter has codified
the right to be heard and the right of access to the file, often regarded to be
rights of the defence under the right to good administration.38 In the Modjahe-
dines case the CFI addressed the close relation between the right to a fair
hearing and the obligation to state of reasons and the right to effective judicial
protection:
It is appropriate to begin by examining, together, the pleas alleging infringement
of the right to a fair hearing, infringement of the obligation to state reasons and
infringement of the right to effective judicial protection, which are closely linked.
First, the safeguarding of the right to a fair hearing helps to ensure that the right
to effective judicial protection is exercised properly. Second, there is a close link
between the right to an effective judicial remedy and the obligation to state reasons.
As held in settled case-law, the Community institutions’ obligation under Article
34 Case C-12/08, Mono Car Styling [2009], paras 47-49.
35 Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, p 50. See also p 45.
36 Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, p 42. The principle of effectiveness may for example require
the imposition of sanctions on individuals or the recovery of illegal State aid. In the field
of asylum procedures it is hard to imagine a situation in which the effective enforcement
of EU law is not in the interest of the individual asylum applicant.
37 Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, pp 39-40.
38 Barbier de La Serre 2006, pp 234-236.
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253 EC to state the reasons on which a decision is based is intended to enable the
Community judicature to exercise its power to review the lawfulness of the decision
and the persons concerned to know the reasons for the measure adopted so that
they can defend their rights and ascertain whether or not the decision is well
founded […] Thus, the parties concerned can make genuine use of their right to
a judicial remedy only if they have precise knowledge of the content of and the
reasons for the act in question […].39
For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to define the exact relationship
between all relevant EU procedural rights and principles. It is sufficient to note
that all these principles set requirements for national proceedings. In the
following thematic chapters all relevant case-law with regard to certain pro-
cedural topics will be assessed, regardless which right or principle was used
by the EU Court. The right to an effective remedy, the principle of effectiveness
and related procedural rights are taken as a category of procedural norms.40
Provisions of international law inspiring EU procedural rights
Like the EU procedural rights, the procedural rights guaranteed by international
law which inspire the interpretation of those EU right also overlap and comple-
ment each other. Provisions of international law which may inspire the inter-
pretation of EU procedural rights in the context of CEAS could be divided into
four categories: (1) provisions guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy,
(2) provisions regarding the right to a fair trial, (3) substantive provisions, in
particular those containing a prohibition of refoulement, of which the effective
protection requires certain procedural guarantees and finally provisions aimed
at ensuring the subsidiary role of human rights mechanisms (4). The ECtHR,
like the Court of Justice, addresses the same procedural issues under different
provisions. The obligation of a rigorous scrutiny of a risk of refoulement for
example has been derived from both Article 3 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR. The
use of secret information has been addressed under the right to family life
guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR as well as several procedural rights (Articles 5
(4), 6 and 13 ECHR).41 The ECtHR usually does not explain in its judgments
why it addresses a procedural issue under a certain provision. For these
reasons the procedural rights recognised by the ECHR as well as other treaties
are for the purpose of this study (like procedural rights recognised by EU law)
considered to be one category of procedural rights which are all interlinked.
In the thematic chapters the relevant case-law and views of the supervising
bodies with regard to each theme is taken into account, irrespective which
provision was applied.
39 Case T-228/02, Organization des Modhahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006].
40 See also Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 385.
41 See section 10.3.
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4.3 THE EU RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY
Article 47 of the Charter states: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective
remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this
Article’. Furthermore according to Article 19 (1) TEU: ‘Member States shall
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law’42 These articles codify the general principle of effective
judicial protection which has been considered a principle of EU law and a
fundamental right by the Court of Justice.43 According to the Court of Justice
the right to an effective remedy44 reflects a general principle of EU law stem-
ming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and
enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.45
It follows from the text of Article 47 of the Charter and the case-law of
the Court of Justice that the EU right to an effective remedy comprises the right
to a fair trial.46 Article 47 states:
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall
be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.
The objective of the right to an effective remedy is to secure for the individual
effective protection of the (fundamental) rights granted by EU law.47 The Court
of Justice has held that it is particularly important for judicial protection to
be effective, when the measures challenged by the individual have serious
consequences.48
42 Haapaniemi states that this provision gives a solid legal basis to interfere, under EU law,
with national law of remedies and therefore, cures the problem that such a firm basis for
intervention that was missing before. Haapaniemi 2009, p 120.
43 See Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission [1998], para 60 (the right of access to the
Court), Case C-105/03, Pupino [2005] para 58 and Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux franco-
phones et germanophones [2007] para 29 (the right to a fair trial) and Case C-28/05, Dokter
[2006], para 75 (rights of the defence).
44 The Court uses different terminology for the same principle such as ‘ the right tot an
effective judicial remedy’ (Case 222/84, Johnston [1986]), ‘the principle of effective judicial
control’ (Case C-185/97, Coote [1998]), ‘the requirement for judicial review’ (Case C-459/99,
MRAX [2002]) or the requirement of judicial control (Case C-269/99, Kühne [2001]).
45 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v Heylens and others [1987], para 14.
46 The Court of Justice often refers to the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Art 6 ECHR when
applying the principle of effective judicial protection.
47 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v Heylens and others [1987] and Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou [1991].
48 Case C-229/05 P, PKK/KNK v Council [2006], para 110.
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4.3.1 Provisions of international law inspiring the EU right to an effective
remedy
The (case-law concerning) various provisions of international law may inspire
the EU right to an effective remedy and fair trial in the context of CEAS. Ob-
viously these are provisions containing a right to an effective remedy or a right
to a fair trial. Furthermore the procedural guarantees derived from the prin-
ciple that the prohibition of refoulement and other substantive rights should
be effectively protected and those derived from the subsidiary role of human
rights mechanisms should be considered sources of inspiration. In the following
sections the procedural requirements following from these sources of inspira-
tion will be further elaborated on.
The right to an effective remedy
Article 13 ECHR and Article 2 (3) ICCPR require State parties to provide an
effective remedy to any person whose rights included in the Convention and
the Covenant respectively are violated.49 The Committee against Torture has
derived a right to an effective remedy from Article 3 CAT.50 According to the
ECtHR the right to an effective remedy serves two purposes. The first is compar-
able to the objective of the EU principle of effective judicial protection: to secure
for the individual effective protection of the rights granted by the treaties
concerned.51 Secondly the right to an effective remedy aims to preserve the
subsidiary nature of the treaty system.52 It gives direct expression to the
States’ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their own
legal system.53
The right to a fair trial
Article 6 (1) ECHR and Article 14 (1) ICCPR guarantee the right to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established
by law. The right to a fair trial is intended to secure the interests of the parties
49 Art 5 (4) ECHR and Art 9 (4) ICCPR require judicial review of detention measures. Article
5 (4) ECHR provides a lex specialis in relation to Art 13 ECHR. Sometimes an Art 5 (4)
ECHR procedure should be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Art
6 ECHR. Such procedure must always have a judicial character and provide guarantees
appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question. Art 5 (4) ECHR and Art 9
(4) ICCPR only play a minor role in this study. Therefore the specific requirements set by
these provisions will not further be addressed.
50 See ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden, no 233/2003.
51 See ECtHR (GC) 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, no 30210/96, para 152.
52 See for example ECtHR 5 February 2002, Conka v Belgium, no 51564/99, para 33.
53 ECtHR (GC) 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, no 30210/96, para 152 and ECtHR (GC) 10
May 2001, Z and others v UK, no 29392/95, para 103, where the ECtHR emphasised that
Art 13 takes on a crucial function in ensuring the supervisory role of the ECtHR.
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and those of the proper administration of justice.54 According to the ECtHR
the right to a fair trial holds a prominent place in a democratic society.55
Effectiveness of the prohibition of refoulement and other substantive rights
Not only under EU law, but also under international law, procedural safeguards
have been derived from the principle that substantive rights must be effectively
protected. Procedural safeguards may be derived from the principle that the
prohibition of refoulement laid down in Article 33 Refugee Convention must
be effectively protected.56 Hathaway for example states that ‘a fair assessment
of refugee status is the indispensable means by which to vindicate Convention
rights’.57 The EXCOM and UNHCR have developed procedural guidelines which
seek to promote the fair determination of refugee status. These may inspire
the EU procedural rights and principles in the asylum context.
The Committee against Torture has applied the principle of effectiveness
to the principle of non-refoulement by recognising that Article 3 CAT entails a
right to an effective remedy. In Agiza v Sweden the Committee against Torture
observed
that the right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention underpins the
entire Convention, for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention would
be rendered largely illusory.[..] In the Committee’s view, in order to reinforce the
protection of the norm in question and understanding the Convention consistently,
the prohibition on refoulement contained in article 3 should be interpreted the same
way to encompass a remedy for its breach, even though it may not contain on its
face such a right to remedy for a breach thereof. […]The nature of refoulement
is such, however, that an allegation of breach of that article relates to a future
expulsion or removal; accordingly, the right to an effective remedy contained in
article 3 requires, in this context, an opportunity for effective, independent and
impartial review of the decision to expel or remove, once that decision is made,
when there is a plausible allegation that article 3 issues arise.58
The ECtHR has derived procedural guarantees directly from Article 3 ECHR.
The clearest example of the application of the principle of effectiveness can
54 ECtHR 27 January 1997, Nideröst-Huber v Switzerland, no 18990/91, para 30. According to
HRC General Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para I sub 2, Art 14 ICCPR ‘aims
at ensuring the proper administration of justice, and to this end guarantees a series of
specific rights’.
55 ECtHR 9 October 1979, Airey v Ireland, no 6289/73, para 24.
56 See for example EXCOM Conclusion no 71 ((XLIV), 1993, para (i) which reiterates the
importance of establishing and ensuring access consistent with the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol for all asylum-seekers to fair and efficient procedures for the determination
of refugee status in order to ensure that refugees and other persons eligible for protection
under international or national law are identified and granted protection.
57 Hathaway 2005, p 630. See also Wouters 2009, pp 164-165, Goodwin Gill & McAdam 2007,
pp 530-531, Boeles 1997, pp 66-69.
58 ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden, no 233/2003.
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be found in Jabari v Turkey. In this case the complainant was denied any
scrutiny of the factual basis of her fears about being removed to Iran, because
she failed to comply with the requirement to submit her asylum application
within five days of her arrival in Turkey. The Court considered that the
automatic and mechanical application of this time-limit for submitting an
asylum application was ‘at variance with the protection of the fundamental
value embodied in Article 3 of the Convention’.59
The ECtHR has also derived procedural rules from other substantial provi-
sions of the Convention, notably Article 8 ECHR on the right to private and
family life. An important procedural issue addressed under Article 8 ECHR
is the use of secret evidence in the context of measures affecting national
security.60 In asylum cases similar procedural issues as those addressed under
Article 8 may arise.61 The case-law concerning the procedural safeguards
which follow from Article 8 should therefore also be considered relevant in
asylum cases.62
The subsidiary role of human rights mechanisms
It is first and foremost up to the State Parties, including their national courts,
to guarantee the rights included in international human rights treaties.63 The
ECtHR, Human Rights Committee and Committee against Torture cannot be
regarded as courts of fourth instance; they only play a subsidiary role. As
President Costa stated in 2011 in his statement concerning requests for interim
measures:
[T]he Court is not an appeal tribunal from the asylum and immigration tribunals
of Europe, any more than it is a court of criminal appeal in respect of criminal
convictions. Where national immigration and asylum procedures carry out their
own proper assessment of risk and are seen to operate fairly and with respect for
human rights, the Court should only be required to intervene in truly exceptional
cases.64
59 ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 40. See also ECtHR 22 September
2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 115.
60 See for example ECtHR 8 June 2006, Lupsa v Romania, no 10337/04 and ECtHR 6 December
2007, Liu and Liu v Russia, no 42086/05. See further Chapter 10 on the use of secret informa-
tion.
61 Chapter 10 will discuss the use of secret information. In this context references will be made
to ECtHR’s case-law regarding the right to adversarial proceeding under Art 8 ECHR.
62 The procedural requirements for Art 3 ECHR cases are normally stricter than those for
Art 8 ECHR cases. See ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/
93, para 150.
63 The ECtHR states that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsi-
diary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. ECtHR (GC) 28 July 1999, Selmouni
v France, no 25803/94, para 74.
64 Statement Issued by the President of the ECtHR concerning Requests for Interim Measures
(Rule 39 of the Rules of Court), 11 February 2011, available at www.echr.coe.int.
90 Chapter 4
It follows from this subsidiary role that national authorities must provide for
effective remedies against expulsion measures.65 These remedies must be
exhausted by applicants before they turn to the ECtHR or the UN Committees.66
This means in general that the complainant must have appealed until the
highest national authority and that the complaint must have been made before
the national authority at least in substance.67 Only the ineffectiveness of the
domestic remedy,68 the fact that this remedy was bound to fail69 or the parti-
cular circumstances of the case may absolve a person from the obligation to
exhaust domestic remedies. In the light of their assessment whether domestic
remedies have been exhausted the ECtHR and UN Committees thus regularly
examine the effectiveness of those remedies. Their case-law with regard to
the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in asylum cases is therefore
relevant in order to discover what procedural guarantees are necessary in such
cases.
Secondly it may be argued that it follows from the subsidiary role of
supervising bodies that the way in which those bodies assess claims under
the substantive provisions of the treaties is indicative for the way in which
the national courts should assess such claims. In particular it is contended
that the scope and intensity of judicial review performed by national courts
should not be more limited than the review performed by the supervising
bodies. Spijkerboer argues with regard to the ECtHR that in asylum cases
national authorities ‘should operate in such a way as to ensure that the national
remedy provides scrutiny of at least as good a quality as that provided by
the Court’.70 The same may be true for the scrutiny applied by the Human
Rights Committee or Committee against Torture. For this reason the case-law
under Article 3 ECHR, Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 CAT will be used as a source
of inspiration for the EU right to effective judicial protection, in particular when
assessing its meaning and content for the scope and intensity of judicial review
by national courts in asylum cases in Chapter 9.
65 See for example ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
paras 286-287.
66 Art 35 (1) ECHR, Artt 2 and 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and Art 22
(5) (b) CAT.
67 ECtHR (GC) 16 September 1996, Akdivar v Turkey, no 21893/93, para 66. HRC 28 April 2009,
Moses Solo Tarlue v Canada, no 1551/2007, para 7.5. See for application of this rule in an
asylum case: ECtHR 19 February 1998, Bahaddar v the Netherlands, no 25894/94.
68 The requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is applied by the ECtHR while making due
allowance for the context of the case and with some degree of flexibility and without
excessive formalism. ECtHR (GC) 28 July 1999, Selmouni v France, no 25803/94, para 77.
See also HRC 5 April 1995, Griffin v Spain, no 493/1992, para 6.1 and ComAT 9 June 1995,
Parot v Spain, no 6/1990, para 6.1.
69 See for example ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 50,
HRC 28 April 2008, Lnenicka v Czech Republic, no 1484/2006, para 6.3 and ComAT 22
February 1996, R.K. v Canada, no 42/1996, para 7.2.
70 Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 52.
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4.3.2 Application to asylum cases
The scope of application of the EU right to an effective remedy and the right
to a fair trial is broader than the same rights guaranteed by international
treaties. The right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial recognised
by the ECHR and other treaties do inspire the Court of Justice when applying
the EU right to an effective remedy and fair trial in all cases falling within the
scope of EU law.71 This means that indirectly, via EU law, the scope of applica-
tion of the right to a fair trial recognised under international law is extended.
Most important for the purpose of this study is that, even in asylum cases,
the EU right to an effective remedy and a fair trial may be inspired by the
ECtHR’s case-law concerning Article 6 ECHR. It would not make sense if in
migration cases the EU right to a fair trial is inspired by Article 6 ECHR, but
not by the ECHR’s case-law in which this provision is interpreted. Widder-
shoven argues that the Court of Justice in the asylum case of Samba Diouf
indeed (implicitly) interpreted the EU right to an effective remedy in the light
of the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 which requires a court or tribunal to
have full jurisdiction.72
Asylum procedures must comply with the EU right to a fair trial
The EU right to a fair trial applies to all claims under EU law, including asylum
cases. The explanations with Article 47 of the Charter state:
In Union law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil
law rights and obligations. That is one of the consequences of the fact that the
Union is a community based on the rule of law. Nevertheless, in all respects other
than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way to
the Union.73
71 Case C-327/02, Panayotova [2004], para 27, a migration case in which the Court considered
‘that Community law requires effective judicial scrutiny of the decisions of national
authorities taken pursuant to the applicable provisions of Community law, and that this
principle of effective judicial protection constitutes a general principle which stems from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and is enshrined by the [ECHR]
in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.’ See Peers & Rogers 2006, pp 120-121.
72 Widdershoven 2011, para 4. It should furthermore be noted that some important rights
following from Article 6, such as the right of access to a remedy and the right to legal
assistance have also been brought within the scope of Art 13 ECHR by the ECtHR. See
ECtHR 10 January 2012, G.R. v the Netherlands, no 22251/07, para 49-50 and ECtHR 2
February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 151.
73 See the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 14 December 2007,
C 303/17. See also Ward, who writes that the Court of Justice has never applied the
existence of a civil right or obligation or criminal charge as a threshold to the application
of the right of access to an effective judicial remedy. The EC right thus appears to extend
to all forms of administrative decision making. What Community law requires is ‘effective
judicial scrutiny of the decisions of national authorities taken pursuant to the applicable
provision of Community law’. Ward 2007, p 174.
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Articles 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR are limited to cases which concern the
determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or any criminal
charge.74 Both the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee ruled that the
right to a fair trial does not apply to proceedings concerning the entry, stay
and deportation of aliens.75
No need for an arguable claim
The EU right to an effective remedy has a broader scope of application than
the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 ECHR, Article 2 (3)
ICCPR and Article 3 CAT, because it does not require an ‘arguable claim’ of a
violation of an EU fundamental right. The EU right to an effective remedy
implies the right to effective judicial scrutiny of the decisions of the EU Institu-
tions76 or national authorities77 taken pursuant to the applicable provisions
of EU law. Article 39 PD shows that the EU right to an effective remedy applies
also to asylum claims which were rejected as inadmissible or manifestly
unfounded.
The right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 ECHR and
Article 2 (3) ICCPR can only be invoked in conjunction with one of the sub-
stantive rights included in those treaties.78 There must be an arguable claim
of a treaty violation.79 Both the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee
recognised that a State party cannot be reasonably required to make an effect-
ive remedy available no matter how unmeritorious a claim of such violation
may be.80 Also the scope of application of the right to an effective remedy
74 The applicability of the right to a fair trial guaranteed in Art 14 ICCPR is limited to ‘rights
and obligations in a suit at law’.
75 They referred to the fact that a provision exists which contains guarantees specifically
concerning proceedings for the expulsion of aliens (Art 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR and Art 13
ICCPR) and considered that the States thus clearly intimated their intention not to include
such proceedings within the scope of Artt 6 (1) ECHR and 14 ICCPR. ECtHR (GC) 5 October
2000, Maaouia v France, no 39652/98, para 40, HRC 4 April 2007, Ernst Zundel v Canada,
no 1341/2005, para 6.8 and HRC 28 April 2009, Moses Solo Tarlue v Canada, no 1551/2007,
para 7.8.
76 Case T-228/02, Organization des Modhahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 110.
77 Case C-226/99, Siples [2001], para 17 and Case C-327/02, Panayotova [2004], para 27.
78 Van Dijk a.o 2006, p 998. According to the ECtHR, Art 13 guarantees the availability at
national level of a remedy ‘to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms
in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order’. ECtHR
11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 48.
79 See with regard to the ECHR Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 50. The HRC has considered that the
right to an effective remedy would be void, if it were not available where a violation of
the Covenant had not yet been established. See HRC 19 September 2003, George Kazantzis
v Cyprus, no 972/2001, para 6.6.
80 ECtHR (Plen) 27 April 1988, Boyle and Rice v the United Kingdom, no 9659/82, para 52 and
HRC 19 September 2003, George Kazantzis v Cyprus, no 972/2001, para 6.6.
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under Article 3 CAT is limited, namely to a ‘plausible allegation’ of a violation
of Article 3 CAT.81
Only applicable to decisions with legal effect
The EU right to an effective remedy does not apply where the contested de-
cision is without legal effect and therefore not capable of infringing any rights
guaranteed by EU law.82 Furthermore the Court of Justice held in Samba Diouf
specifically with regard to asylum procedures that decisions that are prepara-
tory to the decision on the substance or decisions pertaining to the organisation
of the procedure are not covered by the right to an effective remedy laid down
in Article 39 PD.83 In that case it concerned the decision to process an asylum
claim in an accelerated procedure. The Court considered that it follows from
the EU right to effective judicial protection that asylum applicants should be
able to effectively challenge the reasons for the decision to accelerate the
procedure in the context of the appeal against the decision to reject the asylum
application.84
4.3.3 Effectiveness
According to the Court of Justice’s case-law EU law requires ‘that national
legislation does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection’.85
In its case-law the Court of Justice has tested national procedural rules, in-
cluding technical rules which affect the accessibility of a remedy, against the
principle of effectiveness. This principle prohibits national procedural rules
which render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights
conferred by EU law.86 The principle of effectiveness seeks to ensure the
effective enforcement of EU law in national courts. As Accetto and Zleptnig
state:
81 ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden, no 233/2003, para 13.7. The ComAT has not explained
when an allegation or claim is plausible. Wouters p 517.
82 Case T-276/02, Forum 187 v Commission [2003], para 50.
83 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 43.
84 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 58.
85 See for example Case C-87/90, Verholen [1991], para 24, Case C-13/01, Safalero [2003], para
50 and Case C-12/08, Mono Car Styling [2009] para 49.
86 The standard consideration used by the Court of Justice is: ‘In the absence of Community
rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to
designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed pro-
cedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly
from Community law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing
similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law
(principle of effectiveness).’ Case 33/76, Rewe [1976], para 5 and Case C-13/01, Safalero
[2003], para 49.
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Effectiveness may [..] be eroded by specific substantive and procedural hurdles
at the national level that are not immediately apparent: subtle procedural rules,
administrative practices adopted by national authorities, or systemic failures in
the institutional set-up of authorities in charge of ensuring the proper application
of Community law.87
When assessing whether a national procedural rule renders the exercise of
an EU right excessively difficult ‘a comprehensive review in which all particu-
larities of national legal systems must be taken into account’ is required.88
The Court of Justice considered:
Each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders
application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed
by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its
special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the
light of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as
protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper
conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration.89
The Court of Justice has assessed many types of national procedural rules in
the light of the principle of effectiveness. In Chapters 6 to 10 the content and
meaning of the principle with regard to certain procedural issues in the context
of CEAS will be examined.
Effectiveness of remedies under international law
The effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 does not
depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant.90 The
remedy concerned must be able to prevent the alleged violation or its continu-
ation, or to provide adequate redress for any violation that had already
occurred.91 Article 13 does not go so far as to require any particular form
of remedy.92 The Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the
manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under
Article 13.93 In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum applicants the ECtHR’s
main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant
87 Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 376.
88 Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, p 102.
89 See for example Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995], para 14 and Case C-276/01, Steffensen
[2003], para 66.
90 See for example ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para
122.
91 ECtHR (GC) 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, no 30210/96, para 158, ECtHR 11 July 2000,
Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 48. Van Dijk ao 2006, p 1006.
92 ECtHR, 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos 13163/87; 13164/87;
13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 122.
93 See for example ECtHR (GC) 10 May 2001, Z and others v the United Kingdom, no 29392/95,
para 163.
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against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which
he or she has fled.94
The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is limited to making use of
those remedies which can be considered effective and available.95 The require-
ment of effectiveness for domestic remedies under the requirement to exhaust
domestic remedies and the right to an effective remedy are very similar. This
follows most clearly from the ECtHR’s case-law, which states that Article 35
has ‘a close affinity’ with Article 13 ECHR.96 The ECtHR’s case-law on Articles
35 (1) and 13 ECHR run to a certain extent parallel.97 In order to be considered
effective domestic remedies must offer sufficient safeguards.98 The ECtHR has
for example held under Article 35 (1) ECHR that the domestic remedy must
be accessible for the person concerned99 and that the remedy must have
automatic suspensive effect in case of a claim of a risk of refoulement.100
4.3.4 Institutions responsible for providing effective remedies
It is the national courts which need to provide natural or legal persons with
an effective remedy against a decision by the EU Institutions or national author-
ities taken pursuant to the applicable provisions of EU law.101 Therefore ‘it
is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures
which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection.’102 The
Court of Justice held that the principle of effective judicial protection ‘affords
94 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 286.
95 ECtHR (GC) 28 July 1999, Selmouni v France, no 25803/94, para 75. For the ICCPR see for
example HRC 26 August 2004, Madafferi v Australia, no 1011/2001, para 8.4. Art 22 (5) (b)
CAT provides that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies shall not apply where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective
relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of the Convention. See also Nowak
& McArthur 2008, p 796.
96 See for example ECtHR (GC) 28 July 1999, Selmouni v France, no 25803/94, para 74.
97 Spijkerboer 2009, p 51, Harris, O’ Boyle & Warbrick 2009, p 562. In some cases the prelimin-
ary objection regarding the alleged non exhaustion of domestic remedies and the complaint
of a violation of Art 13 ECHR are assessed together by the ECtHR. See for example ECtHR
(GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 336-337. Arguably
a clear parallel also exists between the right to an effective remedy and the obligation to
exhaust domestic remedies included in the ICCPR and CAT.
98 ECtHR 23 October 2008, Soldatenko v Ukraine, no 2440/07, para 49.
99 ECtHR 8 January 2004, Sardinas Albo v Italy, no 56271/00.
100 ECtHR (Adm) 20 September 2007, Sultani v France, no 45223/05, para 51. According to the
HRC the fact that a remedy must be effective and available entails that procedural guaran-
tees for a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal must
be scrupulously observed. HRC 1 November 1985, Arzuaga Gilboa v Uruguay, no 147/1983
101 See section 2.5.
102 Case C-50/00, Union de Pequeños [2002], para 41.
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an individual a right of access to a court or tribunal but not to a number of
levels of jurisdiction’.103
The EU right to an effective remedy provides broader protection than Ar-
ticle 13, Article 2 (3) ICCPR and Article 3 CAT. These provisions require an
effective remedy before an independent and impartial authority, which does
not need to be a judicial authority.104 Both Article 6 (1) ECHR and Article 14
(1) ICCPR do require a fair trial before an independent and impartial court or
tribunal.
Criteria court or tribunal
When examining whether a national body can be regarded a court or tribunal
the Court of Justice takes several factors into account, such as whether the
body concerned is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its
jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes and whether
it applies rules of law. Furthermore a court or tribunal is independent and
impartial.105
The factors used by the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee in order
to establish whether a national body should be considered a court or tribunal
are similar to those used by the Court of Justice.106 Article 6 (1) ECHR further-
more demands that the court or tribunal have ‘full jurisdiction’. This means
that it must be able quash the challenged decision in all respects, on questions
of fact and law.107
103 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 69.
104 See for example ECtHR 11 January 2007, Musa e.a. v Bulgaria, no 61259/00, HRC 10 Novem-
ber 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no 1416/2005, para 11.8. Art 13 ECHR speaks of a ‘national
authority’, Art 2 (3) requires a competent judicial, administrative or legislative authority,
or any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State. The ComAT
decided in Agiza v Sweden, 20 May 2005, no 233/2003, para 13.7 that the review required
under Art 3 CAT can be provided by a judicial or independent administrative authority.
105 See for example Case C-506/04, Wilson [2006], paras 47-53.
106 Whether a body can be regarded as independent depends on ‘the manner of appointment
of its members and their term of office, the existence of safeguards against outside pressures
and the question whether it presents an appearance of independence’. The requirement
of impartiality entails that the court or tribunal be subjectively free of personal prejudice
or bias and that it be impartial from an objective viewpoint. ECtHR (GC) 6 May 2003, Kleyn
and others v the Netherlands, nos 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, paras 190-191.
See with regard to Art 14 ICCPR for example: HRC 10 November 1993, Oló Bahamonde v
Equatorial Guinea, no 468/1991, para 9.4 and HRC 3 November 2008, Castedo v Spain, no
1122/2002, paras 9.5-9.8 and General Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para III,
sub 19-21.
107 See for example ECtHR 28 September 1995, Schmautzer v Austria, no 15523/89, para 36.
See further Chapter 9 on judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts.
The EU right to an effective remedy and related procedural rights and principles 97
4.3.5 Effect in the national legal order
What needs to be done if a national procedural rule does not comply with
EU right to an effective remedy? First of all the national court should try to
interpret national procedural rules in conformity with EU rules.108 This may
avoid a breach of the right to effective judicial protection. The Court considered
in Unibet:
[I]t is for the national courts to interpret the procedural rules governing actions
brought before them [..] in such a way as to enable those rules, wherever possible,
to be implemented in such a manner as to contribute to the attainment of the
objective [..] of ensuring effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under
Community law.109
If consistent interpretation is not possible a national procedural rule which
breaches the EU right to effective judicial protection should be set aside.110
No new remedies?
An important question is whether EU law requires a Member State to introduce
new remedies, if no effective remedy is available. The Court of Justice’s judg-
ment in Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord v Hauptzollamt Kiel suggested that the
Court is of the opinion that no such requirement exists. The Court considered
that ‘the EC-Treaty was not intended to create new remedies in the national
courts to ensure the observance of Community law other than those already
laid down by national law’.111
For a long time it remained uncertain whether Member States could be
obliged to introduce new remedies under EU law. Several judgments seemed
to undermine the no new remedies statement in Rewe.112 In Unibet the Court
finally made clear that Member States are exceptionally required to create new
national remedies if this is necessary to ensure the EU fundamental right to
effective judicial protection.113 This right thus entails negative as well as posit-
ive obligations.114 In Unibet the Court considered:
108 Haapaniemi 2009, pp 96-97. Arnull 2011, p 55.
109 Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], para 44. See also Case C-50/00, Union de Pequeños [2002],
para 42 and Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 60.
110 Haapaniemi 2009, pp 96-97. He states: ‘Only if it is not possible to attain the conformity
of national law with EU law by virtue of consistent interpretation, the national court can
set aside a national provision conflicting with it.’
111 Case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981], para 6.
112 Craig & de Búrca 2003, pp 237-238. They refer amongst others to the Factortame case (see
further section 6.3.1.1). Groussot refers to Case C-424/99, Commission v Austria [2001], paras
39-47 and Case C-97/91, Borelli [1991], para 13. Groussot 2006, p 338.
113 Arnull 2011, p 56, Haapaniemi 2009, pp 107-108 and Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, pp 105-106.
114 Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, pp 41-42.
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Although the EC Treaty has made it possible in a number of instances for private
persons to bring a direct action, where appropriate, before the Community Court,
it was not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the
observance of Community law other than those already laid down by national law
[..]. It would be otherwise only if it were apparent from the overall scheme of the
national legal system in question that no legal remedy existed which made it
possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual’s rights under Com-
munity law [..].115
Applicants cannot insist on a particular remedy where alternative remedies
exist in the national legal system, which comply with the principles of effective-
ness and equivalence.116
4.3.6 The right of access to a court or tribunal
Article 19 (1) EU Treaty and Article 39 PD require the existence of an effective
remedy before national courts, but do not explicitly demand that such remedy
is accessible for the individual. It should however be derived from Article 47
of the Charter and the Court of Justice’s case-law that the EU right to an
effective remedy includes a right of access to such a remedy.117 Article 47
requires that free legal aid be provided when necessary to ensure effective
access to justice.118 This implies that the remedy required by Article 47 should
be accessible. In DEB the Court of Justice explicitly mentioned ‘the right of
access to the courts’.119 In Union de Pequeños the Court ruled that, in accord-
ance with the principle of sincere cooperation,
national courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables
natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision
or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act
of general application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act.120
Furthermore the Court of Justice has ruled in several cases that national
procedural rules limiting access to a remedy were contrary to the principle
115 Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], paras 40-41.
116 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 54, Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], para 65 and Case
C-326/96, Levez [1998], para 53. See also on this issue Arnull 2011, p 58-62.
117 See also Dougan 2004, p 4-5.
118 See also Case C-279/09, DEB [2010], para 29, where the Court of Justice considered that
the question referred, concerned the right of a legal person to effective access to justice
and, accordingly, in the context of EU law, concerned the principle of effective judicial
protection.
119 Case C-279/09, DEB [2010], para 60.
120 Case C-50/00, Union de Pequeños [2002], para 42.
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of effectiveness as they rendered the right to an effective remedy virtually
impossible or excessively difficult.121
Access to court under international law
It also follows from the sources of inspiration for the interpretation of the EU
right to an effective remedy that access to court should be guaranteed. The
ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee have ruled that the remedy required
by Article 13 ECHR122 and Article 2 (3) ICCPR must be accessible for the indi-
vidual.123 According to the ECtHR this means in particular that the exercise
of the remedy must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of
the authorities of the respondent State.124 This follows from the fact that the
remedy required by Article 13 must be effective in practice as well as in law.
Furthermore both Article 6 (1) and Article 14 ICCPR include a right of access
to court.125 According to the ECtHR this implies for example that free legal
assistance should be granted to a person if, without the assistance of a lawyer,
this person would not be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily
before the court.126 It also prohibits that access to a court is blocked because
of short time-limits for lodging the appeal127 or procedural rules which
amount to excessive formalism.128
4.3.7 The right to equality of arms and adversarial proceedings
The principle of equality of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings are
often linked to each other and to other elements of the right to a fair trial or
the right to an effective remedy such as the right of the defence, the right to
121 See eg Case C-459/99, MRAX [2002], paras 102-103, where the Court held that the require-
ment for judicial review of the refusal of a residence permit or the decision to expel by
a national authority would be rendered largely ineffective if entitlement to this remedy
were excluded in the absence of an identity document or visa or where one of those
documents has expired. See also Case C-78/98, Preston and Fletcher [2000] and Case
C-255/00, Grundig Italiana [2002], in which the Court held that national time-limits for
bringing proceedings were contrary to EU law.
122 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 318.
123 The HRC ruled that Art 2 (3) ICCPR requires State parties to ensure that individuals have
accessible, effective and enforceable remedies to uphold the rights protected by the
Covenant. HRC 16 August 2007, Kimouche v Algeria, no 1328/2004, para 7.10 and HRC 19
September 2003, George Kazantzis v Cyprus, no 972/2001, para 6.6.
124 Van Dijk a.o. 2006, p 1006. See for example ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v
Georgia and Russia, no 36378/02, para 447.
125 ECtHR (Plen) 21 February 1975, Golder v the United Kingdom, no 4451/70 and HRC 10
November 1993, Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea, no 468/1991, para 9.4. See also HRC
General Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para II sub 9.
126 ECtHR 9 October 1979, Airey v Ireland, no 6289/73, para 24.
127 ECtHR 28 October 1998, Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v Spain, no 28090/95.
128 See for example ECtHR 28 June 2005, Zednik v Chech Republic, no 74328/01, para 29.
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be heard or the duty to give reasons for a decision.129 The principle of equal-
ity of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings are also guaranteed by
the right to a fair hearing or fair trial included in Article 6 ECHR and Article
14 ICCPR. Chapter 10 discusses the meaning of the principle of equality of arms
and the right to adversarial proceedings in cases where the (asylum) decision
is based on secret evidence. Here some general remarks will be made concern-
ing these rights
The right to equality of arms
The Court of Justice has recognised the principle of equality of arms as a
general principle of EU law.130 Although this EU principle is based on Article
6 ECHR, which only applies to procedures before courts, it seems to apply also
to administrative proceedings.131 The Court of Justice has derived procedural
guarantees from this principle, in particular in competition cases. These rights
often relate to the right of access to the file. The Court held for example that
the principle presupposes that in a competition case the knowledge which
the undertaking concerned has of the file used in the proceeding is the same
as that of the Commission.132 In its case-law the Court has not provided a
clear definition of the principle of equality of arms.
According to Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR the right to equality of
arms requires each party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present his
or her case under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.133 According to the Human Rights
Committee this principle implies that the parties to the proceedings must have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their arguments, which,
in turn, requires access to the documents necessary to prepare such argu-
ments.134
129 See for example Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995].
130 See for example Case T-30/91, Solvay v Commission [1995] and Case C-341/04, Eurofood
IFSC [2006], paras 65-66.
131 See for example Case C-63/01, Evans [2003], paras 74-78, where the Court of Justice held
that the principle of effectiveness may require national authorities to grant legal assistance
to persons because of their less advantageous position in which they find themselves vis-à-
vis the decision-making authority and the conditions under which they are able to submit
their comments on matters that may be used against them. Case T-9/99, HFB and others
v Commission [2002], para 330 and Case T-232/00, Chef Revival USA v OHIM [2002], para 42,
where it concerned translation of documents in the administrative phase before an EU
Institution.
132 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 93.
133 ECtHR 27 October 1993, Dombo beheer v the Netherlands, no 14448/88, para 33. See with
regard to the ICCPR: HRC 28 July 1989, Morael v France, no 207/86, para 9.3. and General
Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para II, sub 8 and 13.
134 See for example HRC 20 August 2004, Perterer v Austria, no 1015/2001, para 10.6
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The right to adversarial proceedings
Closely linked to the principle of equality of arms is the right to adversarial
or inter partes proceedings. The Court of Justice has referred also to this right
particularly in competition cases. The adversarial principle means, as a rule,
that the parties have a right to a process of inspecting and commenting on
the evidence and observations submitted to the court.135 It also requires that
in proceedings before (EU) courts, the parties be appraised of and be able to
debate and be heard on, the matters of fact and of law which will determine
the outcome of the proceedings.136
These requirements are very similar to those following from the right to
adversarial proceedings means guaranteed by Articles 6 ECHR and Article 14
ICCPR.137 Also the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 ECHR
includes the right to adversarial proceedings.138
4.4 THE EU RIGHT TO GOOD ADMINISTRATION
Article 41 of the Charter includes the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time (the right to good administra-
tion). This right includes amongst others the right to be heard, the right of
access to the file and the duty to state reasons for a decision. Kañska mentions
that this provision is the first official attempt at a positive definition of the
meaning of ‘good administration’.139 Part of the rights of Article 41 of the
Charter are based on rights which were already included in the former EC
Treaty (the duty to state reasons, the right to reparation of damages and the
right to write the institutions). However, Article 41 is mainly inspired by the
case-law of the EU Courts.140 The EU principle of good administration is an
umbrella principle which comprises more rights and obligations than those
included in Article 41 of the Charter, such as the duty of care141 and the right
to transparency other than the right of access to the file.142
135 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 47.
136 Case C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland and others [2009], para 56.
137 According to the ECtHR this right requires in principle, the opportunity for the parties
to a trial to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed,
with a view to influencing the court’s decision. ECtHR (GC) 22 January 1996, Lobo Machado
v Portugal, no 15764/89, para 31. See also HRC 28 July 1989, Morael v France, no 207/1986,
para 9.3 and General Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para II.
138 See ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, para 137.
139 Kañska 2004, p 303. See also Dutheil de la Rochère 2008, p 168.
140 Kañska 2004, pp 303-304.
141 See for example Joined Cases T-3/00 and T-337/04, Pitsiorias v Council and ECB [2007], para
163 where it is stated that the principle of sound administration entails that the competent
institution is under a duty to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects
of the individual case.
142 Kañska 2004, pp 305 and 322-323, Dutheil de la Rochère 2008, p 169.
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Applicability to national administrative proceedings
It follows from the text of Article 41 that it does not apply to pure national
administrative proceedings. However the Court of Justice does impose pro-
cedural obligations for the administrative phase on the Member States.143
It requires amongst others that national authorities state the reasons for their
decisions and that persons aversely affected by a decision be heard during
the administrative phase. A.G. Kokott wrote in an opinion of 2009 that for
that reason ‘Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not just
contain rules of good administration by the institutions but documents a
general principle of law, which authorities of the Member States too must
observe when applying Community law’.144 Some aspects of the principle
of good administration are codified in the Procedures Directive. Article 8 (2)
PD for example contains a duty for the decision-making authorities to conduct
an appropriate examination of the asylum claim. This could be regarded as
a codification of the duty of care. Article 16 (1) PD guarantees the applicant’s
lawyer’s access to the applicant’s file.
Several rights included in Article 41 of the Charter play a role in this study.
In the following sections the right to be heard and the duty to state reasons
will be introduced more in detail.
4.4.1 Provisions of international law inspiring the EU right to good
administration
Although according to its text Article 13 ECHR only applies to proceedings
before an independent and impartial authority, the ECtHR has also derived
guarantees for administrative proceedings from this provision. In M.S.S. v
Belgium and Greece the ECtHR concluded that Article 13 ECHR had been violated
amongst others as a result of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities’ examina-
tion of the applicant’s asylum request (insufficient information about the
asylum procedure, difficult access to the asylum procedure, shortage of inter-
preters and lack of training of the staff responsible for conducting the indi-
vidual interviews, lack of legal aid and excessively lengthy delays in receiving
a decision). Furthermore it took into account the risk the applicant faced of
being returned to his country of origin without any serious examination of
the merits of his asylum application and without having access to an effective
remedy.145
143 Kañska 2004, p 309, Dutheil de la Rochère 2008, p 170.
144 Opinion of A.G. Kokott with Case C-75/08, Mellor [2009], para 33.
145 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 301-320. See
also ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, paras 111-
117.
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Arguably also the case-law regarding Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR
may inspire the EU right to good administration laid down.146 As was men-
tioned in section 4.3.7 the Court of Justice for example seems to apply the
principle of equality of arms to the administrative phase.
4.4.2 The right to be heard
According to Article 41 of the Charter the right to good administration includes
the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which
would affect him or her adversely is taken.147 The right to be heard (also
seen as part of the rights of the defence) is not only applicable to decisions
by EU Institutions, but also to decisions taken by national authorities.148 It
may be assumed that the EU Courts’ case-law regarding the right to be heard
on decisions by EU Institutions is also relevant for the interpretation of the
right to be heard in the national context. This case-law will therefore be briefly
discussed in this section.
According to the standing case-law of the EU Courts the right to be heard
is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are able to culminate
in a measure aversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of EU
law.149 The right to be heard must be guaranteed even in absence of any rules
governing the procedure in question150 or where legislation existed, but did
not take sufficient account of that right.151 A violation of the right to be heard
will only lead to the annulment of the contested decision if, in the absence
of this irregularity, the procedure could have lead to a different decision.152
The right to be heard requires that the addressees of decisions which
significantly affect their interests be placed in a position in which they may
effectively make known their views on the evidence on which the decision
is based153 and the relevant facts and circumstances.154 This implies that
146 See also Kañska 2004, p 306, who states that ‘the right to good administration, as expressed
by the Charter, mirrors the principles of fair trial (or due process) guaranteed by the
Convention’.
147 Schwartze mentions that the right to be heard is probably the most important principle
of administrative procedure. Schwartze 2004, p 91.
148 C-28/05, Dokter [2006], paras 74. This case concerned a decision by national authorities
to impose measures on breeders in order to control foot-and-mouth disease on their
holdings. See also Reichel 2008, p 266.
149 See for example Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 74. A.G. Bot stated in para 32 of his
opinion in Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Ireland that the
right to be heard also applies to asylum procedures.
150 See for example Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], para 91 and Joined cases C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others [2010], para 55.
151 Craig 2006, p 519.
152 Case T-372/00, Campolargo v Commission [2002], para 39.
153 See for example Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 74 and Case C-32/95P, Commission v
Lisrestal and others [1996], para 21.
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the parties concerned must be informed of the evidence adduced against
them155 or that a draft decision is submitted to this party.156 According to
the EU Courts’ settled case-law the right of access to the file is one of the
procedural safeguards which ensure that the right to be heard can be exercised
effectively.157 The right of every person to have access to his or her file is
laid down in Article 41 (2) of the Charter.
The safeguarding of the right to be heard in the context of the administrat-
ive procedure itself is to be distinguished from that resulting from the right
to an effective judicial remedy against the act having adverse effects which
may be adopted at the end of that procedure.158 The party must generally
be able to exercise the right to be heard before the administrative decision is
adopted159 and a reasonable period should be afforded to effectively put
forward his views.160 The Court of Justice considered in Hercules Chemicals
NV that an infringement of the right to be heard had not been remedied by
the mere fact that access to the relevant files was made possible after the
decision, in particular during the judicial proceedings relating to an action
in which annulment of the contested decision is sought.161
The right to be heard may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in
fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in
question and that they do not constitute, with regard to the objectives pursued,
a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very
substance of the rights guaranteed.162 The EU Courts have for example
accepted that the right to be heard may be restricted in the context of measures
against foot and mouth disease163 and decisions to freeze funds of persons
154 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991], para 25 and Case C-458/98 P, Industrie
des Poudres Sphériques v Council [2000], para 99.
155 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 93. Case
C-32/95P, Commission v Lisrestal and others [1996], para 41. See also T-49/88, Al-Jubail
Fertilizer v Council [1991], para 17.
156 Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission [2000], para 42. The right to be heard does not
extend to the final decision which an administrative authority intends to adopt. See for
example Case T-262/09, Safariland v OHIM [2011], para 80.
157 See for example Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission [2007], para 197. It also follows from
this judgment that the relevant documents should be made accessible to the party concerned
at a moment where the right to be heard can still be exercised. See para 201. See also Kañska
2004, p 318.
158 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 94 and
Case T-372/00, Campolargo v Commission [2002], para 36.
159 See for example Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991], para 25, Joined cases
C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others [2010], paras 54-56 and Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006],
para 74.
160 Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission [2000], para 38.
161 Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1999], paras 78-79. See also section 4.5.2.
162 Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 75.
163 Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 76.
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groups or entities identified as being involved in terrorist acts.164 In such
cases the authorities who took the decision may be obliged to hear this party
as soon as possible after the adoption of the decision165 or in subsequent
proceedings.166
The right to be heard will play a significant role in Chapter 7 on the asylum
applicant’s right to be heard on his asylum motives and Chapter 10 on the
use of secret information.
4.4.3 The duty to state reasons
According to Article 296 TfEU167 and Article 41 (2) of the Charter the bodies
of the EU have the obligation to state reasons for their legal acts or decisions.
The Court of Justice regards this obligation as an essential procedural require-
ment,168 which may be derogated from only for compelling reasons.169 The
plea of absence of or inadequate statement of reasons is a plea involving a
matter of public policy which may, and even must, be raised by the EU judi-
cature of its own motion.170
Article 296 TfEU and Article 41 (2) of the Charter are directed towards the
Institutions of the EU. It follows however from the case-law of the Court of
Justice that the duty to state reasons also applies to the national authorities
taking a decision on the basis of EU legislation.171 The duty of national author-
ities to state reasons is also laid down in Article 9 PD.
The Court of Justice has not ruled whether the requirements under the
duty to state reasons are the same for national authorities and EU Institu-
tions.172 However, it may be assumed that the Courts’ case-law under Article
296 TfEU and Article 41 of the Charter is relevant for the interpretation of the
duty to state reasons in the national context. This is supported by the fact that
164 The Court stated that an initial measure to freeze funds must be able to benefit from a
surprise effect and to be applied with immediate effect. Case T-228/02, Organisation des
Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 127. See also Case C-111/02 P Parliament
v Reynolds [2004], paras 57-60.
165 See for example Case T-211/98, F v Commission [2000], para 34.
166 Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 76, and Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du
peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 130.
167 Art 253 of the former EC Treaty.
168 Case C-17/99, France v Commission [2001], para 35.
169 See for example Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], para 80.
170 Case C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland and Others [2009], para 34.
171 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v Heylens and others [1987], para 15 and Case C-239/05, BVBA
Management, Training en Consultancy [2007], para 36. Reichel states that Heylens shows the
function of the principle of good administration as ‘a vehicle to strengthen private parties’
possibilities to bring about an effective application of their Community rights before national
authorities’. Reichel 2008, p 265.
172 See Reichel 2008, pp 265-267.
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several EU measures seem to have codified the case-law of the EU Courts
regarding the EU Institutions’ duty to state reasons in EU legislation containing
requirements for national authorities.173
The duty to state reasons is closely connected to the right to an effective
remedy.174 This right can only be effectively exercised if the person concerned
knows the reasons underlying the negative decision.175 Compliance with
the obligation to state reasons is all the more important, if the party concerned
is not afforded the opportunity to be heard before the adoption of the initial
decision. In that situation the obligation to state reasons constitutes the sole
safeguard enabling the party concerned, especially after the adoption of that
decision, to make effective use of the legal remedies available to it to challenge
the lawfulness of that decision.176 Furthermore the statement of reasons must
enable the court to review the decision.177 Finally the statement of reasons
serves transparency and may raise the quality of decision-making.178
The duty to state reasons must ensure that the party concerned can defend
an EU right under the best possible conditions and that this person has the
possibility to decide with a full knowledge of the relevant facts whether there
is any point in his applying to the court.179 The statement of reasons for a
decision required by Article 296 TfEU must be appropriate to the act at issue
and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed
by the EU institution which adopted the measure in question.180 Reasons of
a general, stereotype nature, which do not contain any specific information
173 See for example Art 30 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/
148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ
L158/77.
174 See also section 4.2.
175 Ponce writes: ‘The record and the reasons stated are similar to the black box in planes,
but in relation to administrative procedures: a place where everybody (including the judge
in event of controls) can check what has happened, what was well done, and what was
overlooked, or done badly.’ Ponce 2005, p 574.
176 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 140 and
Case T-237/00, Reynolds v Parliament [2004], para 95.
177 The statement of reasons must enable the EU judicature to exercise its power of review.
See Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission [1998], Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and
T-405/03, Sison v Council [2005], para 59 and Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines
du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 89. See Kañska 2004, p 320.
178 See also Reichel 2008, p 252 and A.G. Kokott’s opinion with Case C-75/08, Mellor [2009]:
‘The giving of reasons is not exclusively in the interest of the citizen, moreover: it also effects
an initial self-check on the part of the administration and can pacify relations with the
citizen, since if the reasons are convincing they put an end to existing conflicts and prevent
superfluous legal disputes.’
179 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v Heylens and others [1987] para 15 and Case C-70/95, Sodemare
[1997], para 19.
180 Case C-41/00 P, Interporc v Commission [2003], para 55.
The EU right to an effective remedy and related procedural rights and principles 107
relating to the case at issue do not suffice.181 The EU institutions are not
obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the parties
concerned in support of their case182 nor on all the relevant facts and points
of law.183 It is sufficient if they set out the facts and legal considerations
having decisive importance in the context of the decision.184 This includes
the factual and legal elements which provide the legal basis which have lead
to the adoption of the decision185 and the assessment of the essential com-
plaints made by the parties.186
The requirements under the duty to state reasons vary according to the
circumstances of the case. In France v Commission the Court of Justice stated
that the duty to state reasons
must be appraised by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the
content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest
which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and
individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations.187
The degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a decision must
moreover be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical
facilities available for making the decision.188
The statement of reasons must be notified to the person concerned, as far
as possible, at the same time as the act adversely affecting him, or as swift
as possible after the decision has been taken.189 According to the CFI the
failure to state the reasons of a decision cannot be remedied by the fact that
the person concerned learns the reasons for the act during the proceeding
before the judicature.190 The possibility of remedying the total absence of
a statement of reasons after an action has been brought would prejudice the
rights of the defence because the applicant would have only the reply in which
to set out his pleas contesting the reasons which he would not know until after
181 Case T-132/03, Casini v Commission [2005], para 35.
182 Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission [1998], para 79 and Case T-387/94, Asia Motor
France v Commission [1996], para 104.
183 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison v Council [2005], para 59.
184 Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission [1998], para 79 and Case T-387/94, Asia Motor
France v Commission [1996], para 104.
185 Joined Cases T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa and others v Commission [2003], para 232.
186 Joined Cases T-371/94 and T-394/94, British Airways and British Midland Airways v Commis-
sion [1998], para 64.
187 Case C-17/99, France v Commission, para 36 and Case T-70/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EMSA
[2010], para 171. See also Reichel 2008, p 253.
188 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 141 and
Case T-237/00, Reynolds v Parliament [2004], para 102.
189 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 336.
190 See for example Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], para 80 and Case T-228/02,
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 139.
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he had lodged his application. The principle of equality of the parties before
the EU judicature would accordingly be adversely affected.’191
The EU duty to state reasons plays an important role in Chapter 10 of this
study on the use of secret information.
4.5 THREE BASIC NOTIONS
For the purpose of this study a large number of judgements of the Court of
Justice’s and the ECtHR was assessed. It is contended here that from this case-
law three what could be called ‘basic notions’ emerge:
1 When assessing whether EU procedural rights have been infringed (often)
interests must be balanced against each other
2 When determining whether a procedure should be considered fair, regard
should be had to all aspects and instances of this procedure: the overall
fairness of a procedure must be examined
3 The subject matter of the procedure influences the level of procedural
protection which must be offered to the applicant.
These notions seem to play a role in many of the cases in which procedural
rules are tested against procedural rights and principles. Therefore they may
be helpful on the one hand to explain some of the choices made by the Court
of Justice and the ECtHR and on the other hand to predict these courts’
approach in new situations. These notions will therefore be used as a tool to
analyse the case-law examined in the thematic chapters and to develop a set
of EU procedural standards for the procedural topics discussed in those chap-
ters. The three ‘basic notions’ will be further explained in this section.
4.5.1 Balancing of interests
The EU Courts have recognised that Member States are allowed to limit EU
procedural rights, such as the right to an effective remedy, the right to be heard
or the duty to state reasons. In that situation often the interest of the party
concerned must be balanced against the interests of the State or other parties
191 Case T-253/04, KONGRA-GEL and others v Council [2008], para 101, Case T-228/02, Organisa-
tion des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 139, 165 and Case T-132/03,
Casini v Commission [2005], para 33. The last mentioned case the Court admits however
that ‘l’insuffisance initiale de la motivation puisse être palliée par des précisions complé-
mentaires apportées, même en cours d’instance, lorsque, avant l’introduction de son recours,
l’intéressé disposait déjà d’éléments constituant un début de motivation.’ In Case T-237/00,
Reynolds v Parliament [2004], para 97 and 101, the Court stated however that this applies
only in exceptional cases.
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in such limitations. The right of access to court for example may be limited
by the imposition of time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interest of
legal certainty.192 The right to be heard of one company may be limited in
order to ensure the right of protection of business secrets of another com-
pany.193 The State’s interest to assess an asylum claim as quick as possible
in order to remove persons who have no right to stay may result in lesser
procedural guarantees for the applicant.194
The Court of Justice has held that in the assessment of the effectiveness
of national procedural rules ‘the basic principles of the domestic judicial
system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal
certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be
taken into consideration.’195 The Court examines which aim is underlying
the national procedural rule which limits a party’s procedural right. Often
these underlying aims, such as legal certainty, are also recognised as EU general
principles. The Court then strikes a balance between this underlying aim of
the national procedural rule on the one hand and the need for effectiveness
on the other.196 Some authors call this the “procedural rule of reason”
test.197
The procedural rule of reason test has been criticised because it leads to
a lack of predictability and legal certainty, as it is applied on a case by case
basis. Using case-law as guidelines is therefore complicated.198 Haapaniemi
remarks that in its case-law the Court of Justice has not in every case where
it applied the principles of effectiveness and equivalence repeated the pro-
cedural rule of reason test, but has referred to it from time to time. He states
however that ‘reconciliation of the interests the national provision represents
and the exigencies of EU law are at any rate intrinsic in the Rewe/Comet
jurisprudence’ also without any explicit reference to the balancing test.199
Prechal and Widdershoven argue that the balancing test performed by the
Court of Justice under the principle of effectiveness is less intense than that
applied when the EU right to an effective remedy is at stake.200
Balancing of interests in the ECtHR’s case-law
The ECtHR has held with regard to Article 13 ECHR that the context in which
an alleged violation occurs may entail inherent limitations on the conceivable
192 See for example Case C-63/08, Pontin [2008], para 48.
193 See for example Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 51 and Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006],
para 40. See also Schwartze 2004, p 96.
194 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 65.
195 Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995], para 14.
196 Engström 2008, p 68. See also Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, p 103.
197 Engström 2008, p 68. Prechal & Shelkoplyas 2004, p 593.
198 Engström 2008, p 71. See also Prechal & Shelkoplyas 2004, p 593.
199 Haapaniemi 2009, p 98.
200 Prechal & Widdershoven 2011, p 43-44.
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remedy.201 The ECtHR has for example accepted limitations to the right to
an effective remedy in circumstances where national security considerations
did not permit the divulging of certain sensitive information.202 Furthermore
the right to a court guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR, of which the right of access
is one aspect, is not absolute. It is subject to limitations permitted by implica-
tion, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are
concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State. However,
these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way
or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Lastly, such
limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 (1) if they do not pursue a
legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim pursued.203 Furthermore the right
to a public hearing may in exceptional circumstances be dispensed with.204
Finally the ECtHR has recognised that the right to adversarial proceedings may
be limited for example in order to preserve the fundamental rights of another
individual or to safeguard an important public interest, which justifies a
limitation of this right.205
4.5.2 Assessing the overall fairness of a procedure
Asylum procedures and other procedures usually consist of several phases,
for example an administrative phase, an appeal phase and a higher appeal
phase. Within those phases several procedural steps may be taken. The admin-
istrative phase of an asylum procedure for example may consist of several
interviews with the asylum applicant, the gathering of additional evidence
or information, contacts between the applicant and his lawyer and taking the
decision. Generally shortcomings in one phase or step of the procedure may
be compensated or repaired in another step or phase of the same procedure
or even in a subsequent procedure. Shortcomings in the assessment of evidence
during the administrative phase may for example be repaired by a full judicial
review of the facts. In such a situation a violation of a procedural right or
201 ECtHR (GC) 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, no 30210/96, para 151.
202 ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99. See also HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani
v Canada, no 1051/2002, where the HRC considered that in the circumstances of national
security involved, it was not persuaded that the process was unfair to the author. See further
section 10.3.3.
203 See for example ECtHR 15 February 2000, Garcia Manibardo v Spain, no 38695/97, para 36
and ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly & sons v the United Kingdom, no 20390/92 and 21322/92,
para 72. See also HRC General Comment No 32 (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32, para II, sub 9.
204 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 41 and ECtHR (GC)
11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 47.
205 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96,
para 45.
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principle may be prevented. It is therefore the fairness of a procedure as a
whole which should be assessed.
The Court of Justice has considered in cases where it assesses national
procedural rules in the light of the principle of effectiveness that:
each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders
application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed
by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its
special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances.206
This implies that the fairness of a national procedural rule should not be
assessed in a vacuum but in the context of the national procedure as a
whole.207 Recital 27 of the Preamble of the Procedures Directive reflects this
case-law, while stating that the effectiveness of a national remedy, also with
regard to the examination of the relevant facts, depends on the administrative
and judicial system of each Member State seen as a whole.208
Overall fairness in the ECtHR’s case-law
According to the ECtHR ‘even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely
satisfy the requirements under Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided
for under domestic law may do so’.209 Furthermore the ECtHR has explicitly
considered under Article 6 that it ‘always tries to take into account the “pro-
ceedings as a whole” before deciding whether or not there has been a violation
of the Convention in respect of a specific episode’.210 Guarantees offered in
one instance of the procedure may justify lesser safeguards in further instances.
Article 6 applies to appeal and cassation procedures. In its assessment of the
fairness of such proceedings, the ECtHR takes into account the guarantees
offered in first instance proceedings.211 Furthermore the possibility exists
that a higher or the highest tribunal may, in certain circumstances, make
206 See for example Case C-63/01, Evans [2003], para 46 and Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995],
para 14.
207 See also Accetto & Zlepnig 2005, p 391, who state that the Court of Justice confirmed in
Evans that the negative impact of a national procedural provision on the application of
EU law must be analysed in the light of the domestic judicial system as a whole.
208 Recital 27 Preamble PD.
209 See for example ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
para 289 and ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v Sweden, no 9248/81, para 84.
210 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para 164. See also ECtHR 13
October 2009, Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia, no 36500/05, para 128 and ECtHR 25 October 1995,
Bryan v the United Kingdom, no 19178/91, paras 45-46 and Harris, O’ Boyle & Warbrick
2009, p 246.
211 According to the ECtHR ‘the manner in which Article 6 applies to courts of appeal or of
cassation must depend on the special features of the proceedings concerned and account
must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and
the court of cassation’s role in them.’ See for example ECtHR 22 March 2007, Sialkowska
v Poland, no 8932/05, para 104.
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reparation for an initial violation of Article 6 ECHR. Such a violation cannot
be remedied in a later stage of the procedure if any prejudice suffered in the
meantime has become irreversible.212 On the other hand, the ECtHR may rule
that domestic proceedings had been unfair ‘because of the cumulative effect
of various procedural defects’. In such a situation each defect, taken alone,
would not have convinced the ECtHR that the proceedings were unfair, but
their coexistence is the factor that leads to a finding of a violation of
Article 6.213
No possible reparation for procedural flaws
It is however also possible that a procedural rule or practice on its own
amounts to a violation of a procedural right or principle. The CFI has for
example held that a violation of the right to be heard during the administrative
procedure cannot be repaired during the appeal phase.214 In Hercules Chem-
icals the Court of Justice considered that the disclosure during the appeal phase
of relevant documents underlying a Commission decision to impose a fine
or penalty, cannot remedy a breach of the rights of the defence caused by the
non-disclosure of those documents during the administrative phase.215 The
Court stated:
Although belated disclosure of documents in the file allows the undertaking that
has support of the forms of order it is seeking, it does not put the undertaking
back into the situation it would have been in if it had been able to rely on those
documents in presenting its written and oral observations to the Commission.216
Furthermore procedural rules which effectively block access to a court or
tribunal often in themselves violate the right to effective judicial protection
or fair trial.217
212 ECtHR 14 June 2011, Mercieca and others v Malta, no 21974/07, para 49.
213 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para 165.
214 Case T-253/04, KONGRA-GEL and others v Council [2008], para 101 and Case T-228/02,
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 139.
215 Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission. paras 77-79.
216 Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission. para 79.
217 See for example Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] and ECtHR 28 October 1998, Pérez de Rada
Cavanilles v Spain, no 28090/95, where the ECtHR held that the particularly strict application
of a procedural rule by the domestic courts deprived the applicant of the right of access
to a court.
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4.5.3 The subject matter of the procedure
When assessing procedural matters the Court of Justice and the ECtHR often
take the individual circumstances of the case into account.218 Factors which
may influence the level of procedural protection which should be granted are
amongst others the nature of the rights claimed by the applicant and the
personal circumstances of the applicant. Arguably the required level of pro-
cedural protection depends on the interests at stake for the party concerned.
Furthermore the characteristics of the person concerned may require more
or less procedural guarantees. As a result one must be careful not to apply
judgments of the EU Courts and the ECtHR mechanically to other fields of (EU)
law.219
Asylum cases have a few characteristics which distinguish them from most
other cases falling within the scope of EU law. These relate first of all to the
fundamental and even absolute nature of the rights claimed and secondly to
the special and often vulnerable situation in which asylum applicants find
themselves. The Court should take these characteristics into account when
interpreting the Procedures Directive and assessing national procedural rules
in the light of EU procedural rights and principles. Also other factors may
influence the level of procedural guarantees offered. Both the Court of Justice
and the ECtHR have for example accepted that the level of discretion left to
the decision-making authorities determines the standard of judicial review
which is required.220
4.5.3.1 The nature of the rights claimed
As opposed to State aid, mergers or agriculture, asylum is not an economic,
but very much a human rights issue, in which the absolute EU prohibition of
refoulement and the right to asylum play a crucial role. The fact that the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement is absolute will potentially play an important role in
218 Barbier de la Serre states for example that the rights of the defence will be acknowledged
and or increased in their intensity: where (i) the institution enjoys a wide margin of appreci-
ation, (ii) the party’s participation may contribute substantially to the overall quality of
the decision; (iii) the procedure concerns a field in which the institution enjoys strong
investigative powers; (iv) the decision to be taken involves an appreciation of the party’s
behaviour and/or could be injurious to that party’s reputation; (v) the exercise of the rights
of the defence entails no excessive material costs; and to a lesser extent (vi) failure to exercise
the rights of the defence would entail significant moral costs. Barbier de la Serre 2006, pp
248-249.
219 In Case C-473/00, Cofidis [2002], para 37 the Court of Justice stated that the Rewe and
Palmisani decisions cited by Cofidis and the French Government were merely the result
of assessments on a case by case basis, taking account of each case’s own factual and legal
context as a whole, which cannot be applied mechanically in fields other than those in which
they were made.
220 See further Chapter 9 on judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts
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cases regarding procedural guarantees for asylum applicants. A lack of pro-
cedural guarantees or the balancing of interests may never lead to a violation
of this principle. Therefore, it is not unlikely that in asylum cases the Court
of Justice will require more procedural guarantees than in cases involving
fundamental rights, which allow for derogations and demand a balance of
interests.221 The Court of Justice has held that the assessment of the extent
of the risk of refoulement ‘must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and
care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person
and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of
the Union’.222 The fundamental nature of the right to asylum, although not
absolute, will potentially also require high procedural standards.223
The Court of Justice has also shown in its case-law regarding other fields
of EU law that it takes into account what is at stake for an individual when
deciding on the effectiveness of national procedural rules. In Visciano for
example the Court of Justice took into account, when assessing a time-limit
set by national law in the light of the principle of effectiveness that the case
concerned a claim for payment of salary. According to the Court such claims
are by their very nature, of great importance to the individual concerned.224
The Court of Justice also held that the duty to state reasons must be appraised
by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the
measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which
the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and
individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations.225
The same approach can be found in the case-law of the ECtHR. This court
has considered that the scope of the obligation to provide an effective remedy
under Article 13 ECHR varies according to the nature of the applicant’s com-
plaint under the Convention.226 The absolute nature of the right safeguarded
under Article 3 has implications for Article 13 ECtHR.227 It held that ‘in view
of the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3 of the Convention and
the irreversible nature of the damage which may result if the risk of torture
or ill-treatment materialises’, the effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning
221 Staffans states hat the vast interests embedded in asylum procedures on the side of the
State as well as the applicant require real, objective and effective possibilities for review
and remedy. Staffans 2010, pp 273-297.
222 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 90.
223 See also the opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform Ireland, para 43.
224 Case C-69/08, Visciano [2009], para 44. See also Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 74.
225 Case C-17/99, France v Commission, para 36 and Case T-70/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EMSA,
para 171.
226 According to the ECtHR the scope of the obligation under Art 13 varies according to the
nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention. See ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif
v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, para 136.
227 See for example ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
para 288.
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of Article 13 imperatively requires close scrutiny by a national authority,
independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial
grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 and access
to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.228 The Human Rights Commit-
tee considered in Ahani v Canada that ‘where one of the highest values pro-
tected by the Covenant, namely the right to be free from torture, is at stake,
the closest scrutiny should be applied to the fairness of the procedure applied
to determine whether an individual is at a substantial risk of torture.229 When
assessing the fairness of the proceedings under Article 6 ECHR the ECtHR also
takes into account what is at stake for the person concerned. The Court allows
greater latitude when dealing with civil cases than when dealing with criminal
cases.230 In several cases in which the right to adversarial proceedings was
limited as a result of the use of secret evidence the Court stressed the need
for procedural safeguards while referring to the serious consequences of the
contested decision for the applicant.231
4.5.3.2 Special vulnerability of the person concerned
Apart from the nature of the rights claimed, also specific circumstances in
asylum cases may require more procedural guarantees than in other cases
governed by EU law. Many asylum applicants do not speak the language of
the Member State, are not familiar with the legal system in the Member State
and do not have any resources to pay for legal aid. Therefore interpreters,
information on the asylum procedure or free legal aid may be essential in order
to guarantee a fair asylum procedure.232 According to the UNHCR Handbook:
It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee status is normally in a particularly
vulnerable situation. He finds himself in an alien environment and may experience
serious difficulties, technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the
authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not his own. His application
228 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 293.
229 HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani v Canada, no 1051/2002, para 10.6. See also HRC 19 August 1997,
Vincente et al. v Colombia, no 612/1995 where the Committee considered in the context of
the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies ex Art 5 (2) (b), of the Optional Protocol
that, if the alleged offence is particularly serious, as in the case of violations of basic human
rights, in particular the right to life, purely administrative and disciplinary remedies cannot
be considered adequate and effective. Joseph states that this consideration applies also to
allegations of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment given the grave
nature of such abuses. Joseph & others 2006, p 66.
230 See for example ECtHR 27 October 1993, Dombo beheer v the Netherlands, no 14448/88,
para 32.
231 ECtHR 24 April 2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 59, ECtHR 31 October 2006, Aksoy
v Turkey, no 59741/00, para 27 and ECtHR 19 October 2010, Özpinar v Turkey, no 20999/04,
para 78.
232 See for example ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
paras 304-311, 319.
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should therefore be examined within the framework of specially established pro-
cedures by qualified personnel having the necessary knowledge and experience,
and an understanding of an applicant’s particular difficulties and needs.233
Furthermore most asylum applicants have no documents or other proof to
substantiate their asylum claim. The assessment of their asylum claim consists
for the largest part of an examination of the credibility of their asylum
account.234 Finally certain groups of specifically vulnerable asylum applicants
are in need of extra procedural safeguards.235 This applies for example to
(unaccompanied) minor asylum applicants.236 Victims of torture may be afraid
to speak freely to the authorities of the State of refuge.237 Asylum applicants
may have psychological or physical problems, which impede a normal ex-
amination of their case.238 These circumstances may require for example that
the burden of proof normally incumbent upon the applicant be lightened, or
‘different techniques of examination’ be used by the authorities.239
The Court of Justice takes into account the personal circumstances of the
party concerned when assessing national procedural rules in the light of the
principle of effectiveness. In several consumer law cases the Court concluded
for example that national courts must assess the fairness of a contract term
of their own motion in order to ensure consumer protection envisaged by the
relevant directive. It had regard to the fact that the consumer may be unaware
of his rights or may encounter difficulties in enforcing them. The Court con-
sidered:
In disputes where the amounts involved are often limited, the lawyers’ fees may
be higher than the amount at stake, which may deter the consumer from contesting
the application of an unfair term. While it is the case that, in a number of Member
States, procedural rules enable individuals to defend themselves in such proceed-
ings, there is a real risk that the consumer, particularly because of ignorance of
233 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva
1979 (reedited in 1992) (UNHCR Handbook), para 190. See with regard to children also
ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6, para 1, 68 and General Comment
No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 123. The ECtHR considered in ECtHR (GC) 21 January
2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 251 that asylum applicants constitute
‘a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special pro-
tection’.
234 UNHCR Handbook, para 196. See further Chapter 8.5.
235 Note that Art 17 RCD and Art 20 (3) QD mention as vulnerable persons: minors, unaccom-
panied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor
children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of
psychological, physical or sexual violence.
236 According to recital 14 Preamble PD ‘specific procedural guarantees for unaccompanied
minors should be laid down on account of their vulnerability.
237 UNHCR Handbook, para 198.
238 UNHCR Handbook, para 207.
239 UNHCR Handbook, paras 207 and 210.
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the law, will not challenge the term pleaded against him on the grounds that it
is unfair.240
Trstenjak and Beysen state that the Court of Justice resorted to ‘a consumer-
oriented interpretation’ of the concepts of procedural and remedial autonomy
of the Member States. ‘By emphasizing the weak position of the consumer
the ECJ implicitly raised the effectiveness threshold which national procedural
rules for the enforcement of rights under the consumer protection directives
must meet.’241
In Pontin the Court considered that a 15-day period for bringing an action
for nullity of a dismissal and reinstatement of a pregnant woman, must be
regarded as being particularly short and appeared to infringe the principles
of effectiveness ‘in view inter alia of the situation in which a woman finds
herself at the start of her pregnancy’. It also took into account that it would
be ‘very difficult for a female worker dismissed during her pregnancy to obtain
proper advice and, if appropriate, prepare and bring an action within the 15-
day period’.242
The Court of Justice generally assesses in the abstract whether a procedural
rule, taken into account the rights claimed by the party concerned and the
specific features of the procedure, is reasonable and proportionate. The Court
of Justice has made clear however that the application in a particular case of
a procedural rule, which was generally considered reasonable and proportion-
ate, may violate the EU right to an effective remedy. In Samba Diouf for example
the Court of Justice considered a time-limit of fifteen days to bring an appeal
against the rejection of the asylum application in the accelerated procedure
suffient in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy. The Court did not
exclude however that, while a time-limit may be considered reasonable in
general, it may be insufficient in the individual circumstances of the case.
Whether this is the case, is up to the national court to decide.243
240 See for example Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores
[2000], para 26.
241 Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, p 121.
242 Case C-63/08, Pontin [2008], paras 62 and 65.
243 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], paras 66-68. See also Case C-349/07, Sopropé [2008],
para 44.

5 Preliminary conclusions and methodology
used for the following chapters
In order to be able to understand the potential significance of the right to an
effective remedy and related procedural rights for the asylum context, it was
necessary to address several preliminary issues in the previous chapters. The
following conclusions are most important for the purpose of this study:
· Asylum procedures are now governed by the Procedures Directive and
thus fall within the scope of EU law.
· The Court of Justice and national courts may test the validity of the mini-
mum standards of the Procedures Directive against the EU right to an
effective remedy. Those standards should be considered invalid if they
require or expressly or impliedly authorise the Member States to adopt
or retain legislation which does not respect the EU right to an effective
remedy.
· The Court of Justice and national courts may also use the EU right to an
effective remedy to interpret the provisions of the Procedures Directive.
· Member States are bound by the EU right to an effective remedy when
acting within the scope of EU law. They should observe this right even
when making use of the discretionary powers afforded to them by the
Procedures Directive. As a result the discretion left to the Member States
to design their asylum system may be limited to an important extent. The
Court of Justice has shown in its case-law concerning other fields of EU
law that the EU right to an effective remedy considerably limits the pro-
cedural autonomy of the Member States.
· Asylum legislation is a relatively new phenomenon within the EU and case-
law concerning the meaning of the EU right to an effective remedy for
asylum procedures is still scarce. However, the Court of Justice has devel-
oped an important body of case-law concerning the EU right to an effective
remedy in its judgments concerning other fields of EU law. The principles
emerging from this case-law are applicable in all fields of EU law, including
asylum law.
· The EU right to an effective remedy includes rights such as the right to
a fair trial, the right of access to court, the right to equality of arms and
the right to adversarial proceedings. Furthermore it is closely linked to
the right to good administration, which embodies the right to be heard
and the duty to state the reasons of a decision. The exact relationship
between the EU right to an effective remedy and the principle of effective-
ness, which also sets standards for national procedures, remains unclear.
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For the purpose of this study the EU Courts’ case-law regarding all these
rights and principles will be taken into account.
· The interpretation of EU fundamental rights is inspired by international
treaties. In the context of asylum the ECHR, Refugee Convention, CAT, ICCPR
and CRC are particularly relevant. The EU right to an effective remedy is
inspired by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, Article 3 CAT, Articles 2 (3) and 14
ICCPR. The Court of Justice attaches by far most weight to the ECHR and
the ECtHR’s judgments as a source of inspiration. However also the author-
itative but non-binding views of other supervising bodies such as UNHCR,
the Committee against Torture, the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child should be taken into account. For
the purpose of this study the ECtHR’s case-law plays a prominent role, while
the non-binding views of other monitoring bodies are used as comple-
mentary sources of inspiration.
· EU fundamental rights such as the right to an effective remedy may not
offer a lower level of protection than international treaties. the Court of
Justice has shown in its case-law that it scrupulously interprets EU funda-
mental rights in full conformity with the ECtHR’s case-law. It follows from
the text of the Charter as well as the case-law of the Court of Justice that
EU fundamental rights may offer broader protection than international
treaties.
· The EU right to a fair trial applies to all cases falling within the scope of
EU law including asylum cases. Even though the ECtHR has ruled that
Article 6 ECHR does not apply to asylum cases falling within the scope of
application of the ECHR, its case-law concerning Article 6 ECHR may very
well inspire the EU right to a fair trial, also when it is applied in the asylum
context.
· From the EU Courts’ and the ECtHR’s case-law concerning the right to an
effective remedy and fair trial three basic notions emerge, which may be
helpful to explain the choices made by these courts when deciding on
procedural issues and to predict these courts’ approach in new situations:
1 Procedural rights may be limited. Often it is necessary to balance
conflicting interests of the parties involved in the procedure
2 The overall fairness of a procedure should be assessed
3 The courts should have regard to the subject matter of the procedure,
in particular the nature of the rights claimed and special vulnerability
of the person concerned.
5.1 METHOD FOR DEFINING THE MEANING OF THE EU RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE
REMEDY
The next chapters will examine the potential meaning of EU fundamental rights
and general principles for an number of key issues of asylum procedures: The
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right to remain on the territory during first instance and appeal asylum pro-
ceedings (Chapter 6), the asylum applicant’s right to be heard on his asylum
motives in first instance and appeal proceedings (Chapter 7) and questions
relating to evidence in asylum procedures (Chapters 8 to 10).
With regard to most of these topics the Procedures Directive does not
provide for minimum standards, the applicable standards leave the Member
States wide discretion or these standards are in need of interpretation. It is
examined whether the EU right to an effective remedy sets additional standards,
limits the Member States’ discretion or prescribes a certain interpretation of
the Procedures Directive. With regard to some minimum standards the ques-
tion is raised (and answered) whether they violate the EU right to an effective
remedy and should be considered invalid.
The following method is used in order to define the meaning of the EU
right to an effective remedy:
· Most of the topics which will be discussed are not specifically addressed
by Articles 47 and 41 of the Charter. The meaning of the EU right to an
effective remedy is therefore derived from the case-law of the EU Courts
and from relevant sources of inspiration, in particular the ECtHR’s case-law.
· The case-law of the Court of Justice with regard to the specific meaning
of the EU right to an effective remedy for asylum procedures is still very
scarce. However the EU Courts have addressed many of these topics in
the context of other fields of EU law, such as competition law, equal treat-
ment law or EU sanctions. As was concluded above the procedural prin-
ciples emerging from this case-law are applicable to asylum procedures.
· The ECtHR’s case-law regarding Articles 6 and 13 ECHR with regard to non
asylum cases is taken into account when examining which procedural
principles follow from the EU right to an effective remedy. With regard
to some topics, such as the use of secret information, the standards set out
in the ECtHR’s case-law complement the principles emerging from the EU
Courts’ case-law.
· When applying these procedural principles to the asylum context the
special features of asylum procedures should be taken into account (see
the three basic notions mentioned above). The ECtHR in its case-law under
Articles 3 and 13 ECHR concerning asylum cases and the UNHCR and the
UN Committees in their views concerning asylum procedures provide
important guidance for the way in which the EU right to an effective
remedy should be interpreted in the asylum context.
· With regard to some issues discussed in the following chapters, such as
the assessment of the credibility of the asylum applicant’s asylum account
or the right to an oral hearing before a court or tribunal, no relevant case-
law of the EU Courts is available. In such situation the meaning of the EU
right to an effective remedy is largely defined on the basis of the ECtHR’s
case-law and (complementary) the views of UNHCR and the UN Committees
concerning this issue.
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For the purpose of this method in each of the following chapters the following
steps will be taken:244
1 Identification of the provisions of the Procedures Directive applicable to
the specific procedural issue discussed
2 Assessment of the existing case-law of the EU courts concerning the specific
topic.
3 Examination of the case-law of the ECtHR and the non-binding views of
the UNHCR, ComAT, Human Rights Committee and the ComRC, which inspire
the EU right to an effective remedy
4 Conclusion as to the meaning of the EU right to an effective remedy for
the specific aspect of the asylum procedure
5 Application to the provisions of the Procedures Directive
The result of this exercise is a set of EU procedural standards with regard to
the key issues discussed in the following chapters.
244 See also section 1.4.
PART II
Key issues of asylum procedures

6 The right to remain on the territory of
the Member State1
This chapter addresses three questions which relate to the asylum applicant’s
right to remain on the territory of the Member State during the asylum pro-
cedure:
1 Should an asylum seeker be allowed to stay in the State where he applied
for asylum during first instance proceedings?
2 Are Member States required to grant applicants the time and opportunity
to lodge an appeal against this expulsion before being expelled?
3 Must the Member State refrain from expelling the applicant until the
decision on the appeal against the asylum decision has been taken?
Several international monitoring bodies have addressed these questions over
the past years. Most importantly, the ECtHR ruled that Article 13 ECHR requires
State Parties to provide for a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, in the
case of an arguable claim that the person concerned will be subjected to torture
or ill-treatment upon return to his country of origin.
It is argued in this chapter that the effective protection of the prohibition
of refoulement and the right of (access to) an effective remedy require Member
States to refrain from expulsion while asylum proceedings (first instance and
appeal) are still pending. Expulsion of an asylum applicant while the deter-
mining authorities and/or the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39
PD have not yet decided on the risk of refoulement entails a risk of irreparable
harm: the asylum applicant may be subjected to persecution or serious harm
upon expulsion. Furthermore the EU right of access to a court or tribunal
requires that the asylum applicant be offered sufficient time and opportunity
to lodge an appeal against a negative asylum decision.
The right to remain during first instance proceedings
According to Article 7 (1) PD Member States must allow asylum applicants
to remain on their territory for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the
determining authority has made a decision on the asylum application. How-
ever, the second limb of Article 7 PD permits Member States to make an
exception to this rule in certain situations. It will be argued in section 6.1 that
1 Part of this chapter has been published as: A.M. Reneman, An EU Right to Interim Pro-
tection during Appeal Proceedings in Asylum Cases?, 12 European Journal of Migration and
Law (2010), pp 407-434
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the effective protection of the principle of non-refoulement requires that the
applicant will not be expelled before the determining authority has decided
on the potential risk of refoulement.
Access to a remedy before expulsion
The Procedures Directive does not provide asylum applicants with a right
to remain on the territory for the time needed to lodge an appeal against the
asylum decision. Section 6.2 contends however that such a right is guaranteed
by the EU right of access to a court. Expulsion of an asylum applicant, whose
asylum claim has been rejected, may therefore only take place if he has had
reasonable time and opportunity to lodge an appeal against this decision.
The right to remain during appeal proceedings
The main part of this chapter addresses the right to remain in the Member
State during appeal procedures. This issue was heavily discussed by the
Member States during the drafting of the Procedures Directive.2 The result
of these discussions was a clear compromise: the Directive does not oblige
the Member States to attach suspensive effect to the asylum appeal required
by Article 39 PD. Article 39(3) PD leaves this issue to the discretion of the
Member States, while explicitly stating that national rules concerning interim
protection need to comply with international law.3 It is argued in section 6.3
that Article 39(3) PD, interpreted in the light of the EU right to an effective
remedy, requires a judicial remedy with automatic suspensive effect in all
asylum cases, including those which are deemed manifestly unfounded.
6.1 THE RIGHT TO REMAIN DURING THE EXAMINATION OF THE ASYLUM CLAIM
According to Article 7 (1) PD Member States must allow asylum applicants
to remain on their territory, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the
determining authority has made a decision in accordance with the procedures
at first instance set out in Chapter III of the directive.4 However, the second
limb of Article 7 permits Member States to make an exception to this rule in
2 Michelogiannaki 2008, p 25.
3 In this chapter “interim protection” is used as a general term covering both the question
whether an appeal should have suspensive effect and the question whether an applicant
should be able to request interim relief (in asylum cases usually the suspension of the
expulsion measure).
4 See also Council resolution regarding minimum guarantees for asylum procedures of 20
June 1995, para 12. The European Commission reported in 2010 that the right to remain
in the Member State pending the outcomes of first instance procedures is generally recog-
nised in national legislation. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the application of Directive 2005/85/EC, 8 September 2010, COM (2010)
465 final, p 4.
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two situations. First of all the right to remain does not apply where, in accord-
ance with Articles 32 and 34, a subsequent application will not be further
examined. According to these provisions such further examination does not
need to take place if no new elements or findings relating to the examination
of whether he/she qualifies for an asylum status have arisen or have been
presented by the asylum applicant.5
Secondly the applicant may be expelled during the first instance asylum
procedure where the Member State will surrender or extradite a person either
to another Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a Euro-
pean arrest warrant or otherwise, to a third country, or to international
criminal courts or tribunals. The Commission reported in 2010 that Member
States adopt divergent approaches with respect to these surrender or extra-
dition related exceptions. In some Member States such exceptions are allowed.6
Although the Court of Justice has not yet addressed the matter, it is clear that
expulsion or extradition before an assessment of the merits of the asylum claim
has taken place would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the (absolute)
EU principle of non-refoulement.
It follows from the case-law under Articles 3 and 13 ECHR that an asylum
applicant may not be expelled or extradited to his country of origin or a third
country before his claim that he will be subjected to a treatment contrary to
Article 3 ECHR in that country has been scrutinised closely and rigorously by
the national authorities.7 According to the ECtHR effective guarantees must
exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or
indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled.8 This means that the
applicant must (also) be granted the opportunity to have the ‘arguability’ of
his claim of a risk of refoulement assessed by an independent and impartial
5 According to UNHCR many Member States provide for a right to remain during subsequent
asylum procedures. UNHCR mentioned Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, the UK and implicitly in Finland. In Germany and
the Netherlands the right to remain is not guaranteed by law or the status of persons
awaiting the decision on a subsequent application is unclear UNHCR, Improving Asylum
Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice, Geneva: March
2010, s 14, pp 42-43.
6 The Commission mentioned Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Sweden and Romania (only in cases of terrorism). Commis-
sion Report COM (2010) 465 final, p 4-5.
7 See for example ECtHR (GC) 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09,
para 205, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 293,
ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 113, ECtHR
13 April 2010, Charahili v Turkey, no 46605/07, paras 57-58 and ECtHR 21 October 2010,
Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, paras 122-127
8 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 286.
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authority in the meaning of Article 13 ECHR before being expelled or extra-
dited.9
In M.S.S v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR was concerned because of the risks
of refoulement the applicant faced in practice before any decision was taken
on the merits of his case. The applicant, who had lodged an asylum claim with
the Greek authorities, was detained and subjected to an administrative ex-
pulsion procedure after an attempt to leave the country with false papers.
Furthermore he claimed to have barely escaped an attempt by the police to
deport him to Turkey when he tried to leave Greece a second time, while his
asylum application was still pending. The ECtHR considered that the fact that
the applicant had been trying to leave Greece could not be held against him
when examining the conduct of the Greek authorities with regard to the
Convention and when the applicant was attempting to find a solution to his
situation,10 which the Court considered contrary to Article 3.11
The Committee against Torture in 2010 expressed its concerns with regard
to the Austrian asylum law which provided that persons basing their repeat
applications for international protection on new grounds cannot be granted
a stay of their expulsion if they lodge their application within two days prior
to the date set for deportation. According to the Committee those asylum
applicants may, consequently, be at risk of refoulement.12
It also follows from the effective protection of the principle of non-refoule-
ment under the Refugee Convention that States should determine whether a
person qualifies as a refugee before expelling this person.13 The principle of
effectiveness requires that during the determination process this person be
allowed to remain on the territory.14 According to the UNHCR Handbook and
EXCOM Conclusion No 8 the asylum applicant’s right to remain in the country
pending a decision on his initial request for a refugee status is a ‘basic require-
ment’ of an asylum procedure. Only if it is established that this request is
clearly abusive, may the applicant be expelled before a decision on the request
has been taken.15
It should be concluded that the effective protection of the EU prohibition
of refoulement requires that all asylum applicants be allowed to stay on the
territory of the Member States until their claim of a risk of refoulement has been
9 See for example ECtHR 19 November 2009, no 41015/04, Kaboulov v Ukraine, para 119. See
further section 6.3.
10 No reception facilities were offered to the applicant. As a consequence he slept on the streets
of Athens.
11 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 315.
12 ComAT Concluding Observations on Austria, 20 May 2010, CAT/C/AUT/CO/4-5, para 13.
13 See for example Goodwin Gill & McAdam 2007, p 528, Hathaway 2005, pp 158-160, Wouters
2009, p 164.
14 Hathaway 2005, pp 303-304.
15 EXCOM Conclusion no 8 (XXVIII), 1977, para (e) and UNHCR Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva 1979 (reedited in 1992), para 192.
The right to remain on the territory of the Member State 129
closely and rigorously assessed by the determining authority. Subsequent
asylum applications should first be assessed in the light of all facts or evidence
supporting the existence of a risk of refoulement, which have not been taken
into account in the previous asylum procedure(s).16 If an asylum applicant
claims to risk refoulement or onward removal to a country where he risks
refoulement as a result of his surrender or extradition to another Member State,
a third country, or to an international criminal court or tribunal, Member States
should thus always rigorously assess this claim. This does not mean however
that the applicant may be expelled or extradited right after a rigorous assess-
ment of the risk of refoulement has been made by the determining authority,
before a decision has been taken. The EU right to an effective remedy requires
that an applicant be able to appeal the outcome of this assessment and the
decision to expel or extradite him before a court or tribunal. This implies that
the Member State should offer the applicant sufficient time and opportunity
to lodge an appeal in accordance with Article 39 PD (see section 6.2). Further-
more, as will be argued in section 6.3 this appeal should have automatic
suspensive effect.
Should Article 7 (2) of the Procedures Directive then be declared invalid?
This is hard to determine. Potentially there are situations in which the the EU
principle of refoulement and the EU right to an effective remedy does not
prohibit expulsion or extradition an applicant during first instance asylum
proceedings, even though such situations will be rare. It is not excluded for
example that an asylum applicant claims to fear persecution or to risk serious
harm upon return to his country of origin, but does not oppose to expulsion
or extradition to a third country or an international court or tribunal.
6.2 THE RIGHT TO REMAIN DURING THE TIME NECESSARY TO LODGE THE APPEAL
The Procedures Directive does not regulate the right to remain in the Member
State in order to exercise the right of appeal. Swift expulsion after the asylum
decision may render the right of access to court illusory or excessively difficult.
First of all, the applicant may have no opportunity at all to file the appeal,
for example because he is not informed that he is going to be deported and
is not able to reach his lawyer in time. Secondly when expulsion is imminent
the applicant may be forced to immediately lodge an appeal and, if necessary,
a request for interim protection. This may not allow him to take all required
procedural steps in order to submit the appeal, such as consulting a lawyer.
UNHCR mentioned in 2010 that in Finland the expulsion order may be executed
immediately upon the decision being taken. According to UNHCR this means
16 See also section 9.3.
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that the appellant does not have an effective opportunity to apply to the
Helsinki District Court to suspend enforcement.17
The Court of Justice has not yet addressed the question whether an asylum
applicant should be allowed to stay on the territory of the Member State for
the time necessary to lodge an appeal against the negative asylum decision.
However the Court of Justice seems to recognise in Pecastaing that such right
to remain should be accorded to EU citizens who are going to be expelled. The
Court of Justice considered that expulsion of an EU citizen may take place
immediately after the expulsion order has been taken ‘subject always to the
right of this person to stay on the territory for the time necessary to avail
himself of the remedies accorded to him’.18 The accessibility of the remedy
should thus be guaranteed. It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law and the views
of the UN Committees that the same should apply to asylum cases
The ECtHR ruled in several cases that Article 13 ECHR had been violated
because the person claiming that his expulsion or extradition would violate
Article 3 ECHR, did not have the time and opportunity to appeal the expulsion
or extradition decision before this decision was enforced. In Shamayev and others
v Georgia and Russia the ECtHR stated:
[W]here the authorities of a State hasten to hand over an individual to another
State two days after the date on which the order was issued, they have a duty to
act with all the more promptness and expedition to enable the person concerned
to have his or her complaint under Articles 2 and 3 submitted to independent and
rigorous scrutiny and to have enforcement of the impugned measure suspended.
The Court finds it unacceptable for a person to learn that he is to be extradited
only moments before being taken to the airport, when his reason for fleeing the
receiving country has been his fear of treatment contrary to Article 2 or Article 3
of the Convention.19
The Court concluded that Article 13 ECHR had been violated because neither
the applicants nor their lawyers were informed of the extradition orders issued
in respect of the applicants and the competent authorities unjustifiably
hindered the exercise of the right of appeal that might have been available
to them, at least theoretically.20
17 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, p 42.
18 Case 98/79, Pecastaing [1980], para 4. A right to a remedy was provided in this case in Art 8
of Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special
measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health [1964] OJ 056/850.
19 ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v Georgia and Russia, no 36378/02, para 460.
20 ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v Georgia and Russia, no 36378/02, para 461. See
also ECtHR 7 June 2007, Garabayev v Russia, no 38411/02 and ECtHR 10 August 2006,
Olaechea Chuas v Spain, no 24668/03, where the court took into account with regard to
exhaustion of domestic remedies that the applicant ‘fut extradé le premier jour du délai
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The UN Committees also ruled in a few cases that expulsion before a person
could avail himself of an effective remedy violated the right to an effective
remedy.21 The Human Rights Committee considered in Alzery that by the
nature of refoulement, effective review of a decision to expel to take place prior
to expulsion, in order to avoid irreparable harm to the individual and render-
ing the review otiose and devoid of meaning.22 In Judge v Canada the Human
Rights Committee was even of the opinion that the State had to give the
applicant the opportunity to lodge a further appeal before being expelled.23
Finally UNHCR stated that access to an effective remedy is best guaranteed by
ensuring by law that deportation orders are not issued or cannot be executed
within the time-limit to lodge an appeal.24
The right of access to an effective remedy following from Article 39 PD,
read in the light of the Pecastaing judgment, the ECtHR’s judgment in Shamayev
and the UN Committees’ views requires that an asylum applicant be allowed
to stay on the territory for the time necessary to avail himself of this remedy.
This means that the applicant is informed of the imminent expulsion in time,
leaving him sufficient opportunity to consult his lawyer. Arguably the time-
limit for lodging the appeal indicates the time necessary for lodging the appeal.
That would imply that the applicant may not be deported before the time-limit
for filing the appeal has expired.
6.3 THE RIGHT TO REMAIN DURING APPEAL PROCEEDINGS
Once the appeal against the negative asylum decision has been lodged, the
question arises whether the asylum applicant is allowed to await the decision
of the court or tribunal on the territory of the Member State. This question
will be addressed in this section.
The Procedures Directive does not demand that the asylum appeal pro-
cedure automatically suspends the expulsion of the asylum applicant. Article 39
dont il disposait pour faire appel’. Furthermore the available remedy did not have sus-
pensive effect. Therefore this remedy could not be considered effective.
21 ComAT 5 June 2000, Josu Arkauz Arana v France, no 63/1997, para 11.5. See also ComAT
3 May 2005, Iratxe Sorzábal Díaz v France, no 194/2001, para 6.1. The ComAT also stated
in its Annual Report 2006 that “the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies can
be dispensed with, if […] there is a risk of immediate deportation of the complainant after
the final rejection of his or her asylum application”. ComAT, Annual Report 2006, A/61/44,
para 61.
22 HRC 10 November 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no 1416/2005, para 11.8.
23 HRC 20 October 2003, Judge v Canada, no 829/1998, para 10.8-10.9 . In this case the complain-
ant challenged his deportation to the United States, where he was under a death sentence.
The Committee held that the decision to deport the author to a State where he is under
sentence of death without affording him the opportunity to avail himself of an available
appeal, was taken arbitrarily and in violation of Art 6, together with Art 2 (3) ICCPR.
24 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, p 38.
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(3) PD provides that the Member States shall, where appropriate, provide for
rules in accordance with their international obligations dealing with the question
of whether the remedy shall have the effect of allowing applicants to remain
in the Member State concerned pending its outcome. If the remedy does not
have suspensive effect, the Member States shall provide for rules dealing with
the possibility of legal remedy or protective measures.
According to the Commission report concerning the implementation of
the Procedures Directive of 2010 automatic suspensive effect is attached to
all first instance appeals against asylum decisions in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Portugal. In Spain and Greece, automatic
suspensive effect was not afforded to any appeals.25 In other Member States,
applicable exceptions are widely divergent and concern decisions not to further
examine a subsequent application, a refusal to reopen the examination, de-
cisions taken in border procedures, inadmissibility decisions, decisions taken
in an accelerated procedure, applications deemed manifestly unfounded and
decisions concerning applicants in detention. Where an appeal does not have
suspensive effect, interim measures are generally available. However, the right
to remain pending the outcome of the procedure for interim measures is not
guaranteed by law in the Czech Republic, Greece and Sweden. In other Mem-
ber States the request for an interim measure does not have suspensive effect
in certain categories of cases.26
UNHCR mentioned in its report of 2010 that many refugees are recognised
only following an appeal process. UNHCR estimated that in 2007 around 14%
of the total of persons, who were recognised as refugees or received a comple-
mentary form of protection initially received a negative decision, which was
subsequently overturned during the appeal stage. In some States, such as the
United Kingdom the percentage of asylum decisions overturned in appeal
lies around 20%.27 These figures indicate the need to allow asylum applicants
to remain on the territory of the Member State during appeal proceedings,
in order to prevent irreparable harm.
This section will first argue that EU law requires that the appeal in the
meaning of Article 39 PD have automatic suspensive effect (in 5.3.1). Section
6.3.2 will examine the required form of the interim protection which should
be offered. Should the lodging of the appeal automatically entail that the
asylum applicant is allowed to stay on the territory of the Member State? Or
25 Commission Report COM (2010) 465 final, p 14. See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum
Procedures, s 16, p 38.
26 Commission Report COM (2010) 465 final, pp 14-15. See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum
Procedures, s 16, p 44. In Finland and the Netherlands removal may immediately be enforced
with respect to decisions on subsequent claims and in the Netherlands also where a person
poses a danger to public order or national security. In the United Kingdom, where an
in–country right of appeal does not apply, a decision may only be either challenged by
seeking a leave for judicial review or appealed against from abroad.
27 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, pp 36-37.
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is a system allowed in which the asylum applicant needs to apply to the
national court for interim relief?
6.3.1 The right to interim protection
6.3.1.1 The Court of Justice’s case-law
The Court of Justice ruled on the right to interim protection in a number of
cases. In some of them, such as the Siples case, which will be discussed below,
the Court was asked to interpret EU legislation which specifically addressed
the right to interim protection. In the most important cases however no rel-
evant EU legislation existed with regard to this issue. In those cases the Court
judged that the principle of effectiveness28 or the right to effective judicial
protection29 may nevertheless oblige national courts to provide interim pro-
tection. Important examples of the latter category are the judgments in Factor-
tame and Zuckerfabrik, which will be discussed at greater length in this section.
In all cases the Court has recognised the significance of the right to interim
protection. It held that interim protection should be provided by the national
court if necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of its judgment on the exist-
ence of a right guaranteed by EU law.
The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on interim protection in issues of
asylum. Taking into account the fundamental nature of the rights claimed
during asylum proceedings, there is no reason to believe that the Factortame
standards will not apply in asylum cases. Thus, it may be assumed that
Article 39 PD read in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy, demands
that interim protection be granted in asylum cases if necessary to ensure the
full effectiveness of the judgment by the national court regarding the question
whether the applicant’s expulsion would violate the prohibition of refoulement.
It is therefore important to examine whether and if so under which circum-
stances, interim protection is necessary in asylum cases to ensure the effective-
ness of the remedy available and to avoid irreparable harm to the applicant.
For this purpose the case-law of the Court of Justice in cases concerning
expulsion of EU citizens and the requirements following from the ECHR, ICCPR
and CAT should be considered relevant. The Court of Justice’s case-law with
regard to the necessity of interim protection against expulsions EU citizens
during the proceedings against the expulsion measure will be discussed in
28 Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990], paras 20-21. See Sinaniotis 2006, p 65, where he states:
‘It should be emphasized that the essential legal basis for which interim relief was acknow-
ledged in the instant case is the principle of effectiveness of Community law’.
29 Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest
[1991], paras 16-17 and Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], para 72.
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this section, while the case-law of the ECtHR and the views of the UN Commit-
tees and UNHCR will be examined in section 6.3.1.2 below.
Factortame, Zuckerfabrik and Siples
According to the Court of Justice interim protection must be provided, if it
is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of EU law. The most fundamental case
in this respect was Factortame.30 In Factortame, fishing companies questioned
the compatibility with Community law of a British act which prohibited them
from fishing. They asked for interim relief until such time as final judgment
was given on their application for judicial review. The question put before
the Court of Justice by the House of Lords was whether Community law
obliges the national court to grant interim protection of the rights claimed.
Under national law the English courts had no power to grant interim relief
in a case such as the case before it. The Court of Justice referred to its judgment
in Simmental where it held that
any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or
judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by with-
holding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power
to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national
legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules
from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, which
are the very essence of Community law […].31
Then the Court of Justice went on to consider that
the full effectiveness of Community law would be just as much impaired if a rule
of national law could prevent a court seised of a dispute governed by Community
law from granting interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the
judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under Community law.
It follows that a court which in those circumstances would grant interim relief,
if it were not for a rule of national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.32
The Court left the conditions for granting interim relief up to the national
courts. It considered however, in line with the Rewe judgment,33 that these
national procedural rules should not be less favourable than those for the
30 Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990]. See also Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007].
31 Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990], para 20. The Court of Justice referred to Case 106/77,
Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978], paras 22-23.
32 Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990], para 21.
33 Case 33/76, Rewe [1976].
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enforcement of national law rights, nor should they render the exercise of the
right to get interim protection practically impossible or excessively difficult.34
According to Sinaniotis the judgment in Factortame is revolutionary, because
it established interim protection as part of the principle of effectiveness of
Community rights, by imposing on the national judge dealing with interim
relief the task of acting as a Community judge.35 Toth wrote that as a result
the national courts are able to ‘provide immediate protection to individuals
by “freezing” […] national laws, whose compatibility with Community law
is challenged, thereby saving them from irreparable loss, and possibly from
economic ruin, which might otherwise occur while their Community rights
are being determined.’36 According to Toth the obligation to grant interim
relief had been implicitly present in some fundamental principles of Commun-
ity law, namely the principle of supremacy of Community law, the principle
of complete and effective judicial protection and the principles of effectiveness
and equivalence.37
Factortame also did not explicitly answer the question whether the Court
requires a national court to create a new remedy in order to be able to grant
interim relief.38 The Court only obliged the national court to set aside a
national procedural rule which precludes the national court from granting
interim relief. However, the problem in Factortame was that in the United
Kingdom no legal basis for granting interim relief was available under national
law. Therefore, the national court could comply with the Court’s judgment
only by creating a new remedy. According to Craig and De Búrca, Factortame
weakened the force of the Court’s previous statement that, in the absence of
harmonisation, EC law does not oblige national courts to create new remedies
34 Sinaniotis 2006, p 95. In Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], the Court also refrained from pro-
viding the national courts with conditions for granting interim relief. The Court followed
the opinion of A.G. Sharpston that in cases which concern the validity of a national measure,
there is no reason to depart from the general rule of procedural autonomy. See Arnull 2007,
pp 1777-1778.
35 Sinaniotis 2006, p 61.
36 Toth 1990, p 583.
37 Toth 1990, pp 583-584.
38 A.G. Tesauro wrote in his opinion regarding Factortame that provision for interim protection
of a right pending the final determination of a case is made in the United Kingdom.
Therefore it is simply a question of using the already existing procedure in order to protect
a right claimed on the basis of a provision of Community law having direct effect. However
Tesauro did not seem to exclude that Community law may oblige a Member State to
introduce the possibility for the courts to grant interim relief. Sinaniotis is of the opinion
that the Court neglected the fact that national law did not provide a legal basis to grant
interim relief. In his view the Court did not answer the question whether the national court
should create a new remedy. Sinaniotis 2006, p 61. See also Trstenjak & Beysen 2011, supra
footnote 38.
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which would not be available under national law.39 In its later judgment in
Unibet the Court of Justice made clear that Member States are exceptionally
required to create new national remedies if this is necessary to ensure the EU
fundamental right to effective judicial protection.40
In Zuckerfabrik41 it was not the deficiency of national law but of Commun-
ity law which was at issue. In this case the Court accepted that, under certain
conditions, interim relief can be granted by a national court in a case in which
the applicant’s claim is based on the alleged invalidity of Community legis-
lation. The applicants contested a decision, before the national court, which
required them to pay an amount of money in respect of a special elimination
levy for the 1986/87 sugar-marketing year. The applicants argued that this
levy was based on a Community regulation, which was in their opinion
contrary to Community law. They asked the national court for suspension
of the contested decision.
The national court asked the Court of Justice whether national courts may
suspend by way of an interim measure an administrative measure, based on
a regulation, and if so, under what conditions. The possible barrier against
the interim measure was not national law, as in Factortame, but Community
law itself. By temporarily not applying a rule of Community law by way of
interim measure the national court could violate the principle of priority of
Community law and the monopoly of the Court to decide upon its legality.
The Court considered that interim legal protection, which Community law
ensures for individuals before national courts, must remain the same, irrespect-
ive of whether they contest the compatibility of national legal provisions with
Community law or the validity of secondary Community law, in view of the
fact that the dispute in both cases is based on Community law itself. Because
of the fact that, by granting interim relief in a case where the validity of a
Community measure is contested, the national court temporarily disapplies
a Community measure, the Court in Zuckerfabrik set conditions to the national
courts for granting interim relief in such cases.42 The national courts may
grant interim relief only if the conditions applied by the Court of Justice when
deciding on applications to it for interim measures pursuant to Articles 278
and 279 TfEU, are satisfied.43 First of all, the national court should entertain
39 Craig & de Búrca 2003, pp 237-238. Toth stated however in his comment on Factortame that
the Court does not require the courts to devise an interim relief where none exists. Toth
1990, p 586.
40 Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007], paras 40-41. See further section 4.3.5.
41 Joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest
[1991], paras 16-33.
42 According to A.G. Sharpston, there is a clear Community interest in having uniform strict
criteria for granting interim relief in this situation. See also Arnull 2007, pp 1777-1778.
43 Jans and others 2007, p 278. The Court uses four criteria when it examines an application
for interim relief: there must be a prima facie case, which means that the applicant’s argument
must be serious and not clearly untenable, the case must be urgent: the interim measure
must be necessary to avoid serious and irreparable harm and the interim measure should
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serious doubts as to the validity of the Community measure. It must further-
more refer the question on the validity of the Community measure to the Court
of Justice for preliminary ruling. Finally there should be urgency and a threat
of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant44 and the national court
should take due account of the Community’s interests.
In Zuckerfabrik the Court expressly accepted the national judiciary’s role
in Community legal protection. Schermers considers the Zuckerfabrik case a
landmark, for the reason that it so clearly placed the protection of the indi-
vidual in the foreground, even before the question of priority of Community
law.45
Provisions of secondary EU law may not prevent national courts from
providing interim protection, in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the
judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under EU law. This
was decided in the Siples judgment.46 In this case the Court was asked to
interpret Article 244 of the Customs Code,47 which confers power to suspend
implementation of the contested decision exclusively on the customs author-
ities. The Court ruled, while referring to Factortame, that this provision meant
that both the customs authorities and the courts have the power to suspend
a customs decision.
The right to interim protection in cases concerning EU citizens
The Court of Justice seems to be of the opinion that the fact that a person is
expelled before a decision on the appeal against the expulsion measure has
been given, does not automatically render his right to an appeal ineffective.
This may be derived from a few expulsion cases concerning nationals of other
Member States and their family members, falling within the scope of former
Directive 64/221/EEC.48 According to this directive the general rule was that
the court deciding on the appeal against the expulsion measure had suspensive
effect. However, Article 9 of this directive provided for a possibility to omit
suspensive effect of this appeal on the condition that the expulsion decision
would not be taken by the administrative authority until an opinion had been
be intended to preserve the positions of the parties to a dispute. Finally, the Court takes
into account the relevant interests. See Jans and others 2007, p 248.
44 This should be examined on the basis of the circumstances of the case. According to the
court, purely financial damage cannot be regarded in principle as irreparable. Joined cases
C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991], para
29.
45 Schermers 1992, pp 136-137. See also Sinaniotis 2006, p 68.
46 Case C-226/99, Siples [2001], paras 16-19, see also Case C-1/99, Kofisa Italia [2001], paras
48-49.
47 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community
Customs Code [1992] OJ L 302/1.
48 Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the
movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health [1964] OJ 056/850.
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obtained from a competent authority49 of the host country. In cases of urgency
this opinion could be omitted. In Dörr and Ûnal the Court seemed to accept
that these provisions provided sufficient legal protection. Expulsion of the
person concerned before the decision on the appeal against the expulsion
measure had been taken was thus allowed, if the opinion of the competent
authority had been obtained50 or in cases of urgency.51
Article 31 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which replaced Directive 64/221/EEC
gives as the general rule:
Where the application for appeal against or judicial review of the expulsion decision
is accompanied by an application for an interim order to suspend enforcement of
that decision, actual removal from the territory may not take place until such time
as the decision on the interim order has been taken.52‘
The request for interim relief should thus have suspensive effect. There are
a few possibilities of deviating from this general rule, namely where the
expulsion decision is based on a previous judicial decision, where the person
concerned has had previous access to judicial review or where the expulsion
decision is based on imperative grounds of public security.
It should be concluded that the general rule which follows from Directive
64/221/EEC and Directive 2004/38/EC is that EU citizens should be allowed
to await the decision on their appeal against the expulsion decision or their
request to suspend the expulsion measure for the duration of the appeal
proceedings. These Directives as well as the Court of Justice in Dörr and Ûnal,
allow under certain conditions expulsion before the decision on the appeal
regarding the expulsion measure. However, it is not excluded that, even if
these conditions were fulfilled, the Court would have required suspensive
effect of the appeal, if an applicant could show that his expulsion would render
his right to an appeal ineffective.
Neither does Dörr and Ûnal exclude that the Court may require that a
national court be able to grant interim relief or that a remedy have (automatic)
49 The Directive did not set any requirements for this competent authority, except that it shall
not be the same as the authority empowered to take the decision refusing renewal of the
residence permit or ordering expulsion. According to the Court of Justice, the independent
authority, mentioned in Art 9 of Directive 64/221/EEC, needed to examine all the facts
and circumstances and the expediency of the expulsion measure before the final decision
was adopted. See Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ünal [2005], paras 48-51 and 55.
50 Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ûnal [2005].
51 Case 98/79, Pecastaing [1980], para 19, referred to in Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ûnal [2005],
para 55. Whether there was a case of urgency was for the administrative authority to decide.
52 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC,
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77.
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suspensive effect in asylum cases.53 The fact that expulsion of an asylum seeker
to his country of origin may lead to irreparable harm (torture or ill-treatment),
should urge the Court of Justice to require more safeguards regarding interim
protection in asylum cases than in cases of EU citizens. Furthermore, it is
conceivable that while EU citizens may be able to exercise their right to an
effective remedy from abroad, this is often more problematic in asylum cases.
6.3.1.2 Obligations stemming from the ECHR, ICCPR, CAT and Refugee Convention
This section will assess the national court’s obligations regarding interim
protection by examining the ECtHR’s case-law as well as the UN Committees’
views regarding the right to an effective remedy and the obligation to exhaust
national remedies. Furthermore the interim measures granted by the ECtHR,
the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee will be
briefly examined, as these give an indication of the situations in which these
bodies consider interim protection against expulsion to be essential. It will
be argued on the basis of this case-law and these views that in an asylum case
a judicial remedy without automatic suspensive effect cannot be considered
effective.
The right to remain under the right to an effective remedy and the obligation to
exhaust domestic remedies
The ECtHR has laid down rather clear standards with regard to suspensive effect
of asylum appeals in asylum cases under Articles 13 and 35 ECHR. In the case
Gebremedhin v France the ECtHR ruled for the first time that Article 13 ECHR
requires that an asylum seeker have access to a remedy with automatic
suspensive effect, if a State decides to expel him to a country where he runs
a real risk of becoming a victim of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.54
The ECtHR incorporated the principle of automatic suspensive effect as an
absolute safeguard based upon the possible irreversible consequences of a
deportation in violation with Article 3 ECHR.55 Even if, after expulsion, a
53 See also Council resolution regarding minimum guarantees for asylum procedures of 20
June 1995, which includes in para 17 the general principle that the asylum seeker may
remain in the territory of the Member State concerned until a decision has been taken on
the appeal.
54 ECtHR 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin v France, no 25389/05. See also ECtHR 11 December
2008, Muminov v Russia, no 42502/06, para 100 and ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani
and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 108. Automatic suspensive effect only needs to
be guaranteed in one instance. See ECtHR 22 September 2011, H.R. v France, no 64780/09,
paras 78-80.
55 Byrne 2005, p 80. The ECtHR considered that ‘given the irreversible nature of the harm
which might occur if the alleged risk of torture or ill-treatment materialised and the
importance which the Court attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy under
Article 13 requires […] a remedy with automatic suspensive effect’. See ECtHR 22 September
2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 108.
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violation of Article 3 ECHR is found, it is according to the ECtHR hard to see
how this court can still offer the asylum applicant suitable redress as required
by Article 13 ECHR.56
The applicant in the Gebremedhin case had been refused access to France
at the airport Charles de Gaulle upon arrival in June 2005. The French author-
ities deemed his application for permission to enter France for asylum reasons
manifestly unfounded, because of inconsistencies in his asylum account. He
appealed to the urgent applications judge of the Administrative Court. During
the appeal procedure, France tried but failed to expel him. The Administrative
Court dismissed his appeal. Less than a week later the ECtHR accepted the
applicant’s request for an interim measure and indicated to the French Govern-
ment that it was not desirable to remove the applicant to Eritrea prior to the
forthcoming meeting of the appropriate Chamber. Following this interim
measure, the French authorities granted the applicant leave to enter France
and granted the applicant a refugee status in November 2005.57
The two judicial remedies at the applicant’s disposal (an appeal against
the refusal of entry and a request for interim relief), which provided according
to the ECtHR, ‘solid guarantees’,58 both lacked automatic suspensive effect.
The applicant could be legally expelled before the judgment by the court. The
ECtHR concluded that Gebremedhin did not have access to a remedy with
automatic suspensive effect in the transit zone and that therefore Article 13
ECHR had been violated.
The judgment by the ECtHR in Gebremedhin was affirmed by many later
cases, among which Sultani v France in which the effectiveness of the remedy
was assessed in the light of Article 35 (1) ECHR.59 The Court stated, even more
explicitly than in Gebremedhin that a remedy without suspensive effect cannot
be considered effective60:
56 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 393. The ECtHR
considered that ‘it failed to see how, without its decision having suspensive effect, the
Belgian Aliens Appeals Board could still offer the applicant suitable redress even if it had
found a violation of Article 3 after the applicant’s removal’. The Belgian Government
contended before the ECtHR that the applicant could have continued his proceedings before
the Aliens Appeal Board after his transfer to Greece.
57 The fact that the Court decided on the complaint regarding Art 13 ECHR, while the com-
plaint regarding Art 3 ECHR had been declared inadmissible because of the granting of
a refugee status, shows that the Court apparently deemed the complaint regarding the lack
of interim protection very serious. See differently ECtHR 31 January 2008, Mir Isfahani v
the Netherlands, no 31252/03, which was declared inadmissible because the applicant received
a status. The applicant complained under Art 13 ECHR about the limited scope of judicial
review by the national court.
58 ECtHR 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin v France, no 25389/05, para 65.
59 ECtHR (Adm) 20 September 2007, Sultani v France, no 45223/05, paras 50-52. See also ECtHR
4 December 2008, Y v Russia, no 20113/07, para 70 and ECtHR 18 November 2010, Boutagni
v France, no 42360/08, paras 35-37.
60 See Spijkerboer 2008.
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[L]orsqu’un individu se plaint de ce que son renvoi l’exposerait à un traitement
contraire à l’article 3 de la Convention, les recours sans effet suspensif ne peuvent
être considérés comme efficaces au sens de l’article 35 § 1 de la Convention [..].61
It should be noted that the Court does not seem to consider the existence of
an arguable claim of a violation of Article 3 ECHR a prerequisite for the applic-
ability of this rule. The ECtHR may therefore be of the opinion that in all cases
in which an applicant complains of a violation of Article 3 ECHR, a national
remedy without automatic suspensive effect cannot be regarded as effective.
Important reasons for the ineffectiveness of remedies without suspensive effect,
other than the risk of irreparable harm, are that after being expelled, (ex)-
asylum applicants may not be able to keep in touch with their lawyer or the
authorities in the Member State.62 This makes it complex, if not impossible,
to substantiate their case.63 Furthermore, it might be impossible to trace
asylum applicants in their country of origin, which prevents their return to
the Member State when the remedy turns out to be successful.64
The Court established in Sultani that the remedies pending did not have
suspensive effect and concluded that they did not need to be exhausted in
order for the complaint to be admissible.65 Asylum applicants who do not
have a remedy with automatic suspensive effect at their disposal thus can
complain directly at the ECtHR and request an interim measure in order to
prevent expulsion during the proceedings before this court. In 2011 the Pres-
ident of the ECtHR requested the State Parties to the ECHR to provide national
remedies with suspensive effect in the context of the high numbers of requests
for interim measures which were submitted to the ECtHR in the previous years.66
61 ECtHR (Adm) 20 September 2007, Sultani v France, no 45223/05, para 50.
62 See by analogy ECtHR 17 January 2006, Aoulmi v France, no 50278/99, where the ECtHR
considered with regard to the effectiveness of its interim measure: ‘In the present case,
as the applicant was expelled by France to Algeria, the level of protection that the Court
was able to afford the rights which he was asserting under Article 3 of the Convention
was irreversibly reduced. In addition, as the applicant’s lawyer has lost all contact with
him since his expulsion, the gathering of evidence in support of the applicant’s allegations
has proved more complex.’ See also ECtHR (GC) 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others
v Italy, no 27765/09, para 206 and ECtHR 5 April 2011, Toumi v Italy, no 25716/09, paras
72-76.
63 See also the decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht to grant interim protection
to an asylum seeker who would be transferred to Greece under the Dublin Regulation.
The court took into account that the asylum seeker substantiated that it would be impossible
for him to register in Greece and that he would become homeless. In this situation it would
be very difficult to contact him during the proceedings before the court. Bundesverfassungs-
gericht 8 September 2009, BvQ 56/09.
64 This happened for example in ECtHR 23 June 2011, Diallo v Czech Republic, no 20493/07,
para 44.
65 See also ECtHR 10 August 2006, Olaechea Chuas v Spain, no 24668/03, para 35 and ECtHR
23 October 2008, Soldatenko v Ukraine, no 2440/07, para 49.
66 Statement Issued by the President of the ECtHR concerning Requests for Interim Measures
(Rule 39 of the Rules of Court), 11 February 2011, available at www.echr.coe.int.
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In their views in individual cases, the Committee against Torture and the
Human Rights Committee have not explicitly addressed the question whether
the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 3 CAT and Article 2 (3)
ICCPR requires that an asylum applicant should be allowed to remain on the
territory of the State during appeal proceedings. However both Committees
in their Concluding Observations with regard to several State Parties did stress
that remedies against expulsion orders should have suspensive effect67 or
even automatic suspensive effect.68
In Alzery v Sweden the Human Rights Committee considered that effective
review of a decision to expel to an arguable risk of torture must have an
opportunity to take place prior to expulsion, in order to avoid irreparable harm
to the individual and render the review otiose and devoid of meaning. The
absence of any opportunity for effective, independent review of the decision
to expel in the author’s case accordingly amounted to a breach of Article 7,
read in conjunction with Article 2 of the Covenant.69 One may conclude from
this consideration that there must be a possibility for interim protection during
the proceedings before a national court reviewing the decision regarding the
risk of refoulement.70
Both the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee
have considered, in the light of the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies,
that a remedy which does not suspend the asylum seeker’s expulsion cannot
be deemed effective.71 In some of these cases, national proceedings were still
pending,72 in others the complainant had been deported before the decision
on the remedy had been concluded.73 The reason for the ineffectiveness is
67 ComAT Concluding Observations on Austria (15 December 2005, CAT/C/AUT/CO/3),
Belgium (27 May 2003, CAT/C/CR/30/6), Finland (29 June 2011, CAT/C/FIN/CO/5-6),
France (3 April 2006, CAT/C/FRA/CO/3 and 20 May 2010, CAT/C/FRA/CO/4-6.) Ireland
(17 June 2011, CAT/C/IRL/CO/1), Slovenia (20 June 2011, CAT/C/SVN/CO/3) and
Switzerland (25 May 2010, CAT/C/CHE/CO/6). HRC Concluding Observations on Belgium
(12 August 2004, CCPR/CO/81/BEL) and Finland (2 December 2004, CCPR/CO/82/FIN).
68 ComAT Concluding Observations on Austria (20 May 2010, CAT/C/AUT/CO/4-5) and
Monaco, (28 May 2004, CAT/C/CR/32/1).
69 HRC 10 November 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no 1416/2005, para 11.8.
70 In Weiss the HRC found a violation of the right to equality before the courts as laid down
in Art 14 (1) taken together with the right to an effective and enforceable remedy under
Art 2 (3) ICCPR because the author was extradited to the United States in violation of a
national administrative court’s stay of execution. HRC 15 May 2003, Weiss v Austria, no
1086/2002, para 9.6.
71 The ComAT stated in its Annual Report 2006 that ‘the requirement of exhaustion of
domestic remedies can be dispensed with, if the only remedies available to the complainant
are without suspensive effect, i.e. remedies that do not automatically stay the execution
of an expulsion order […].’ ComAT Annual Report 2006, A/61/44, para 61.
72 See ComAT 16 May 2007, Nadeem Ahmad Dar v Norway, no 249/2004, paras 6.2-6.5 and
ComAT 17 December 2004, Falcon Rios v Canada, no 133/1999, para 7.3.
73 See also ComAT 11 May 2007, Adel Tebourski v France, no 300/2006, para 7.3 and ComAT
15 May 2001, Z.Z. v Canada, no 123/1998, para 8.2.
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that irreparable harm cannot be averted if the domestic remedy subsequently
yields a decision favourable to the complainant.74
The Refugee Convention does not provide for a right to a remedy with
suspensive effect. However, such a right may be derived from the principle
that the rights granted by the Convention should be effectively protected.
UNHCR is of the opinion that an applicant for refugee status should in principle
be permitted to remain in the country while an appeal to a higher administrat-
ive authority or to the court is pending.75 If an applicant is not permitted
to await the outcome of an appeal against a negative decision at first instance
in the territory of the Member State, the remedy against a decision is ineffective
according to UNHCR.76
Interim protection by the ECtHR, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights
Committee
The ECtHR has not only stressed the importance of interim protection to prevent
irreparable harm in asylum cases in its case-law, but also by calling for (bind-
ing) interim measures called in a large number of expulsion and extradition
cases pending before it.77 In cases where there is plausibly asserted to be a
risk of irreparable damage to the enjoyment by the applicant of one of the
core rights under the Convention, the object of an interim measure is to main-
tain the status quo pending the Court’s determination of the justification for
the measure. Indications of interim measures given by the Court permit it to
carry out an effective examination of the application and to ensure that the
protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective.78 The ECtHR
has considered that although the assessment of a real risk of ill-treatment is
to some degree speculative, the Court has always been very cautious, examin-
74 ComAT 24 May 2005, Mafhoud Brada v France, no 195/2002, para 7.7. The HRC stated in
HRC 15 May 2003, Weiss v Austria, no 1086/2002, para 8.2, in which it ordered an interim
measure, that ‘a remedy, which is said to subsist after the event which the interim measures
sought to prevent occurred is by definition ineffective, as the irreparable harm cannot be
reversed by a subsequent finding in the author’s favour by the domestic remedies consider-
ing the case.’
75 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion no 8 (XXVIII), 1977, para (e) and UNHCR Handbook, para 192.
76 UNHCR Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on common
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals, December 2005.
77 In 2008-2010 the ECtHR in total granted 2,842 interim measures. See ECtHR statistics interim
measures 2008-2010, available at www.echr.coe.int. Usually interim measures are granted
in expulsion or extradition cases. See ECtHR statistics, interim measures by respondent
State and country of destination from 1 January to 30 June 2011, available at www.echr.coe.
int.
78 ECtHR (GC) 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, nos 46827/99 and 46951/99,
para 108, ECtHR (Adm) 20 February 2007, Al-Moayad v Germany, no 35865/03, paras 119-120
and 125 and ECtHR 5 April 2011, Toumi v Italy, no 25716/09, paras 69-71.
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ing carefully the material placed before it in the light of the requisite standard
of proof before indicating an interim measure under Rule 39.79
In practice the Court has granted requests for interim measures in many
asylum cases to prevent expulsion to the asylum seeker’s country of origin.
The Court has even called for interim measures for certain groups of asylum
applicants, such as Somali asylum applicants in 2004,80 Tamils from Sri Lanka
in 200781 and Afghan asylum applicants82 and applicants who were to be
transferred to Greece in 2008.83
Like the ECtHR, the Committee against Torture84 and the Human Rights
Committee85 regularly request the State Party concerned not to deport or
extradite the complainant while his complaint is being considered. They call
for an interim measure, when they consider that there is a risk of irreparable
harm if the complainant were to be expelled.
The ECtHR,86 the Committee against Torture87 and the Human Rights
Committee88 have ruled that interim measures are binding for the State Party
concerned. It is their view that, by ignoring a request for an interim measure,
the State Party undermines the protection offered by the ECHR, CAT or ICCPR
and therefore commits a breach of its obligations under those treaties.
6.3.1.3 Subconclusion: the right to interim protection
The Court of Justice attaches great importance to the effectiveness of a judg-
ment on the existence of the rights claimed under EU law. The national court
should be able to grant interim relief if this is necessary to ensure this effective-
79 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 142.
80 The Court granted interim measures in at least 11 complaints against the Netherlands in
Somalian cases.
81 By October 2007 the Court had applied Rule 39 in 22 cases where Tamils sought to prevent
their removal to Sri Lanka from the United Kingdom. ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United
Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 21.
82 In a press release of 18 November 2008 the ECtHR announced that it indicated interim
measures in 11 cases to the French Government in order to prevent removal to Afghanistan.
83 ECtHR (Adm) 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v the United Kingdom, no 32733/08 mentions that
between 14 May 2008 and 16 September 2008, the acting President of the Fourth Section
of the ECtHR applied Rule 39 in a total of eighty cases.
84 ComAT 24 May 2005, Mafhoud Brada v France, no 195/2002, para 7.7. See also Annual Report
of the ComAT 2006, A/61/44, para 61, which states that ’a complaint must have a substan-
tial likelihood of success on the merits for it to be concluded that the alleged victim would
suffer irreparable harm in the event of his or her deportation.’
85 See for example HRC 15 May 2003, Weiss v Austria, no 1086/2002, HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani
v Canada, no 1051/2002.
86 ECtHR (GC) 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99.
87 ComAT 24 May 2005, Mafhoud Brada v France, no 195/2002 and ComAT 29 May 2007, Elif
Pelit v Azerbaijan, no 281/2005.
88 HRC 15 May 2003, Weiss v Austria, no 1086/2002, HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani v Canada, no
1051/2002, paras 8.1-8.2.
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ness, even if the court does not have the power to grant interim relief under
national law. Whether interim relief should be considered necessary depends
on the nature of the case lying before the court. Furthermore the Court
accepted that under strict conditions the national court may grant an interim
measure which involves the (temporary) disapplication of EU legislation. EU
legislation may further not prevent a national court from granting interim
relief, if this is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of its judgment.
In cases concerning the expulsion of EU citizens the general rule is that
the EU citizens should be allowed to await the decision on the appeal against
the expulsion measure or his request for interim relief on the territory of the
Member State. Article 31 of Directive 2004/38/EC as well as the Court of Justice
allow under certain conditions that EU citizens are expelled before the decision
on the appeal regarding the expulsion measure has been taken. Apparently
it is accepted that the expulsion of an EU citizen while the remedy against the
expulsion measure is still pending, does not automatically render this remedy
ineffective. The Court seems to be of the opinion that the person concerned
can pursue the proceedings from abroad.
It follows from the case-law of the ECtHR and the views of the Human
Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and UNHCR that the Court
of Justice’s approach should be different in asylum cases than in cases concern-
ing the expulsion of EU citizens. It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law as well
as the views of the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture
and UNHCR that a remedy before a national authority cannot be considered
effective if the expulsion of an asylum seeker takes place before the final
decision of this authority, mainly because this expulsion may lead to irrepar-
able harm.89 The need for interim protection in cases in which a risk of refoule-
ment is claimed is also underlined by the fact that the ECtHR, the Human Rights
Committee and the Committee against Torture deemed it necessary to grant
requests for interim measures in many expulsion and extradition cases in order
to protect the applicant against irreparable harm and to ensure the effectiveness
of their judgment or view.
The ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the UN Committees also indicate
that the effectiveness of the judgment on the expulsion measure against an
asylum seeker can never be ensured if expulsion takes place prior to this
judgment, even if no arguable claim is present. In Sultani the ECtHR stated in
general terms that a remedy without suspensive effect cannot be regarded
as effective. Moreover the Committee against Torture and Human Rights
Committee did not limit their recommendation to attach (automatic) suspensive
effect to remedies against expulsion orders to arguable claims. The reason for
this may be that the applicant is not able to effectively proceed the appeal
procedure from the country to which he has been expelled.
89 It is much less likely that the expulsion of an EU citizen during appeal proceedings will
lead to irreparable harm.
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It should be reiterated that the EU right to an effective remedy guaranteed
by Article 39 PD applies to all asylum cases, including asylum applications
deemed inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.90 It is therefore conceivable
that also the obligation to provide for a remedy with automatic suspensive
effect applies in all asylum cases.
The next section will examine whether a specific form of interim protection
is required under EU law. Article 13 ECtHR requires a remedy with automatic
suspensive effect. Does that mean that the appeal itself must automatically
suspend the expulsion of the asylum seeker? Or could a system in which the
asylum seeker can request interim relief and is allowed to remain in the
country until the decision on this request is taken by the national authority,
also be sufficient? And how should interim protection be guaranteed? Does
it need to be provided by law or do practical arrangements suffice?
6.3.2 The meaning of automatic suspensive effect
Interim protection can be provided in a national legal order in several ways.
Two important characteristics of the national system determine the level of
protection offered to an asylum seeker. The first is whether the lodging of the
appeal in itself has suspensive effect or whether the asylum seeker has to apply
to the national court for interim relief. A system in which national law provides
for an appeal against an asylum decision, which automatically suspends the
expulsion decision, offers most guarantees. Potentially less protection is offered
by a system in which interim relief may be granted on request by the national
court, while the mere fact that such a request has been lodged suspends the
expulsion decision. Often the judge deciding on the request for interim relief
does not perform a test of the risk of refoulement which is as rigorous as the
test performed in the appeal, time-limits are shorter and the applicants has
fewer procedural rights. Article 39 (3) PD refers to both systems mentioned
above.
Even fewer guarantees are offered by a system in which the asylum seeker
is not protected against expulsion while the request for interim relief is
pending. It follows from the ECtHR’s judgment in Gebremedhin v France that
such a system violates the (EU) right to an effective remedy.
The second characteristic of the national system which determines the level
of protection offered to an asylum seeker relates to the way in which interim
protection is provided. If national authorities have only agreed in practice to
await the decision on the request for interim relief, this offers fewer guarantees
than where the suspensive effect of such request is provided for by law. The
question is what level of protection is required in asylum cases by EU law.
90 See also section 4.3.2.
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In order to answer this question the case-law by the Court of Justice and the
ECtHR will be examined in this section. The Human Rights Committee and
the Committee against Torture have not addressed this question.
6.3.2.1 The Court of Justice’s case-law
It cannot be derived from the Court of Justice’s case-law whether in asylum
cases Member States are required to attach suspensive effect to the appeal itself
or whether they may demand from the applicant to lodge a request for interim
relief. The judgment of the Court of Justice in Dörr and Ünal does seem to
imply that, according to the Court, an appeal with automatic suspensive effect
provides for more protection than a system in which interim relief should be
requested. It held that the safeguard of the right of appeal with suspensive
effect guaranteed by Article 9 of Directive 64/221/EEC in cases of expulsion
of EU citizens, required – in principle – automatic suspensive effect:
In order to be regarded as having a suspensory effect in terms of that article, the
appeal available to persons covered by Directive 64/221 must have an automatic
suspensory effect. It is not sufficient for the court having jurisdiction to have the
authority, upon application by the person concerned and under certain conditions,
to stay implementation of the decision ending that person’s residence. The assertion
by the Austrian Government that suspension of such a decision may in fact be
obtained as a matter of course from the Austrian courts is not such as to vitiate
that conclusion.91
As was pointed out in section 6.3.1.1 the Court of Justice did allow that no
automatic suspensive effect was attached to the appeal if an opinion had been
obtained from a competent authority in the meaning of Article 9 of the Direct-
ive 64/221/EEC or in cases of urgency.92
Article 31 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which replaced Directive 64/221/EEC,
does not guarantee a remedy with suspensive effect in cases of expulsion of
EU citizens. It does provide that, if the appeal against an expulsion decision
is accompanied by a request for application for an interim order to suspend
enforcement of this decision, no removal from the territory may take place
until the decision on this application has been taken. The request for applica-
tion of interim relief thus needs to have suspensive effect.
91 Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ünal [2005], para 51. Austrian law stated that the Verfassungs-
gerichtshof shall, at the request of the appellant, grant suspensory effect by order in so
far as this is not precluded by overriding public interests and, following consideration of
all the affected interests, the enforcement or exercise by a third party of the right granted
by the decision would involve disproportionate detriment to the appellant. See para 23
of the judgment.
92 Case C-136/03, Dörr and Ünal [2005], paras 48-51 and 55.
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6.3.2.2 Obligations stemming from the ECHR
The term ‘automatic suspensive effect’ suggests that suspensive effect should
be attached to the appeal against the asylum or expulsion decision. However
the ECtHR’s case-law seems to indicate that the Court is of the opinion that
a system in which automatic suspensive effect is attached to the applicant’s
request for interim relief (suspension of the expulsion decision) is also allowed
under Article 13 ECHR.93 In Grebremedhin v France, the Court not only ex-
amined whether the appeal, but also whether the possibility of requesting the
administrative court for interim relief could be regarded as an effective remedy.
This would have been unnecessary if Article 13 could only be complied with
if the appeal itself had automatic suspensive effect. Likewise in M.S.S. v
Belgium and Greece the ECtHR examined the effectiveness of the Belgian extreme-
ly urgent procedure in which the applicant could have applied for a stay of
execution of the order to leave the country.94
In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR made clear that the judge who
is examining the request for interim relief should apply close and rigorous
scrutiny to the claim of a risk of refoulement. Furthermore it showed that
important procedural rights such as the rights of the defence should be
respected in such procedure and that the burden to prove the need to suspend
the expulsion decision may not be set too high. The ECtHR considered that
the requirement flowing from Article 13 that execution of the impugned measure
be stayed cannot be considered as a subsidiary measure, that is, without regard
being had to the requirements concerning the scope of the scrutiny. The contrary
would amount to allowing the States to expel the individual concerned without
having examined the complaints under Article 3 as rigorously as possible.95
93 The judgment in ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08
seems to indicate that the ECtHR requires that the appeal itself has automatic suspensive
effect. The ECtHR concluded in para 108 that Art 13 was violated ‘since an application
for annulment of a deportation order does not have suspensive effect, unless the administrat-
ive court specifically orders a stay of execution of that order’. Peers and Rogers write that
if a system of separate applications (one for appeal and one for interim relief ) is compatible
at all with the ECHR ‘it must confer a fully automatic suspensive effect immediately
following an application’. Peers & Rogers 2006, p 408.
94 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 386-396. See
for the procedure paras 138-140 of the judgment. Also in ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah
Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 154, arguments can be found which support the
opinion that such systems suffice. The Court concluded that the applicant was provided
with an effective remedy as regards the manner in which his expulsion was to be carried
out, although the objection which the applicant lodged did not automatically suspend that
expulsion. However, he was able to apply to the provisional-measures judge requesting
the expulsion be stayed pending a decision on his objection. This judge ruled that the
expulsion would not be in breach of Art 3 ECHR.
95 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 387-388. See
further with regard to the standard of judicial review Chapter 9.
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The Belgian extremely urgent procedure did not comply with the requirements
of Article 13 ECHR because it reduced the rights of the defence and the examin-
ation of the case to a minimum. According to the ECtHR the examination of
the complaints under Article 3 carried out by the Aliens Appeals Board in
the extremely urgent procedure was not thorough. The Alien Appeals Board
limited its examination to verifying whether the persons concerned had pro-
duced concrete proof of the irreparable nature of the damage that might result
from the alleged potential violation of Article 3. According to the ECtHR it
thereby increased the burden of proof to such an extent as to hinder the
examination on the merits of the alleged risk of a violation.96 It follows from
this judgment that Member States cannot circumvent the requirement of a
rigorous scrutiny and other important procedural safeguards, by choosing
for a system in which interim relief should be requested, instead of an appeal
with automatic suspensive effect. Furthermore the ECtHR’s judgment in I.M.
v France makes clear that short time-limits for preparing a remedy and receiv-
ing legal and linguistic assistance may seriously affect the accessibility of this
remedy.97 If the applicant is expected to lodge a fully substantiated request
for interim relief within a very short period of time this would thus be prob-
lematic under Article 13 ECHR.
Furthermore it follows from the fact that the requirements of Article 13
take the form of a guarantee and not of a mere statement of intent or a
practical arrangement that suspensive effect of a remedy must be provided
for by law or other clear rules. Practical arrangements with regard to interim
protection in asylum cases are thus not sufficient.98 In Čonka v Belgium the
ECtHR held that the extremely urgent procedure before the Conseil d’Etat, which
existed in Belgium before 2006 did not comply with Article 13 ECHR, because
it was not guaranteed in fact and in law that an application for interim relief
would suspend the enforcement of the expulsion measure. A few factors lead
to this conclusion. First of all the authorities were not required to stay the
deportation while an application under the extremely urgent procedure was
pending, not even for a minimum reasonable period to enable the Council
of State to decide on the application. Further, in practice it was up to the
Council of State to ascertain the authorities’ intentions regarding the proposed
expulsions and to act accordingly. However, the Council of State did not
appear to be obliged to do so. Lastly, it was merely on the basis of internal
directions that the registrar of the Council of State, acting on the instructions
of a judge, contacted the authorities for that purpose, and there was no indica-
tion of what the consequences might be should he omit to do so. Ultimately,
the alien had no guarantee that the Council of State and the authorities would
comply in every case with that practice, that the Council of State would deliver
96 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 389-390.
97 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 150.
98 ECtHR 5 February 2002, Čonka v Belgium, no 51564/99, para 83.
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its decision, or even hear the case, before his expulsion, or that the authorities
would allow a minimum reasonable period of grace.99
6.3.2.3 Subconclusion: the meaning of automatic suspensive effect
On the basis of the Court of Justice’s and the ECtHR’s case-law it is conceivable
that Article 39 (3) PD read in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy
allows for two systems. The first is a system in which the remedy mentioned
in Article 39 (1) PD itself has suspensive effect. This option generally offers
most protection and would be in line with the Court of Justice’s interpretation
of the term remedy with ‘suspensory effect’ in Dörr and Ünal.
The second system entails that a national system in which provisional
measures may be taken by national courts on request. Such a system is only
compatible with Article 39 (3) PD if the fact that the asylum applicant must
apply seperately for interim protection does not put up hurdles which render
the exercise of the EU right to an effective remedy virtually impossible or
excessively difficult. Furthermore it may be derived from the ECtHR’s case-law
that the following important procedural guarantees must be put in place:
· this request has automatic suspensive effect
· sufficient time is offered to the applicant to prepare the request for interim
relief, if necessary with the help of a lawyer and/or interpreter
· the burden to prove the need to suspend the expulsion decision is not set
too high
· the judge deciding on the request performs close and rigorous scrutiny
of the claim of a risk of refoulement.
Giving the Member States the opportunity to chose between those two systems
would be respectful of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. How-
ever, given the fact that both systems should offer similar procedural guar-
antees, a system in which interim relief is granted on request does not seem
to enable Member States to process asylum cases much more expeditiously
than a system in which the appeal has automatic suspensive effect.
On the basis of the ECtHR’s judgment in Čonka v Belgium it is contended
that Article 39 (3) PD requires that Member States provide for clear entitlements
regarding interim protection. Practical arrangements which allow asylum
applicants to await the appeal in the territory of the receiving Member State
do not provide sufficient guarantees.
99 ECtHR 5 February 2002, Čonka v Belgium, no 51564/99, para 83. See also ECtHR 7 June
2011, R.U. v Greece, no 2237/08, para 77.
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6.4 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
The effectiveness of the EU prohibition of refoulement would be seriously
undermined if an asylum applicant is expelled or extradited before he has
had the opportunity to have his asylum claim closely and rigorously assessed
by the determining authority as well as the national court or tribunal. Early
expulsion could result in the asylum applicant being subjected to irreparable
harm (persecution or serious harm). Furthermore expulsion during the appeal
proceedings will render the judgment of the national court concerning the
existence of an EU right to be protected against refoulement or a right to asylum
ineffective. Therefore the asylum applicant should be allowed to remain on
the territory of the Member State:
· Until the determining authority in first instance has carried out a close
and rigorous assessment of the asylum claim.100 This means that in
practice the possibility to derogate from the right to remain during first
instance asylum proceedings provided for in Article 7 (2) PD can only be
applied in exceptional circumstances.
· For the time necessary to avail himself of the effective remedy before a
court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 (1) PD. Access to this remedy
may not be blocked as a result of the swift expulsion of the asylum
applicant after the negative asylum decision. The applicant should be
informed of the imminent expulsion in time, leaving him sufficient op-
portunity to consult his lawyer.101
· During the course of the appeal proceedings, until rigorous scrutiny of
the claim of a risk of refoulement has been performed by the court or
tribunal.
Specifically with regard to the right to interim protection during the appeal
proceedings the following conclusions should be drawn:
· It should be considered very unlikely that Article 39 (3) PD will be declared
invalid by the Court of Justice because of violation of the EU right to
effective judicial protection, as this provision expressly requires national
legislation concerning interim protection to be in accordance with inter-
national law.102
· It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR as well
as the views of the UN Committees that a remedy cannot be considered
effective when irreparable harm may be done before the final judgment
has been reached. In asylum cases expulsion of the asylum seeker before
100 See ECtHR (GC) 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09, para 205 and
ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 286 and 293.
101 Case 98/79, Pecastaing [1980], para 4, and ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v Georgia
and Russia, no 36378/02, paras 460-461.
102 See also section 2.4.1.
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the court has reached a final judgment against the expulsion order or
negative asylum decision may lead to such irreparable harm.103 The
remedy is also rendered ineffective by the real chance that asylum appli-
cants who are expelled to their country of origin lose contact with their
lawyers and disappear or face difficulties substantiating their case. Granting
interim protection against expulsion during the proceedings before the
court is therefore essential.
· Article 39 (3) PD, read in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy,
thus requires that interim protection against expulsion be granted in all
asylum cases, including for example manifestly unfounded cases.
As to the required form of interim protection it was concluded that:
· Article 39 PD read in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy
requires that automatic suspensive effect be attached to either the appeal
itself or to a request for interim relief.104
· It follows from the ECtHR’s judgment in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece that
the procedure in which interim relief may be granted by the national court
or tribunal on request, can only be considered an effective remedy if it
complies with important procedural guarantees. These include the rights
of the defence, a reasonable burden of proof and a rigorous scrutiny of
a claim of a risk of refoulement.105
· Article 39 (3) PD, read in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy,
requires that Member States provide for clear entitlements regarding
interim protection. Practical arrangements which allow asylum applicants
to await the appeal in the territory of the receiving Member State do not
suffice.106
103 See notably Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990], paras 20-21, ECtHR 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin
v France, no 25389/05, para 66, ComAT 24 May 2005, Mafhoud Brada v France, no 195/2002,
para 7.7 and HRC 15 May 2003, Weiss v Austria, no 1086/2002, para 8.2.
104 This may be derived from the fact that the ECtHR assessed in Gebremedhin v France and
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece whether the request for interim relief had automatic suspensive
effect.
105 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 387-388.
106 ECtHR 5 February 2002, Čonka v Belgium, no 51564/99, para 83.
7 The asylum applicant’s right to be heard
on his asylum motives
The asylum applicant should be allowed to remain in the territory of the
Member State until his asylum claim has been closely and rigorously assessed,
in order to effectively guarantee the prohibition of refoulement. At the same
time a rigorous assessment of the asylum claim is not possible without the
presence of the asylum applicant in the Member State. The statements of the
asylum applicant play an essential role in the assessment whether he runs a
risk of refoulement upon return to his country of origin. This is due to the fact
that in many asylum cases there is a lack of documentary evidence supporting
the asylum claim. The assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s asylum
account is often decisive for the outcome of the case.1 It is therefore crucial
that claimants are offered sufficient opportunity to present their case to the
determining authorities. For this purpose a personal interview is often indis-
pensable. Furthermore it may be considered necessary that the applicant is
able to respond to allegations against him and the evidence underlying the
(concept) asylum decision.
In Chapter 9 it will be argued that the judicial review required by Article 39
PD must cover the establishment and qualification of the facts. In this light
it is relevant to examine whether EU law also demands that the national courts
hear the applicant and/or his legal representative at a public hearing.
This chapter addresses the EU standards with regard to the asylum appli-
cant’s right to be personally heard on his asylum motives in first instance and
appeal proceedings.
The right to a personal interview
It is generally recognised that asylum applicants should have the right to a
personal interview. The Commission stated for example that since the right
to a personal interview is a basic procedural safeguard, the very possibility
of taking a decision without interviewing an applicant makes procedures
vulnerable to error and consequent refoulement.2 Furthermore, given the weight
1 See also Chapter 8.
2 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member
States for granting and withdrawing international protection, COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009)
1377, of 21 October 2009, p 13. See also Council resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum
guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ 19 September 1996, C 274, para 14, which provides
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of the applicant’s statements, it is considered of utmost importance that this
interview is conducted in a profound, patient and objective manner3 and in
a language which the applicant understands.4 In 2009 the Commission pointed
at the fact that due to the circumstances of the interview in some cases infor-
mation collected in a personal interview is clearly insufficient to correctly apply
the provisions of the Qualification Directive.5 Finally the asylum applicant’s
statements should be carefully recorded in a report as it is on the basis of this
report that the asylum decision is taken.6
The Procedures Directive allows for a number of exceptions to the right
to a personal interview. It is to a large extent silent on the required conditions
of the personal interview. The Court of Justice has not addressed the right
to a personal interview or the right to be heard during asylum proceedings
yet. This chapter contends mainly on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law and
non-binding sources of inspiration that the EU right to be heard and the full
effectiveness of the principle of non-refoulement set additional standards to those
laid down in the Procedures Directive. In section 7.1. it is argued on the basis
of these principles that a personal interview may only be omitted in exceptional
circumstances. Section 7.2. discusses the requirements as to the way the inter-
view is conducted.
The right to be heard following the personal interview
The Procedures Directive does not require Member States to offer the asylum
applicant the opportunity to comment on the contents of the report of the
interview and to respond to the determining authority’s conclusions as to the
fact-finding and the assessment of the risk of refoulement. Section 7.3. addresses
the applicant’s right to be heard following the personal interview. It examines
in particular whether the applicant has the right to comment on the report
that, before a final decision is taken on the asylum application, the asylum-seeker must
be given the opportunity of a personal interview with an official qualified under national
law.
3 See Doornbos 2005, p 104. See also Commission Staff Working Document COM(2009) 554,
SEC(2009) 1377, p 13, where it is stated that the awareness of the applicant about the
purpose of the interview, the preparedness of the personnel, and the content of and con-
ditions in which the interview takes place may be decisive for the outcomes of the ex-
amination.
4 See for example UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommenda-
tions for Law and Practice, March 2010, s 4, p 9.
5 It stated that the length of interviews varies significantly between Member States (from
0,5 hour to 3 hours) and that in the UK, a quality control audit found that in about 13 %
of 1,085 cases sampled applicants were refused asylum based on decisions and/or interviews
that were rated as poor or not fully effective. Furthermore legal advisors indicated that
factual mistakes or misunderstandings are common in the reports of interviews having
direct impacts on the outcomes of the examination. Commission Staff Working Document,
COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009) 1377, p 13.
6 See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, p 1.
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of the interview and on the conclusions of the determining authority concern-
ing the merits of the asylum claim.
The right to be heard by the national court
Does EU law require that the asylum applicant and/or his legal representative
be heard by the court during a public hearing, or may the appeal against the
asylum decision in the meaning of Article 39 PD also be decided on the basis
of written documents only? As case-law of the EU Courts on this issue is
(almost) non-existent, this question will be addressed in this chapter mainly
on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law regarding Article 6 ECHR, which incor-
porates the right to an oral hearing before a court. It is contended that an oral
hearing of the asylum applicant before the court can only be omitted in ex-
ceptional circumstances, given the fact that the credibility of the asylum
applicant’s account and the applicant’s personal fear for persecution or serious
harm are generally crucial for the asylum decision and the fundamental rights
at stake for the applicant.
7.1 THE RIGHT TO A PERSONAL INTERVIEW IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS
The Procedure Directive as a general rule provides for a right to a personal
interview in all asylum cases including those assessed in border procedures.7
However the Directive allows Member States to omit an interview on several
grounds in the asylum procedure. The absence of a personal interview in
asylum cases may limit the applicant’s ability to substantiate his asylum
claim.8 Article 12 (4) PD states that the absence of a personal interview in
accordance with Article 12 PD shall not prevent the determining authority from
taking a decision on an application for asylum. Some applicants may thus only
get the opportunity to submit written information to substantiate their asylum
claim.
The first ground for making an exception to the right to a personal inter-
view is that the determining authority is able to take a positive decision on
the basis of the evidence available.9 The absence of an interview in such cases
may prove problematic if the asylum status is withdrawn in a later stage. In
cases of withdrawal of an asylum status a personal interview is not obligatory.
The person concerned may also only be given the opportunity to submit the
reasons as to why his/her refugee status should not be withdrawn in a written
7 See Art 12 PD in normal asylum cases and Art 35 (3) (d) PD in border procedures.
8 The fact that Art 12 (5) PD provides that the absence of a personal interview pursuant to
Art 12 (2) (b) and (c) and (3) shall not adversely affect the decision of the determining
authority, does not prevent that. Costello states that if the apparent discretion afforded
by Art 12 of the directive were exploited by decision-makers, it would lead to refoulement.
Costello 2006, p 24.
9 Art 12 (2) (a) PD.
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statement.10 It is thus possible that an asylum status is granted and with-
drawn, while the asylum applicant has not been given the opportunity to
explain his asylum motives in an interview.
Secondly Member States may refrain from conducting a personal interview,
if the competent authority has already had a meeting with the applicant for
the purpose of assisting him with completing his application and submitting
the essential information regarding the application.11 Thirdly an interview
may be omitted if the determining authority, on the basis of a complete ex-
amination of information provided by the applicant, considers the application
to be unfounded where certain circumstances apply which may also be reason
to accelerate the procedure. The applicant:
· only raised issues that are not relevant or of minimal relevance to the
examination of whether he/she qualifies as a refugee;
· is considered to be from a safe country of origin;
· can be returned to a safe third country;
· has made inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient representa-
tions;
· has submitted a subsequent application which does not raise any relevant
new elements or;
· is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate his re-
moval.12
According to Article 34 (2)(c) PD the preliminary examination in subsequent
asylum applications may be conducted on the sole basis of written submissions
without a personal interview.
The fourth ground to omit a personal interview is that the interview is
not reasonably practicable, in particular where the competent authority is of
the opinion that the applicant is unfit or unable to be interviewed owing to
enduring circumstances beyond his/her control.13 In that situation reasonable
efforts shall be made to allow the applicant or the dependant to submit further
information. Finally the Member States have discretion to omit an interview
in the case of dependent adults and minors. The right to an interview of these
two groups will be addressed separately in sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2.
According to information of the Commission of 2009, ten Member States
have provided for a possibility to derogate from the right to a personal inter-
10 Art 38 (1) (b) PD.
11 Art 12 (2) (b) PD.
12 Art 12 (2) (c) jo Art 23(4)(a), (c), (g), (h) and (j) PD.
13 Art 12 (3) PD states that when in doubt, Member States may require a medical or psycho-
logical certificate.
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view in asylum cases in their national legislation.14 Also UNHCR mentions
in its report of 2010 concerning the implementation of the Procedures Directive
that several of the Member States surveyed allow that a personal interview
be omitted in specific cases.15 Slovenia for example usually omits a personal
interview when an asylum application is assessed in the accelerated pro-
cedure.16 In France a personal interview may be omitted amongst others in
cases in which the asylum applicant is a national of a country to which
Article 1C of the Refugee Convention applies, where the elements underlying
the asylum claim are manifestly unfounded or where medical reasons prevent
the interview.17
The question should be raised whether the absence of a personal interview
undermines the effectiveness of the right to asylum or the principle of non-
refoulement. The Court of Justice has not addressed this issue yet. As the right
to a personal interview is the general rule, it may be expected that the Court
will interpret the exceptions allowed to the right of a personal interview
restrictively and in the light of the principle of effectiveness.18
The right to an interview should be considered essential to ensure an
appropriate examination of a claim of refoulement in the meaning of Article 8
(2) PD and therefore for the effective exercise of the right to asylum or the
prohibition of refoulement for the following reasons. It will be shown in Chap-
ter 8 that EU law requires that the claim of refoulement be assessed on an
individual basis and be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. This means that claim-
ants must be able to submit relevant information and to substantiate their claim
of refoulement. In exceptional cases it may be possible to do so by submitting
written statements and evidence only. This may for example be the case where
the asylum applicant has submitted only that he fears for serious harm as a
result of the general human rights situation in his country of origin. Such a
case may be decided on the basis of country of origin information provided
by governments, UN bodies or NGO’s. However, generally the asylum applicant
himself will be the most important source of information, at least with regard
to the personal risk of persecution or serious harm. This is particularly the
case when this person does not have sufficient evidence supporting his claim.
Furthermore, as is recognised in Article 4 (3) QD the individual position and
personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background
14 Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009) 1377, p 13. According
to the Commission up to 111 650 applicants (40 % of the total asylum applicants’ population)
might be potentially targeted by this derogation. See also Report from the Commission
to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2005/85/EC,
8 September 2010, COM (2010) 465 final, p 6.
15 UNHCR mentions Finland, France, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. UNHCR,
Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, pp 33-39
16 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 6 and s 9 p 27.
17 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 37, s 9, p 25.
18 See for example Case C-578/08, Chakroun [2010], para 43.
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and gender should be taken into account in the assessment whether, on the
basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant
has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm.
This information is best obtained by a personal interview of the person con-
cerned. Moreover an interview is necessary to test the credibility of the appli-
cant’s account. As was stated in the explanations with the amended proposal
for the Procedures Directive:
Since in most if not all asylum cases the determining authorities must assess the
credibility of statements and/or of the applicant on the basis of all available facts,
it is imperative for a proper assessment that applicants have, as much as possible,
the opportunity to bring these forward in a personal manner, i.e. in an interview.19
Finally a personal interview may be necessary to allow the applicant to exercise
his EU right to be heard. The applicant may for example clarify any alleged
discrepancies, inconsistencies or omissions in an initial written or oral
account,20 give his view on evidence relied on by the determining authorities
or rebut the presumption of safety of his country of origin or a third coun-
try.21
A meeting as mentioned in Article 12 (2) (b) PD should not be considered
an appropriate alternative for a personal interview. This meeting serves to
assist the applicant with completing his application and to submit the essential
information regarding the application mentioned in Article 4 (2) QD. Battjes
noted that this meeting does not address the assessment of the applicant’s
credibility. The interview allows the applicant to present the grounds for their
applications in a comprehensive manner and the determining authority to
assess the credibility of the asylum account.22
Obligations stemming from the ECHR, the CAT and the Refugee Convention
The ECtHR has stressed the importance of the personal interview in several
asylum cases. The ECtHR attaches much weight to the assessment of the credibil-
ity of the applicant’s asylum account by an authority who heard the applicant
in person. In R.C. v Sweden the ECtHR held that as a general principle the
national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts, but, more
particularly, the credibility of witnesses ‘since it is they who have had an
opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the person concerned’.23
19 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 18 June 2002, COM (2002) 326 final,
pp 7-8.
20 Costello 2006, p 24. See also UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, Geneva 1979 (reedited in 1992) (UNHCR Handbook), para 109.
21 Battjes 2006, p 313.
22 See Art 13 (3) PD. See also Battjes 2006, p 313.
23 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 52.
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In E.G. v the United Kingdom the Secretary of State had in a subsequent asylum
procedure disregarded the fact that the Adjudicator had accepted in the first
asylum procedure that the applicant had been detained and ill-treated in the
past. The ECtHR considered: ‘It is unfortunate, in the Court’s view, that the
Secretary of State did not consider the findings of the Adjudicator who had
had the opportunity to see the applicant give evidence in person.’ As a result
the Secretary of State did not take into account an important risk factor in this
case.24 In cases in which the national authorities failed to assess the asylum
claim of the applicant and thus to conduct a personal interview, the ECtHR
relied heavily on the opinion of UNHCR. It stressed that UNHCR interviewed
the person concerned and thus had the opportunity to test the credibility of
his fears and the veracity of his account of the circumstances in her home
country.25
When assessing the quality of the national decision-making process the
Court takes into account that the applicant was interviewed by the national
authorities or was granted ‘ample opportunity to state his case and to submit
whatever he found relevant for the outcome’.26 On the other hand in Charahili
v Turkey the Court referred to the fact that the Turkish Government failed to
submit any document to the Court demonstrating that the applicant had been
interviewed in relation to his asylum request.27 In I.M. v France the ECtHR
took into account when assessing the quality of the French accelerated pro-
cedure that the personal interview with the applicant only lasted half an hour.
The ECtHR noted in this context that it concerned a first asylum application.28
The significance of the personal interview is also recognised in several non-
binding views of human rights bodies. It its Concluding Observations on
France of 2006, the Committee against Torture recommended for example
that the situations covered by article 3 of the Convention should be the subject
of a more thorough risk assessment in accordance with the provisions of article 3,
24 ECtHR 31 May 2011, E.G. v the United Kingdom, no 41178/08, para 72.
25 See for example ECtHR 15 June 2010, M.B. and others v Turkey, no 36009/08, para 33, ECtHR
15 June 2010, Ahmadpour v Turkey, no 12717/08, para 39, ECtHR 13 April 2010, Charahili
v Turkey, no 46605/07, para 59, ECtHR 19 January 2010, Z.N.S. v Turkey, no 21896/08, para
48, ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abbdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 82.
26 See for example ECHR (Adm) 16 March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden, no 38865/02, ECtHR (Adm)
24 June 2004, Kandomabadi v the Netherlands, no 6276/03, ECtHR (Adm) 1 October 2002,
Tekdemir v the Netherlands, nos 46860/99 and 49823/99.
27 ECtHR 13 April 2010, Charahili v Turkey, no 46605/07, para 57, See also ECtHR 15 June
2010, Ahmadpour v Turkey, no 12717/08, para 38, where the Court considered that ‘there
is nothing in the case file which shows that the applicant was actually interviewed and
that the national authorities indeed examined her request, taking into account the require-
ments of Article 3 of the Convention’.
28 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 155.
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including by systematically holding individual interviews to better assess the
personal risk to the applicant, and by providing free interpretation services.29
Both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe have recommended the governments of the Member States
of the Council of Europe to ensure the right of all asylum applicants to a
personal interview when accelerated procedures are applied.30 Finally UNHCR
EXCOM conclusion No 30 requires a complete personal interview by a fully
qualified official in cases deemed manifestly unfounded or abusive.31 UNHCR
states in its Handbook that basic information, frequently given, in the first
instance, by completing a standard questionnaire, will normally not be suffi-
cient to enable the examiner to reach a decision, and that one or more personal
interviews will be required.32
Subconclusion: the right to a personal interview
Article 12 PD read in the light of the principle of effectiveness as well as the
right to be heard requires in principle that a personal interview is held in each
first asylum procedure. It precludes that whole categories of cases are excluded
from a right to a personal interview on the basis of the possibilities for deroga-
tion mentioned in this article. The absence of a personal interview is only
justified in exceptional cases, where it is established that this absence does
not make it impossible for the claimant to substantiate his case and for the
examining authorities to take a careful decision. Where the interview is
omitted, the examining authorities should ensure that sufficient information
is gathered to accurately assess the risk of refoulement, in particular when the
person concerned is not able to be interviewed because of his mental situation.
7.1.1 Dependent adults
If Member States provide that an application may be made by an applicant
on behalf of his/her dependants,33 they may give the opportunity of a per-
29 ComAT Concluding Observations on France, 3 April 2006, CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, para 6.
30 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Guidelines on human rights protection
in the context of accelerated asylum procedures, 1 July 2009, under IV 1.d and Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1471 (2005) on accelerated asylum procedures
in Council of Europe member states, para 8.10.2.
31 EXCOM Conclusion no 30 (XXXIV), 1983, on the problem of manifestly unfounded or
abusive applications for refugee status or asylum.
32 UNHCR Handbook, para 199.
33 See Art 6 (3) PD. In such cases Member States shall ensure that dependant adults consent
to the lodging of the application on their behalf, failing which they shall have an
opportunity to make an application on their own behalf.
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sonal interview to each dependant adult, but are not obliged to do so.34 Per-
sons (mostly women), on whose behalf an asylum application is made by
another person, may have independent asylum motives. If an interview of
these persons is omitted, there is a risk that these motives will not come to
the fore. The woman may be afraid to talk about her experiences, such as
sexual abuse, to her husband or he may not want to mention those experiences
to the determining authorities.35 She may be willing to express her personal
fear for persecution or serious harm in a confidential interview with the
authorities.
The ECtHR and the UN Committees have not addressed the right to an
interview of dependent adults specifically. UNHCR is of the opinion that the
determining authority should meet with each dependant adult individually
to ensure that they understand the grounds for protection and their procedural
rights.36 In order to ensure that gender-related claims, of women in particular,
are properly considered in the refugee status determination process, women
asylum-seekers should be interviewed separately, without the presence of male
family members, in order to ensure that they have an opportunity to present
their case. It should be explained to them that they may have a valid claim
in their own right.37
It may thus be argued that the determining authorities should investigate
whether the dependent adult has an independent claim of refoulement. This
is best done during a personal meeting with the dependent adult without the
presence of family members. Where an independent claim is present, the
omission of a personal interview may undermine the effectiveness of the right
to asylum or the prohibition of refoulement.
7.1.2 Accompanied and unaccompanied minor asylum applicants
Article 12 (1) PD leaves it to the discretion of the Member States to determine
in which cases a minor shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview.
This applies both to accompanied and unaccompanied minors.38 Thus, even
though in an asylum procedure an unaccompanied minor is often the most
34 According to the UNHCR report of 2010 there was an opportunity for adult dependants
to have a personal interview in 10 of the 12 Member States of focus. UNHCR, Improving
Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 16.
35 See for an example ComAT 22 January 2007, V.L. v Switzerland, no 262/2005.
36 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 15.
37 UNHCR Guidelines of International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, para 36.
38 Art 17 PD on unaccompanied minors does not provide whether such a minor should get
a personal interview, but does set out minimum standards in the case such an interview
is conducted.
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important source of information,39 the Procedures Directive does not provide
him with a right to a personal interview.
The Commission reported in 2010 that applications made by parents
generally cover dependent minors. It mentions that in three Member States
(Greece, the Netherlands and Germany), the right to lodge an application is
recognised for minors of a certain age. Furthermore in a number of Member
States a guardian or other representative is competent to lodge an application
for an unaccompanied minor.40
The asylum claim of an accompanied child will often be directly related
to the claims of their parents or other accompanying family members. In such
a case the parents may well be able to represent the child in the asylum
procedure and to present their and their child’s asylum motives in their
personal interview. This may be different however if the accompanied child
has independent asylum motives. It may for example fear for persecution
because of it’s sexual orientation or religious beliefs. Furthermore it may fear
child specific forms of persecution such as under-age recruitment, child
trafficking, female genital mutilation, family and domestic violence, forced
or underage marriage, bonded or hazardous child labour, forced labour, forced
prostitution and child pornography.41 Potentially the child’s parents are not
aware of such independent asylum motives or are unwilling to mention them
to the determining authorities. The child may for example conceal its homo-
sexual feelings, because it fears to be disowned. Or the parents may be
involved in practices such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation or
forced labour. In such cases a personal interview with the child will be the
only way for the determining authorities to be informed about his asylum
motives.42 Furthermore even if the asylum claim of the child is directly related
to the claim of his parents, it is possible that a child has important additional
information which supports these asylum claims. The child may for example
have personally experienced persecution or serious harm in his country or
origin as a result of the political activities of his parent(s).
It is argued in this section that Article 12 PD read in the light of Article 24
of the Charter requires that each child which is sufficiently mature be informed
39 UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2
and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
Geneva 22 December 2009, para 70.
40 Commission Report COM (2010) 465 final, p 4.
41 See UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion no 107 (LVIII), 2007, para (g) (viii) and UNHCR, Guide-
lines on international protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of
the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 22
December 2009, para 18.
42 UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2
and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
Geneva 22 December 2009, para 70, which stated that ‘A child’s own account of his/her
experience is often essential for the identification of his/her individual protection require-
ments and, in many cases, the child will be the only source of this information’.
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on the asylum process and in particular options to present its own asylum
claim. This would also be in line with asylum seeker’s right to information
guaranteed by Article 10 (1) PD. If the child wants to be interviewed personally
on his asylum motives he must be given this opportunity.
Article 12 PD and Article 24 of the Charter
Article 12 (1) PD should be read in the light of Article 24 (1) and (2) of the
Charter and Article 12 CRC.43 According to Article 24 (1) of the Charter
children may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into con-
sideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and
maturity. Furthermore Article 24 (2) provides that in all actions relating to
children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s
best interests must be a primary consideration. The best interests principle
is also mentioned in Article 17 (6) PD concerning the rights of unaccompanied
minors.
The child’s right to be heard according to the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice has made clear in Aguirre Zarraga that Article 24 of the
Charter requires that a child be able to express its views in legal proceedings.
However it must be assessed in each individual case how the right to be heard
should be exercised, taking account of the age and maturity of the child as
well as its best interests. This case concerned a child which illegally remained
with her mother in Germany instead of with her father in Spain. According
to EU law the German court was bound by the Spanish court’s judgment which
awarded the sole custody over the child to the Spanish father and ordered
the return of the child to Spain.44 One of the preliminary questions put before
the Court of Justice was whether the German court should enforce the Spanish
judgment even though the Spanish court had not heard the child’s opinion
on the case before rendering its judgment. In this context the Court of Justice
considered that it is for the court which has to rule on the return of a child
to assess whether an oral hearing of the child is appropriate. The Court noted
that the conflicts which lead to child custody cases and the associated tensions
create situations in which the hearing of the child, particularly when, as may be
the case, the physical presence of the child before the court is required, may prove
to be inappropriate, and even harmful to the psychological health of the child, who
is often exposed to such tensions and adversely affected by them. Accordingly,
43 See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, pp 19-20.
44 Art 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the
matters of parental responsibility [2003] OJ L 338/1. This provision also states that the court
deciding on the custody of the child should give the child an opportunity to be heard, unless
a hearing was considered inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of
maturity.
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while remaining a right of the child, hearing the child cannot constitute an absolute
obligation, but must be assessed having regard to what is required in the best
interests of the child in each individual case, in accordance with Article 24(2) of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.45
According to the Court of Justice it is not a necessary consequence of the right
of the child to be heard that a hearing before the court of the Member State
of origin take place. However that right does require that there are made
available to that child the legal procedures and conditions which enable the
child to express his or her views freely and that those views are obtained by
the court.46
Obligations stemming from the Convention on the Rights of the Child
Article 24 of the Charter is based on several provisions of the CRC, amongst
others Article 12 CRC47 which provides that the child ‘shall be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affect-
ing the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate
body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law’.
Article 12 CRC applies, according to its text, to all judicial and administrative
proceedings affecting the child, and thus also to asylum procedures.48
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is of the opinion that Article 12
CRC requires that in the case of an asylum claim, ‘the child must […] have
the opportunity to present her or his reasons leading to the asylum claim’.49
It also stated with regard to unaccompanied and separated children that ‘where
the age and maturity of the child permits, the opportunity for a personal
interview with a qualified official should be granted before any final decision
is made’.50 In order to be able to exercise its right to be heard the child must
be informed on the asylum process.51 According to the Committee on the
Rights of the Child there can be no correct application of the best interests
45 Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zaraga [2010], para 64.
46 Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zaraga [2010], para 65.
47 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/25.
48 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12,
para 32 states that Art 12 ‘applies to all relevant judicial proceedings affecting the child,
without limitation, including, for example [..] unaccompanied children, asylum-seeking
and refugee children [..].’
49 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12,
para 123. See also paras 32 and 67.
50 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6,
para 71. See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 18.
51 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12,
General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6, para 25.
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of the child principle laid down in Article 3 CRC if the components of Article 12
are not respected.52
Article 12 CRC applies to all minors capable of forming their own views,
irrespective of their age.53 The Committee on the Rights of the Child stated
that States parties are obliged:
to assess the capacity of the child to form an autonomous opinion to the greatest
extent possible. This means that States parties cannot begin with the assumption
that a child is incapable of expressing her or his own views. On the contrary, States
parties should presume that a child has the capacity to form her or his own views
and recognise that she or he has the right to express them; it is not up to the child
to first prove her or his capacity.54
The Committee points at the fact that children are able to form views from
the youngest age, even when they are unable to express them verbally. It states
that consequently, full implementation of Article 12 CRC ‘requires recognition
of, and respect for, non-verbal forms of communication including play, body
language, facial expressions, and drawing and painting, through which very
young children demonstrate understanding, choices and preferences’.55 Fur-
thermore States parties are under the obligation to ensure the implementation
of the right to be heard for children experiencing difficulties in making their
views heard. For instance, efforts must be made ‘to recognise the right to
expression of views for minority, indigenous and migrant children and other
children who do not speak the majority language’.
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child children should
never be coerced into expressing views against their wishes.56 If the child
has decided to be heard, he or she will have to decide how to be heard, either
directly, or through a representative or appropriate body. The representative
can be the parent(s), a lawyer, or another person (inter alia, a social worker).
The Committee recommends that, wherever possible, the child must be given
the opportunity to be directly heard in any proceedings.57 The Committee
emphasises that that a child should not be interviewed more often than neces-
sary, in particular when harmful events are explored. According to the Com-
52 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12,
para 74. See also UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion no 107 (LVIII), 2007, on Children at risk:
‘States, UNHCR, and other relevant agencies and partners shall assure to the child who
is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance
with the age and maturity of the child.’
53 See Art 12 (1) CRC and ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 21.
54 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 20.
55 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 21.
56 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 134 (b).
57 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, paras 35-36.
166 Chapter 7
mittee the hearing of a child is a difficult process that can have a traumatic
impact on the child.58
Subconclusion: minor’s right to a personal interview
It should be concluded that Member States do not have full discretion when
setting out rules regarding interviewing minors. It follows from Article 12 PD
read in the light of Article 24 of the Charter which should in turn be inter-
preted in conformity with Article 12 CRC that each child must in some way
be put in the position to present its asylum claim. For that purpose children
should be informed on the asylum process in conformity with Article 10 (1) PD.
If the child is unaccompanied or if it has individual asylum motives or
important information in support of his and his parents asylum claim, it should
be decided whether the age and maturity of the child permits that the child
is interviewed on its asylum motives. If this is the case the child should in
principle be personally interviewed if it wishes so. However it should always
be noted that an interview in an asylum procedure can be stressful for a child,
as it may be asked to talk about traumatic events it experienced in its country
of origin. Like in child abduction cases as Aguirre Zarraga it should therefore
be assessed whether an asylum interview is inappropriate, or even harmful
to the psychological health of the child. If interviewing the child would indeed
be inappropriate or harmful the interview should be omitted. In analogy with
Article 12 (3) PD then reasonable efforts shall be made to allow the child to
submit further information, for example via his guardian or legal represent-
ative.
7.2 REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW
According to Article 13 (2) PD personal interviews should take place under
conditions which ensure appropriate confidentiality. Furthermore Article 13
(3) PD requires Member States to take appropriate steps to ensure that personal
interviews are conducted under conditions which allow applicants to present
the grounds for their applications in a comprehensive manner.59 Important
guarantees in this regard are amongst others that the interview is conducted
in a language which the person concerned understands or that he is assisted
by an interpreter. Furthermore it is essential that the interviewer is competent
and able to gain the trust of the applicant. The Procedures Directive does not
guarantee these safeguards in all asylum cases. Therefore these issues will be
addressed in this section. Other circumstances which also determine the quality
of the interview, which will not be discussed in this section are the con-
58 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 24.
59 This provision also applies to interviews in border procedures and in case the refugee status
is withdrawn. See Artt 35 (3) (d) and 38 (1) (b) PD.
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fidentiality of the interview, the time and assistance available for the asylum
applicant to prepare for the interview, the environment in which the interview
takes place and the time allocated for and duration of the personal inter-
view.60
In 2010 UNHCR pointed out that in several Member States the quality of
the personal interviews was not guaranteed. It observed for example that in
some Member States the confidentiality of the interview was not ensured61
and that interviews were conducted by officers who were not properly trained.
Furthermore the UNHCR research revealed widespread misconduct involving
interpreters in personal interviews, such as a lack of competence and impar-
tiality. Finally UNHCR noted that in some Member States interviews may not
take place in a language the applicant actually understands as a result of a
shortage of interpreters in a certain language.62 Conditions such as those
described by UNHCR may impede the applicant to fully present his asylum
claim and thus undermine the effectiveness of the right to a personal interview.
7.2.1 Language of the interview
Article 13 (3) (b) PD states that communication during the personal interview
need not necessarily take place in the language preferred by the applicant for
asylum if there is another language which he may reasonably be supposed to
understand and in which he is able to communicate. According to UNHCR’s
research of 2010 most interviews were conducted in the mother-tongue of the
applicant or in another language chosen by the applicant. However, in some
cases the applicant was interviewed in a language he was supposed to, but
did not actually understand, mostly as a result of a shortage of interpreters
in particular languages.63
It may be argued that the effectiveness of the right to a personal interview
and consequently the right to asylum or the prohibition of refoulement are
undermined when it is not ensured that the person concerned is actually able
to explain his asylum motives or objections against transfer or expulsion in
an interview.64 It should be remembered that the credibility of the account
of the person concerned is assessed on the basis of, often very detailed informa-
60 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5.
61 UNHCR states in its report of 2010 that it observed interviews in Greece, Spain and Italy
which took place in conditions which breached Art 13 (2) PD. It occurred for example that
three personal interviews were conducted simultaneously in one room. UNHCR, Improving
Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 10. See also Commission Report COM (2010) 465 final, 2010, p 6.
62 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5.
63 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 45. See also Commission Report COM (2010)
465 final, p 7.
64 Doornbos notes in her research that asylum applicants often hesitate to let the interviewer
know that they do not understand the interviewer or the interpreter. Doornbos 2006, p 274.
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tion, gathered during the interview. If a person does not understand exactly
what the interviewer is asking him or is not able to respond to questions in
detail, this may work to his detriment and lead to the conclusion that the
account should be deemed not credible.
The Court of Justice, the ECtHR and the UN Committees have not addressed
this issue. Both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
UNHCR stress that Member States must ensure the right of all asylum applicants
to a personal interview in a language they understand.65 UNHCR is of the
opinion that an interview in the language the applicant understands is a pre-
requisite for a fair procedure and when it is not fulfilled any evidence gathered
in the course of the personal interview may be unreliable.66 Furthermore
UNHCR stresses that there is a difference between the basic ability to make
oneself understood in a language and the ability to present a complex account
which may include difficult or painful events in that language.67 UNHCR notes
that assumptions that an asylum-seeker speaks or understands the official
language of his or her country of origin may be incorrect. As a matter of
principle, bearing in mind the need to prevent deliberate obstruction, every
effort should be undertaken in this regard by the countries of asylum.68
Arguably the principle of effectiveness thus requires Member States to
ascertain that the person concerned is actually able to understand the language
chosen for the interview and that he can express himself effectively in this
language. If the claimant does not understand the interviewer, an interpreter
should be used to facilitate communication. If such an interpreter is not avail-
able (for example because of the rareness of the language spoken by the
claimant) the authorities should take this into account when examining the
case and taking a decision on the credibility of the claimant’s account.
7.2.2 The right to a free and competent interpreter
If the language chosen for the interview is not understood by the person
concerned free interpretation services should be provided, in a language this
person understands. This follows from Article 10 (1) (b) PD, which grants
asylum applicants a right to an interpreter for submitting their case to the
competent authorities whenever this is necessary.69 According to this pro-
65 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1471 (2005) on accelerated
asylum procedures in Council of Europe member states, para 8.10.2.
66 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 29.
67 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 44.
68 UNHCR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum
Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status
(Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), p 13.
69 Note that this right also applies in border procedures in the meaning of Art 35 PD. See
Art 35 (3) (c) PD.
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vision Member States shall consider it necessary to give the services of an
interpreter at least when the determining authority calls upon the applicant
to be interviewed and appropriate communication cannot be ensured without
such services. Interpreters used at the interview and in other cases where the
competent authorities call upon the applicant, shall be paid for out of public
funds.70 Article 13 (3) (b) PD requires Member States to select an interpreter
who is able to ensure appropriate communication between the applicant and
the person who conducts the interview.71 It may be derived from this pro-
vision that the Member States need to ensure that interpreters are competent72
and qualified and that the languages spoken by the interpreter are understood
by the person who is interviewed and the interviewer.73
UNHCR mentions in its report of 2010 that a number of Member States face
shortages of interpreters in particular languages or in particular regional
locations. This problem is sometimes solved by using interpreters in other
Member States via a video-conference call.74 UNHCR also states that in some
Member States no specific professional qualifications are required for inter-
preters and that in the twelve Member States of focus the provision of training
for interpreters is at best limited and in many cases non-existent.75 Finally
UNHCR’s research revealed widespread misconduct involving interpreters in
personal interviews, and serious shortcomings in the ability of interviewers
to work effectively with or manage the conduct of interpreters.76
The right to an interpreter is considered an important procedural safeguard
in asylum proceedings by several sources of inspiration.77 In M.S.S. v Belgium
and Greece the ECtHR took into account a number of deficiencies in the Greek
asylum procedure which together lead to a violation of Article 13 ECHR. One
70 See Art 10 (1) (b) PD. See also Council resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees
for asylum procedures, OJ 19 September 1996, C 274 , pp 13-17, para 13.
71 See also recital 13 Preamble PD.
72 See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 42. According to UNHCR the inter-
viewer should confirm that the applicant and the interpreter understand each other and
that the applicant is comfortable with the interpretation arrangement.
73 UNHCR understands the clause ‘appropriate communication to also require that the
interpreter possesses competent interpreting skills, is neutral in his interpretation, is
impartial, does not provide any kind of supplementary information as a contribution to
the case he is interpreting and does not provide procedural or legal advice to the applicant’.
UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 28-29.
74 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 32-33.
75 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 35-36.
76 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 38. UNHCR mentions examples on pp 38-40.
77 See for example Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1471 (2005)
on accelerated asylum procedures in Council of Europe member states, adopted on 7
October 2005, para 7 and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommenda-
tion 1236 (1994) on the right of asylum, adopted on 12 April 1994, where the Parliamentary
Assembly recommended the Committee of Ministers to insist that asylum-seekers shall
be informed, if appropriate, of their right to linguistic assistance.
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of those deficiencies was the shortage of interpreters.78 In I.M. v France the
ECtHR recognised that a lack of linguistic aid may affect the asylum applicant’s
ability to present his asylum claim.79 The Committee against Torture in its
Concluding Observations regarding France of 2006, recommended ‘that the
situations covered by article 3 of the Convention should be the subject of a
more thorough risk assessment in accordance with the provisions of article 3,
including by systematically holding individual interviews to better assess the
personal risk to the applicant, and by providing free interpretation services’ (em-
phasis added).80
With regard to the competence of the interpreter it is interesting to note
that the ECtHR has recognised that in order for the right of every defendant
to the free assistance of an interpreter of Article 6 (3) (e) ECHR ‘to be practical
and effective, the obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the
appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular
circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the
adequacy of the interpretation provided’.81 On the basis of this judgment it
may be argued that in order to comply with their obligation under Article 13
(3) (b) PD, the Member State authorities should control the quality of the
interpretation offered by the State.
7.2.3 The competence of the interviewer
A personal interview should be conducted by a person competent under
national law and not necessarily by the determining authority. Article 13 (3)
(a) PD states that Member States must ensure that the person who conducts
the interview is sufficiently competent to take account of the personal or general
circumstances surrounding the application, including the applicant’s cultural
origin or vulnerability, insofar as it is possible to do so. These are not par-
ticularly high standards.
Arguably Article 13 PD does entail that Member States should ensure that
interviewers receive proper training. UNHCR observed in its report of 2010 that
Greece, Spain and Italy did not provide for formal and compulsory specialist
training for all interviewers upon recruitment.82
The ECtHR recognised the importance of training for interviewers in asylum
cases in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. In this case it considered the ‘lack of
training of the staff responsible for conducting the individual interview’ to
78 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 301.
79 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 145.
80 ComAt Concluding Observations on France, 3 April 2006, CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, emphasis
added.
81 ECtHR (GC) 18 October 2006, Hermi v Italy, no 18114/02, para 70.
82 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 12-25.
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be one of the deficiencies in the Greek asylum procedure which lead to a
violation of Article 13 ECHR.83 UNHCR stresses that the task of the interviewer
is ‘hugely challenging and complicated’.84 According to the UNHCR Handbook
it will be necessary for the examiner to gain the confidence of the applicant
in order to assist the latter in putting forward his case and in fully explaining
his opinions and feelings.85
UNHCR specified the minimum knowledge and skills any interviewer should
have, which may provide useful guidance for the interpretation of Article 13
(3) (a). In UNHCR’s view Member States should ensure amongst others that
interviewers have knowledge and understanding of the applicable national,
international refugee and human rights law. Furthermore interviewers should
have knowledge of and be able to use appropriate interviewing and question-
ing techniques and must be competent to take account of the applicant’s
vulnerabilities. They must be able to work with interpreters and to ensure
effective communication and a complete record of the personal interview.
Finally they must be impartial and objective.86
7.2.4 Gender-sensitive interviews
Some persons claiming a risk of refoulement, in particular victims of sexual
violence, may feel apprehensive to talk about their experiences. According
to the Committee against Torture: ‘It is well-known that the loss of privacy
and prospect of humiliation based on revelation alone of the acts concerned
may cause both women and men to withhold the fact that they have been
subject to rape and/or other forms of sexual abuse until it appears absolutely
necessary’.87 It may be argued that Article 13 (3) PD requires the use of an
interviewer and interpreter of the same sex as the claimant, if this is necessary
to (better) allow the applicant to present the grounds for his application in
a comprehensive manner. When interpreters of the same sex are not available
the examining authorities should arguably take this into account when taking
the decision and/or when assessing the value of late statements in first or
subsequent asylum procedures.88
Several non-binding sources of inspiration have stressed the importance
of the involvement of female interviewers and interpreters in interviews with
women. The Council resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures
provides that Member States must endeavour to involve skilled female
83 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 301.
84 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 12.
85 UNHCR Handbook, para 200.
86 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 12-13.
87 ComAT 22 January 2007, V.L. v Switzerland, no 262/2005, para 8.8.
88 See with regard to late statements also section 8.5.
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employees and female interpreters in the asylum procedure where necessary,
particularly where female asylum-seekers find it difficult to present the
grounds for their application in a comprehensive manner owing to the ex-
periences they have undergone or to their cultural origin.89 The Human Rights
Committee in its Concluding Observations regarding Austria noted with
concern that asylum-seeking women were not automatically interviewed by
female asylum officers and assisted by female interpreters. The Committee
recommended that the State party should adopt a gender-sensitive approach
to refugee status determination by automatically assigning female interviewers
and interpreters to asylum-seeking women.90 Furthermore UNHCR stressed
the importance of the use of female interpreters in interviews with female
asylum applicants in EXCOM conclusion No 64.91
7.2.5 Child-friendly interviews
Article 17 provides for special provisions concerning the interview of unaccom-
panied minors. Article 17 (1) (b) PD states that the Member States should ensure
that the minor’s representative is given the opportunity to inform the unaccom-
panied minor about the meaning and possible consequences of the personal
interview and, where appropriate, how to prepare himself/herself for the
personal interview. Furthermore it requires Member States to allow the repres-
entative to be present at that interview and to ask questions or make com-
ments, within the framework set by the person who conducts the interview.
Article 17 (4) (a) PD demands that if an unaccompanied minor has a personal
interview on his application for asylum, that interview be conducted by a
person who has the necessary knowledge of the special needs of minors.
Such special guarantees do not apply to the interviews with accompanied
minors. It may be argued on the basis of the Court of Justice’s judgment in
89 Council resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ
19 September 1996, C 274, pp 13-17, para 28.
90 HRC Concluding Observations on Austria, 30 October 2007, CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4, para
18. See also ComAT Concluding Observations on Austria, 15 December 2005, CAT/C/AUT/
CO/3 and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1374 (1998)
on the situation of refugee women in Europe, where it is recommended that the Committee
of Ministers urge the member states to ensure that female medical and social staff (including
interpreters) are available for refugee women.
91 EXCOM Conclusion no 64 (XLI) 1990, on Refugee Women and International Protection
(1990) states that, wherever necessary, skilled female interviewers should be provided in
procedures for the determination of refugee status. See also UNHCR Guidelines of Inter-
national Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, para 36, which
even states that Claimants should be informed of the choice to have interviewers and
interpreters of the same sex as themselves and that they should be provided automatically
for women claimants.
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Aguirre Zarraga as well as the views of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child and UNHCR that Article 17 (4) PD should be applied by analogy to such
interviews. Such application would be in line with the requirement included
in Article 13 (3) PD that personal interviews must be conducted under con-
ditions which allow applicants to present the grounds for their applications
in a comprehensive manner and that the person who conducts the interview
should be sufficiently competent to take account of the personal circumstances
of the applicant including his vulnerability.
UNHCR reported in 2010 that several Member States did not provide special
training for interviewing children.92 Only four of the twelve Member States
of focus in UNHCR’s research of 2010 had specific guidelines on interviewing
children.93
Interviewing in a child-friendly manner
The Court of Justice has recognised that Article 24 of the Charter requires that
the State authorities should ensure that a hearing of the child should be
conducted in a child-friendly manner. In Aguirre Zarraga it considered that
where a court decides to hear the child, Article 24 of the Charter requires the
court ‘to take all measures which are appropriate to the arrangement of such
a hearing, having regard to the child’s best interests and the circumstances
of each individual case, in order to ensure the effectiveness of those provisions,
and to offer to the child a genuine and effective opportunity to express his
or her views’.94
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child interviews with
children should take place in a friendly and safe atmosphere.95 ‘A child cannot
be heard effectively where the environment is intimidating, hostile, insensitive
or inappropriate for her or his age’.96 Furthermore it stated that ‘the context
in which a child exercises her or his right to be heard has to be enabling and
encouraging, so that the child can be sure that the adult who is responsible
for the hearing is willing to listen and seriously consider what the child has
92 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 22-23.
93 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 61.
94 Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zaraga [2010], para 66.
95 ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6, para 20. See also UNHCR,
Guidelines on international protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F)
of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva
22 December 2009, para 72, which states that interviewing children ‘may require involving
experts in interviewing children outside a formal setting or observing children and commu-
nicating with them in an environment where they feel safe, for example, in a reception
centre’.
96 ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6 para 34.
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decided to communicate’.97 In order to be able to express its views effectively
the child should according to the Committee be well-prepared for the inter-
view. The decision maker ‘should provide explanations as to how, when and
where the hearing will take place and who the participants will be, and has
to take account of the views of the child in this regard’.98
Training of interviewers
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is of the view that officials working
with separated and unaccompanied children and dealing with their cases
should be trained in amongst others ?appropriate interview techniques.99
According to the Committee interviews of unaccompanied minors in the
context of the asylum procedure should be conducted by representatives of
the refugee determination authority who will take into account the special
situation of unaccompanied children in order to carry out the refugee status
assessment and apply an understanding of the history, culture and background
of the child.100
It is UNHCR’s position that ‘personal interviews of children – whether they
are accompanied, unaccompanied or separated – should be carried out by an
interviewer who has special training and knowledge regarding the psycho-
logical and emotional development and behaviour of children’.101 UNHCR
mentions that the training of the personnel of the determining authority
charged with conducting the personal interview of children should include
relevant human rights norms, standards and principles, including the rights
of the child, the impact and consequences of persecution, serious harm and
trauma on children and understanding of the effect of the child’s age and stage
of development on the child’s recall of events and knowledge of conditions
in the country of origin. Interviewers should furthermore have appropriate
adult-child communication skills and must be able to use interview techniques
that minimise trauma to the child while maximising the quality of information
received from the child. Interviewes must finally have the skills to deal with
children in a sensitive, understanding, constructive and reassuring manner.102
97 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 42. See also para 23 which
states: ‘States parties must ensure conditions for expressing views that account for the child’s
individual and social situation and an environment in which the child feels respected and
secure when freely expressing her or his opinions.’
98 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 41.
99 ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6 para 96.
100 ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6 para 72.
101 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, p 21.
102 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 21-22.
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7.3 THE ASYLUM APPLICANT’S RIGHT TO BE HEARD FOLLOWING THE PERSONAL
INTERVIEW
The question which will be addressed in this section is whether the asylum
applicant’s right to be heard under EU law is completely fulfilled with the
personal interview. Should he also be offered the opportunity to add informa-
tion to the report of the interview or to correct mistakes? Must he be able to
comment on conclusions of the determining authority with regard to the
credibility of his account, the value of other evidence underlying the assess-
ment of the asylum claim and the risk of refoulement before the decision on
the asylum application will be taken?
It is argued in this section that, although the Procedures Directive does
not require the determining authorities to give the asylum applicant such
opportunity, the EU right to be heard does. It follows from the EU right to be
heard that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests,
such as asylum decisions, be placed in a position in which they may effectively
make known their views on the evidence on which the decision is based103
and the relevant facts and circumstances.104105 This implies that the asylum
applicant should not only be able to present his asylum motives during the
personal interview, but also to express his views regarding the fact-finding
and assessment of the risk of refoulement by the determining authorities.
7.3.1 The right to comment on the report of the interview
Article 14 (1) PD requires the Member States to ensure that a written report
of the personal interview be made ‘containing at least the essential information
regarding the application, as presented by the applicant’.106 In this context
the provision refers to Article 4(2) QD, which mentions the elements needed
to substantiate the asylum claim: statements concerning the applicant’s age,
background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality, coun-
try(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel
routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for applying for inter-
national protection. In many cases this report forms, together with the evidence
103 See for example Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006], para 74 and Case C-32/95P, Commission v
Lisrestal and others [1996], para 21.
104 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991], para 25 and Case C-458/98 P, Industrie
des Poudres Sphériques v Council [2000], para 99.
105 See section 4.4.2.
106 This provision also applies to interviews held in the context of border procedures (Art 35
(3) (d) PD) or procedures in which a refugee status is withdrawn (Art 38 (1) (b) as well
as in cases in which a meeting was held with the applicant for the purpose of assisting
him/her with completing his/her application and submitting the essential information
regarding the application referred to in Art 12 (2)(b) PD (see Art 14 (4) PD).
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submitted by the asylum applicant and the determining authorities as well
as country of origin information, the basis of the decision on the asylum
claim.107 The Procedures Directive does not give the applicant the right to
comment on the contents of the report of the interview.108 Article 14 (3) PD
only states that Member States may request the applicant’s approval of the
contents of the report of the personal interview. Where an applicant refuses
to approve the contents of the report, the reasons for this refusal shall be
entered into the applicant’s file.
UNHCR stated in 2010 that practice with regard to the possibility to check
the accuracy and change the content of the report of the personal interview
is divergent among the Member States.109 In some Member States the report
is printed out immediately after the interview and read back to the applicant
before he is asked his signature of approval. In other Member States applicants
are asked to sign the report, although they had not had the opportunity to
read it or to have it read back to them.110 In several Member States the
written report of the interview is provided after the asylum decision has been
taken.111 The Commission noted in 2010 that the accuracy of records therefore
varies.112
In the light of the crucial role of the statements of the asylum applicant
as evidence in the asylum procedure, it is of utmost importance for the quality
of the decision that the written report of the personal interview is complete
and that the information contained in it is accurate.113 Gaps or mistakes in
the report may occur as a result of disturbed communication, faults or
omissions by interpreters or the person drawing the report.114 In order to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the report and thus an adequate
examination of the case in the meaning of Article 8 PD, it may be considered
necessary that the person concerned or his representative be able to examine
this report and to correct mistakes or fill in gaps.
107 See further on evidentiary assessment sections 8.6-8.7.
108 Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009) 1377, 21 October 2009,
p 13.
109 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, p 11.
110 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, pp 12-17.
111 The Commission mentions Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece and Romania. Commission
Report COM (2010) 465 final, p 7. See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, pp
19-20.
112 Commission Report COM (2010) 465 final, p 7. See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Pro-
cedures, s 6.
113 See also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, p 2.
114 Doornbos 2006, p 45. She states that also researches from other States than the Netherlands
are critical of the quality of reports of the interview. UNHCR in its 2010 expressed grave
concerns about the quality of the reports of interviews in Greece. It found during its
observations of interviews in Athens that the written summary reports made of personal
interviews did not reflect the oral evidence given by the applicant at all. UNHCR, Improving
Asylum Procedures, s 6, pp 7-9.
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Arguably Article 14 (3) PD read in the light of the EU right to be heard
requires that the applicant is granted the opportunity to comment on the report
of the interview, in particular when the determining authority intends to reject
the asylum application on the basis of the information included in the report.
If for example the determining authority finds the statements of the applicant
as written down in the report inconsistent, contradictory, vague or incomplete
and thus not credible, the applicant should be able to respond to those allega-
tions.
This also implies that the report of the personal interview(s) should be
provided to the applicant before the decision on the asylum application is
taken.115 The EU right to be heard requires that the parties concerned must
be informed of the evidence adduced against them.116 Article 14 (2) PD
demands that Member States ensure that applicants have timely access to the
report of the personal interview. However, this provision allows that access
to the report is only granted after the decision on the application. If the Mem-
ber State chooses to make use of this option, access must be made possible
as soon as necessary for allowing an appeal to be prepared and lodged in due
time.117 Such late provision of the report of the interview may infringe the
EU right to be heard, as the person concerned must, according to the standing
case-law of the Court of Justice, in principle be able to exercise this right before
the administrative decision is adopted.118 Furthermore it should be derived
from this case-law that the person concerned must be afforded a reasonable
period to effectively put forward his views.119 The content of the report of
the interview should thus be made known to the applicant at a moment that
it is still possible to effectively exercise his right to be heard.
115 See also UNHCR, which recommends that in all cases the applicant must be granted the
right to rectify, clarify or provide additional information for inclusion in the transcript.
For that purpose the content of the report must have been read by, or to the applicant,
in a language s/he understands. UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 6, pp 12-17.
116 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’ Iran v Council [2006], para 93. Case
C-32/95P, Commission v Lisrestal and others [1996], para 41. See also T-49/88, Al-Jubail
Fertilizer v Council [1991], para 17.
117 According to the explanations of the Commission with the amended proposal for the
Procedures Directive this provision reflects the principle of a fair and effective procedure.
It is meant to enable the applicant to exercise his appeal rights properly and to enable
appellate bodies, when appropriate, to verify whether the decision is based on relevant
information. Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on pro-
cedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 18 June 2002, COM
(2002) 326 final, pp 8-9.
118 See for example C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991], para 25, Joined cases
C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others [2010], paras 54-56 and Case C-28/05, Dokter [2006],
para 74.
119 Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission [2000], para 38.
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7.3.2 The right to comment on the fact-finding and risk assessment
After the personal interview(s) the determining authority will establish the
facts and assess the credibility of the asylum account. Following the establish-
ment of the facts, it is decided whether there is a real risk of refoulement upon
return to the country of origin or transfer to a third country. The determining
authority may include evidence in these assessments on which the applicant
has not had the opportunity to comment. The question rises whether the
claimant should be heard on the conclusions of the decision-making authority
concerning the fact-finding and risk assessment. This could be done for
example by offering the claimant the opportunity to comment on these con-
clusions (and the evidence on which they are based) in an oral hearing or by
submitting written observations.
The Procedures Directive does not provide for a right to be heard on the
conclusions reached by the determining authority. Such a right may be derived
from Article 4 (1) QD, which states that the Member State has the duty to assess
the relevant elements of the application in cooperation with the applicant.120
According to Noll this provision entails far-reaching obligations to com-
municate, for both the Member State and the applicant. The Member State
should allow the applicant to participate in the assessment of the evidence.121
This interpretation of Article 4 (1) QD has not yet been confirmed by the Court
of Justice.122
On the basis of the EU Courts’ case-law concerning the EU right to be heard
discussed in section 4.4.2 it should be concluded that the addressee of an
asylum decision has a right to effectively make known his views on the evid-
ence on which this decision is based and the relevant facts and circumstances
taken into account, before the decision is taken. The EU right to be heard may
require that a draft decision is submitted to the party concerned.123 Article 4
(1) QD should be interpreted in the light of this case-law and must therefore
be considered to include a right to be heard on important evidence relied on
and the main conclusions reached by the determining authority. If the applicant
did not have the opportunity to comment on such evidence and conclusions
during the personal interview, in response to the written report of the personal
120 It concerns a duty to assess the elements underlying the asylum claim together with the
applicant. Battjes 2006, p 226.
121 Noll 2005-II, p 4.
122 This question will probably be answered in Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform Ireland, which was pending when this study was finalised. A.G. Bot
concluded in his opinion that the duty to cooperate laid down in Art 4 (1) QD has the sole
objective of assisting the applicant to complete his application and to assemble the elements
deemed essential for that purpose. It does in his view not entail an obligation for the
determining authority to seek the applicant’s observations on the elements on which it
intends to base a negative decision before such decision is taken.
123 Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission [2000], para 42.
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interview or otherwise, he should be granted this opportunity before the
negative decision is taken. This is in particular the case if the applicant’s
comments concerning the fact-finding or credibility assessment cannot be fully
taken into account in the appeal-phase as a result of a limited judicial review
of the fact-finding by the national court.124
This view is supported by the ECtHR’s judgment in I.M. v France. In this
case the applicant’s asylum application was rejected in essence because his
statements during the interview were very imprecise and wrong with regard
to his ethnic origin as well as his family’s origin from the Darfur region.
According to the French determining authority the applicant’s origin could
therefore not be established. Furthermore it was stated in the decision that
the applicant’s statements regarding the applicant’s involvement in a student
movement, the circumstances of his arrest, the conditions of his detention,
and the reasons for his release were not sufficiently precise and credible. The
fact that the applicant was not granted the opportunity to dispute these allega-
tions was one of the factors leading to a violation of Article 13 ECHR in this
case. The ECtHR considered that
le caractère accéléré de la procédure n’a pas permis au requérant d’apporter des
précisions sur ces points, éventuellement par écrit ou au cours d’un second entre-
tien, alors même qu’il a pu, par la suite, dissiper les incohérences supposées et
fournir les documents manquants.125
Furthermore the ECtHR has held that asylum applicants must be put in the
position to effectively comment on the decision-making authority’s conclusions
as to the credibility of the asylum account or the authenticity of the documents
submitted by the applicant. According to the ECtHR the individual must provide
a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies, when the examining
authorities present information which gives strong reason to question the
veracity of an asylum-seeker’s submissions.126 Furthermore it ruled that when
the authorities examined documents adduced by the applicant and give
detailed reasons why they consider these documents to be forgeries, the
applicant has to contest these allegations.127 This implies that the applicant
must be put in the positition to present its views on the authority’s conclusions
during the asylum proceedings.
On the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law potentially Article 4 (1) QD read in
the light of the EU right to be heard should be considered to include a right
to contest the decision-making authorities’ main conclusions as to the credibil-
124 See section 9.2. It is argued in this section that Art 39 PD requires a thorough judicial review
of the asylum decision.
125 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 147.
126 See ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 50, ECtHR (Adm) 8 March 2007,
Collin and Akaziebie v Sweden, no 23944/05.
127 ECtHR (Adm) 21 June 2005, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v Sweden, no 31260/04.
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ity of the asylum account, the assessment of the evidence and the existence
of a risk of refoulement upon return. The EU right to be heard also requires that
the determining authority’s conclusions be made available to the applicant
and that the applicant have access to the evidence underlying the (concept)
asylum decision.
7.4 THE RIGHT TO AN ORAL HEARING BEFORE A COURT OR TRIBUNAL
In Chapter 9 it will be concluded that the right to an effective remedy
guaranteed by Article 39 PD requires a thorough judicial review of the asylum
decision. This entails that the national courts review asylum decisions on points
of fact as well as points of law. Furthermore it implies as a minimum that the
national court or tribunal assesses the claim of a risk of refoulement on its
merits. It should carefully examine the facts and evidence underlying the
asylum claim.
The question which will be addressed in this section is whether the national
court is obliged to hear the asylum applicant in the context of his appeal
against the refusal of his asylum claim. It will be argued that Article 39 PD
read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter requires that the asylum applicant
is heard in an oral hearing by the court or tribunal in the sense of Article 39
PD, if this court decides on factual issues, including the credibility of the
applicant’s asylum account. According to the UNHCR report of 2010 in several
Member States the national court may decide on the appeal against the negat-
ive asylum decision without holding an oral hearing.128
Article 39 PD does not contain standards with regard to the right to a public
and oral hearing. Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. The
Court of Justice has not yet interpreted the EU right to a public hearing yet.
No judgments were found in the context of this study which addressed the
right to an oral hearing in the light of the general principle of effective judicial
protection. However, the ECtHR has developed an extensive body of case-law
regarding the right to an oral hearing under Article 6. It is argued here that
Article 47 of the Charter should be interpreted in conformity with this case-law.
Obligations stemming from the ECtHR
The ECtHR has not ruled on the question whether Article 13 requires that
asylum applicants be heard by an independent authority. However it should
be reiterated that the ECtHR has recognised the importance of an oral hearing
in particular for the assessment of the credibility of the asylum applicant’s
statements.129
128 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, pp 58-60.
129 See further section 7.1.
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Like Article 47 of the Charter, Article 6 ECHR provides for a right to a ‘fair
and public hearing’. According to the standing case-law of the ECtHR the right
to a public hearing includes the right to an oral hearing before a court or
tribunal.130 The Court is of the opinion that the right to a public hearing,
which applies both in criminal and in civil cases, is a right of a fundamental
nature.131
The obligation to hold a hearing is not absolute. A hearing may be dis-
pensed with if a party unequivocally waives his or her right thereto and there
are no questions of public interest making a hearing necessary.132 Further-
more the ECtHR assesses the overall fairness of the procedure. An oral hearing
does not have to take place in every instance before a court or tribunal. The
absence of a hearing before a second or third instance may be justified by the
special features of the proceedings at issue,133 in particular the fact that the
appellate or Cassation court is only competent to review questions of law.134
Absence of an oral hearing may however not undermine the right to
adversarial proceedings and the principle of equality of arms.135
The complete absence of an oral hearing before a court or tribunal in a
procedure can only be justified in exceptional circumstances.136 The character
of the circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral hearing essential-
ly comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the competent
national court. The frequency of such situations is not relevant: Article 6 (1)
ECHR does not mean that the absence of an oral hearing may only be justified
in rare cases.137 The Court has accepted exceptional circumstances in cases
where proceedings concerned exclusively legal or highly technical questions.
The ECtHR held for example ‘that disputes concerning benefits under social-
security schemes are generally rather technical and their outcome usually
130 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 40.
131 ECtHR (GC) 11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 46, ECtHR (GC) 23 November
2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 40.
132 A waiver can be done explicitly or tacitly, in the latter case for example by refraining from
submitting or maintaining a request for a hearing. See for example ECtHR 12 November
2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 37.
133 See for example ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 39.
134 According to the ECtHR ‘proceedings for leave to appeal or proceedings involving only
questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact, may comply with the requirements of
Article 6 even where the appellant was not given an opportunity of being heard in person
by the appeal or cassation court’. ECtHR (GC) 26 July 2002, Meftah and others v France, nos
32911/96, 35237/97 and 34595/97, para 41. See also ECtHR (Plen) 26 May 1988, Ekbatani
v Sweden, no 10563/83, para 32.
135 ECtHR 25 March 1998, Belziuk v Poland, no 23103/93, para 39. In this case the public
prosecutor attended the hearing before the Court of Cassation and submitted oral statements
while the applicant was not allowed to be present.
136 See for example ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 39.
137 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 42.
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depends on the written opinions given by medical doctors. Many such disputes
may accordingly be better dealt with in writing than in oral argument.’138
Furthermore an oral hearing may be dispensed with when a case ‘raises
no questions of fact or law which cannot be adequately resolved on the basis
of the case-file and the parties’ written observations.’139 As an example of
such cases the ECtHR mentions cases ‘where there are no issues of credibility
or contested facts’.140 In Jussilla v Finland the ECtHR considered that ‘checking
and ensuring that the taxpayer has given an accurate account of his or her
affairs and that supporting documents have been properly produced may often
be more efficiently dealt with in writing than in oral argument.’ It was not
persuaded by the applicant that in this particular case any issues of credibility
arose in the proceedings which required oral presentation of evidence or cross-
examination of witnesses.141
If factual questions are at issue in the first instance or second instance
appeal procedure, the ECtHR is generally of the opinion that an oral hearing
should be held.142 The ECtHR ruled on the necessity of an oral hearing in
several cases in which the applicant had claimed compensation before the
national court for damage suffered as a result of alleged unlawful detention.
In these cases, when deciding on the level of compensation, the national court
had regard to a series of personal factors, namely the financial and social status
of the applicant and, in particular, the extent of the emotional suffering which
he endured during the period of his detention. According to the ECtHR an oral
hearing could not be dispensed with in these cases because of ‘the essentially
personal nature of the applicant’s experience, and the determination of the
appropriate level of compensation’. It considered:
While it is true that the fact of the applicant’s detention and the length of that
detention as well as his financial and social status could be established on the basis
of the report drawn up by the judge rapporteur and without the need to hear the
applicant […], different considerations must apply to assessment of the emotional
suffering which the applicant alleged he endured. In the Court’s opinion, the
138 ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 41. In this case the ECtHR
considered that no oral hearing was necessary in a social security case as the appeal
concerned the correct interpretation of written medical evidence. According to the ECtHR
the appellate court could adequately resolve this issue on the basis of the medical certificates
in question and the applicant’s written submissions.
139 See for example ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 37.
140 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 41.
141 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 47.
142 ECtHR (GC) 12 July 2001, Malhous v the Czech Republic, no 33071/96, para 60, ECtHR 25
April 1995, Fischer v Austria, no 16922/90, para 44 and ECtHR 26 January 2006, Brugger
v Austria, no 7693/01, para 23. See for examples in which an oral hearing was considered
necessary before an appellate court, which considered both questions of fact and law: ECtHR
(Plen) 29 October 1991, Helmers v Sweden, no 11826/85, para 38 and ECtHR (Plen) 26 May
1988, Ekbatani v Sweden, no 10563/83, para 32.
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applicant should have been afforded an opportunity to explain orally to the
Karşiyaka Assize Court the moral damage which his detention entailed for him
in terms of distress and anxiety.143
In the ECtHR’s view the administration of justice and the accountability of the
State would have been better served in the applicant’s case by affording him
the right to explain his personal situation in a hearing before the domestic
court subject to public scrutiny.144
When deciding whether the omittance of an oral hearing is justified the
ECtHR takes into account the interests at stake for the applicant. In Fischer v
Austria for example it had due regard ‘to the importance of the proceedings
in question for the very existence of Mr Fischer’s tipping business’.145 How-
ever the ECtHR also held that ‘the fact that proceedings are of considerable
personal significance to the applicant, as in certain social insurance or benefit
cases, is not decisive for the necessity of a hearing.’146
Furthermore the ECtHR has acknowledged that the national authorities may
have regard to the demands of efficiency and economy.147 Systematically
holding hearings could for instance be an obstacle to the particular diligence
required in social-security cases.148 In determining the necessity of a public
hearing at stages in the proceedings subsequent to the trial at first instance
considerations such as the right to trial within a reasonable time and the
related need for expeditious handling of the courts’ case-load must be taken
into account.149 In the cases mentioned above in which compensation was
claimed for damage suffered as a result of unlawful detention the ECtHR held
that the interests served by an oral hearing outweighed the considerations
of speed and efficiency on which the absence of an oral hearing was based.150
Finally it is relevant to note that the ECtHR has ruled in criminal cases that
Article 6 ECHR also includes the right of the person concerned to hear and
follow the proceedings before the court or tribunal and generally to participate
effectively in them. ‘Such rights are implicit in the very notion of an adversarial
procedure and can also be derived from the guarantees contained in sub-
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 3 of Article 6 […], – “to defend himself
in person”, “to examine or have examined witnesses”, and “to have the free
143 ECtHR (GC) 11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 51.
144 ECtHR (GC) 11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 51, ECtHR 20 October 2005, Ozata
v Turkey, no 19578/02, para 36.
145 ECtHR 25 April 1995, Fischer v Austria, no 16922/90, para 44. See also ECtHR (Plen) 29
October 1991, Helmers v Sweden, no 11826/85, para 38, where the ECtHR referred to the
seriousness of what was at stake for the applicant, namely his professional reputation and
career.
146 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 44.
147 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 42.
148 ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95, para 41.
149 ECtHR (Plen) 29 October 1991, Helmers v Sweden, no 11826/85, para 36.
150 ECtHR (GC) 11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 51.
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assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in court”’.151 The ECtHR considered that in the case of a child, it is essential
that he be dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level
of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken
to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.152
The right to adversarial proceedings also applies in civil law cases as well as
cases falling within the scope of Articles 5 and 13 ECHR.153 It is therefore
conceivable that the right to participate effectively in a hearing before a court
or tribunal also applies in such cases.
Application to asylum cases
On the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law it may be argued that the right to a public
hearing in the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter should include a right to
an oral hearing. The absence of an oral hearing, in particular in first instance
appeal proceedings is only allowed in exceptional cases. The ECtHR’s case-law
indicates in particular that an oral hearing is necessary in cases in which a
court or tribunal needs to decide on factual issues, in which the credibility
of the person concerned is disputed or in which the personal experiences of
the person concerned play an important role.
As was mentioned before, asylum cases often hinge on the credibility of
the applicant’s asylum account. Furthermore the personal experiences of the
asylum applicant in the country of origin in the past are important for the
assessment of his individual risk of refoulement upon return.154 It should be
derived from the ECtHR’s case-law that a court which reviews the asylum
decision on such factual grounds should in principle hold an oral hearing.
The fact that in asylum cases the fundamental nature of the EU right to asylum
and the prohibition of refoulement are at stake adds to the need for an oral
hearing. An oral hearing is less crucial if the disputed facts do not concern
the individual asylum seeker, but for example only the seriousness of the
general human rights situation in his country of origin. The court may include
in its decision whether to hold an oral hearing, the interest of both Member
States and applicants for asylum to decide as soon as possible on applications
for asylum.155
It should thus be concluded that there are strong arguments that Article 39
PD read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter generally requires an oral
hearing before the (first instance) court or tribunal hearing the appeal against
the rejection of the asylum claim. Furthermore it should be derived from the
151 ECtHR 23 February 1994, Stanford v the United Kingdom, no 16757/90, para 26.
152 ECtHR 16 December 1999, V. v the United Kingdom, no 24888/94, para 86. ECtHR 15 June
2004, S.C. v the United Kingdom, no 60958/00, para 28.
153 See further section 10.3.2.
154 See further sections 8.2 and 8.3.1.
155 Recital 11 Preamble PD.
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ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 ECHR that the right to an oral hearing can
only be effectively exercised if the person concerned is able to hear and follow
the proceedings before the court or tribunal and generally to participate
effectively in them. Therefore arguably the EU right to a fair trial requires for
example that in asylum cases free interpretation services are available for
asylum applicants who do not understand the language spoken in the
court.156
7.5 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
Asylum applicants must be granted sufficient opportunity to substantiate their
claim that their return will violate the prohibition of refoulement. Often these
persons are themselves the most important source of information as to the
risk of refoulement, for example because there is no evidence supporting the
claim and/or because their personal experiences play an important role in
the assessment of this risk. With regard to the asylum applicant’s right to be
heard the following conclusions were drawn in this chapter.
The right to a personal interview
· A personal interview is indispensable in order to fulfil the requirement
to carry out an appropriate examination of the asylum claim in the meaning
of Article 8 (2) PD. The ECtHR’s case-law indicates that a personal interview
with the applicant is crucial for the assessment of the credibility of the
applicant’s asylum account. According to the ECtHR the absence of such
interview is a factor which may contribute to a violation of Articles 3 and
13 ECHR.157 Also other sources of inspiration have pointed at the import-
ance of a personal interview in all asylum cases, including cases considered
manifestly unfounded and/or examined in an accelerated procedure.158
156 See also ComAT Concluding Observations on France, 20 May 2010, CAT/C/FRA/CO/4-6,
para 15, where the Committee expressed its concerns regarding the fact that the administrat-
ive judge may reject the appeal against the decision refusing entry for the purposes of
asylum by court order, thereby depriving the applicant of a hearing at which he may defend
his case, and of procedural guarantees such as the right to an interpreter and a lawyer.
The Committee recommended that any appeal relating to an asylum application submitted
at the border be subject to a hearing at which the applicant threatened with removal can
present his case effectively, and that the appeal be subject to all basic procedural guarantees,
including the right to an interpreter and counsel.
157 ECtHR 13 April 2010, Charahili v Turkey, no 46605/07, para 57 and ECtHR 2 February 2012,
I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 155.
158 See notably Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Guidelines on human rights
protection in the context of accelerated asylum procedures, 1 July 2009, under IV 1.d and
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1471 (2005) on accelerated
asylum procedures in Council of Europe member states, para 8.10.2, EXCOM Conclusion
no 30 (XXXIV), 1983, on the problem of manifestly unfounded or abusive applications for
refugee status or asylum.
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· Therefore the exceptions to the right to a personal interview allowed for
by Article 12 of the Procedures Directive may only be applied in ex-
ceptional cases.
· The determining authority of the Member State should ensure that the EU
right to refoulement will not be undermined as a result of the absence of
an interview. The asylum applicant should be given sufficient opportunity
to substantiate his asylum claim, for example by submitting written infor-
mation.
· The determining authorities should arguably investigate whether dependent
adults have independent asylum motives which could best be explained
in a personal interview.159
Article 24 of the Charter limits the Member State’s discretion to interview
minor asylum applicants.
· A minor asylum applicant should in principle be interviewed if he wishes
so and if the age and maturity of the child permits. Only if an interview
is not considered to be in the best interests of the child, for example
because it would cause harm to the child, should an interview be
omitted.160
Requirements as to the conduct of the interview
· It follows from Article 13 PD as well as several (non-binding) sources of
inspiration that the right to a personal interview can only be exercised
effectively if the conditions, under which interviews are conducted, allow
applicants to present the grounds for their applications in a comprehensive
manner.
· This means that the interviewer should be able to communicate effectively
with the applicant. The principle of effectiveness requires the determining
authority to ascertain that the applicant is actually able to understand the
language chosen for the interview and that he can express himself effective-
ly in this language.161
· If the applicant does not understand the language of the interview the
Member State should provide free of charge for a competent and qualified
159 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 4, p 15, UNHCR Guidelines of International
Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, para 36.
160 Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zaraga [2010], paras 64-65, Committee on the Rights of the
Child, General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 123 and General Comment
No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6, para 71.
161 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1471 (2005) on accelerated
asylum procedures in Council of Europe member states, para 8.10.2, UNHCR, Improving
Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 29 and 44 and UNHCR Provisional Comments on the Proposal
for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting
and Withdrawing Refugee Status (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November
2004), p 13.
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interpreter who facilitates communication. If no such interpreter is available
the determining authority should take this into account when examining
the case.162
· The interviewer must be competent and properly trained to interview
asylum applicants.
· On the basis of several non-binding sources of inspiration it may be argued
that Article 13 PD entails that interviews be conducted in a gender-sensitive
manner.163
· It follows from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Aguirra Zarraga as well
as the views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and UNHCR that
Article 24 of the Charter requires that minors be heard in a child-friendly
manner.164
The asylum applicant’s right to be heard following the personal interview
· The fact that the applicant was interviewed on his asylum motives does
not necessarily suffice for the Member State to comply with the EU right
to be heard.
· It is conceivable that the EU right to be heard requires that the applicant
be granted the opportunity to comment on the report of the personal
interview. This is particularly so if the determining authority intends to
reject the asylum application on the basis of the information contained in
the report and the applicant was not able to comment on this information
during the interview.The applicant should have timely access to the report
of the interview in order to be able to exercise his right to be heard.165
· The EU right to be heard obliges the Member States at one stage of the
administrative procedure to hear the asylum applicant on its main con-
clusions regarding the fact-finding (including the assessment of the credibil-
ity of the asylum account) and the assessment of the risk of refoulement
as well as important pieces of evidence on which these conclusions are
based. This is in particular so if the applicant’s comments concerning the
162 Artt 10 (1) (b) and 13 (3) (b) PD. See also ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium
and Greece, no 30696/09, para 301 and ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09,
para 145.
163 Council resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ
19 September 1996, C 274, pp 13-17, para 28, EXCOM Conclusion no 64 (XLI) 1990, on
Refugee Women and International Protection (1990), HRC Concluding Observations on
Austria, 30 October 2007, CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4, para 18 and ComAT Concluding
Observations on Austria, 15 December 2005, CAT/C/AUT/CO/3.
164 Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zaraga [2010], para 66, ComRC General Comment No 6 (2005),
CRC/GC/2005/6, paras 20 and 34, UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child
Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 22 December 2009, para 72.
165 The EU right to be heard requires that the parties concerned be informed of the evidence
adduced against them. See for example Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du
peuple d’ Iran v Council [2006], para 93.
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fact-finding or credibility assessment cannot be fully taken into taken into
account in the appeal-phase as a result of a limited judicial review of the
fact-finding by the national court.166
The right to a hearing before a court or tribunal
· It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 ECHR that the right
to a public hearing guaranteed by Article 47 includes the right to an oral
hearing before a court or tribunal.167
· Article 39 PD read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter arguably requires
that in principle an oral hearing be held before the first instance court or
tribunal reviewing the negative decision on the asylum claim.
· The ECtHR’s case-law indicates that an oral hearing is especially indispens-
able when the court decides on important questions of fact or the credibility
of the applicant and where the applicant’s personal experiences play an
important role.168
· It should be derived from the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 ECHR that
Article 47 of the Charter requires the Member States to ensure that the
applicant is able to hear and follow the proceedings before the court or
tribunal and generally to participate effectively in them.169
166 The EU right to be heard may require that a draft decision is provided to the parties
concerned. See Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission [2000], para 42. See with regard
to asylum procedures ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 147.
167 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, para 40.
168 ECtHR (GC) 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, no 73053/01, paras 41 and 47. ECtHR
(GC) 11 July 2002, Göç v Turkey, no 36590/97, para 51.
169 ECtHR 23 February 1994, Stanford v the United Kingdom, no 16757/90, para 26.
8 The burden and standard of proof and
evidentiary assessment
On the basis of the applicant’s statements made during the personal interview
and the other evidence available the determining authority shall assess whether
the applicant is in need of international protection and whether he qualifies
as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection. Establishing the
facts in asylum cases is not easy. In most asylum cases there is a lack of
documentary evidence with regard to the asylum applicant’s personal situation.
Often the applicant’s statements are the only evidence available. The assess-
ment of the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account therefore usually takes
up an important part of the decision-making process. Cultural and linguistic
differences between the applicant and the examining authorities may com-
plicate the establishment of the facts.1 Furthermore the determining authorities
need to assess whether there is a future risk of refoulement. This means that
there are no certainties which can be established.2
Evidentiary rules for asylum cases vary considerably among Member States
of the European Union, in particular between common law and civil law
systems.3 Rules concerning the standard and burden of proof and evidentiary
assessment are decisive for the outcome of the asylum proceedings. It is argued
in this chapter that evidentiary rules or practices which make unreasonable
demands on the asylum applicant undermine the effective exercise of the EU
right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement. A standard of proof which
is set too high, the authorities’ refusal to apply the benefit of the doubt, their
unwillingness to share the burden of proof, the use of presumptions which
are (practically) impossible for the applicant to rebut, a credibility assessment
on the basis of details which are not part of the core of the asylum account
or a failure to take into account or to recognise the value of certain types of
evidence are all examples of such rules or practices.
This chapter examines which standards with regard to the standard and
burden of proof and evidentiary assessment follow from EU law. In particular
in Article 4 QD (concerning assessment of facts and circumstances) and Article 8
(2) PD (requirement of an appropriate and careful examination of the asylum
claim, aim to harmonise the Member State’s legislation as regards evidence
1 See Staffans 2008, pp 621-622 and Thomas 2006, p 84.
2 See Thomas 2006, p 84.
3 See for example UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, Geneva,
16 December 1998, para 3, Gorlick 2003, p 361.
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to a certain extent. However, they leave many important evidentiary issues
untouched. It may be assumed in the light of the importance of evidentiary
rules for the effective exercise of the prohibition of refoulement that also evident-
iary issues which are not explicitly governed by the Qualification or Procedures
Directive fall within the scope of EU law. They may therefore be addressed
by the Court of Justice in the light of the principle of effectiveness. It follows
from the Court of Justice’s case-law that any requirement of proof which has
the effect of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise
a right granted by EU law would be incompatible with EU law.4 The Court
of Justice has assessed national evidentiary rules in the light of this principle
in several fields of EU law, such as equal treatment, State aid and the Member
State’s duty to repay charges levied contrary to EU law. The underlying prin-
ciples emerging from this case-law should be considered relevant in asylum
cases.
It is conceivable however, that the specific nature of asylum cases requires
special evidentiary rules. Therefore in this chapter relatively important weight
is attached to the case-law of the ECtHR and other supervising bodies, which
specifically address evidentiary issues in asylum cases. The ECtHR has held
that Article 6 (1) ECHR does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of
evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under
national law.5 For this reason no attention is paid to the ECtHR’s case-law under
that provision.
The issues addressed in this chapter are all linked together and sometimes
overlap. Therefore it is useful to make some preliminary remarks as to their
mutual relationship. Section 8.1 on the standard of proof addresses the question
what needs to be proved. In asylum cases the most important question is how
likely the risk of future harm should be in order to qualify as a refugee or
a person in need of subsidiary protection. Section 8.2 regarding the burden
of proof examines who bears the risk (the applicant or the State) if the standard
of proof is not met and who bears the burden of producing evidence in support
of the asylum claim. A particular heavy burden of proof is placed on the
applicant when the Member State makes use of certain presumptions. In section
8.3 the use of such presumptions is examined in the light of the duty to con-
duct an individual examination of the asylum claim. Finally sections 8.4. and
8.5 address the assessment of the evidence produced by the applicant and the
State in the context of the asylum application. They examine which types of
evidence should be taken into account and what value should be attributed
to them. Section 8.5. particularly concerns the statements of the applicant. It
addresses amongst other the question when the determining authority should
grant the applicant the benefit of the doubt in the assessment of the credibility
4 Case C-199/82, SpA San Giorgio [1983], para 14.
5 ECtHR 18 March 1997, Mantovanelli v France, no 21497/93, para 34.
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of the asylum account. Section 8.6. regards other types of evidence such as
documentary evidence and expert reports. Some aspects of the asylum claim
may have consequences for several of the issues mentioned. The fact that the
applicant was persecuted or subjected to serious harm in the past for example
makes that the standard of proof is (nearly) met and at the same time causes
a shift of the burden of proof from the applicant to the State. Furthermore the
importance which should be attributed to this fact arguably requires that
evidence, such as medical reports supporting past torture or ill-treatment, may
not be ignored by the determining authority.
8.1 THE STANDARD OF PROOF: WHAT NEEDS TO BE PROVED?
This section examines the standard of proof which should be met in order
to qualify for an asylum status or to be protected from refoulement. The central
questions with regard to the standard of proof in asylum cases is first of all
how likely the risk of persecution or serious harm must be6 and secondly
which indicators should be taken into account in order to assess this risk.
The Qualification Directive does not provide standards with regard to the
question regarding the likeliness of the risk.7 Therefore Member States are
in principle allowed to maintain or introduce their own national requirements
regarding the standard of proof. However it is submitted in this section that
EU law prohibits Member States to set the standard of proof too high, because
this will undermine the full effectiveness of the EU prohibition of refoulement
and the right to asylum.8 It follows from the principle of effectiveness that
Member States cannot require asylum applicants to prove something which
is impossible or excessively difficult to prove.9 In particular it is argued that
6 Noll 2005-II, p 3. Gorlick states that ‘the term ‘standard of proof’ means the threshold to
be met by the claimant in persuading the decision-maker of the truth of his or her factual
assertions’. Gorlick 2003, p 367.
7 Noll 2005-II, p 3. The proposal for the Directive provided that there had to be a ‘reasonable
possibility’ of persecution or serious harm. This was however deleted during the negoti-
ations because the Member States could not agree on a risk criteria. Hailbronner 2010, pp
1026-1027.
8 See also Trstenjak and Beysen who state that national rules of evidence may provide for
specific requirements concerning the standard of proof, as long as those rules do not make
it impossible or excessively difficult to secure the enforcement of the rights at issue. Trsten-
jak & Beysen 2011, p 101.
9 See Case C-435/03, British American Tobacco and and Newman Shipping [2005], para 28. In
this case the Court of Justice assessed a national rule according to which the victim of a
theft of goods could obtain repayment of VAT only if he succeeded in showing that the
goods had indeed been stolen and that they had not been put on the market after the theft.
The Court held that a requirement of proof of a negative, which is moreover outside the
knowledge of the person concerned, makes it virtually impossible to make use of the right
to repayment. See also the opinion of A.G. Sharpston with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010],
192 Chapter 8
Member States may not require that a future risk of persecution or serious
harm be proved. Also the standard of proof cannot be raised in cases where
the applicant is considered a danger to national security.
It is also submitted in this section that the principle of effectiveness requires
that all relevant risk factors be taken into account individually as well as in
coherence. Furthermore Member States may not always expect an asylum
applicant to substantiate that he runs an individual risk of serious harm as such
risk can (in exceptional circumstances) also emanate from the general situation
in the country or origin alone. The individual risk should always be assessed
in the light of the general situation in the country of origin.
Relevant provisions of the Qualification Directive
According to the Qualification Directive a person must have a ‘well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership of a particular social group’ in order to be considered
a refugee.10 This definition refers directly to the refugee definition in the
Refugee Convention.11 For this reason it is conceivable that the interpretation
of the standard of proof under the Refugee Convention will inspire the Court
of Justice when addressing the standard of proof for qualification as a refugee
under the Qualification Directive.12 For this purpose UNHCR’s view as well
as legal doctrine will be examined in this section.
According to Article 2 (e) QD a person is eligible for subsidiary protection
when ‘substantial grounds have been shown’ for believing that he, if returned
to his country of origin ‘would face a real risk of suffering serious harm’.
Article 15 QD defines the term serious harm as: (a) death penalty or execution;
or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an
applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict. These provisions refer to the standard
of proof following from the ECtHR’s case-law13 and the views of the Committee
against Torture and the Human Rights Committee. It may therefore be
assumed that the standard of proof required under EU law may not be set
higher than the standard of proof applied by these bodies.14 This also follows
from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Elgafaji where it considered that the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 3 ECHR forms part of the general
para 95, where she stated that ‘the State may not lay down unrealistic standards for the
evidence required’.
10 Art 2 (c) QD.
11 See also Hailbronner 2010, p 1026.
12 See also Staffans 2008, p 638.
13 See also Hailbronner 2010, p 1026.
14 It should however be noted that the case-law of the ECtHR, ComAT and HRC only regards
the principle of non-refoulement, while, the fact that a person is eligible for subsidiary
protection (also) gives him a right to an asylum status.
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principles of EU law, observance of which is ensured by the Court and that
the ECtHR’s case-law is taken into consideration in interpreting the scope of
that right in the EU legal order.15
Applicants who risk persecution or serious harm upon return may be
excluded from the right to an asylum status, for example because they con-
stitute a danger to the community of the Member State.16 Such applicants
will however be protected against expulsion by the EU prohibition of refoule-
ment, laid down in Article 21 (1) QD. This provision does not mention the
requirements which should be met in order to be protected by this prohibition.
It only states that States should respect the principle of non-refoulement in
accordance with their international obligations. This provision should be
interpreted in the light of Article 19 of the Charter, which provides that no
one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a ‘serious
risk‘ that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. On first right this provision
seems to require a higher degree of forseeability of the risk of refoulement
(serious risk) than the ECtHR (real risk) does.17 However, it follows from
Article 52 (3) of the Charter as well as the explanations with Article 19 of the
Charter that the EU prohibition of refoulement incorporates the ECtHR’s case-law
regarding Article 3 ECHR.18 Furthermore, as was mentioned above, the Court
of Justice has recognised the principle of non-refoulement guaranteed by
Article 3 ECHR as a principle of EU law. This implies that the standard of proof
under Article 21 (1) QD is the same, or at least not more restrictive, than the
standard of proof required under Articles 2 (c) and 15 QD.
Likeliness of the risk of persecution or serious harm
It is argued by UNHCR as well as legal scholars that an applicant should not
be required to prove a well-founded fear of persecution in order to qualify as
a refugee. According to the UNHCR Handbook an applicant’s fear of persecution
‘should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree,
that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him
for the reasons stated in the [refugee] definition, or would for the same reasons
be intolerable if he returned there’ (emphasis added).19 In its ‘Note on Burden
15 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 28.
16 Artt 12, 14, 17 and 19 QD.
17 Battjes 2006, p 115.
18 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 Decem-
ber 2007, C 303/24.
19 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva
1979 (reedited in 1992) (UNHCR Handbook), para 42. See also UNHCR Note on Burden
and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, Geneva, 16 December 1998, para 17. Gorlick states
that ‘the flexibility which the decision-maker must take into account in assessing evidence
on a refugee application as well as the concern that placing too high an evidentiary burden
on refugee applicants is inconsistent with the humanitarian nature of refugee law, supports
the view that the standard of proof is satisfied if an applicant has demonstrated a ‘serious
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and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims’ UNHCR states that a substantial body
of jurisprudence ‘largely supports the view that there is no requirement to
prove well-foundedness conclusively beyond doubt, or even that persecution
is more probable than not.20 Furthermore several scholars contend that the
‘reasonable possibility test’ is the appropriate test for assessing the risk of
persecution.21 In their view the more restrictive ‘balance of probabilities stand-
ard’, which requires the applicant to establish that persecution will probably
take place or is reasonable likely or more likely than not to occur, should be
rejected.22
On the basis of the foregoing it may be argued that the full effectiveness
of the EU right to a refugee status would be undermined if Member States
require applicants to prove a well-founded fear of persecution in stead of
granting refugee status when such a fear is established to a reasonable degree.
As will be shown below the binding judgments of the ECtHR confirm the non-
binding view of UNHCR that an asylum applicant should not be required a
to prove a future risk of a certain treatment.
Article 3 ECHR,23 Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR24 and Article 3 CAT25 prohibit
expulsion by a Contracting State where substantial grounds have been shown
for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a treatment
contrary to these provisions in the receiving country. The applicant is not
expected to prove that he will be treated in violation with the prohibition of
refoulement.26 The ECtHR is of the opinion that to demand direct documentary
possibility’, good reason’, valid basis’ or ‘real or reasonable chance or likelihood’ of per-
secution’. Gorlick 2003, pp 369-370.
20 See on the standard of proof in several countries, Norman 2007, pp 279-280.
21 Hathaway states that ‘the “reasonable possibility” test is the appropriate compromise
between respect for the Convention’s commitment to anchor protection decisions in object-
ively observable risks and the need simultaniously to avoid the establishment of an in-
appropriately high threshold of concern’. Hathaway 1991, pp 79-80. See also Wouters 2009,
pp 84-85.
22 Wouters 2009, p 85, Hathaway 1991 p 79, Goodwin Gill & McAdam 2007, p 234.
23 See for example ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 125. In
several cases the ECtHR applied a higher standard of proof, namely ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’. See Wouters pp 269-270. He refers to ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others
v Russia, no 36378/02, para 338 and ECtHR 7 June 2007, Garabayev v Russia, no 38411/02,
para 76. More recent examples are ECtHR (Adm) 10 July 2007, Achmadov and Bagurova v
Sweden, no 34081/05 and ECtHR 23 September 2010, Iskandarov v Russia, no 17185/05. The
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard is used by the Court in cases under Art 3 ECHR, which
do not involve refoulement.
24 HRC General Comment No 31 (2004), CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add. 13, para 12.
25 See Art 3 CAT.
26 See ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, where the United
Kingdom argued that Mr Soering could be extradited to the United States although there
was “some risk”, which was “more than merely negligible”, that the death penalty would
be imposed on him upon extradition. The ECtHR concluded that there were substantial
grounds for believing that the applicant faced a real risk of being sentenced to death.
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evidence proving that the applicant is wanted for any reason by the authorities
of his country of origin ‘may well present even an applicant whose fears are
well-founded with a probatio diabolica’.27 In M.S.S v Belgium and Greece the
ECtHR held that persons engaged in an extremely urgent procedure before the
Belgian Aliens Appeals Board were prevented from establishing the arguable
nature of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention because they were
required to produce ‘concrete proof of the irreparable nature of the damage
that might result from the alleged potential violation of Article 3’.28
Article 3 ECHR requires the decision-maker to focus on the ‘foreseeable
consequences of removal” for each individual applicant.29 The mere possibility
of ill-treatment on account of an unsettled situation in the receiving country
does not in itself give rise to a breach of Article 3.30 The Committee against
Torture is of the opinion that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds
that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk of torture must be foresee-
able, real and personal. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of
being highly probable.31
It is not always easy to predict on the basis of the facts whether the ECtHR
will consider the standard of proof to be met. In some cases the ECtHR seems
to apply a higher standard of proof than in others. In S.H. v UK the Court
accepted that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a
real risk that the applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment if returned to
Bhutan, although the existence of this risk was supported by little evidence.
The Court considered that none of the experts who had written reports on
the applicant’s request were able to predict precisely what would happen to
the applicant on return. It took into account that there was no evidence that
the situation of the ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan had improved following the
adoption of the Constitution.32 In B.A. v France on the other hand the Court
seems to apply a rather high standard of proof. The Court held that there was
no real risk of refoulement although it accepted that the applicant was a deserter
and that deserters were severely repressed in Chad, the applicant’s country
According to the ECtHR the likelihood of the feared exposure of the applicant to the “death
row phenomenon” had been shown to be such as to bring Art 3 ECHR into play.
27 ECtHR (Adm) 27 January 2005, Mawajedi Shikpohkt and Makkamat Shole v the Netherlands,
no 39349/03. See also ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02, para 49.
28 According to the ECtHR thereby the Aliens Appeal Board increased the burden of proof
to such an extent as to hinder the examination on the merits of the alleged risk of a viola-
tion. ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 389.
29 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para 249.
The ECtHR often assesses itself whether the ‘foreseeable consequences’ of extradition or
expulsion are such as to bring Art 3 ECHR into play. ECtHR 12 May 2010, Khodzayev v
Russia, no 52466/08, para 91, ECtHR 20 July 2010, N. v Sweden, no 23505/09, para 54.
30 See for example ECtHR 10 February 2011, Dzhaksybergenov v Ukraine, no 12343/10, para 35.
31 ComAT General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, paras 6-7 and ComAT 16 May 2008, Z.K.
v Sweden, no 301/2006, para 8.3.
32 ECtHR 15 June 2010, S.H. v the United Kingdom, no 19956/06, para 71.
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of origin. The Court reproached the applicant for not having submitted any
documents which concerned him personally and which proved that the author-
ities in Chad were still looking for him six years after he left the country.33
Likeliness of a risk of refoulement in cases of danger of national security
The United Kingdom has argued that in cases in which an asylum status was
refused on national security grounds a higher standard of proof should apply
in order for the person concerned to be protected under the prohibition of
refoulement. This entails that, if the State adduces evidence that there is a threat
to national security, the individual concerned must prove that it is “more likely
than not” that he would be subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3.34
The ECtHR has ruled that such an approach is contrary to Article 3 ECHR. As
a result it should also be considered to undermine the full effectiveness of the
EU prohibition of refoulement.
The ECtHR observed that requiring a higher standard of proof in cases in
which national security concerns are involved is not compatible with the
absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3 ECHR.35 It amounts
to asserting that, in the absence of evidence meeting a higher standard, pro-
tection of national security justifies accepting more readily a risk of ill-treat-
ment for the individual. The ECtHR therefore sees
no reason to modify the relevant standard of proof […] by requiring in cases like
the present that it be proved that subjection to ill-treatment is more likely than
not.’ The Court ‘reaffirms that for a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of
the Convention it is necessary and sufficient for substantial grounds to have been
shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be
subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by Article 3.36
Indicators of a future risk of persecution or serious harm
There are various factors which may indicate that a future risk of persecution
or serious harm exists. It is argued here that the duty to perform an appro-
priate and careful examination of the asylum claim laid down in Article 8 (2)
33 ECtHR 2 December 2010, B.A. v France, no 14951/09, para 44. The arrest warrant submitted
by the applicant only stated that he committed a grave fault and not that he was a deserter.
34 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 122.
35 The Court considered that the prospect that the person concerned may pose a serious threat
to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill-
treatment that the person may be subject to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect
to require a higher standard of proof where the person is considered to represent a serious
danger to the community, since assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a
test.
36 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 140.
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PD requires that all relevant factors be taken into account.37 It should be pre-
vented that such factors are examined only in isolation and are not taken
together.
A very important indicator of a future risk of persecution or serious harm
is the fact that an applicant was persecuted or suffered serious harm in the
past on the condition that such past persecution or serious harm is connected
to the grounds on which the applicant claims to fear persecution or risk serious
harm in the future.38 This follows from Article 4 (4) QD, which applies to the
assessment of both refugee and subsidiary protection status. This provision
states that the fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution
or to direct threats of such persecution is a serious indication of the applicant’s
well-founded fear of persecution, unless there are good reasons to consider that
such persecution will not be repeated. Several authors mention that this
provision implies that previous (threats of) persecution or serious harm gives
rise to a refutable presumption that the applicant qualifies for refugee or
subsidiary protection.39
The importance of the fact that a person was persecuted, tortured or ill-
treated in the past when assessing a future risk of such treatment is confirmed
in the case-law of the ECtHR and the Committee against Torture.40 In Salah
Sheekh for example the ECtHR established that the applicant suffered inhuman
treatment in the past. It considered:
Having regard to the information available [..], the Court is far from persuaded
that the situation has undergone such a substantial change for the better that it
could be said that the risk of the applicant being subjected to this kind of treatment
anew has been removed or that he would be able to obtain protection from the
(local) authorities. There is no indication, therefore, that the applicant would find
himself in a significantly different situation from the one he fled.41
37 The ECtHR emphasises in NA v the United Kingdom that the assessment of whether there
is a real risk must be made on the basis of all relevant factors which may increase the risk
of ill-treatment. ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 130. See
also ECtHR 31 May 2011, E.G. v the United Kingdom, no 41178/08, para 72.
38 In Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para
94 the Court of Justice considered that ‘the evidential value attached by Article 4(4) of the
Directive to such earlier acts or threats will be taken into account by the competent author-
ities on the condition, stemming from Article 9(3) of the Directive, that those acts and threats
are connected with the reason for persecution relied on by the person applying for pro-
tection’. Also in the assessment of a risk of serious harm past ill-treament is only relevant
if it is connected to the reasons why the applicant claims to risk serious harm in the future.
See also Hailbronner 2010, p 1037.
39 See Battjes 2006, p 227, Haibronner 2010, p 1037, Staffans 2008, p 638.
40 See for example ComAT 30 November 2010, Said Amini v Denmark, no 339/2008, para 9.8
and ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005. See also General
Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 8 (b).
41 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, paras 146-147. See also
ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 55.
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The fact that past persecution is an important indicator for a well-founded
fear of persecution in the future is recognised by the UNHCR Handbook42 as
well as legal scholars.43
In the case-law of the ECtHR and the Committee against Torture past torture
or ill-treatment does not automatically make the existence of a future risk of
such treatment plausible. An important change of the conditions in the country
of origin,44 the fact that the abuses were applied by individuals and not con-
doned by the authorities45 and in some cases the fact that the past persecution
or torture occurred a long time ago,46 may warrant the conclusion that no
such future risk exists. Arguably these factors may be considered ‘good
reasons’ that no risk of future persecution or serious harm exists in the mean-
ing of Article 4 (4) QD.
Also other factors such as the applicant’s high profile,47 the fate of his
family members, friends or members of the same racial or social group48 or
the existence of systematic human rights violations in the country of origin49
are indicators of a future risk of persecution or serious harm.On the basis of
the ECtHR’s case-law, the UNHCR Handbook as well as the view of the Commit-
tee against Torture it should be concluded that the duty to perform an appro-
priate examination of the asylum claim laid down in Article 8 (2) PD requires
that risk factors should be taken together and not (only) be assessed in isola-
tion.50 According to the ECtHR:
42 UNHCR Handbook, para 45. See also UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in
Refugee Claims, Geneva, 16 December 1998, para 19.
43 According to Grahl-Madsen the fact that a person has experienced previous persecution
‘should be considered prima facie proof to the effect that he may again become a victim
of persecution should he return to his home country, so long as the regime which persecuted
him prevails in that country’. Grahl-Madsen 1966, p 176. See also Hathaway 1991, p 88.
44 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 147, which implies
that a substantial change for the better, could have taken away the future risk of inhuman
treatment and ECtHR, 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 71. In
ComAT 27 March 2002, Y.H.A. v Australia, no 162/2000, para 7.4, for example the ComAT
took into account that a new Transitional government was formed, which included members
of the clan to which the applicant belonged. See also UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard
of Proof in Refugee Claims, Geneva, 16 December 1998, para 19 and Hailbronner 2010,
pp 1037-1038.
45 ECtHR (Adm) 27 March 2008, Hakizimana v Sweden, no 37913/05.
46 See for example ComAT 16 May 2008, Z.K. v Sweden, no 301/2006, para 8.4 and ComAT
19 May 2008, R.K. v Sweden, no 309/2006, para 8.5. In ECtHR 2 September 2010, Y.P. and
L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 71, the ECtHR considered that the passage of time did
not diminish the risk of refoulement.
47 See for example ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal, v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93,
para 106 and ComAT 7 July 2011, Harminder Singh Khalsa et al v Switzerland, no 336/2008,
para 11.5.
48 See for example ECtHR 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 73.
49 See for example ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 130.
50 UNHCR Handbook, paras 53 and 201.
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[D]ue regard should also be given to the possibility that a number of individual
factors may not, when considered separately, constitute a real risk; but when taken
cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general violence and heightened
security, the same factors may give rise to a real risk.51
In the ECtHR’s view both the need to consider all relevant factors taken together
and the need to give appropriate weight to the general situation in the country
of destination derive from the obligation to consider all the relevant circum-
stances of the case.52
Individual risk or general risk
The determining authorities in Member States may be inclined to expect an
asylum applicant to substantiate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution
or faces a real risk of suffering serious harm on individual grounds. Further-
more they may assess the risk emanating from the individual situation of the
applicant and that emanating from the general situation in the country of origin
separately, instead of taking them together.53
It is true that applicants who fear to become the victim of the general
situation of (indiscriminate) violence in their country of origin will not qualify
as a refugee under the Qualification Directive, in the absence of a persecution
ground.54 However members of a particular group, which is systematically
persecuted because of its race, religion, ethnicity or another persecution ground
should be considered refugees, without being further singled out.55
It follows from the Court of Justice’s and the ECtHR’s case-law that requiring
individual grounds for a risk of serious harm in each case undermines the
full effectiveness of the EU right to subsidiary protection and the prohibition
of refoulement. This case-law shows that a real risk of suffering serious harm
may also emanate from the fact that a person belongs to a special vulnerable
group or, in exceptional situations, even from the general situation in the
applicant’s country or region of origin. In the assessment of the risk of serious
harm individual factors as well as the general situation in the country of origin
should be taken into account. This case-law will now be further examined.
The Court of Justice held in Elgafaji that the terms ‘death penalty’, ‘ex-
ecution’ and ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of
51 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 130. See for an example
where the ComAT considered that cumulative factors established a real and foreseeable
risk of torture: ComAT 7 July 2011, Mondal v Sweden, no 338/2008, para 7.7.
52 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 130. See also ECtHR 20 July
2010, N. v Sweden, no 23505/09, para 62 and UNHCR Handbook, para 201.
53 Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp 91-93.
54 Wouters 2009, p 71.
55 Hathaway states that ‘the historical framework of the Convention makes clear that it was
designed to protect persons within large groups whose fear of persecution is generalized,
not merely those who have access to evidence of particularized risk.’ Hathaway 1991, pp 90-
94. Wouters 2009, p 88, Goodwin Gill & McAdam 2007, pp 128-129.
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an applicant in the country of origin’, used in Article 15(a) and (b) QD cover
situations in which the applicant for subsidiary protection is specifically
exposed to the risk of a particular type of harm. Article 15 (c) QD on the other
hand covers a more general risk of harm.56 This provision covers
harm to civilians irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate
violence characterising the armed conflict taking place reaches such a high level
that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the
relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on
account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk
of being subject to the serious threat referred in Article 15(c) of the Directive.57
According to the Court collective factors play a significant role in the applica-
tion of Article 15(c) of the Directive, ‘in that the person concerned belongs,
like other people, to a circle of potential victims of indiscriminate violence
in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.58 In order to meet
the standard of proof required under Articles 2 (e) and 15 QD, the grounds
substantiating the risk of suffering the serious harm in the meaning of
Article 15 (c) may thus focus (at least to a large extent) on the general situation
in the country of origin. According to the Court the system of Article 15 QD
entails a sliding scale: ‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is speci-
fically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances,
the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible
for subsidiary protection’.59 It may be assumed that the opposite is also true:
the higher the level of indiscriminate violence in the country of origin, the
less important it is for the applicant to show that he is specifically affected
by reason of his individual circumstances.
The Court of Justice’s approach resembles to the approach taken by the
ECtHR.60 The ECtHR accepted that, if the existence of a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 ECHR is established, ‘the applicant’s removal would
necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a
general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a
combination of the two.’61 In Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom the ECtHR
56 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], paras 32-33.
57 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 35.
58 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 38.
59 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 39. See also paras 36 and 41 of the opinion of A.G.
Maduro in this case.
60 In ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para
225, the ECtHR considered that it was not persuaded that Art 3 ECHR does not offer
comparable protection to that afforded under the QD. Art 3 CAT does not cover cases of
risk of harm because of indiscriminate violence. See for example ComAT 19 May 2008,
R.K. v Sweden, no 309/2006, para 8.2.
61 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para
218.
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held that the level of violence in Mogadishu was of sufficient intensity to pose
a real risk of treatment reaching the Article 3 threshold to anyone in that city.
In its assessment of the situation in Mogadishu, the ECtHR took into account
the indiscriminate bombardments and military offensives carried out by all
parties to the conflict, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the
substantial number of persons displaced within and from the city, and the
unpredictable and widespread nature of the conflict.62
The Court also recognised that persons belonging to a group systematically
exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, face a real risk of refoulement. The pro-
tection of Article 3 ECHR enters into play when an applicant establishes that
there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of such practice of ill-treat-
ment and establishes (proves) that he is a member of the group concerned.63
To insist in such cases that the applicant show the existence of special dis-
tinguishing features would render the protection offered by Article 3 illusory.
Moreover, such a finding would call into question the absolute nature of
Article 3.64 Only if the level of violence in the country is not sufficiently
intense to and an individual is not a member of a vulnerable group, the
applicant must show the existence of ‘further special distinguishing features’.
Then the focus lies on the individual asylum account of the applicant, which
should be assessed in the light of the general situation in the country of
origin.65
8.2 THE BURDEN OF PROOF: WHO NEEDS TO MAKE PLAUSIBLE?
In this section it is examined which party in asylum proceedings (the asylum
applicant or the determining authority) bears the burden of proof. The concept
‘burden of proof’ has different meanings. First of all it may refer to the objective
burden of proof which determines which party bears the negative consequences
if the required standard of proof for the matter to be proved in the individual
case is not met.66 It may also refer to a subjective burden of proof which deter-
mines the responsibility to produce evidence.67 In this section both issues
will be addressed. It is assumed for the purpose of this section that for the
62 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 248.
63 Zahle calls these two evidentiary aspects of a refugee case ‘risk-group existence’ and ‘risk-
group affiliation’. Zahle 2005, p 18.
64 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 217.
65 ECtHR (GC) 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, no 46827/99, para 67.
66 See Staffans 2008, p 629. See also Popovic 2005, p 36.
67 See Staffans 2008, p 630. See also UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee
Claims, Geneva, 16 December 1998, para 5, which states that the duty to produce evidence
in order affirmatively to prove the alleged facts is termed “burden of proof”.
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assessment whether a person qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for
subsidiary protection, the same EU standards regarding the burden of proof
apply. This also follows from the fact that Article 4 QD, which concerns the
assessment of facts and circumstances, applies to both assessments. Therefore
the standards which may be derived from the Refugee Convention and those
which follow from the ECHR, ICCPR and CAT are discussed in coherence.
8.2.1 Adducing evidence and dispelling doubts
The Qualification Directive does not explicitly mention that the asylum appli-
cant bears the risk if the standard of proof for qualification as a refugee or
person eligible for subsidiary protection is not met.68 However, it may be
assumed in particular on the basis of the Court of Justice’s case-law,69 State
practice and principles of international law70 that the objective burden of proof
is on the applicant.71 This section only addresses the general burden of proof
with regard to the risk of refoulement upon return. The burden of proof with
regard to more specific aspects of the assessment of the asylum claim, such
as the reliance on a safe country of origin, a safe third country, an internal
flight alternative or the effectiveness of diplomatic assurances will not be
examined.72
The case-law of the Court of Justice, which will be addressed below shows
that the principle of full effectiveness of EU law may require a shift of the
burden of proof from the applicant to another party, even if no EU legislation
with regard to the burden of proof exists. Furthermore the ECtHR’s recent case-
law has made clear that in refoulement cases the burden of proof needs to shift
to the determining authority if the applicant has adduced evidence capable
of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real
risk of treatment in violation with Article 3 ECHR upon return. Also the Com-
mittee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee apply such a shift
of the burden of proof when the applicant has substantiated (an important
part) of the asylum claim. On the basis of this case-law it is argued in this
section that the full effectiveness of the EU right to asylum and the prohibition
68 See also Noll 2005-II, p 5.
69 See for example Case C-381/99, Brunhofer [2001], para 52, Case C-127/92, Enderby [1993],
para 13.
70 See for example ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 129, ComAT
General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 5 and UNHCR Handbook, para 196.
71 See Staffans 2008, p 629. She states that ‘both customary law, international law and also
regional law quite without hesitation allocate the objective burden of proof to the applicant
in the asylum procedure. It is thus commonly agreed that it indeed, as a starting point,
is the task of the applicant to prove his or her status as a refugee’.
72 See with regard to safe countries of origin Art 31 (1) PD, with regard to safe third countries
and first countries of asylum Art 27 (1) PD and Art 26 PD (which refers to Art 27 (1) PD)
and with regard to internal flight alternatives, Art 8 QD.
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of refoulement require a shift of the burden of proof to the determining author-
ity in a number of specific situations.
Shifting the burden of proof in EU equal treatment cases
The Court of Justice has recognised in several cases that national rules concern-
ing the burden of proof are capable of undermining the full effectiveness of
EU law. According to the Court, Member States may be obliged to apply and
interpret their national rules on the burden of proof in the light of the purpose
of the applicable EU legislation.73 In equal treatment cases (mostly concerning
equal pay between men and women) the Court requires a shift of the burden
of proof from the applicant (the worker) to the defending party (the employer)
in order to guarantee the full effectiveness of the right to equal treatment,
where there is a prima facie case of discrimination.74 The employer then has
to show that there are objective reasons for the difference in pay. There is a
prima facie case of discrimination for example when significant statistics disclose
an appreciable difference in pay between two jobs of equal value, one of which
is carried out almost exclusively by women and the other predominantly by
men.75
When establishing whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been
made out, the Court of Justice takes into account difficulties encountered by
the applicant in adducing evidence of discrimination. In Danfoss for example
the employer applied a system of pay which was wholly lacking in trans-
parency, which made it very difficult for female employees to prove that they
were paid less than their male colleagues, who were doing the same work
and that this was ad variance with the Equal Pay Directive.76 Female
employees could establish differences only so far as average pay was con-
cerned. The Court therefore required a shift of the burden of proof to the
employer, if a female worker established, in relation to a relatively large
number of employees, that the average pay for women was less than that for
men. The employer had to prove that the differentiation in pay between men
73 Joined Cases C-253/96 to C-258/96, Kampelmann and others [1997], paras 32-34 and Case
C-350/99, Lange [2001], paras 31-32. Note that in these cases Council Directive 91/533/EEC
of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions
applicable to the contract or employment relationship [1991] OJ 288/32 provided that the
Directive shall be without any prejudice to national law and practice concerning proof as
regards the existence and content of a contract or employment relationship.
74 Case C-127/92, Enderby [1993], para 18, Case C-381/99, Brunnhofer [2001], para 58. In Case
C-54/07, Feryn [2008], para 31, which concerned discrimination on the grounds of racial
or ethnic origin a ‘presumption of a discriminatory recruitment policy’ caused the shift
of the burden of proof.
75 Case C-127/92, Enderby [1993], para 19.
76 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and
women [1975] OJ L045/19.
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and women was not the result of discrimination.77 The Court considered that
the concern for effectiveness which underlies the Equal Pay Directive ‘means
that it must be interpreted as implying adjustments to national rules on the
burden of proof in special cases where such adjustments are necessary for the
effective implementation of the principle of equality’.78 The Court’s case-law
in equal treatment cases has been codified in EU legislation, in particular in
a special directive on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on
sex.79
Cases before the ECtHR, Committee against Torture and Human Rights Committee
In the case-law of the ECtHR, the Committee against Torture and the Human
Rights Committee it is accepted that the burden of proof should shift from
the asylum applicant to the determining authority when the applicant has
made out a prima facie case of a risk of refoulement.80 The burden of proof shifts
back to the applicant if these authorities have sufficiently disputed the evidence
or arguments submitted by the applicant. The ECtHR uses the following
standard as regards the burden of proof:
It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there
are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to
be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment
contrary to Article 3. [..] Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government
to dispel any doubts about it.81
It is impossible to point out exactly when the burden of proof needs to shift
to the determining authority. In most refoulement cases the ECtHR, Committee
against Torture or Human Rights Committee did not indicate that the burden
77 See also Case C-196/02, Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikonion Ellados AE [2005], para 74 and
Case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark [1995], paras 24-27. In Case C-381/99,
Brunnhofer [2001], para 58 the normal burden of proof applied because there were no special
circumstances such as those established in Danfoss. The worker had to prove that the pay
she received was less than that of her chosen comparator and that she did the same work
or work of equal value comparable to that performed by him.
78 Case C-109/88, Danfoss [1989], para 14. Art 6 of the Equal Pay Directive provides that
Member States must, in accordance with their national circumstances and legal systems,
take the measures necessary to ensure that the principle of equal pay is applied and that
effective means are available to ensure that it is observed.
79 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of
discrimination based on sex [1997] OJ L 14/6. See also Art 8 of Council Directive 2000/43/
EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespect-
ive of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 and Art 10 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC
of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16.
80 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 61-62.
81 See for example ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 129.
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of proof had shifted and for which reasons.82 However on the basis of their
judgments several circumstances can be identified which may trigger a shift
of the burden of proof.
Past persecution or serious harm
A first example is the fact that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment in
the past. In the previous section it was already submitted that past ill-treatment
or torture is an important factor which indicates that a future risk of per-
secution or serious harm exists. It follows from Article 4 (4) QD83 as well as
the ECtHR’s and Committee against Torture’s case-law that this factor also
requires a shift of the burden of proof to the decision-making authorities. In
R.C. v Sweden the ECtHR considered:
Having regard to its finding that the applicant has discharged the burden of proving
that he has already been tortured, the Court considers that the onus rests with the
State to dispel any doubts about the risk of his being subjected again to treatment
contrary to Article 3 in the event that his expulsion proceeds.84
The Court then assessed the future risk of a treatment in violation with
Article 3 ECHR in the light of the very tense situation in Iran at the time.
Furthermore the Court considered that the applicant would face a specific risk
upon return as he could not produce evidence of his having left that country
legally. The Court observed that the Government had not rebutted the appli-
cant’s claim that he left Iran illegally. Therefore the Court found it probable
that the applicant, being without valid exit documentation, would come to
the attention of the Iranian authorities and that his past was likely to be
revealed. The Court concluded that the expulsion of the applicant to Iran
would violate Article 3.
82 In non-asylum cases under Artt 2 and 3 ECHR the ECtHR did set out more precisely which
circumstances lead to a shift of the burden of proof to the State authorities. It considered
for example that where the events lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive know-
ledge of the authorities, as in the case of the death of a person within their control in
custody, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation of, in particular, the causes of the detained person’s
death. See for example ECtHR (GC) 6 July 2005, Nachova and others v Bulgaria, nos 43577/98
and 43579/98, para 157. See similarly HRC 16 August 2007, Kimouche v Algeria, no 1328/
2004.
83 See also Noll 2005-II, p 8. He states that the Member State must show on an individual
basis, why earlier persecution or harm will not entail renewed persecution or harm after
rejection of the application and refoulement.
84 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 55. See also ECtHR 10 December
2009, Koktysh v Ukraine, no 43707/07, para 64.
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Plausible statements and reliable proof
The burden of proof may also shift to the determining authority if the applicant
substantiated to a certain extent that there is a future risk of refoulement by
submitting credible statements and/or documents in support of their asylum
account. In S.H. v the United Kingdom for example the applicant had adduced
several expert reports (Amnesty International, the Human Rights Council of
Bhutan, Human Rights Watch and two individual experts) which supported
his claim that he would be at risk of imprisonment and ill-treatment upon
return to Bhutan. Furthermore human rights reports indicated that the ethnic
Nepalese in Bhutan were afforded discriminatory treatment on account of their
ethnicity. The Court was satisfied that there were substantial grounds for
believing that there was a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to
ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Bhutan. It noted that the
Government had not adduced any evidence capable of dispelling the Court’s
concerns. In particular the Government had accepted that there was no evid-
ence that the situation of the ethnic Nepalese had improved following the
adoption of the Constitution in Bhutan.85 In Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden
the Committee against Torture found it impossible to verify the authenticity
of some of the documents provided by the complainant. ‘However, in view
of the substantive reliable documentation he has provided, including medical
records, a support letter from Amnesty International Sweden, and an attesta-
tion from the Al-Nahdha chairman, the complainant [..] has provided sufficient
reliable information for the burden of proof to shift’.86
Serious human rights violations in the country of origin
When reports of human rights organisations submitted by the applicant or
taken into account by the ECtHR of its own motion, show the existence of
serious human rights violations, it is up to the determining authority to dispute
that information. The burden of proof with regard to the risks emanating from
the general situation in the country of origin thus shifts to the State. In Garayev
for example the applicant claimed that he would be tortured in prison upon
extradition to Uzbekistan. The ECtHR considered that the Government had not
adduced any evidence or reports capable of rebutting the credible reports by
human rights organisations of torture, routine beatings and use of force against
criminal suspects or prisoners by the Uzbek law-enforcement authorities. No
evidence had been produced of any fundamental improvement in the pro-
tection against torture in Uzbekistan in recent years.87
85 ECtHR 15 June 2010, S.H. v the United Kingdom, no 19956/06, paras 69-71.
86 ComAT 25 May 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, no 185/2001, para 10, See also
ComAT 15 February 2001, A.S. v Sweden, no 149/1999, para 8.6 and HRC 9 December 2004,
Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v Denmark, no 1222/2003, paras 11.2-11.4.
87 ECtHR 10 June 2010, Garayev v Azerbaijan, no 53688/08, para 73. See also ECtHR 19 Novem-
ber 2009, Kaboulov v Ukraine, no 41015/04, para 111. ECtHR 12 May 2010, Khodzayev v Russia,
no 52466/08, para 98.
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The applicant belongs to a group at risk
It follows from Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom that the determining author-
ity should prove that an individual is not at risk, when it is established on
the basis of human rights reports that the violence in a country or region of
origin is of such a level of intensity that in principle anyone in that region
or country would be at real risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the
Convention. In this case the Court concluded that such a situation occurred
in Mogadishu. It accepted that some persons who were exceptionally well-
connected to “powerful actors” could find protection in Mogadishu. However
it was for the Government to show that a person could find protection for
such reasons.88 On the basis of this judgment it is conceivable that, if it is
established that a person belongs to a group systematically exposed to a
practice of ill-treatment (such as the Ashraf minority in the case of Salah
Sheekh89), it is up to the determining authorities to prove that this person
can find protection against persecution or serious harm.
No burden of proving negative facts
Potentially it should be derived from M and others v Bulgaria that the asylum
applicant should not be expected to prove negative facts. In this case the
Bulgarian Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a risk of death and
ill-treatment of the applicant, who converted to Christianity, upon return to
Afghanistan. However it refused the applicant’s claim because the applicant
had not proved that those risks stemmed from the Afghan authorities and
that those authorities would not guarantee his safety. The ECtHR considered
under Article 13 ECHR:
[B]y dealing with such a serious issue summarily and by placing on the first
applicant, without any explanation, the burden of proving negative facts, such as
the lack of State guarantees in Afghanistan, the court practically deprived Mr M.
of a meaningful examination of his claim under Article 3.90
88 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, paras 249-
250. See similarly ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
para 359 where the Court held that the State authorities should have concluded on the
basis of the available human rights reports that the applicant faced a real and individual
risk of refoulement.
89 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04.
90 ECtHR 26 July 2011, M. and others v Bulgaria, no 41416/08, para 127. See also ECtHR 24 May
2011, Abou Amer v Romania, no 14521/03, para 58, where the State placed on the applicant
the burden of proving that he had not been involved in any activities threatening national
security. According to the ECtHR such proof seems impossible to produce, notably because
the applicant was not informed of the concrete suspicions against him.
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This case is quite specific because of the number of deficiencies in the Supreme
Court’s review of the asylum claim.91 However, it does show that, in parti-
cular when a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 is found real, no burden
to prove negative facts can be placed on the applicant.
Shifting the burden of proof back to the applicant
If the examining authorities provide well-founded reasons to contest the
statements or the evidence submitted by the applicant, the burden of proof
shifts back to the applicant.92 The determining authority may for example
have submitted good reasons to consider that past ill-treatment will not be
repeated, by showing that the situation in the country of origin has improved
to an important extent.93 Furthermore the burden of proof may shift back
to the applicant if the determining authority gave strong reasons to question
the information submitted by the applicant94 or the authenticity of documents
provided by him.95
Subconclusion: the objective burden of proof
It should be derived from the Court of Justice’s case-law in equal treatment
cases that the principle of effectiveness requires a shift of the burden of proof
from the applicant to the State if this is necessary to ensure the purpose of
the Procedures and Qualification Directive, namely respect for the right to
asylum and the prohibition of refoulement and the full and inclusive application
of the Refugee Convention.96 It is contended on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-
law that such a shift of the burden of proof is necessary if the applicant
adduced evidence capable of proving that he has a well-founded fear of
persecution or that there are substantial founds for believing that he faces a
real risk of suffering serious harm. It may be derived from the ECtHR’s case-law
that this condition is met in the following situations:
91 The Supreme Administrative Court failed to carry out a proper examination of the execut-
ive’s assertion that the applicant presented a national security risk. According to the ECtHR
this undermined the effectiveness of this remedy with regard to the requirements of Art 13
in conjunction with Art 3. Furthermore the Court placed excessive reliance on the question
whether the ill-treatment risked in the receiving State would emanate from State or non-State
sources. Finally the remedy before the Supreme Court did not have suspensive effect.
92 See also Zahle 2005, pp 19-20.
93 See Art 4 (4) QD, ECtHR (Adm) 4 July 2006, Karim v Sweden, no 24171/05 and ComAT
27 March 2002, Y.H.A. v Australia, no 162/2000, para 7.4.
94 See for example ECtHR (Adm) 8 July 2008, A.J. v Sweden, no 13508/07, para 56, ECtHR
(Adm) 2 September 2008, A.A. v Sweden, no 8594/04, para 66, ECtHR (Adm) 27 March 2008,
Hakizimana v Sweden, no 37913/05.
95 ECtHR (Adm) 21 June 2005, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v Sweden, no 31260/04, ComAT
26 November 2008, M.F. v Sweden, no 326/2007, para 7.7.
96 According to Recital 8 of the Preamble PD and Recital 10 Preamble QD, the Qualification
Directive and the Procedures Directive aim to ensure these rights. See also section 2.1.2.
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· it is established that the applicant was subjected to torture or ill-treatment
in the past.
· the applicant has substantiated to a certain extent that there is a future
risk of refoulement by submitting credible statements and or documents
in support of the asylum account.
· human rights organisations report the existence of serious human rights
violations in the applicant’s country of origin. The burden of proof shifts
to the State authorities with regard to the risk emanating from the general
situation in the country of origin.
· it is established that in the applicant’s country or region of origin the
violence is of such intensity that anyone is at risk of torture or ill-treatment
or that the applicant belongs to a special vulnerable group
Finally the ECtHR’s judgment in M and others v Bulgaria may indicate that the
applicant may not be required to prove negative facts.
8.2.2 Producing evidence: a shared duty
Most Member States impose upon the applicant the duty to produce evidence
in support of his asylum claim.97 This is allowed by Article 4 (1) QD, which
provides that the Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant
‘to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the applica-
tion for international protection’.98 Also according to the ECtHR’s case-law99
and the views of the Committee against Torture,100 the Human Rights Com-
mittee101 and UNHCR102 the applicant bears the burden of providing evidence
in support of his asylum claim.
97 According to the Commission in 2010 Art 4 (1) first sentence was transposed by all Member
States except for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania and
Romania. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the application of Directive 2005/85/EC, 8 September 2010, COM (2010) 465 final, p 4.
98 Note that the Member States are not required to place the burden of proof on the applicant.
This also follows from Art 4 (5) QD, where rules are provided for the situation where
Member States apply Art 4 (1) first sentence. See also Hailbronner 2010, pp 1027-1028.
99 According to the ECtHR it is ‘incumbent on persons who allege that their expulsion would
amount to a breach of Article 3 to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, material
and information allowing the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, as well as
the Court, to assess the risk a removal may entail’. ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the Netherlands,
no 2345/02, para 49.
100 See for example ComAT 2 May 2007, E.R.K. and Y.K. v Sweden, no 270 & 271/2005, para
7.4 and ComAT 5 May 2009, X v Australia, no 324/2007, para 7.4.
101 The HRC has declared several cases inadmissible because the person concerned failed to
substantiate his claims under Art 7 ICCPR. See for example: HRC 28 April 2009, Moses
Solo Tarlue v Canada, no 1551/2007, para 7.4.
102 UNHCR Handbook, para 195.
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This section agues however that the duty to conduct an appropriate ex-
amination of the asylum claim prescribed by Article 8 (2) PD read in the light
of the principle of full effectiveness of EU law entails a positive obligation for
the Member States to investigate certain aspects of the asylum claim. Po-
tentially the Member States’ duty to assess the relevant elements of the applica-
tion in cooperation with the applicant laid down in Article 4 (1) QD also entails
such a positive obligation.103
This interpretation of Articles 8 (2) PD and 4 (1) QD would be in line with
the ECtHR’s case-law concerning Article 3 ECHR. According to the ECtHR Article 3
ECHR entails an obligation for the State to carry out a meaningful or adequate
assessment of the applicant’s claim of a risk of refoulement.104 It follows from
this obligation that the State authorities must address the applicant’s allegations
of past torture and the future risk of refoulement.105 In a number of complaints
against Turkey the ECtHR concluded that the State authorities failed to carry
out a meaningful assessment of the risk of refoulement. The ECtHR took into
account amongst others that the State authorities did not interview the appli-
cants. In these cases the ECtHR concluded on the basis of the evidence submitted
by the applicants and the fact that UNHCR recognised the applicants as refugees
that expulsion would violate Article 3 ECHR.106
It will be argued in this section that it follows in particular from the duty
to an adequate assessment of the asylum claim that Member States are obliged
to gather reliable country of origin information from different sources. Further-
more the State is required to request a medical report by an expert, if the
applicant makes out a prima facie case that the scars on his body or other
medical problems suffered by him are caused by ill-treatment in his country
of origin. Finally it is argued that the determining authority should gather
evidence which is only obtainable by this authority and not by the asylum
applicant. The authority examining the asylum claim is thus not allowed to
103 According to Boeles and others the Member States’ duty to assess the asylum application
in cooperation with the asylum applicant laid down in Art 4 (1) QD implies that the Member
State must actively contribute in gathering the necessary evidence for status determination
and allow the asylum applicant to participate in that process as soon as the applicant has
provided the initial necessary elements in support of his asylum claim. Boeles and others
2009, p 338. Under the ECtHR such positive obligation follows from the duty of a ‘close
scrutiny’ of the asylum claim following from Artt 3 and 13 ECHR. See ECtHR (GC) 21
January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 293.
104 See for example ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 122, ECtHR
15 June 2010, Ahmadpour v Turkey, no 12717/08, para 38, ECtHR 19 January 2010, Z.N.S.
v Turkey, no 21896/08, para 48 and ECtHR, 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98,
para 40.
105 ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 123.
106 See for example ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08,
ECtHR 13 April 2010, Tehrani and others v Turkey, nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08, ECtHR
13 July 2010, Dbouba v Turkey, no 15916/09.
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sit back and limit itself to the assessment of the statements and evidence
adduced by the applicant.107
The duty to gather reliable country of origin/transit country information of different
sources.
Article 8 (2) (b) PD states that in the context of their duty to conduct an appro-
priate examination of the asylum claim Member States must ensure that
‘precise and up-to-date information is obtained from various sources’, such
as the UNHCR, ‘as to the general situation prevailing in the countries of origin
of applicants for asylum and, where necessary, in countries through which
they have transited’. Such information should be made available to the per-
sonnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions’.108 The
duty to gather relevant country of origin information is important in all asylum
cases and in particular in the context of the assessment of the right to sub-
sidiary protection on the basis of Article 15(c) QD. In this assessment collective
factors play a significant role. The determining authority should examine
whether the person concerned ‘belongs, like other people, to a circle of po-
tential victims of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or
internal armed conflict’.109
It also follows from the ECtHR’s case-law that the determining authority
should carry out an adequate assessment of the situation in the country of
origin which is sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by
materials originating from other, reliable and objective sources.110 The ECtHR
has reproached Governments because they failed to include any country of
origin information in the assessment of the asylum claim or to refer to such
information in their asylum decision.111 In M.S.S v Belgium and Greece the
ECtHR considered that the Belgian Governments should have been aware of
the general situation in Greece and therefore of the applicant’s fears in the
event of his transfer back to this country, although the applicant failed to voice
those fears at his interview. The Court in this context referred to the numerous
reports concerning the situation in Greece. According to the Court the applicant
should in this situation not be expected ‘to bear the entire burden of proof’.
107 See also Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Pro-
cedures, para 5, which states that ‘when examining an application for asylum the competent
authority must, of its own initiative take into consideration and seek to establish all the
relevant facts.’
108 See also Art 4 (3) QD.
109 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], para 38.
110 See ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136.
111 ECtHR 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 70, ECtHR 21 October
2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 125. See also ComAT Concluding Observations
on Hungary, 6 February 2007, CAT/C/HUN/CO/4, para 10, where it recommended that
Hungary should expand and update its country of origin (COI) information database and
take effective measures to certify that the internal regulation about the obligatory use of
the COI system is respected.
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The ECtHR did not explain which part of the burden of proof still rested on
the applicant.112 It did address however what was expected of the Belgian
authorities: the reports concerning the general situation in Greece should have
urged them to verify how the Greek authorities applied their legislation on
asylum in practice. They could not assume that the applicant would be treated
in conformity with the ECHR’s standards.113 The Court concluded that the
Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known that the applicant had no
guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by the
Greek authorities.114
It should be concluded that it follows from Article 8 (2) (b) PD read in the
light of the ECtHR’s case-law that the determining authority should gather and
assess of its own motion reports concerning the general situation in the country
of origin (or transit). The value which should be attached to country of origin
or transit country information, in particular reports issued by human rights
organisations will be examined in section 8.6.2. below.
The duty to request medical expert reports
EU legislation does not explicitly require the determining authority of the
Member States to request an expert to write a medical report if the applicant
claims to have scars or other medical problems as a result of past torture or
ill-treatment. However it is submitted here that the duty to conduct an
adequate examination of the asylum claim following from Article 8 (2) PD read
in the light of the ECtHR’s judgment in R.C. v Sweden does entail such a duty.
The ECtHR held in this case that the State authorities have a duty to direct that
an expert opinion be obtained as to the probable cause of the applicant’s scars,
if the applicant submitted a medical certificate, which makes out a prima facie
case as to the origin of scars on the body of the applicant (namely torture or
ill-treatment).115 In section 8.6.3. it will be contended that medical reports
should be considered very important evidence for the assessment of the asylum
claim.
The duty to gather evidence obtainable by the State authorities, but unavailable to
the applicant
It may be contended on the basis of the case-law of the Court of Justice and
the ECtHR that the duty to conduct an appropriate examination of the asylum
112 See also Battjes 2011, sub 6.2.1.
113 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 359.
114 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 358. See also
ECtHR 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09, paras 131-133 and 156-
157.
115 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 53. See also ComAT 23 October
1997, A. v the Netherlands, no 91/1997, para 6.6 where the Committee considered that the
State party had failed to explain why the applicant’s claims were considered insufficiently
substantial as to warrant a medical examination.
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claim as well as the principle of full effectiveness of EU law entails a positive
obligation for the determining authority to investigate aspects of the asylum
claim, where it has access to the relevant information and the asylum seeker
has not. Arguably State authorities are better placed than the applicant to
produce for example decisions on the asylum claims of relatives of the appli-
cant in other Member States, information of judicial proceedings against the
applicant pending in the country of origin or information on the fate of
returnees to the applicant’s country of origin, who are monitored by the State
authorities.116
The Court of Justice accepted in its case-law that requiring a party to
produce evidence which it cannot obtain is contrary to the principle of effect-
iveness.117 The national court should instead use all the procedures available
to it, including ordering measures of inquiry, in order to obtain the evidence
for example from third parties. This was decided in the judgment in Laboratoires
Boiron. In this case Laboratoires Boiron, a pharmaceutical laboratory, claimed
the reimbursement of taxes, arguing that wholesale distributors, which were
the laboratory’s direct competitors, were not liable to pay those taxes. Labor-
atoires Boiron claimed that this constituted State aid. According national law
it was Laboratoires Boiron’s duty to prove this claim. At the same time, the
national courts had wide (discretionary) powers to order of its own motion
all measures of inquiry permissible in law. The question before the Court was
whether these rules of evidence were in compliance with the principle of
effectiveness. The Court considered:
[I]f the national court finds that the fact of requiring a pharmaceutical laboratory
such as Boiron to prove that wholesale distributors are overcompensated, and thus
that the tax on direct sales amounts to State aid, is likely to make it impossible
or excessively difficult for such evidence to be produced, since inter alia that
evidence relates to data which such a laboratory will not have, the national court
is required to use all procedures available to it under national law, including that
of ordering the necessary measures of inquiry, in particular the production by one
of the parties or a third party of a particular document.118
The ECtHR has not explicitly considered that the burden of producing evidence
should rest with the authorities of the State when they are better placed to
obtain certain relevant information in an asylum case. However the Court
seems to suggest that a duty to investigate certain aspects of the asylum claim
116 E.g. in the context of Art 8 (6) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L 348/98.
117 Case C-310/09, Accor [2011], para 100.
118 Case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron SA [2006], para 55. See also para 57 of this judgment.
See also Case C-264/08, Direct Parcel Distribution Belgium [2010], paras 31-37.
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may indeed exist in Bader v Sweden. In this case the ECtHR found it surprising
that the first applicant’s defence lawyer in Syria was not contacted by the
Swedish embassy during their investigation into the case, even though the
applicants had furnished the Swedish authorities with his name and address
and he could, in all probability, have provided useful information about the
case. In this case the applicant had submitted an original judgment of a Syrian
Court in which he was sentenced to death in absentia on account of mur-
der.119
The UNHCR Handbook states that, in some cases, it may be for the examiner
to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in
support of the application.120 UNHCR here seems to refer to cases of
minors121 and mentally disturbed or traumatised persons.122
8.3 INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENT AND THE USE OF PRESUMPTIONS
According to Article 4 (3) QD and Article 8 (2) (a) PD the assessment of an
application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual
basis.123 When assessing asylum claims the determining authority of the
Member States sometimes applies certain presumptions to groups of asylum
applicants. An important example of such presumption is: persons originating
from a certain country (a safe country of origin) do not have protection
needs.124
119 ECtHR 8 November 2005, Bader v Sweden, no 13284/04, para 45. See also Wouters p 274.
120 UNHCR Handbook, para 196. See also Zahle 2005, p 26.
121 UNHCR states in its annotated comments on the QD that in the case of asylum seeking
children the burden of proof should be applied flexibly and liberally, by fact-finding and
gathering supporting evidence in any manner possible. UNHCR Annotated Comments
on the Directive 2004/83/EC, UNHCR January 2005, p 16.
122 See UNHCR Handbook, para 210, which states that in case of a mentally disturbed person
it will ‘be necessary to lighten the burden of proof normally incumbent upon the applicant’.
Information that cannot easily be obtained from the applicant may have to be sought
elsewhere, e.g. from friends, relatives and other persons closely acquainted with the
applicant, or from his guardian, if one has been appointed. It may also be necessary to
draw certain conclusions from the surrounding circumstances. If, for instance, the applicant
belongs to and is in the company of a group of refugees, there is a presumption that he
shares their fate and qualifies in the same manner as they do.
123 See also Art 19 (4) QD, which requires that the State authorities demonstrate on an indi-
vidual basis that the person concerned has ceased to be or is not eligible for subsidiary
protection.
124 Other presumptions applied in asylum cases which do not fall within the scope of this
study are: all Member States operate equivalent protection systems which comply with
human rights standards (the presumption underpinning the Dublin Regulation), all Members
of a certain organisation are individually responsible for actions giving rise to exclusion
from an asylum status according to Artt 12 and 17 QD or all persons convicted to a certain
sentence for a particular offence are a danger to the security or community of the Member
State. See also Noll 2005-II, p 8.
The burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment 215
The Procedures Directive allows for the use of a presumption of safety
of countries of origin or third countries under certain conditions.125 Member
States are for example allowed to designate a country as a safe country of
origin where it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no
persecution as defined in Article 9 QD, no torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence
in situations of international or internal armed conflict.126 If a country is
designated a safe country of origin it is presumed that asylum applicants
originating from this country do not have a well-founded fear of persecution
or face a real risk of serious harm. According to the Procedures Directive the
presumption of safety of the country of origin may be rebutted by the appli-
cant. The third country designated as a safe country of origin may only be
considered as a safe country of origin for a particular applicant if he has not
submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe
country of origin in his particular circumstances and in terms of his qualifica-
tion as a refugee. If the country of origin is considered safe for the individual
applicant, this has some serious consequences. According to Article 23 (4)(c)(i)
PD the application may be dealt with in an accelerated procedure and Article 28
(2) PD provides that the application may be considered manifestly unfounded.
This will generally reduce the asylum applicant’s chances of rebutting the
presumption of safety.
Asylum applicants may in practice find it (almost) impossible to prove
that a presumption, such as the one mentioned above, does not apply in his
particular case. In several cases the Court of Justice has held that the use of
a presumption which is impossible or excessively difficult to rebut, is contrary
to the principle of effectiveness. It is argued in this section on the basis of this
case-law as well as the case-law of the ECtHR and the views of the Committee
against Torture and UNHCR that in asylum cases the use of presumptions is
permissible, but only if it is possible to rebut them and if the asylum applicant
is granted sufficient opportunity to do so.127 It should be examined on a case-
by-case basis whether such presumption must be considered rebutted. The
use of conclusive (irrebuttable) presumptions should be considered contrary
to the duty of an individual assessment of the asylum claim laid down in
Article 4 (3) QD and Article 8 (2) (a) PD. Furthermore such practice should be
considered to undermine the effectiveness of the EU right to asylum and the
prohibition of refoulement.
125 Artt 26, 27, 30-31, 36 PD.
126 See Art 30 (1) PD and Annex II to the PD.
127 Noll states that the requirement of an assessment on an individual basis means that ‘if a
Member State applies presumptions in the procedure, it must be possible to confute the
presumption in the asylum procedure’. Noll 2005-II, p 8. See also Hailbronner 2010, p 1031.
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Case-law by the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice’s case-law shows that the principle that asylum claims
should be assessed on an individual basis does not preclude the use of pre-
sumptions. However the use of irrebuttable presumptions violates this require-
ment as well as the principle of effective judicial protection. In Samba Diouf
the Court of Justice held that in order for the right to an effective remedy to
be exercised effectively,
the national court must be able to review the merits of the reasons which led the
competent administrative authority to hold the application for international pro-
tection to be unfounded or made in bad faith, there being no irrebuttable presump-
tion as to the legality of those reasons.128
In this case the Luxembourg authorities and the Luxembourg court disagreed
on the extent to which the reasons for rejecting an asylum claim in an acceler-
ated procedure could be reviewed by the national court in the context of the
appeal against the final rejection of the claim.
In NS and ME and others the Court of Justice recognised the importance
of the presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European
Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights in the context of the European
Union as well as CEAS. However it considered that an application of the Dublin
Regulation on the basis of the conclusive presumption that the asylum seeker’s
fundamental rights will be observed in the Member State primarily responsible
for his application is incompatible with the duty of the Member States to
interpret and apply the Dublin Regulation in a manner consistent with funda-
mental rights. The asylum applicant must, according to the Court of Justice,
be able to submit evidence in order to rebut this presumption.129
The Court of Justice addressed the use of a presumption of responsibility
for certain crimes which give rise to the exclusion from an EU asylum status
on the basis of Article 12 QD in its judgment in B and D. The Court established
that the exclusion from refugee status of a person who has been a member
of a terrorist organisation is conditional on an individual assessment of the
specific facts.130 The Court accepted that any authority which finds in the
course of this assessment that the person concerned has occupied a prominent
128 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 61.
129 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others [2011], paras 99-105. The
Court considered that Art 36 PD indicates that the mere ratification of conventions by a
Member State cannot result in the application of a conclusive presumption that that State
observes those conventions. The same principle is applicable both to Member States and
third countries. See also opinion of A.G. Trstenjak with this case of 22 September 2010.
130 The Court considered that it follows from the wording of Art 12 QD that the determining
authority should carry out an assessment of the specific facts within their knowledge with
a view to determining whether there are serious reasons for considering that the acts
committed by the person in question are covered by the exclusion clauses.
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position within an organisation which uses terrorist methods is entitled to
presume that that person has individual responsibility for acts committed by
that organisation during the relevant period. Nevertheless the Court deems
it necessary that all the relevant circumstances be examined before a decision
excluding that person from refugee status can be adopted.131 It should thus
be derived from this judgement that the requirement of an individual assess-
ment laid down in Article 4 (3) QD and Article 8 (2) (a) PD does not preclude
the use of presumptions. However, such presumption may not prevent the
determining authority to assess the specific circumstances of the case. This
implies that the individual must be able to rebut the presumption while
referring to his individual circumstances.
Cases concerning the repayment of charges levied by a Member State contrary to EU
law
In several cases concerning the repayment of charges levied by a Member State
contrary to EU law the Court of Justice reached the conclusion that a pre-
sumption used by State authorities violated the principle of effectiveness,
because this presumption could in practice not be rebutted by an individual
party. In SpA San Giorgio a company brought an action before the Italian court,
reclaiming amounts unduly paid. In these proceedings the State invoked Italian
law, which stated that import duties or taxes would not be repaid, when the
charge in question had been passed on in any way whatsoever to other per-
sons. This charge was presumed to have been passed on, whenever the goods,
in respect of which the payment was effected, had been transferred, in the
absence of documentary proof to the contrary. SpA San Giorgio questioned
the compatibility of these provisions with principles of EU law. The question
put before the Court of Justice was whether the requirement of negative
documentary proof rendered the exercise of rights, which national courts are
under a duty to protect, virtually impossible. The Court of Justice considered
that the conditions for repayment of charges levied by a Member State contrary
to EU law, may not be contrary to the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness. The Court recognised that the Member States may take certain measures
to prevent unjust enrichment of the recipients. The Court considered however:
[A]ny requirement of proof which has the effect of making it virtually impossible
or excessively difficult to secure the repayment of charges levied contrary to
Community law would be incompatible with Community law. That is so particular-
ly in the case of presumptions or rules of evidence intended to place upon the
taxpayer the burden of establishing that the charges unduly paid have not been
passed on to other persons […].132
131 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B and D [2010], paras 94 and 98. See also para 77 of
the opinion of A.G. Mengozzi with this case.
132 Case C-199/82, SpA San Giorgio [1983], para 14. See also Case C-147/01, Weber’s wine world
[2003], paras 109-117.
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The Court thus held that a presumption that the duties and charges unlawfully
levied or collected, have been passed on to third parties and the requirement
for the plaintiff to rebut that presumption, are contrary to EU law.133
Presumptions in the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the Committee against Torture
and UNHCR
The ECtHR and the Committee against Torture have accepted in its case-law
that certain rebuttable presumptions may be used in asylum cases. Like the
Court of Justice the ECtHR held that it needs to be presumed that States comply
with their obligations under international treaties.134 In the context of the
Dublin Regulation it must be presumed in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, that the Member States of the EU will comply with their obligations
under the ECHR and under EU law.135 However according to the ECtHR State
parties are required to assess on a case-by-case basis whether there is evidence
which rebuts the presumption that the State party will comply with its obliga-
tions stemming from international or EU law.136 The ECtHR held in several
cases that the presumption that a State Party with the ECHR complies with its
obligations under this Convention should be considered rebutted. The most
important example of such as case is the judgment in M.S.S. v Belgium and
Greece. In this case the Court based its judgment on numerous reports issued
by human rights organisations which pointed at human rights violations by
Greece (see further section 8.3.1 above).137 Furthermore the ECtHR has held
in the context of the assessment of the reliability of diplomatic assurances that
‘the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guar-
133 See for comparable judgments: Case C-343/96, Dilexport [1999], para 48, Joined Cases
C-441/98 and C-442/98, Kapniki Michaïlidis [2000], paras 36-37 and Case C-129/00,
Commission v Italy [2003] paras 36-40.
134 ECtHR (Adm) 1 September 2009, Harutioenyan and Others v the Netherlands, no 43700/07
and ComAT 3 September 2000, S.C. v Denmark, no 143/199 and ComAT 28 November 2003,
E.J.V.M. v Sweden, no 213/2002.
135 ECtHR (Adm) 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v Greece, no 32733/08. ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011,
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 345.
136 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 341-343,
ECtHR (Adm) 7 March 2000, T.I. v the United Kingdom, no 43844/98. The judgment in R.U.
v Greece made clear that the ECtHR itself assesses on a case-by-case basis whether such
a presumption is rebutted: ‘Il n’en reste pas moins que la Cour ne peut pas fonder son
appréciation sur le seul fait que le renvoi du requérant peut se produire vers une Haute
Partie contractante à la Convention. Elle doit en même temps se pencher sur les éléments
concrets du dossier pour évaluer s’il existe des moyens sérieux de penser qu’un danger
de torture ou de peines ou de traitements inhumains ou dégradants menace l’intéressé
en cas de renvoi en Turquie.’ ECtHR 7 June 2011, R.U. v Greece, no 2237/08, para 79.
137 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09. See also ECtHR
12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v Georgia and Russia, no 36378/02, where the Court
concluded that expulsion from Georgia to Russia amounted to a violation of Art 3 ECHR
and ECtHR 7 June 2011, R.U. v Greece, no 2237/08, para 82 where the Court held that there
was a prima facie serious risk that the applicant would become the victim of a treatment
contrary to Art 3 ECHR upon return to Turkey.
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anteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves
sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where
[…] reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the
authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Conven-
tion’.138 It may thus not be presumed that a country complies with national
law and human rights treaties where reliable sources show the contrary.
Both the Committee against Torture and the UNHCR have criticised the use
of presumptions of safety of countries in asylum procedures. They stress the
need for an effective opportunity to rebut this presumption and for an indi-
vidual assessment of the case.139 UNHCR states that
given the need for an individual assessment of the specific circumstances of the
case and the complexities of such a decision, best State practice does not apply
any designation of safety in a rigid manner or use it to deny access to procedures.
Rather, it bases any presumption of safety on precise, impartial and up-to-date
information and admits the applicant to the regular asylum procedure, so that s/he
has an effective opportunity to rebut any general presumption of safety based on
his/her particular circumstances.140
8.4 ASSESSING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE APPLICANT’S STATEMENTS
Most asylum applicants arrive in the EU Member States without documents
or evidence supporting their asylum account. In most cases therefore, the
asylum application should be examined largely on the basis of the statements
of the asylum applicant and his family members made during interviews or
in writing, in the light of the available country of origin information.141 In
these cases the assessment of the credibility of the asylum account is often
decisive.142 Once the credibility of the individual asylum account is (seriously)
called in question, it is usually concluded that there is no well-founded fear
of persecution or that no substantial grounds have been shown for believing
138 ECHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 147. See also ECtHR 24 March
2009, O. v Italy, no 37257/06, para 40 and ECtHR 12 May 2010, Khodzayev v Russia, no 52466/
08, para 98.
139 See ComAT Concluding Observations on Estonia (19 February 2008, CAT/C/EST/CO/4,
p 3) and France (3 April 2006, CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, p 4). and UNHCR Provisional Com-
ments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in
Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 10 February 2005, p 40.
140 UNHCR Global Consultations on international protection Asylum Processes (Fair and
efficient asylum procedures), 31 May 2001, paras 39-40.
141 This follows from Art 4 (2) and (3) QD, which state that the applicant’s statements and
relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the
application are elements which should be taken into account in the assessment of the asylum
claim. See also for example Herlihy, Gleeson & Turner 2010, pp 351-352.
142 See for example Popovic 2005, p 18 and Thomas 2006, p 79.
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that there is a real risk of serious harm.143 It is argued below that if the general
credibility of the applicant is established, the Member States should, according
to Article 4 (5) QD, be required to consider the facts stated by the applicant
established, even if no evidence is submitted in support of these facts (apply
the benefit of the doubt).
Assessing the credibility of asylum applicant’s account is a very complex
and difficult task.144 EU legislation does not contain any specific standards
with regard to the credibility assessment. However some guidance as to the
factors which should be taken into account when performing such assessment,
may be derived from Article 23 (4) PD. This provision mentions the circum-
stances in which an asylum application may be processed in an accelerated
procedure and may be deemed manifestly unfounded. Member States and
human rights bodies such as the ECtHR, Human Rights Committee and the
Committee against Torture often take these circumstances into account when
examining the credibility of an asylum account:
· the applicant has misled the authorities by presenting false information
or documents or by withholding relevant information or documents with
respect to his identity and/or nationality that could have had a negative
impact on the decision
· the applicant has filed another application for asylum stating other personal
data
· the applicant has not produced information establishing with a reasonable
degree of certainty his identity or nationality
· it is likely that, in bad faith, he has destroyed or disposed of an identity
or travel document that would have helped establish his identity or nation-
ality
· the applicant has made inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insuffi-
cient representations which make his/her claim clearly unconvincing in
relation to his having been the object of persecution.
It is argued in this section that national procedural rules or practices which
have as a consequence that it is concluded too easily that an asylum account
is not credible, undermine the full effectiveness of the EU right to asylum and
the principle of non-refoulement. From the ECtHR’s case as well as the views
of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture several
standards emerge which should be complied with in order to ensure the
effectiveness of the prohibition of refoulement. It follows from this case-law,
143 UNHCR stated in 2010 that ‘a common trend identified through the audit of decisions in
several states was that negative decisions were often made on credibility grounds, and
did not apply the criteria of the Qualification Directive to facts’. UNHCR, Improving Asylum
Procedures, Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice, Geneva: March
2010, p 14.
144 See for example Thomas 2006, p 96.
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which will be examined more extensively below in this section that the deter-
mining authority should focus on the credibility of the essence of the asylum
account and that asylum applicants should be granted the opportunity to
provide a reasonable explanation for the alleged shortcomings in their account.
Credibility assessment by the ECtHR, Human Rights Committee and Committee against
Torture
An asylum account is usually deemed credible when the applicant’s statements
are coherent, detailed and plausible and consistent with information concerning
his country of origin.145 Human rights bodies often consider an asylum
account credible when the State authorities have not presented any information
which rebuts the applications allegations.146
There are many factors which affect the credibility of the asylum
account.147 Often it is a combination of such factors which lead to the con-
clusion that the asylum account is insufficiently substantiated. First of all
contradictions or inconsistencies in the asylum seeker’s statements, which are
not satisfactory explained by the applicant148 or a lack of detail in the asylum
applicant’s account are generally considered to undermine the credibility of
the applicant’s statements.149 In S.M. v Sweden the applicant had claimed
to have been a courier for the Congolese ambassador in Sweden and a friend,
transferring money between them. The Court observed in this case that she
had only given very general information about this activity and had failed
to specify, for example, how she came to be entrusted with such a secret and
dangerous task and the circumstances surrounding her arrest, as well as how
exactly she had been able to escape from a hospital where she was guarded
by a soldier. This was one of the reasons why the ECtHR concluded in this case
that the asylum account was not sufficiently substantiated.150
145 See for example ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, paras 52 and 54, ECtHR
21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09 para 135, ECtHR 10 June 2010, Garayev v
Azerbaijan, no 53688/08, para 72. See also UNHCR Handbook, para 204.
146 See for example ECtHR, 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 68,
HRC 9 December 2004, Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v Denmark, no 1222/2003, para 11.3.
147 See Thomas 2006, p 81.
148 See for example ECtHR (Adm) 8 July 2008, A.J. v Sweden, no 13508/07, paras 59-60 and
ECtHR 5 March 2002, Hemat Kar v Sweden, no 62045/00. See also ComAT General Comment
No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 8 (g) and ComAT 21 June 1999, M.B.B. v Sweden, no 104/1998,
para 6.6.
149 See ECtHR (Adm) 10 July 2007, Achmadov and Bagurova v Sweden, no 34081/05, where the
Court considered that no specific details had been provided amongst others regarding the
alleged ill-treatment to which the applicants maintained that they were subjected. See also
ECtHR 20 January 2011, N.S. v Denmark, no 58359/08, para 94.
150 ECtHR (Adm) 10 February 2009, S.M. v Sweden, no 47683/08, para 33.
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Furthermore it is accepted that the use of a false name or false identity
documents without explanation151 or the applicant’s failure to submit identity
documents or information on the travel route may undermine the credibility
of the asylum account.152 In E.N. v Sweden the ECtHR considered that the
applicant gave a false name and date of birth and submitted a forged identity
card to the Swedish authorities. Moreover, he alleged that he had used a fake
passport and did not know the travel route while, in reality, he had travelled
legally to France on his own passport and with a valid entry visa to study
in France. ‘These untruths clearly affect the applicant’s general credibility
negatively in the eyes of the Court.’153
The applicant is often reproached for a total absence of evidence supporting
the asylum claim or of crucial parts of it, in particular when there are already
doubts as to the credibility of the asylum account.154 In Achmadov and Bagu-
rova v Sweden the ECtHR for example took into account that the applicants were
not in possession of any receipts of police reports or any copies of letters to
or from public authorities, lawyers or human rights organisations relating to
harassment allegedly suffered by them. Nor did they present any medical
statements, despite the fact that one of the applicants visited a doctor after
an assault, just weeks before the applicants entered Sweden. The ECtHR found
this rather remarkable. It particularly referred to the fact that one of the appli-
cants and her adult son had experience with the German and Italian immigra-
tion authorities as a result of an earlier asylum application. Therefore the ECtHR
found that they must have been aware that any kind of evidence would have
been of significant value to the asylum proceedings.155
The Committee against Torture has reproached applicants for a lack of
medical evidence supporting an account of past torture or ill-treatment.156
Also when documents submitted by the applicant, such as arrest warrants,
151 ECtHR (Adm) 8 July 2008, A.J. v Sweden, no 13508/07, para 59 and ECtHR (Adm) 8 Decem-
ber 2009, E.N. v Sweden, no 15009/09, para 30.
152 ECtHR (Adm) 10 February 2009, S.M. v Sweden, no 47683/08, para 33.
153 ECtHR (Adm) 8 December 2009, E.N. v Sweden, no 15009/09, para 30.
154 ECtHR (Adm) 10 July 2007, Achmadov and Bagurova v Sweden, no 34081/05, ComAT 21
November 2007, K.A. and others v Sweden, no 308/2006, para 7.3. and ComAT 26 November
2008, L.J.R. v Australia, no 316/2007, para 7.5.
155 ECtHR (Adm) 10 July 2007, Achmadov and Bagurova v Sweden, no 34081/05
156 ComAT 15 May 2008, M.X. v Sweden, 311/2007, paras 9.4-9.6, ComAT 2 May 2007, E.V.I.
v Sweden, no 296/2006, para 8.6, ComAT 2 May 2007, E.R.K and Y.K. v Sweden, no 270 &
271/2005, para 7.4 and ComAT 19 May 1998, A.L.N. v Switzerland, no 90/1997, para 8.4.
The absence of physical evidence of torture should however not be (automatically) held
against the applicant. See the Manual on Effective Investigation and Documentation of
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Istanbul
Protocol) paras 161 and 172.
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court summons or judgments, turn out to be forgeries, this is generally held
against the applicant.157
Finally an important factor which is generally considered to undermine
the credibility of the asylum account is the fact that the asylum applicant
submitted new statements or evidence in a late stage of the asylum proceed-
ings. The ECtHR noted for example in A.A. v Sweden that the applicant did not
mention being threatened by the LLTE in his first two interviews with the
migration authorities although one of the interviews lasted approximately six
hours. It was not until after the Migration Board had refused to grant him
asylum that the applicant claimed to be in danger of revenge from the LTTE.
More than two years later after the refusal of the Swedish authorities to
reassess the asylum claim, the applicant submitted some documents which
allegedly concerned the threats that he had received from the LLTE. The Court
stated that, taking these circumstances into account, it could not but endorse
the national authorities’ observations as to the applicant’s credibility. In the
same judgment the Court also took into account that the applicant further
extended his reasons for seeking asylum, adding that he would be punished
as a deserter upon return to Sri Lanka after his asylum application had been
rejected twice.158
The ECtHR’s judgment in Hilal v the United Kingdom shows that the ECtHR
does not base its conclusion that the applicant’s asylum account is not credible
only on the fact that statements or evidence were submitted in a late stage
of the procedure. In this case the applicant mentioned that he was tortured
in his second interview, which took place more than a month after the initial
interview. Furthermore he waited almost two years to submit significant
evidence, such as the death certificate of his brother, medical reports and a
police summons. The ECtHR found no reasons to reject these documents as
forged or fabricated, referring to an expert opinion submitted by the applicant
which concluded that the documents were genuine. On the basis of these
documents and the applicant’s statements the ECtHR concluded that there was
a real risk of refoulement.159
Focus on the core of the asylum account
Inconsistencies, vaguenesses or lack of documents and evidence supporting
the asylum account cannot always lead to the conclusion that the asylum
account should not be believed. The determining authority sometimes puts
too much weight on minor defects and refuse to recognise that the asylum
157 See for example ECtHR (Adm) 21 June 2005, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v Sweden,
no 31260/04 and ComAT 21 June 1999, M.B.B. v Sweden, no 104/1998, para 6.6.
158 ECtHR (Adm) 2 September 2008, A.A. v Sweden, no 8594/04, paras 66-68. See also ECtHR
4 December 2008, Y v Russia, no 20113/07, ECtHR (Adm) 27 March 2008, Hakizimana v
Sweden, no 37913/05 and ECtHR 20 January 2011, T.N. v Denmark, no 20594/08, para 101.
159 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99.
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applicant’s basic story is credible and provides substantial grounds for be-
lieving that there is a real risk of refoulement.160 The case-law of the ECtHR
and Committee against Torture show that the general credibility of the asylum
account should be assessed, while attaching less weight to inconsistencies,
vaguenesses or uncertainties in less relevant parts of the account.161
In particular in the ECtHR’s case-law some important examples can be found
in which the Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR although there were
doubts about certain parts of the applicant’s asylum account.162 In Said v
the Netherlands for example the Dutch authorities found the applicant’s account
of his arrest, of the reasons for it, and of his escape, so implausible as to
invalidate his claim of having deserted from the army. The Court proceeded
however to an assessment of the general credibility of the statements made
by the applicant before the Netherlands authorities and during the proceedings
before the Court. The Dutch authorities had not disputed that the applicant
had served in the Eritrean army following a general mobilisation The Court
considered that a strong indication that the applicant was indeed a deserter
lied in the fact that he applied for asylum in the Netherlands at a time when
demobilisation had not yet begun and would not begin for another year. It
considered that it was difficult to imagine by what means other than desertion
the applicant might have left the army. ‘Even if the account of his escape may
appear somewhat remarkable [..] it does not detract from the overall credibility
of the applicant’s claim that he is a deserter’. The Court concluded that being
a deserter, Said faced a real risk of refoulement upon return to Eritrea.163
In R.C. v Sweden the Court also ignored inconsistencies in the applicant’s
escape story, although in this case this part of the asylum account could easily
be considered essential for the asylum claim. The applicant claimed that friends
had helped him to escape from the revolutionary court, where he would be
tried for his participation in demonstrations against the Iranian regime. The
Government questioned this story while referring to international sources
which stated that there was very little public control of these courts, that the
proceedings were only open to the parties and, exceptionally, to some family
members, and that people who entered and exited the court building were
carefully checked. The ECtHR found however that ‘the applicant’s basic story
was consistent throughout the proceedings and that notwithstanding some
160 See for example Wouters pp 268-269 and Gorlick 2003, p 371-372.
161 ComAT 3 June 2010, Njamba and Balikosa v Sweden, no 322/2007, para 9.5, CAT 22 January
2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden,
no 101/97 and ComAT 8 May 1998, A.F. v Sweden, no 89/1997. See also ComAT General
Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 8 (g) and UNHCR Handbook, para 204, which also
speaks of the ‘general credibility’ of the applicant.
162 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 59.
163 ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02, paras 50-53. See also ECtHR 2
September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 69.
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uncertain aspects, such as his account as to how he escaped from prison, such
uncertainties did not undermine the overall credibility of his story’.164
Also in N v Finland the Court held that the applicant’s basic story was
credible although it had ‘certain reservations’ about the applicant’s own
testimony before the Delegates of the ECtHR which it considered to have been
evasive on many points.165 The Court was not prepared to accept every
statement of his as fact. It found in particular the applicant’s account of his
journey to Finland not credible. The Finnish authorities had rejected the asylum
claim amongst others because of inconsistencies in the applicant’s asylum
account, which was not supported by documents.166 Furthermore the appli-
cant’s identity could not be ascertained as the applicant used several names
and had not presented any identity documents.167
It should furthermore be noted that when the risk of refoulement follows
from the general situation in the country of origin the credibility of the indi-
vidual asylum account (except for the person’s nationality or State of habitual
residence) is of no importance.168 If a person claims to face a real risk of
refoulement because he belongs to a vulnerable group, it is sufficient to
substantiate that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of a
systematic practice of ill-treatment of that group and that he is a member of
the vulnerable group concerned to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR.169
In those situations inconsistencies regarding other elements of the asylum
account (e.g. past experiences, age, travel route) cannot lead to refusal of
protection.
Explanations for alleged inconsistencies or late statements
If the examining authorities present information which gives strong reason
to question the veracity of an applicant’s submissions, the individual must
164 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, paras 44 and 52.
165 The Court considered credible that the applicant belonged to President Mobutu’s and the
Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) commander’s inner circle. Furthermore the Court found
sufficiently credible the applicant’s statement that as an official in the DSP he took part
in various events during which dissidents seen as a threat to President Mobutu were singled
out for harassment, detention and possibly execution.
166 The applicant’s statements made during the Finnish asylum procedure differed from his
statements made in the context of an earlier asylum procedure in the Netherlands. Accord-
ing to the Finnish authorities the applicant’s statements concerning his role during the
overthrown of President Mobutu and his escape to Finland had been inconsistent and
imprecise.
167 ECtHR 26 July 2005, N v Finland, no 38885/02, paras 152-157. Wouters states that in N v
Finland elements could have seriously undermined the claim. Wouters 2009, p 268.
168 See ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07
paras 301-304. In this case the ECtHR did not consider relevant whether the applicant made
plausible that he belonged to a minority clan.
169 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 132.
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provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies.170 This
implies that the applicant must be offered the opportunity to rebut the deter-
mining authority’s findings and that his explanations must be seriously
assessed. In Hilal v the United Kingdom for example the applicant failed to
mention the fact that he was tortured in his first interview. The ECtHR accepted
the applicant’s explanation for his failure, namely that that he did not think
he had to give all the details until the full interview a month later. The ECtHR
considered that this explanation had become far less incredible in the light
of the medical report submitted by the applicant which confirmed that the
applicant was tortured.171
Psychological trauma
Notably, it is accepted by the Committee against Torture that inconsistencies
or vaguenesses in the asylum account may be the result of psychological
problems caused by past torture. In that case these inconsistencies and vague-
nesses may not be held against the asylum applicant. The Committee against
Torture has held in many cases that ‘complete accuracy is seldom to be
expected by victims of torture’.172 This applies in particular when the asylum
seeker is suffering of a post traumatic stress syndrome.173 Also the fact that
it has been claimed or established that a person was tortured or detained, is
taken into account by the Committee.174 In this regard the Committee against
Torture attaches importance to medical evidence provided by the author.175
In Falcon Ríos v Canada for example the national authorities concluded that
the complainant’s testimony contained significant gaps. The Committee noted
that, according to the psychologist’s report, the complainant displayed ‘great
psychological vulnerability’ as a result of the torture to which he had allegedly
been subjected. The same report stated that Mr. Falcon Ríos was ‘very
destabilized by the current situation, which presents concurrent difficulties’,
and that he was ‘bruised, weakened by the torture he had undergone and
170 See ECtHR (Adm) 8 March 2007, Collin and Akaziebie v Sweden, no 23944/05, ECtHR 9 March
2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 50. See also Gorlick 2003, p 371.
171 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, para 64.
172 See for example ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, para 7.6,
ComAT 25 May 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, no 185/2001, para 10, ComAT
16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden, no 101/97, para 6.6, ComAT 8 May 1996, Kisoki
v Sweden, no 41/1996, para 9.3 and ComAT 8 May 1995, Alan v Switzerland, no 21/1995,
para 11.3.
173 In ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden, no 101/97, para 6.6 and ComAT 15
November 1996, Kaveh Yaragh Tala v Sweden, no 43/1996, para 10.3.
174 ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, paras 7.5-7.6.
175 ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden, no 101/97, para 6.6 and ComAT 8 May
1998, A.F. v Sweden, no 89/1997, para 6.5. In ComAT 3 June 1999, N.P v Australia,
no 106/1998, para 6.6 the ComAT held against the applicant that he failed to submit medical
evidence, which could have explained the important inconsistencies in the author’s state-
ments before the Australian authorities.
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events associated with trauma’. In the Committee’s view, the vagueness
referred to by the State party could be seen as a result of the psychological
vulnerability of the complainant mentioned in the report; moreover, the
vagueness was not so significant as to lead to the conclusion that the complain-
ant lacked credibility.176 Also the ECtHR acknowledged that complete accuracy
as to dates and events cannot be expected in all circumstances from a person
seeking asylum.177 However, the Committee against Torture and ECtHR do
not accept that major inconsistencies can be explained by the fact that the
person concerned is a victim of torture or ill-treatment.178
Also the late submission of statements or evidence may be the result of
psychological trauma. In that case the tardiness of the submissions does not
affect the credibility of the asylum account.179 The ECtHR has considered that
‘it may be an ordeal to talk about experiences of torture’180 and that it ‘would
not deny that symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder may indeed
materialise years after events’.181 However, the ECtHR has decided in several
cases that late statements could not be explained by the applicant’s psycho-
logical problems. In Cruz Varas v Sweden the Court stated that:
[E]ven if allowances are made for the apprehension that asylum-seekers may have
towards the authorities and the difficulties of substantiating their claims with
documentary evidence, the first applicant’s complete silence as to his alleged
clandestine activities and torture by the Chilean police until more than eighteen
months after his first interrogation by the Växjö Police Authority casts considerable
doubt on his credibility in this respect.182
The applicant in this case stated two years after the asylum application that
he was subjected to sexual abuse. He said that he tried to suppress this event
and that he found it very painful to talk about. Furthermore he submitted a
medical report which concluded that nothing had been established which
contradicted the assumption that Cruz Varas had been subjected to such torture
and sexual abuse as he alleged and that there were strong indications that
176 ComAT 17 December 2004, Enrique Falcon Ríos v Canada, no 133/99, para 8.5.
177 ECtHR (Adm) 17 January 2006, Bello v Sweden, no 32213/04.
178 See ECtHR (Adm) 17 January 2006, Bello v Sweden, no 32213/04, where the ECtHR was
‘struck by the number of major inconsistencies in the applicant’s story’ and ComAT 22
November 2004, S.U.A. v Sweden, no 223/2002, para 6.5. The ComAT considered however
in ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden, no 101/97, para 6.7, ‘that the principle
of strict accuracy does not necessarily apply when the inconsistencies are of a material
nature’. See also Wouters 2009, p 267.
179 See with regard to this issue Bruin & Reneman 2006, pp 87-109. See on the potential
influence of psychological factors on a person’s ability to recount past events: Bloemen,
Vloeberghs & Smits 2006, pp 43-85, Herlihy 2005, p 123-137 and Rhys Jones, p 383. See
also UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 5, pp 23-24.
180 ECtHR (Adm) 16 March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden, no 38865/02.
181 ECtHR (Adm) 10 November 2005, Paramsothy v the Netherlands, no 14492/03.
182 ECtHR (Plen) 20 March 1991, Cruz Varas v Sweden, no 15576/89, para 78.
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he suffered from post traumatic stress syndrome. Also in more recent cases
the ECtHR refused to recognise that psychological trauma provided an accept-
able explanation for new statements which were made considerable time (a
year or more) after the first asylum application. In those cases the Court
considered that the applicant had not substantiated that his mental problems
were caused by experiences in the country of origin.183
The Committee against Torture seems to be more sensitive to the circum-
stances which may prevent victims of sexual violence to talk about their
experiences to the authorities examining the asylum claim.184 In V.L. v
Switzerland the Committee against Torture stated in a case of a woman who
submitted almost two years after her arrival in Switzerland that she was raped
in her country of origin:
The complainant’s explanation of the delay in mentioning the rapes to the national
authorities is totally reasonable. It is well-known that the loss of privacy and
prospect of humiliation based on revelation alone of the acts concerned may cause
both women and men to withhold the fact that they have been subject to rape and/
or other forms of sexual abuse until it appears absolutely necessary. Particularly
for women, there is the additional fear of shaming and rejection by their partner
or family members.185
The Committee considered in this case that the complainant’s allegation that
her husband reacted to the complainant’s admission of rape by humiliating
her and forbidding her to mention it in their asylum proceedings added
credibility to her claim. It noted that as soon as her husband left her, the
complainant who was then freed from his influence immediately mentioned
the rapes to the national authorities. The Committee against Torture considered
further evidence of her psychological state or psychological obstacles, as called
for by the State party, unnecessary. The Committee concluded:
The State party’s assertion that the complainant should have raised and sub-
stantiated the issue of sexual abuse earlier in the revision proceedings is insufficient
basis upon which to find that her allegations of sexual abuse lack credibility,
particularly in view of the fact that she was not represented in the proceedings.186
183 ECtHR (Adm) 10 November 2005, Paramsothy v the Netherlands, no 14492/03, ECtHR (Adm)
31 May 2005, Ovdienko v Finland, no 1383/04, ECtHR (Adm) 16 March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden,
no 38865/02.
184 See also UNHCR Handbook, para 198, which states that a person who, because of his
experiences, was in fear of the authorities in his own country may still feel apprehensive
vis-à-vis any authority. He may therefore be afraid to speak freely and give a full and
accurate account of his case.
185 ComAT 22 January 2007, V.L. v Switzerland, no 262/2005, para 8.8.
186 ComAT 22 January 2007, V.L. v Switzerland, no 262/2005, para 8.8.
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The minor age of the applicant
It was argued in sections 7.1.2 and 7.2.5 that Article 12 read in the light of
Article 24 of the Charter requires that unaccompanied as well as accompanied
minors have the right to a personal interview in order to present their asylum
claim. It also follows from Article 24 (1) of the Charter that the statements
made by a minor in such an interview should be taken into consideration in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. On the basis of the views
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and UNHCR it is argued here that
account should be taken of the age and maturity of the child when assessing
the credibility of the minor’s statements. Inconsistencies or vaguenesses in
the child’s asylum account may well be explained by the child’s young age
or immaturity.
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child the requirement
that due weight must be given to the child’s views in accordance with his age
and maturity means that ‘the views of the child have to be seriously considered
when the child is capable of forming her or his own views.’187 This capacity
should be assessed on a case by case basis. In the context of Article 12 CRC
concerning the right to be heard, ‘maturity’ is ‘the capacity of a child to express
her or his views on issues in a reasonable and independent manner’.188 The
Committee states: ‘The greater the impact of the outcome on the life of the
child, the more relevant the appropriate assessment of the maturity of that
child’.189
UNHCR in its Guidelines on Child Asylum Claims points at the fact that
children recount their experiences differently than adults and that this has
implications for the assessment of the credibility of their statements:
Children cannot be expected to provide adult-like accounts of their experiences.
They may have difficulty articulating their fear for a range of reasons, including
trauma, parental instructions, lack of education, fear of State authorities or persons
in positions of power, use of ready-made testimony by smugglers, or fear of
reprisals. They may be too young or immature to be able to evaluate what informa-
tion is important or to interpret what they have witnessed or experienced in a
manner that is easily understandable to an adult. Some children may omit or distort
vital information or be unable to differentiate the imagined from reality. They also
may experience difficulty relating to abstract notions, such as time or distance. Thus,
what might constitute a lie in the case of an adult might not necessarily be a lie
in the case of a child. It is, therefore, essential that examiners have the necessary
187 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 28.
188 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 30.
189 ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, para 30.
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training and skills to be able to evaluate accurately the reliability and significance
of the child’s account.190
Applying the benefit of the doubt
As was stated above a (total) lack of evidence can undermine the credibility
of the applicant’s asylum account, in particular if no reasonable explanation
is offered for such a lack of evidence. However, Member States should not
require proof of each and every statement submitted by the applicant.191 This
follows from Article 4 (5) QD, which only applies if the Member State has made
use of the option provided for by Article 4 (1) QD to place the burden of
producing evidence in support of the asylum claim on the asylum appli-
cant.192 Under certain conditions the applicant should be granted ‘the benefit
of the doubt’ and his statements should be accepted as fact although no or
insufficient proof is available.193 Article 4 (5) QD states that where Member
States place the burden of proof on the applicant and where aspects of the
applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence,
those aspects shall not need confirmation, if the following conditions are met:
a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;
b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted, and
a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements
has been given;
c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to
the applicant’s case;
d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible
time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having
done so; and
e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.
It is submitted here that a strict application of the conditions mentioned in 4
(5) QD is capable of undermining the effectiveness of the EU right to asylum
and the prohibition of refoulement. It was argued above that the principle of
effectiveness requires Member States to focus on the credibility of the core
or the asylum account (general credibility of the asylum applicant). The con-
190 UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2
and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
Geneva: 22 December 2009, para 72.
191 See also Boeles and others 2009, p 338.
192 According to Battjes this provision means that if the credibility of the applicant’s statements
has been established, these statements should be accepted as facts for the purpose of the
assessment of the asylum claim. If the conditions listed in Art 4 (5) QD are not met ‘the
relevant aspect of the claim may be regarded as not “substantiated” [..]. Battjes p 228.
193 According to Gorlick the application of the benefit of the doubt has been widely adopted
in national determination procedures and as part of UNHCR’s practices in the field. Gorlick
2003, p 366.
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ditions mentioned in Article 4 (5) (a) -(d) QD may affect the general credibility
of the asylum applicant, but this is not necessarily the case. The clearest
example of a condition which on its own cannot undermine the credibility
of the core of the asylum account is the condition mentioned under (d). The
fact that the asylum application was not lodged at the earliest possible time
in itself does not exclude that a person has a well-founded fear of persecution
or runs a real risk of serious harm.194 It would be contradictory if the Member
States are allowed to refuse the benefit of the doubt on (one of) the conditions
mentioned under (a)- (d), while they did not consider them to undermine the
general credibility of the asylum applicant. Therefore the only condition which
should be considered a self-standing ground to refuse the benefit of the doubt
is the fact that the general credibility of the applicant could not be established.
Such explanation would be in line with the views of the ECtHR,195 the
Committee against Torture and UNHCR. They seem to be of the opinion that
the benefit of the doubt should be applied if the asylum account is generally
credible or ‘sufficiently substantiated and reliable’.196 UNHCR points at the
fact that, even if the applicant made genuine efforts to substantiate his story,
there may still be a lack of evidence of some of his statements. According to
UNHCR
it is hardly possible for a refugee to “prove” every part of his case and, indeed,
if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It
is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.197
UNHCR states that the benefit of the doubt should only be given if all available
evidence has been obtained and checked. This seems to be a procedural
requirement, which ensures that a careful exmination has been carried out
before the benefit of the doubt is applied. The only material condition which
must be fulfilled is that the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general
credibility. ‘The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and
must not run counter to generally known facts.’198 UNHCR mentions that there
194 See for example ECtHR 12 May 2010, Khodzayev v Russia, no 52466/08, para 101.
195 The ECtHR acknowledged that, owing to the special situation in which asylum-seekers
often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt in
assessing the credibility of their statements and the supporting documents. See for example
ECHR (Adm) 8 March 2007, Collin and Akaziebie v Sweden, no 23944/05 and ECtHR (Adm)
8 July 2008, A.J. v Sweden, no 13508/07, para 56.
196 ComAT 29 May 1997, Aemei v Switzerland, no 34/1995, para 9.6. See also ComAT 3 June
1999, H.D. v Switzerland, no 112/1998, para 6.4.
197 UNHCR Handbook, para 203.
198 UNHCR Handbook, para 204. See also para 196 of the Handbook. UNHCR’s Note on
Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, Geneva, 16 December 1998, para 12 states
that the benefit of the doubt should be granted ‘where the adjudicator considers that the
applicant’s story is on the whole coherent and plausible, any element of doubt should not
prejudice the applicant’s claim’. See also Gorlick 2003, pp 364 and 366.
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may be ‘good reasons’ to refuse the benefit of the doubt even though the
applicant’s account appears to be credible. It does not explain however what
could be considered such good reasons. UNHCR is of the opinion that a liberal
application of the benefit of the doubt may be called for in cases of unaccom-
panied minors.199
An example of a judgment in which the ECtHR seems to have granted the
benefit of the doubt is NA v the United Kingdom. In this case the Court accepted
that the detention of the applicant was recorded by the authorities in Sri Lanka
(one of the risk factors identified by the Court) although there were many
uncertainties about this record. The document signed by the applicant’s father
in order to secure his son’s release was not available to the parties and there-
fore its precise nature was not known. The Court held that, whatever the
nature of that document, at the very least it amounted to a record of the
applicant’s detention. The Court took into account in its assessment that the
credibility of the applicants account was not disputed by the government of
the State Party.200 In Gaforov v Russia the Court accepted as a fact the appli-
cant’s submission that he had already experienced ill-treatment at the hands
of the Tajikistani law enforcement officials. The Court observed that the appli-
cant did not adduce certain evidence to support his submission, but it con-
sidered nonetheless that the applicant’s account of events was consistent and
detailed.201 In N v Sweden finally the Government contended that the appli-
cant’s claim that her family had rejected her and that she had no social network
or male protection in her home country was unsubstantiated. The Court noted,
however, that although there were divergences as to whether the applicant’s
last contact with her family was in the summer of 2005 or in October 2005,
no information had been presented which gave strong reasons to question
the veracity of her submissions that she had had no contact with her family
for almost five years, which did support her claim that she no longer had a
social network or adequate protection in Afghanistan.202
Subconclusion: assessing credibility
It should be concluded on the basis of the case-law examined above that
Member States may refuse an asylum claim in case of a lack of evidence and
major deficiencies in an applicant’s asylum story. However the full effective-
ness of the EU right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement is seriously
undermined if Member States focus on marginal issues such as non-compliance
199 UNHCR Handbook, para 218 and UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child
Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva: 22 December 2009, para 73.
200 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 143.
201 ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 135.
202 ECtHR 20 July 2010, N. v Sweden, no 23505/09, para 61.
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with procedural rules or inconsistencies in parts of the applicant’s account
which do not relate to the essence of the asylum claim.
Asylum applicants should be granted the opportunity to explain the alleged
deficiencies in their asylum account. It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law and
the Committee against Torture’s views that inconsistencies in an asylum
account or late statements by the applicant, which are caused by psychological
trauma should not be held against the applicant. However, the ECtHR is re-
luctant to accept that inconsistencies and in particular late statements are the
result of psychological problems, while the Committee against Torture is more
ready to accept such problems as an explanation. It was explained in chapter
4 that more weight should be attached to the ECtHR’s case-law as a source of
inspiration of EU fundamental rights than the view of the Committee against
Torture. However arguably this should be different if it concerns the weight
which should be attached to the late statements of persons suffering from
psychological problems. The Committee against Torture is specialised in the
examination of cases of victims of torture, and therefore potentially more
sensitive to the potential difficulties encountered by such persons when talking
about their experiences. Furthermore it should be noted that the ECtHR does
not deem an asylum account not credible, only because of the fact that the
applicant made new statements concerning his asylum motives or provided
evidence in a late stage of the procedure. In the case of Hilal the ECtHR was
convinced that there was a risk of refoulement, even though the applicant did
not mention that he was tortured in his first interview and provided crucial
evidence his asylum claim considerable time after the asylum application had
been lodged. It follows from the views of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child and UNHCR that account should be taken of the age and maturity of the
child when assessing the credibility of the minor’s statements.
As soon as the general credibility of the asylum applicant is established,
his statements should according to Article 4 (5) QD be accepted as facts, without
requiring further evidence. Refusing the benefit of the doubt in such a situ-
ation, for example because the applicant did not comply with certain pro-
cedural requirements, should be considered to undermine the effectiveness
of the EU right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement.
8.5 EVIDENTIARY ASSESSMENT
Asylum applicants may submit all kinds of documents or evidence in order
to support their asylum claim. In this section the question is addressed which
types of evidence should be taken into account in the assessment of the asylum
claim and how this evidence must be valued. The determining authority of
the Member States may regard certain types of evidence as irrelevant or attach
very limited weight to them. According to Dutch case-law for example state-
ments of the applicant’s family members or friends who are still residing in
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his country of origin are considered to be of no value because they do not
originate from an ‘objective source’.203 Documents of which the authenticity
cannot be established by the Dutch authorities, because of a lack of reference
documents, are not taken into consideration in subsequent asylum applications
as they are not considered to be new facts or circumstances.204
In this section it is argued that the automatic exclusion of specific types
or forms of evidence or the fact that very little weight is attributed to them,
may violate the duty to conduct an appropriate examination of the asylum
claim, which follows from Article 8 (2) PD read in the light of the principle
of full effectiveness of EU law.
Section 8.6.1 addresses the weight which must be granted to expert reports.
In this section two types of expert reports are specifically addressed: country
of origin information and medical reports.
EU standards regarding evidentiary assessment
Article 4 QD mentions the elements which should be taken into account in the
assessment of the asylum claim and therefore also gives some general indica-
tions as to which types of documents or other evidence should be considered
relevant. It may be derived from Article 4 (2), (3) and (4) QD that evidence
concerning the following elements should be into consideration: the position
and personal circumstances of the applicant,205 in particular the reasons for
applying for asylum including previous persecution to which he was
exposed,206 the situation in the country of origin,207 the applicant’s activities
in the country of refuge, which may lead to a risk of refoulement upon his
return to the country of origin208 and the availability of safe third coun-
tries.209 As the Qualification Directive does not address which specific types
of evidence should be included or excluded from the assessment of the asylum
claim, the determining authority has wide discretion in the evaluation of all
materials adduced by the applicant. However it is conceivable that the ex-
203 These statements may regard their own observations or experiences or concern the risk
the applicant faces upon return. See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of
the Council of State 18 November 2008, no 200805862/1, where the Council of State con-
sidered that the statements made by the applicant’s father could not be regarded as new
facts as they did not originate from an objective source and were not supported by any
other concrete evidence.
204 See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 26 May 2009,
no 200902200/1/V2.
205 Art 4 (3) and (4) refer to background, gender and age, identity, nationality, country(ies)
and place(s) of previous residence and previous asylum applications.
206 See Art 4 (4) QD.
207 See Art 4 (2) and (3) QD.
208 Art 4 (3) QD mentions ‘the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin’ as a
relevant element.
209 Art 4 (3) QD mentions ‘whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself
of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship’ as a relevant element.
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clusion of relevant evidence from the assessment of the asylum claims or the
fact that little value is attributed to this evidence is capable of undermining
the effectiveness of the EU right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.
Such exclusion should therefore be considered contrary to the duty to conduct
an appropriate examination of the asylum claim following from Article 8 (2)
PD and the effectiveness of the EU prohibition of refoulement and the right to
asylum.
The Court of Justice has ruled in several cases that the requirement of a
particular type of evidence in support of a claim may undermine the effective-
ness of EU law. In Bolbol the Court held that in order to prove that a person
availed himself of the assistance of UNWRA, registration with UNWRA is
sufficient proof. However, as such assistance can be provided even in the
absence of such registration, the beneficiary must be permitted to adduce
evidence of that assistance by other means.210 A.G. Sharpston in her opinion
with this case stated that ‘the State is entitled to insist on some evidence, but
not on the best evidence that might be produced in an ideal world’.211
The principle that national authorities are not allowed to accept only the
best possible evidence in support of a claim under EU law can also be found
in the case-law concerning other fields of EU law, in particular tax law. In SpA
San Giorgio, the Court of Justice considered that requirements of proof having
the effect of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise
a Community right may include ‘special limitations concerning the form of
the evidence to be adduced, such as the exclusion of any kind of evidence
other than documentary evidence’.212 In Meilicke the Court of Justice held
under the principle of sound administration and the principle of
proportionality213 that the tax authorities of a Member State are entitled to
require the taxpayer to provide such proof as they may consider necessary
in order to determine whether the conditions for a tax advantage provided
210 Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 52. See also the opinion of A.G. Sharpston with this case,
in which she stated that UNRWA sometimes provides assistance without registering a
person. Sometimes, the administrative records may lag behind the event; or may themselves
have been destroyed during hostilities. She therefore rejected the French Government’s
submission that only actual proof of UNRWA registration will suffice (para 98).
211 A.G. Sharpston, opinion with Case C-31/09, Bolbol [2010], para 102.
212 Case C-199/82, SpA San Giorgio [1983], para 14. See section 8.4. for a description of the case.
See also Case C-228/98, Dounias [2000], paras 71-72, where the Court of Justice held that
Community law does not preclude a provision of national law under which, in judicial
proceedings in which it is sought to establish State liability with a view to obtaining
compensation for damage caused by a breach of Community law, witness evidence is
admissible only in exceptional cases, provided that such a provision does not prevent
individuals from asserting rights which they derive from the direct effect of Community
law.
213 The case concerned a measure ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision which
restricted free movement of capital. Such measure is only justified if the principle of
proportionality is observed. See paras 40-42 of the judgment.
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for in the legislation applicable to the case at issue have been met and,
consequently, whether or not to grant that advantage. However according to
the Court such assessment must not be conducted too formalistically. The tax
authorities of the Member State of taxation should accept documentary evid-
ence which enables them to ascertain, clearly and precisely, whether the
conditions for obtaining a tax advantage are met. Evidence should be taken
into account even if it lacks the degree of detail and is not presented in the
form of a corporation tax certificate, which is usually required. Only if no such
evidence is produced may the relevant tax authorities refuse the tax advantage
sought.214 It follows from these judgments that the (automatic) exclusion of
particular forms of evidence may be contrary to the principle of effective-
ness.215
Evidentiary assessment in asylum cases before the ECtHR, Committee against Torture
and Human Rights Committee
More specific guidance as to the relevance and value of certain types of evid-
ence is offered by the case-law of the ECtHR, Committee against Torture and
Human Rights Committee. These bodies have not excluded specific types of
evidence when ruling in refoulement cases.216 Documents which they con-
sidered particularly relevant are for example: court summons,217 police sum-
mons,218 judgments entailing a criminal conviction of the applicant219 and
death certificates of family members.220 Letters written by representatives
of political parties or other organisations of which the applicant claims to have
been a member or for which he claims to have been active have also been taken
into account.221 The same applies to statements by human rights organisa-
tions222 or relatives223 regarding the position of the applicant. In Klein v
214 Case C-262/09, Meilicke and others [2011], paras 43-47. See also Case C-310/09, Accor [2011],
paras 99-101.
215 See also Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Proce-
dures, para 4, which states that ‘recognition of refugee status is not dependent on the
production of any particular formal evidence’.
216 ComAT General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 7 states that all pertinent information
may be introduced by either party in order to establish whether the applicant would be
in danger of being tortured.
217 ComAT 11 May 2007, A.A. v Switzerland, no 268/2005, para 8.5.
218 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, para 65.
219 ECtHR 8 November 2005, Bader v Sweden, no 13284/04, para 44, ECtHR 22 June 2006, D and
others v Turkey, no 24245/03, para 48.
220 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, para 64.
221 ComAT 22 January 2007, El Rgeig v Switzerland, no 280/2005, para 7.4, ComAT 5 December
2005, Dadar v Canada, no 258/2004, para 8.6 and ComAT 25 May 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed
Karoui v Sweden, 185/2001, para 10.
222 ECtHR, 2 September 2010, Y.P. and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 68, ECtHR (GC) 28
February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 71 and 144, ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T.
and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, paras 4.7, 5.8 and 7.6, ComAT 25 may 2002, Chedli Ben
Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, 185/2001, para 10.
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Russia important weight was attached to a statement of the Vice-President of
Colombia printed in a Russian news paper, although the source of the informa-
tion was unknown.224 In Hilal v the United Kingdom and N. v Finland the ECtHR
took into account the statements of the applicant’s wife.225
Documents are only considered relevant if they contain information relating
to the applicant personally226 and support the risk of refoulement.227 In
Mawajedi Shikpohkt and A. Makkamat Shole v the Netherlands, the ECtHR noted
that the documents which had been submitted in support of the applicant’s
allegations contained little of any direct relevance to the applicant herself. In
so far as they expressed any fears on her behalf, they were, in the ECtHR’s view,
vague and speculative.228 In Minani v Canada the Committee against Torture
took into consideration that the letter of the President of a Burundian human
rights organisation only mentioned the risk of being detained and not the real
and personal risk of the applicant being tortured upon return to Burundi. It
concluded that the applicant did not submit objective elements of such real
and personal risk.229
The ECtHR seems to consider copies of documents less valuable than original
documents.230 However copies have been taken into account by the super-
vising bodies.231 The fact that there is no official translation of a document
may also work to the applicant’s detriment.232 As was explained in section 8.5
223 ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 135.
224 ECtHR 1 April 2010, Klein v Russia, no 24268/08, para 54.
225 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, para 66. In this case the
applicant’s wife applied for asylum in the United Kingdom several years after the applicant
had applied for asylum there. In ECtHR 26 July 2005, N v Finland, no 38885/02 the ECtHR
took statements from the applicant’s common law wife, who he met in Finland in a re-
ception centre for asylum applicants.
226 ECtHR (Adm) 6 September 2007, M. v Sweden, no 22556/05, para 92.
227 ECtHR (Adm) 16 June 2009, A.M. and others v Sweden, no 38813/08. See also ECtHR (Adm)
6 September 2007, M. v Sweden, no 22556/05, para 59, where the Court considered a letter
issued by the chairman of a political party insignificant because it was issued three years
after the applicant had left Tunisia, it contained no information as to what political activities
the applicant had engaged in, when, or how the issuer knew each sympathiser and member
of the party, or the applicant for that matter.
228 ECtHR (Adm) 27 January 2005, Mawajedi Shikpohkt and Makkamat Shole v the Netherlands,
no 39349/03. See also ComAT 19 May 1998, K.N. v Switzerland, no 94/1997, para 10.3.
229 ComAT 10 December 2009, Minani v Canada, no 331/2007, para 7.7. See also ECtHR (Adm)
20 October 2008, M.H. v Sweden, no 10641/08, para 39. where the ECtHR considered that
the alleged death threats appeared to be letters informing the applicant’s family that he
should be careful rather than actual threats.
230 ECtHR (Adm) 10 February 2009, S.M. v Sweden, no 47683/08, para 34.
231 ComAT 18 November 1994, Khan v Canada, no 15/1994, para 12.4. See also ECtHR (Adm)
10 July 2007, Achmadov and Bagurova v Sweden, no 34081/05, where the ECtHR held against
the applicants that they were not in possession of any receipts of police reports or any copies
of letters to or from public authorities, lawyers or human rights organisations relating to
the harassment at issue.
232 ECtHR (Adm) 12 October 2010, A.M. v France, no 20341/08.
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if a document submitted by the applicant turns out to be a forgery, this is taken
into account in the assessment of the credibility of the asylum account. The
ECtHR and Committee against Torture attach important weight to the findings
by the examining authorities, often the embassy in the country of origin, as
to the veracity of documents. This applies in particular when these findings
are not addressed by the asylum applicants.233 In Mehdi Zare v Sweden the
Committee against Torture noted that the complainant had adduced what he
alleged were two summonses to attend a court. According to the Committee
the State party had provided extensive reasons, based on expert evidence
obtained by its consular services in Tehran, why it questioned the authenticity
of each of the documents. In reply the complainant argued that, apparently,
the criminal procedure was not applied in this case. The Committee considered
that the complainant had failed to disprove the State party’s findings in this
regard, and to validate the authenticity of any of the documents in
question.234
Also the fact that documents are submitted late in the asylum proceedings
without valid explanation, generally reduces their value as evidence.235 In
Nasimi v Sweden for example the ECtHR took into account that a copy of pur-
ported revolutionary court summons were submitted to the Swedish Aliens
Appeals Board one year and eight months after its date of issuance. The Court
stated that ‘notwithstanding the difficulties of obtaining a copy of such a
document in Iran, the applicant has acknowledged, in his submissions to the
ECtHR, that he was aware of the existence of the summons long before he
received a copy of it’. In these circumstances, the ECtHR found it remarkable
that he apparently failed to even mention the document to the immigration
authorities earlier. It also noted, that the applicant submitted the summons
at a time when he had already had two asylum applications rejected.236 In
Chahin v Sweden the Committee against Torture considered that the complain-
233 See for example ECtHR (Adm) 21 June 2005, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v Sweden,
no 31260/04, where the ECtHR considered that the Swedish authorities had given a very
detailed account of alleged inaccuracies in the content of the document submitted by the
applicants and that the applicants had not responded to these allegations except to state
that the findings consisted of disinformation from the Belarusian authorities.
234 ComAT 17 May 2006, Mehdi Zare v Sweden, no 256/2004, para 9.5. See also ComAT 8 July
2011, M. S. G. et al. v Switzerland, no 352/2008, para 11.4 and ComAT 2 May 2007, E.V.I.
v Sweden, no 296/2006, para 8.6, ComAT 2 May 2007, E.R.K and Y.K. v Sweden, no 270 &
271/2005, para 7.5. In ComAT 16 December 1998, J.U.A. v Switzerland, no 100/1997, the
ComAT noted that it had not been clearly established that the arrest warrant furnished
by the applicant was an authentic document, although the applicant was acquitted by a
Swiss criminal court for falsifying documents.
235 ECtHR (Adm) 6 September 2007, M. v Sweden, no 22556/05, para 92, where the ECtHR
considered a letter issued by the chairman of a political party insignificant, amongst others
because it was issued three years after the applicant had left his country of origin. See also
ComAT 16 May 2003, H.B.H. et. al v Switzerland, no 192/2001, para 6.8.
236 ECtHR (Adm) 16 March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden, no 38865/02.
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ant had provided satisfactory explanations for the delay in submitting a
translation of a court judgment and medical reports.237 The Committee took
into account that the complainant’s asylum application had been prepared
by a non-lawyer and that it was only after receiving funds that he was able
to obtain the translation and the medical reports.238
Subconclusion: evidentiary assessment
It should be concluded that Articles 8 (2) PD and 4 QD, read in the light of the
principle of effectiveness require that the determining authority of the Member
State take into account all documents or other evidence which concern:
· the position and personal circumstances of the applicant
· the reasons for applying for asylum, including previous persecution
· the situation in the country of origin
· the applicant’s activities in the country of refuge, which may lead to a risk
of refoulement
· the availability of safe third countries.
It follows from the Court of Justice’s case-law that the principle of effectiveness
precludes that the assessment of the evidence submitted in an asylum case
be conducted formalistically. The (automatic) exclusion of certain types of
relevant and reliable evidence or the fact that they are only given very limited
weight should be considered to undermine the effectiveness of the EU right
to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement. The case-law of the ECtHR and
the views of the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee
show that a wide variety of documents and (witness) statements should be
considered capable of substantiating an applicant’s claim of a risk of refoule-
ment. Only documents, which according to an expert report submitted by the
State authorities, are considered forgeries can be excluded from the assessment
of the asylum claim. The late submission of documents may undermine their
credibility, but may never lead to their automatic exclusion.
8.5.1 Expert reports
In asylum proceedings the determining authority as well as the asylum appli-
cant may submit expert reports in order to support or refute the applicants’
claims. Examples of such expert reports are language analysis reports, reports
in which the authenticity of documents, such as passports or arrest warrants
is assessed, country of origin information reports and medical reports. Some
Member States refuse to take certain expert reports adduced by the asylum
237 The medical reports were dated September 2004, while the asylum application was lodged
in May 2003.
238 ComAT 8 July 2011, Chahin v Sweden, nr 310/2007, para 9.5.
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applicant into account, or attach very little value to them. It is contended in
this section that the exclusion from the assessment of the asylum claim of an
expert report containing relevant and reliable information in support of the
applicant’s asylum claim, may render the applicant’s EU right to asylum and
the prohibition of refoulement ineffective.
It is generally recognised that only expert reports which are of sufficient
quality should be taken into consideration. EU asylum legislation does not
provide any standards for the quality of expert reports.239 However the CFI’s
judgment in Pfizer provides for some useful standards which can also be
applied in asylum cases. These standards will be assessed in this section.
In sections 8.6.2 and 8.6.3. two specific types of expert reports are
addressed: country of origin information reports and medical reports. The
status and value of these reports seem to cause discussion in several Member
States. It is argued on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the
Committee against Torture that country of origin information reports and
medical reports which are reliable and of sufficient quality should be taken
into account in the assessment of the asylum claim. Standards for the quality
of these reports can be derived from the Pfizer judgment. As will be shown
below, the ECtHR and the Committee against Torture use similar standards
as those laid down by the CFI in Pfizer when examining the quality and/or
value of country of origin information and medical reports in asylum cases.
The Court of First Instance’s case-law regarding expert evidence
In Pfizer a regulation was contested, by which the authorisation of an additive
in feeding stuffs was withdrawn, because of the (potential) risk of this additive
for human health. In this context a risk assessment had to be carried out in
order to assess the degree of probability of the additive having adverse effects
on human health and the seriousness of any such adverse effects. For this
purpose the Community Institution had to entrust a scientific risk assessment
to experts who would provide it with scientific advice. In Pfizer the Commis-
sion asked the advice of a committee of experts. However in its decision it
disregarded this committees opinion, while it did use part of this opinion in
support of its decision.
In Pfizer the CFI gave standards for reviewing the quality of scientific advice.
It held that on matters relating to consumer health expert advice must be based
on the principles of excellence, independence and transparency.240 Where
experts carry out a scientific risk assessment, the competent public authority
must be given sufficiently reliable and cogent information to allow it to under-
stand the ramifications of the scientific question raised and decide upon a
policy in full knowledge of the facts. The scientific assessment must enable
the competent public authority to take its decision on the basis of the best
239 See also Noll 2006, p 298.
240 Case T-13/99, Pfizer [2002], paras 158-159.
The burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment 241
available scientific data and the most recent results of international re-
search.241
The CFI stated in Pfizer that the competent public authority in its turn is
required to ensure that any measures that it takes be based on as thorough
a scientific risk assessment as possible, account being taken of the particular
circumstances of the case at issue. The competent Community institution first
has to prepare for the committee of experts the factual questions which need
to be answered before it can adopt a decision and, second, assess the probative
value of the opinion delivered by the committee. The CFI considered that the
Community institution further has to ensure that the reasoning in the opinion
is ‘full, consistent and relevant’.
The CFI considered that the Community Institutions are allowed to dis-
regard the expert the opinion requested by them. However, in such a case
the institution needs to provide specific reasons for its findings by comparison
with those made in the opinion and its statement of reasons must explain why
it is disregarding the latter. The statement of reasons must be of a scientific
level at least commensurate with that of the opinion in question. In such a
case, the institution may take as its basis either a supplementary opinion from
the same committee of experts or other evidence, whose probative value is
at least commensurate with that of the opinion concerned. In the event that
the Community institution disregards only part of the opinion, it may also
avail itself of those parts of the scientific reasoning which it does not dispute.
In Pfizer the CFI concluded that the Community institutions did not make an
error when they decided not to accept the conclusions of the committee of
expert’s opinion.242
Arguably the requirements of excellence, independence and transparency
mentioned in Pfizer apply to all expert reports, including those used in asylum
procedures. Expert reports should be of sufficient quality in order to ensure
that the decision is taken on the basis of reliable information and to prevent
arbitrariness.243 In this context it does not matter whether these reports are
requested by the examining authority or submitted by the asylum applicant.
If the examining authorities request the expert opinion it must pose the right
questions to the expert and it has the duty to ascertain that the expert report
is of sufficient quality. If the determining authority decides to disregard
information in the expert report they have to motivate this decision thoroughly.
241 Case T-13/99, Pfizer [2002], para 162.
242 Case T-13/99, Pfizer [2002], paras 193-210.
243 The CFI stated in para 172 of the Pfizer judgment that in the relevant case a scientific risk
assessment, carried out as thoroughly as possible on the basis of scientific advice founded
on the principles of excellence, transparency and independence is an important procedural
guarantee whose purpose is to ensure the scientific objectivity of the measures adopted
and preclude any arbitrary measures.
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8.5.2 Country of origin information reports
It was concluded in section 8.3.2 that Article 8 (2) (b) PD requires the deter-
mining authority of the Member States to gather and assess of their own
motion country of origin information reports. Determining authorities often
use country or origin information reports produced by their own Ministries.
The quality and status of those reports has been under discussion in several
Member States.244 Asylum applicants often submit reports of (inter)national
human rights organisations and UN bodies concerning the general situation
in their country of origin in support of their asylum claim. With these reports
they sometimes seek to dispute the conclusions made in the report produced
by the State. Member States may however disregard country of origin informa-
tion submitted by the asylum applicant or attach limited weight to it. In the
Netherlands for example the country of origin reports issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are considered to be expert reports. According to the stand-
ing case-law the determining authority may rely on information laid down
in such a report, if this report provides information in an impartial, objective
and transparent manner. This is only different if the applicant has submitted
specific reasons which cast doubt on the reliability or the completeness of the
information contained in the report. Generally country of origin information
reports issued by human rights organisation do, according to the Dutch courts,
not provide such specific reasons.245
It is argued in this section that EU law requires that the determining author-
ity take into account and attach weight to country of origin information pro-
vided by different sources, including reputable human rights organisations.
The exclusion of relevant and reliable country of origin information from the
assessment of the asylum claim is contrary to EU law. Furthermore the asylum-
decision should be based on country of origin information which is of sufficient
quality. Quality standards are derived from the Pfizer judgment as well as the
ECtHR’s case-law.
Taking into account country of origin information from different sources
Article 8 (2)(b) PD explicitly requires the determining authority to take into
account country of origin information provided by different sources, among
which UNHCR. Furthermore it follows from Article 4 (3) QD that all relevant
facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on
the application should be taken into account in the assessment of the asylum
claim. Asylum decisions should thus not only be based on information
244 See with regard to the United Kingdom: Thomas 2006, pp 85-86 and Good 2004, pp 360-361.
See with regard to the Netherlands: ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands,
no 1948/04, paras 80-84.
245 See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 12 October
2001, no 200103977/1. See also Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, pp 275-276.
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gathered by the State itself, but also on information or reports issued by other
organisations. Furthermore these provisions imply that country of origin
information reports submitted by the asylum applicant, which contain relevant
and reliable information should not be excluded from the assessment of the
asylum claim.
The ECtHR’s recent case-law confirms that in asylum cases the determining
authority should base its decision on reliable and objective country of origin
information and cannot rely only on reports issued by their own Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. It needs to include other country of origin information such
as reports by human rights organisations in its assessments. The Court con-
sidered in Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands that
given the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3, it must be satisfied
that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate
and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating
from other, reliable and objective sources.246
The Court itself does not hesitate to compare information included in country
of origin reports used by the determining authority of the State with other
information provided by the complainant or gathered by the Court itself. In
Salah Sheekh the Court considered that it will gather material of its own motion,
in particular where the applicant – or an intervening party– provides reasoned
grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information relied on by the
respondent Government.247
The quality of country of origin information reports
Asylum decisions should be based on country of origin information which
is of sufficient quality. This follows from Article 8 (2) (b) PD according to which
the country of origin information taken into account by the determining
authority should be ‘precise and up-to-date’. Furthermore it may be derived
from the CFI’s judgment in Pfizer that country of origin information reports
should also meet the requirements of excellence, independency and trans-
parency. The reports must contain sufficiently reliable and cogent information.
Determining authorities requesting a country of origin information report must
pose the right questions to the expert and they have the duty to ascertain that
the expert report is of sufficient quality. Furthermore it may be concluded from
Pfizer as well as the more general EU duty to state reasons that if the deter-
246 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136. See also
Wouters p 275.
247 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136, see also ECtHR
24 April 2008, Ismoilov v Russia, no 2947/06, para 120, ECtHR 12 May 2010, Khodzayev v
Russia, no 52466/08, para 96 and ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09,
para 129.
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mining authority decides to disregard country of origin information contained
in an expert report it has to motivate this decision thoroughly.
The ECtHR has shown in its case-law that it only takes into account country
of origin information which meets certain quality criteria. These criteria
resemble to a certain extent to the Pfizer criteria of excellence, independence
and transparency. In N.A. v the United Kingdom the Court stated:
[C]onsideration must be given to its source, in particular its independence, reliability
and objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation of the author,
the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, the
consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other sources are all
relevant considerations.248
When assessing the reliability of certain country of origin information reports
the ECtHR takes into account whether their conclusions are consistent with each
other, whether those conclusions are corroborated in substance by other
sources249 and whether the information has been refuted by the Government
of the State party.250 The consistency of a report with information supplied
by other sources is particularly important where this report is based on anony-
mous sources.251
Furthermore consideration must be given to the presence and reporting
capacities of the author of the material in the country in question. The Court
observed in this respect that States ‘through their diplomatic missions and
their ability to gather information, will often be able to provide material which
may be highly relevant to the Court’s assessment of the case before it’. It finds
that the same consideration must apply, a fortiori, in respect of agencies of the
United Nations, particularly given their direct access to the authorities of the
country of destination as well as their ability to carry out on-site inspections
and assessments in a manner which States and non-governmental organisations
may not be able to do. The Court held in Sufi and Elmi that it
appreciates the many difficulties faced by governments and NGOs gathering informa-
tion in dangerous and volatile situations. It accepts that it will not always be
possible for investigations to be carried out in the immediate vicinity of a conflict
and, in such cases, information provided by sources with first-hand knowledge
of the situation may have to be relied on. The Court will not, therefore, disregard
248 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 120.
249 See for example ECtHR 23 October 2008, Soldatenko v Ukraine, no 2440/07, para 71 and
ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 143. In ECtHR 31 May 2011,
E.G. v the United Kingdom, no 53688/08, para 70, the ECtHR attached limited weight to an
expert report because it differed greatly from the rest of the background evidence.
250 See for example ECtHR 15 June 2010, S.H. v the United Kingdom, no 19956/06, para 71.
251 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, paras
233-234.
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a report simply on account of the fact that its author did not visit the area in
question and instead relied on information provided by sources.252
The Court moreover attaches greater importance to reports which consider
the human rights situation in the country of destination and directly address
the grounds for the alleged real risk of ill-treatment in the case before the
Court. The weight to be attached to independent assessments must inevitably
depend on the extent to which those assessments are couched in terms similar
to Article 3. The Court states that it has therefore given due weight to the
UNHCR’s own assessment of an applicant’s claims when it determined the
merits of a complaint under Article 3.253 Conversely, where the UNHCR’s
concerns are focussed on general socio-economic and humanitarian considera-
tions, the Court has been inclined to accord less weight to them, since such
considerations do not necessarily have a bearing on the question of a real risk
to an individual applicant of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3.254
The ECtHR has in its case-law considered several human rights organisa-
tions, most importantly Amnesty International255 and Human Rights
Watch256 sufficiently independent, reliable and objective.257 Furthermore
it has taken into account information provided by UNHCR258 and other UN
agencies, such as the United Nations Secretary General,259 United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights,260 the United Nations Special Rappor-
252 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para
232.
253 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 122. The Court referred
to ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 41. See also ECtHR 22 September
2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 82.
254 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 122. The Court referred
to ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 141. See also
ECtHR 20 January 2009, F.H. v Sweden, no 32621/06, para 92.
255 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 143 and ECtHR 5 July 2005,
Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02, paras 51 and 54.
256 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 143 and ECtHR 17 July 2008,
NA v United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 127.
257 The Court has also referred to reports issued by other human rights organisations, such
as the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee,
Greek Helsinki Monitor (ECtHR (Adm) 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v the United Kingdom, no
32733/08) and Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (ECtHR 19 November 2009, Kaboulov
v Ukraine, no 41015/04, para 111).
258 In ECtHR (Adm) 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v the United Kingdom, no 32733/08 the Court
stated that UNCHR’s independence, reliability and objectivity are, in its view, beyond doubt.
See also for example ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey,
no 30471/08, paras 80-81 and 85-86.
259 ECtHR 24 April 2008, Ismoilov v Russia, no 2947/06, para 121.
260 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 132 and ECtHR 24 April 2008,
Ismoilov v Russia, no 2947/06, para 122.
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teur on Torture261 and the United Nations Independent Expert on Minority
Issues.262 Finally it has referred to governmental sources263 including the
US State Department,264 the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada265
and the United Kingdom Border Agency.266 Sometimes the ECtHR also attaches
important weight to individual experts.267 The ECtHR has reproached respond-
ing Governments for not including relevant human rights reports into the
assessment of the claim of a risk of refoulement.268
Subconclusion: country of origin information reports
Article 8 (2) (b) PD and Article 4 (3) QD read in the light of the ECtHR’s case-law
require that Member States do not only rely on the information provided by
their own Ministries but also take into account reports issued by reputable
human rights organisations, UN agencies and authorities of other States.
It follows from Article 8 (2) (b) PD that country of origin information reports
taken into account by the determining authority should meet certain quality
standards. This provision explicitly mentions that such reports should be
precise and up-to-date. Further useful standards for the examination of the
quality and relevance of country of origin information reports may be derived
from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Pfizer as well as the ECtHR’s case-law.
Such reports should be independent, reliable and objective. The weight which
should be attached to a country of origin information report depends on the
authority and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the investigations
by means of which they were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions
and their corroboration by other sources. Reports which specifically address
potential violations of Article 3 ECHR should be considered most relevant. On
the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law Member States are allowed to accord less
261 See ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v United Kingdom, no 25904/07, paras 124 and 132 and ECtHR
24 April 2008, Ismoilov v Russia, no 2947/06, paras 121-122. See also ComAT 7 July 2011,
Harminder Singh Khalsa et al v Switzerland, no 336/2008, para 11.3.
262 ECtHR (Adm) 13 October 2009, Haililova and others v Sweden, no 20283/09.
263 These are sources other than the State party in the case lying before the Court and may
be Contracting or non-Contracting States. ECtHR 24 April 2008, Ismoilov v Russia,
no 2947/06, para 120.
264 ECtHR 19 June 2008, Ryabikin v Russia, no 8320/04, para 113 and ECtHR 12 May 2010,
Khodzayev v Russia, no 52466/08, para 93.
265 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 135, ECtHR 8 April 2008,
Nnyanzi v the United Kingdom, no 21878/06, para 64.
266 ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, no 30471/08, para 79.
267 In ECtHR 15 June 2010, S.H. v the United Kingdom, no 19956/06, paras 69-71, the ECtHR
noted that there was a ‘general unavailability of information concerning the human rights
situation’ in the applicant’s country of origin (Bhutan). The Court in this case attached
important weight to the reports of a Professor of Nepali and Himalayan Studies and the
Coordinator of the Bhutanese Refugee Support Group, both residing in the UK, although
they were not able to predict precisely what would happen to the applicant on return.
268 ECtHR 21 October 2010, Gaforov v Russia, no 25404/09, para 125, ECtHR 1 April 2010, Klein
v Russia, no 24268/08, para 56.
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weight to reports focusing on the general socio-economic and humanitarian
situation in the country of origin.
8.5.3 Medical evidence
It was already set out in section 8.2 that the fact that an applicant has already
been subject to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such per-
secution or such harm should, according to Article 4 (4) QD, be considered
a serious indication of the applicant’s future risk of persecution or serious
harm. Asylum applicants often submit medical reports to support their allega-
tions of past torture. However, some Member States refuse to admit such
reports as evidence in asylum procedures. They argue for example that no
causal link can be established between scars or medical problems and past
torture.269 It is submitted in this section on the basis of the ECtHR’s case-law
and the views of the Committee against Torture that medical expert reports,
should be considered relevant or even very important in the assessment of
the asylum claim.270 Therefore Article 8 (2) PD and Article 4 (4) QD read in
the light of the requirement to ensure the full effectiveness of the EU right to
asylum and the prohibition of refoulement require that such reports be taken
into account in this assessment.
The importance of medical reports according to the ECtHR and the Committee against
Torture
The ECtHR’s recent case-law shows that States should attach important weight
to medical reports submitted by the applicant which support the applicant’s
account of past torture or ill-treatment. In R.C. v Sweden the Court even held
that the State is obliged to direct that an expert opinion be obtained as to the
probable cause of the applicant’s scars in circumstances where he has made
out a prima facie case as to their origin. In this case the applicant submitted
a medical certificate, which according to the Court ‘gave a rather strong
indication to the authorities that the applicant’s scars and injuries may have
been caused by ill-treatment or torture’. It is important to note that this cer-
tificate was not written by an expert specialising in the assessment of torture
injuries. In the State authorities’ view this medical certificate provided insuffi-
cient proof of torture injuries, as it could not be ruled out that (part of) the
injuries found could be caused by other events than torture or ill-treatment
269 See for example ComAT Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/
C/NET/CO/4, para 8. Some State parties argued before the ECtHR or the ComAT that
the applicant’s scars could have been caused by other events than torture. See for example
ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, ComAT 18 November 1994, Khan v
Canada, no 15/1994 and ComAT 22 November 2006, M.N. v Switzerland, no 259/2004.
270 See with regard to this issue also Bruin & Reneman 2006.
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of the applicant. The Swedish Government in this context pointed to the fact
that the medical examination had been performed more than seven years after
the alleged torture took place and that the applicant had failed to inform the
doctor of other possible causes for some of the injures. The ECtHR in this case
requested the applicant to submit a forensic medical report. This report docu-
mented numerous scars on the applicant’s body. The ECtHR recognised that
some injuries may have been caused by means other than by torture. However
it accepted the report’s general conclusion that the injuries, to a large extent,
were consistent with having been inflicted on the applicant by other persons
and in the manner in which he described, thereby strongly indicating that he
had been a victim of torture. The medical evidence thus corroborated the
applicant’s story. According to the ECtHR the applicant’s account was also
consistent with the information available from independent sources concerning
Iran. The Court considered therefore that the applicant had substantiated his
claim that he was detained and tortured by the Iranian authorities.271
In several other cases the ECtHR has attributed important or even decisive
weight to medical reports submitted by the applicant.272 The Committee
against Torture has recognised the importance of medical evidence for the
assessment of claims of refoulement in its General Comment no 1,273 its Con-
cluding Observations274 as well as in its views in individual cases.275 It is
of the opinion that State parties should take into account medical reports in
their assessment of a claim under Article 3 CAT.276 Both the ECtHR and the
Committee against Torture are inclined to follow the conclusions of a medical
report if the State party has failed to contest them.277
271 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, paras 53-54.
272 ECtHR 7 June 2011, RU v Greece, no 2237/08, paras 81-82, ECtHR, 2 September 2010, Y.P.
and L.P. v France, no 32476/06, para 68, ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom,
no 45276/99, para 64 and ECtHR (Adm) 7 March 2000, T.I. v the United Kingdom, no 43844/
98.
273 ComAT General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 8 (c) states that medical or other
independent evidence to support a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or
maltreated in the past should be taken into account when assessing the claim under Art 3
CAT.
274 ComAT Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/NET/CO/4,
para 8.
275 ComAT 17 December 2004, Enrique Falcon Ríos v Canada, no 133/99, para 8.4, ComAT 21
March 1997, I.A.O. v Sweden, no 65/1997, para 14.3, ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin
v Sweden, no 101/97, ComAT 25 may 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, 185/2001,
ComAT 12 November 1998, Ayas v Sweden, no 97/1997.
276 In its views in individual cases the ComAT sometimes remarks that the authorities failed
to take into account medical reports. See for example ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T. and
K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, para 7.5. See also ComAT Concluding Observations on the
Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/NET/CO/4, para 8.
277 ComAT 22 January 2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, para 7.5, ComAT 17 Decem-
ber 2004, Enrique Falcon Ríos v Canada, no 133/99, ECtHR 14 October 2008, Mehmet Eren
v Turkey, no 32347/02.
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Quality of medical reports
The ECtHR and the Committee against Torture have not set any standards as
to the quality of medical reports. The ECtHR’s judgment in R.C. v Sweden shows
that also medical reports issued by persons who cannot be considered an
expert can establish a prima facie case as to the origin of scars on the body of
the applicant. In such a situation the State party should request an expert to
write a medical report. In several cases the ECtHR did refer to the expertise
and experience of the physician who drafted the report278 or the way in
which the medical examinations were conducted when assessing the weight
which had to be attached to the report.279 Both the ECtHR (in non-asylum
cases under Article 3 ECHR)280 and the Committee against Torture281 have
indicated that the ‘Manual on Effective Investigation and Documentation of
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(or Istanbul Protocol)’ could be used as a tool to examine the quality of a
medical report.282 This protocol provides clear guidelines for the impartial
and objective documentation of torture and is applicable to asylum pro-
cedures.283 Several bodies which issue medical certificates that are used in
asylum procedures to support allegations of past torture work according to
the guidelines of this protocol.284 The Istanbul Protocol provides useful
standards in order to assess the quality of a medical report, which may be
used to fill in the Pfizer criteria of excellence, independence and transparency.
The Istanbul Protocol states that medical evaluation for legal purposes should
be conducted with objectivity and impartiality and that the evaluation should
be based on the physician’s clinical expertise and professional experience. The
clinicians who conduct an evaluation must be properly trained. The medical
278 ECtHR (Plen) 20 March 1991, Cruz Varas and others v Sweden, no 15576/89, paras 39 and 77.
279 The Court noted that the report ‘was drafted following very detailed medical examinations
which were conducted over five days. It included not only physical but psychological
findings, and an interpretation as to the probable relationship of these findings to possible
torture or ill-treatment.’ ECtHR 14 October 2008, Mehmet Eren v Turkey, no 32347/02, para 43.
280 See for example ECtHR 1 February 2011, Desde v Turkey, no 23909/03, para 98, ECtHR 14
October 2008, Mehmet Eren v Turkey, no 32347/02, para 41 and ECtHR 3 June 2004, Bati
v Turkey, no 33097/96 and 57834/00, para 133.
281 ComAT Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/NET/CO/4,
para 8, where it stated that it ‘encourages the application of the Istanbul Protocol in the
asylum procedures and the provision of training regarding this manual to relevant profes-
sionals’.
282 The protocol is not binding on States, but it may serve as a means of interpretation of State’s
obligations under the ECHR, CAT or ICCPR. See Battjes 2006-II, pp 20-21 and 27. It was
adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA Resolution 55/89 of 4 December 2004) and
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Resolution 200/43 of 25 January 2001, E/
CN.4/2001/66).
283 The introduction of the protocol states that documentation methods contained in the manual
are applicable to amongst others ‘political asylum evaluations’.
284 Examples are the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture in the United
Kingdom and the Amnesty International medical examination group in the Netherlands.
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report needs to be factual and carefully worded. Jargon should be avoided
and all medical terminology should be defined so that it is understandable
to lay persons. Furthermore it is the physician’s responsibility to discover and
report upon any material findings that he or she considers relevant, even if
they may be considered irrelevant or adverse to the case of the party requesting
the medical examination.285
Conclusiveness of medical reports
It should be derived from the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the Committee
against Torture that the medical report should be sufficiently detailed and
conclusive as to the origin of the injuries found on the applicant’s body.286
Usually medical reports contain conclusions as to the degree of consistency
between a physical or psychological after-effect and the attribution given to
it by the patient.287 In R.C. v Sweden the ECtHR attached much weight to the
forensic medical report submitted on its request, which concluded that alternat-
ive causes for the origins of the scars than torture could not be completely
excluded but that experience showed that self-inflicted injuries and injuries
resulting from accidents normally had a different distribution to those showed
by the applicant. The findings in that case favoured the conclusion that the
injuries had been inflicted on the applicant completely or to a large extent by
other persons and in the manner claimed by him. According to the report the
findings strongly indicated that the applicant had been tortured.288 In Elmu-
ratov the ECtHR considered that the medical expert examination report sub-
mitted by the applicant was not conclusive as to the date the injuries were
inflicted and could not in itself serve as evidence of ill-treatment.289 The Com-
285 Paragraph 162 of the Protocol. See also Rhys Jones 2004, p 385.
286 ECtHR 3 March 2011, Elmuratov v Russia, no 66317/09, paras 71 and 86. In ComAT 3 June
2010, A.M. v France, no 302/2006, para 13.5, the Committee noted that the two medical
certificates produced by the complainant referred to a number of scars and fractures on
various parts of the body, but did not contain any evidence confirming or refuting that
they were the result of torture inflicted in the past. See also ComAT 4 July 2011, R.T-N
v Switzerland, no 350/2008, para 8.7.
287 According to para187 of the Istanbul Protocol the following terms are generally used: (a)
Not consistent: the lesion could not have been caused by the trauma described; (b) Con-
sistent with: the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, but it is non-
specific and there are many other possible causes; (c) Highly consistent: the lesion could
have been caused by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes; (d)
Typical of: this is an appearance that is usually found with this type of trauma, but there
are other possible causes; (e) Diagnostic of: this appearance could not have been caused
in any way other than that described.
288 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, paras 25 and 53. See also ComAT 15
November 1996, Kaveh Yaragh Tala v Sweden, no 43/1996.
289 The medical report concluded that the applicant had numerous scars which were the result
of injuries sustained at least eighteen months before the examination and that it was
impossible to establish the date the injuries had been incurred more precisely. ECtHR
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mittee against Torture has held that past torture cannot be made plausible
on the basis of a medical report which lacks detail or conclusiveness alone.
However in several cases the Committee did not exclude such reports as
evidence of past torture.290
Subconclusion: medical evidence
Past experiences of torture or ill-treatment are a serious indication of the
applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious
harm. The ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the Committee against Torture
show that medical reports which assess the degree of consistency between
a physical or psychological after-effect and the applicant’s asylum account
should be regarded important evidence in support of such past torture or ill-
treatment. It should therefore be concluded that the requirement of an appro-
priate assessment of the asylum application of Article 8 (2) PD and Article 4
(4) QD require that Member States take such medical reports into account. The
refusal to take medical reports supporting an account of past torture into
consideration or to attach important weight to them undermines the effective-
ness of the EU right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. The weight
which should be accorded to a medical report depends on its quality and
conclusiveness. However it may be derived from R.C. v Sweden that even
medical reports issued by a physician who is not an expert specialising in the
assessment of torture injuries can make out such a prima facie case as to the
origin of scars. In such a prima facie case EU law requires State authorities to
request an expert report.291
8.6 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
Any requirement of proof which has the effect of making it virtually impossible
or excessively difficult to exercise the EU right to asylum or the prohibition
of refoulement would be incompatible with EU law.292 In the absence of EU
asylum legislation specifically governing a certain evidentiary issue, national
evidentiary rules should be tested against this general rule. In this chapter
several evidentiary issues were discussed in the light of this principle of
effectiveness as well as Article 4 QD concerning the assessment of facts and
3 March 2011, Elmuratov v Russia, no 66317/09, paras 71 and 86. See differently ComAT
8 July 2011, Chahin v Sweden, nr 310/2007, para 9.5.
290 ComAT 16 May 2008, Z.K. v Sweden, no 301/2006, ComAT 19 May 2008, R.K. v Sweden,
no 309/2006. In ComAT 22 November 2006, M.N. v Switzerland, no 259/2004 the ComAT
was not prepared to accept that the applicant had been tortured (partly) because of a lack
of conclusiveness of the medical report.
291 See also section 8.3.2.
292 Case C-199/82, SpA San Giorgio [1983], para 14.
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circumstances and Article 8 (2) PD which contains a duty to conduct an appro-
priate examination of the asylum claim.
In asylum cases in principle the normal evidentiary rules, which govern
all sorts of (administrative) procedures, may be applied. Article 4 QD allows
Member States to require the asylum applicant to make plausible that he is
in need of international protection and to produce evidence substantiating
his asylum claim. However the special nature of the EU fundamental rights
at issue, which require a careful and vigilant assessment293 as well as the
special characteristics of asylum cases (the lack of documentary evidence and
the emphasis on the credibility assessment) demand that the determining
authority adopts an active, flexible and open-minded approach and focuses
on the core of the asylum account. Sometimes this authority may be expected
to assist the applicant in gathering relevant evidence or to ignore his short-
comings or mistakes. No unrealistic evidentiary requirements should be
imposed on the asylum applicant. Otherwise, the applicant’s effective exercise
of the EU right to asylum or the prohibition of refoulement may be undermined.
In particular the following conclusions were drawn in this chapter:
The standard of proof
· It follows from the principle of effectiveness that the standard of proof
should not be set too high. It may be expected of the applicant to show
that there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ of future persecution or that there
are substantial grounds for believing that he faces a real risk of serious
harm.294 Member States may not require the applicant to prove that he
will be subjected to persecution or serious harm in the future or that such
treatment is more probable than not.295 This also applies when examining
whether an applicant, who poses a risk to the national security of the
Member State, is in need of subsidiary protection.296
· In the examination of the asylum claim all relevant indicators, with regard
to the individual applicant as well as the general situation in the country
of origin, should be taken into account.297 The fact that a person was
persecuted or subjected to serious harm in the past is an important indi-
cator for the existence of a future risk of such treatment.298
293 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 90.
294 See with regard to refugee status UNHCR Handbook, para 42 and Gorlick 2003, pp 369-370
and with regard to subsidiary protection ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no
37201/06, para 125.
295 ECtHR (Adm) 27 January 2005, Mawajedi Shikpohkt and Makkamat Shole v the Netherlands,
no 39349/0.
296 ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 140.
297 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009], paras 38-40, ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United
Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para 218 and ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United
Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 130.
298 Art 4 (4) QD, ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, paras 146-
147, ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 55, UNHCR Handbook, para 45.
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The burden of proof
· Member States are allowed to place the burden of proof on the asylum
applicant.299
· It should be derived from the Court of Justice’s case-law in equal treatment
cases300 as well as the ECtHR’s case-law that certain circumstances should
make the burden of proof shift from the applicant to the determining
authority. This is particularly so if:
1 The applicant made plausible that he was persecuted or subjected to
serious harm in the past.301
2 The applicant substantiated that there is a risk of refoulement by sub-
mitting credible statements and/or documents.302
3 Country of origin information reports show that serious human rights
violations occur in the applicant’s country of origin.303
4 The applicant made plausible that he belongs to a group which is at
risk.304
· The duty to produce evidence is shared between the applicant and the
determining authority.
· The determining authority has a positive obligation to gather precise and
up-to-date country of origin information.305
· The determining authority must direct that a medical expert report be
written if the applicant makes out a prima facie case as to the origin of the
scars on his body.306
· The determining authority may also be required to gather evidence which
is accessible to it, but not to the applicant.307
299 Under EU law the claimant normally bears the burden of proof. See for example Case C-
381/99, Brunhofer [2001], para 52. See with regard to asylum cases ECtHR (GC) 28 February
2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06, para 129, ComAT General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44,
para 5 and UNHCR Handbook, para 196.
300 Case C-109/88, Danfoss [1989], para 14, Case C-127/92, Enderby [1993], para 18 and Case
C-381/99, Brunnhofer [2001], para 58.
301 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 55.
302 ECtHR 15 June 2010, S.H. v the United Kingdom, no 19956/06, paras 69-71 and ComAT 25
May 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, no 185/2001, para 10.
303 ECtHR 10 June 2010, Garayev v Azerbaijan, no 53688/08, para 73.
304 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, paras 249-
250.
305 Art 8 (2) (b) PD, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
para 358-359.
306 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 53.
307 This may be derived from Case C-310/09, Accor [2011], para 100 and Case C-526/04,
Laboratoires Boiron SA [2006], paras 55-57.
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Individual assessment and the use of presumptions
· The use of presumptions is permissible even though an individual assess-
ment of the case is required according to Articles 4 (3) QD and 8 (2) (a)
PD.
· However it follows in particular from the Court of Justice’s judgment in
N.S. and M.E. and others, B. and D. and San Giorgio that presumptions, which
are excessively difficult to rebut are capable of undermining the effective-
ness the EU right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement.308
Assessing the credibility of the applicant’s statements
· When assessing the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account, the
determining authority should focus on the core of the asylum account and
should not put decisive weight on marginal issues such as non-compliance
with procedural rules or inconsistencies in parts of the applicant’s account
which do not relate to the essence of the asylum claim.309
· Asylum applicants should be granted the opportunity to explain the alleged
deficiencies in the asylum account.310
· Inconsistencies in an asylum account or late statements by the applicant,
which are caused by psychological trauma or by the minor age of the
applicant should not be held against the applicant.311
· As soon as the general credibility of the asylum applicant is established,
his statements should according to Article 4 (5) QD be accepted as facts,
without requiring further evidence. Refusing the benefit of the doubt in
such a situation should be considered to undermine the effectiveness of
the EU right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement.
Evidentiary assessment
· When examining the (documentary) evidence submitted by the asylum
applicant, the determining authority should not take a formalistic approach,
requiring or excluding specific forms of evidence. All relevant and reliable
evidence should be taken into account in the assessment of the asylum
claim. This may be derived from the Court of Justice’s case-law in tax law
308 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others [2011], paras 99-105, Joined
Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, B and D [2010], paras 94 and 98 and Case C-199/82, SpA
San Giorgio [1983], para 14.
309 See for example ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, paras 44 and 52, ECtHR
26 July 2005, N v Finland, no 38885/02, paras 152-157 and ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the
Netherlands, no 2345/02, paras 50-53.
310 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 50.
311 See with regard to trauma notably the views of ComAt such as ComAT 22 January 2007,
C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, para 7.6, ComAT 22 January 2007, V.L. v Switzerland,
no 262/2005, para 8.8. See with regard to children ComRC General Comment No 12 (2009),
CRC/C/GC/12, paras 28 and 30 and UNHCR, Guidelines on international protection: Child
Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 22 December 2009, para 72.
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cases312 as well as the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the Committee
against Torture and the Human Rights Committee, which show that a wide
variety of evidence is capable of substantiating an applicant’s claim of a
risk of refoulement.
· It should be derived from the CFI’s judgment in Pfizer that expert reports
must fulfil the requirements of excellence, independence and trans-
parency.313
Country of origin information reports and medical reports are expert
reports which should, according to Articles 4 QD and 8 (2) PD and the
ECtHR’s case-law, be accorded important weight in asylum cases.
· Member States may not only rely on country of origin information pro-
vided by their own Ministries but should also take into account reports
issued by reputable human rights organisations, UN agencies and author-
ities of other States. It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law that the weight
which should be attached to a country of origin information report depends
on the authority and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the invest-
igations by means of which they were compiled, the consistency of their
conclusions and their corroboration by other sources.314
· The weight which should be accorded to a medical report depends on its
quality and conclusiveness.315 However it may be derived from the
ECtHR’s judgment in R.C. v Sweden that medical reports issued by a
physician who is not an expert specialising in the assessment of torture
injuries can make out a prima facie case as to the origin of scars.316
312 Case C-199/82, SpA San Giorgio [1983], para 14, Case C-262/09, Meilicke and others [2011],
paras 43-47.
313 Case T-13/99, Pfizer [2002], paras 158-159.
314 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136, ECtHR 17 July
2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 120-122.
315 This follows from the Pfizer criteria. See for quality criteria the Istanbul Protocol (section
8.5.3). See with regard to conclusiveness ECtHR 3 March 2011, Elmuratov v Russia,
no 66317/09, paras 71 and 86 and ComAT 3 June 2010, A.M. v France, no 302/2006,
para 13.5.
316 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 53.

9 Judicial review of the establishment and
qualification of the facts
The establishment and qualification (assessment) of the facts is generally
considered in the first place the task of the determining (administrative)
authorities. National rules concerning the standard of the judicial review of
the facts, including the credibility assessment, depend on the Member State’s
vision on the division of tasks between the legislator, administration and
judiciary. Spijkerboer notes that the national courts ‘will generally avoid taking
substantive decisions, and merely supervise (a) correct interpretation of the
law; (b) the reasonableness of decisions; and (c) conformity with procedural
requirements’.1 However, there are significant differences in the standard
(scope and intensity)2 of judicial review applied by the national courts in the
Member States.3 Greece for example provides for judicial review by the Coun-
cil of State on points of law only. The (first instance) courts of some Member
States consider the determining authorities best placed to establish the facts
and therefore pay (more or less) deference to these authorities’ decision. The
courts of other Member States apply a full judicial review to the asylum
decision and replace their own findings of fact for those of the determining
authorities.4
The Procedures Directive does not provide for minimum standards concern-
ing the standard of judicial review. However the Court of Justice considered
in Samba Diouf that in order for the EU right to an effective remedy to be
exercised effectively, ‘the national court must be able to review the merits of
the reasons which led the competent administrative authority to hold the
application for international protection to be unfounded or made in bad faith.’5
The legality of the final decision adopted in an accelerated asylum procedure,
1 Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 52.
2 The scope of judicial review determines which issues are included by the court in its
assessment of the case. The review may for instance be limited to questions of law and
leave out questions of fact. The intensity of judicial review relates to how rigorous the court
scrutinises a certain issue. Does the court for example pay deference to the part of the
decision in which the credibility of the asylum account is assessed or does it carry out its
own credibility assessment?
3 See also Costello, who states that the deferent standard of judicial review in the Netherlands
is incompatible with Art 13 ECHR and EC law while the ‘most anxious scrutiny test’, which
is the standard for the UK judiciary appears to meet those standards. Costello 2006 p 30.
4 UNHCR, Improving asylum procedures, Comparatative Analyses and Recommendations for Law
and Practice, Geneva: March 2010, pp 461-463.
5 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 61.
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and, in particular, the reasons which led the competent authority to reject the
application for asylum as unfounded, should be the subject of a ‘thorough
review’ by the national court.6 The Court of Justice has not explained what
is exactly meant by a ‘thorough review’.
In this chapter it is argued that Article 39 PD read in the light of the EU
right to an effective remedy sets limits to the Member States’ discretion with
respect to the standard of judicial review of the fact-finding in asylum cases.
The right to an effective remedy precludes that the appeal against the first
instance asylum decision is limited to points of law. Furthermore this chapter
contends that potentially EU law requires rigorous and ex nunc judicial scrutiny
of the facts by the national courts in asylum cases. This is based on an examin-
ation of the EU Courts’ as well as the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the
UN Committees.
This chapter limits itself to the standard of judicial review of the assessment
of the facts in asylum cases. Other issues with regard to the standard of judicial
review, such as the possible obligation of national courts to apply EU law ex
officio or the judicial review of points of law will not be addressed in this
chapter. The question whether EU law requires that the asylum applicant be
heard by the national court was examined in Chapter 7 on the asylum appli-
cant’s right to be heard on his asylum motives in first instance and appeal
proceedings.
The set up of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.1 argues that Article 39
PD read in the light of the EU right to effective judicial protection requires the
national court or tribunal to address both of points of law and points of fact.
Section 9.2 then addresses the required intensity of judicial review of the fact-
finding, including the assessment of the credibility of the asylum claim, by
the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD. Finally section 9.3 ex-
amines whether the national court or tribunal is obliged to carry out an ex
nunc or an ex tunc assessment of the case. In other words it is assessed whether
the national court should or may restrict itself to a review of the contested
decision and its underlying facts or whether it should take into account facts
or circumstances which emerged or were submitted after the issuing of an
asylum decision. Conclusions will be drawn in section 9.4.
9.1 LIMITATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO POINTS OF LAW?
This section addresses the question whether EU law allows the Member States
to maintain or introduce a system in which the facts underlying the asylum
decision are assessed by a non-judicial body, while the appeal before the court
or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD will be limited to points of law.
6 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 56.
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UNHCR’s research of 2010 shows that in a majority of the Member States
surveyed the judicial body, competent to review negative decisions on applica-
tions for international protection, has jurisdiction to review questions of both
fact and law.7 However in Belgium as well as the United Kingdom the appeal
body does not have full jurisdiction over some categories of decisions.8 In
such cases the judicial review is limited to the legality of the decision. In
Greece the appeal body, the Council of State, has jurisdiction only to review
the legality of the decision by the determining authority and does not review
the facts. Also in Slovenia the facts of an asylum case are not reviewed by
a court or tribunal.9
9.1.1 The Court of Justice’s case-law
The Court of Justice held in Samba Diouf that the national court in the meaning
of Article 39 PD should be able ‘to review the merits of the reasons which led
the competent administrative authority to hold the application for international
protection to be unfounded or made in bad faith’.10 In Samba Diouf the
national court was potentially prevented from reviewing the reasons under-
lying the decision to process an asylum claim in an accelerated procedure,
in the context of the appeal against the decision to reject the asylum applica-
tion.11 In that case the reasons for processing the asylum claim in accelerated
procedure were identical to the reasons for rejecting the asylum claim. As a
result the national court was potentially not allowed to review the reasons
underlying the rejection of the asylum claim. According to the Court of Justice
such a situation ‘would render review of the legality of the asylum decision
impossible, as regards both the facts and the law’.12 It should be concluded
from this consideration that in asylum cases the national court or tribunal is
expected to review factual issues such as whether the applicant has presented
false information.
The conclusion that a court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD
should review the facts is reinforced by the fact that the Court of Justice in
7 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, p 461.
8 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, pp 461-462. In Belgium this applies to decisions
of the Aliens office relating to the preliminary examination of subsequent applications or
asylum applications from EU citizens.
9 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, s 16, p 463.
10 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 61.
11 The referring court was of the opinion that a review of the decision to rule on the merits
of an application for asylum under an accelerated procedure through the remedy available
against the final decision, appeared to be contrary to the intention of the legislature to
exempt that decision from any judicial review. The representative of the Luxembourg
Government disagreed with this opinion.
12 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 57.
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Samba Diouf referred to its judgment in Wilson.13 It follows from this judgment
that under EU law a ‘court of tribunal’ should be able to review both fact and
law. In Wilson the Court was asked by a national court to interpret Article 9
of Directive 98/5,14 which requires a remedy before a court or tribunal in
accordance with the provisions of domestic law’.15 In the Wilson case the facts
were reviewed in first and second instance by non-judicial bodies, which could,
according to the Court of Justice not be considered impartial. Therefore they
did not fulfil the requirements for a court or tribunal as defined by Community
law.16 The Court of Justice established that the jurisdiction of the Cour de
Cassation, deciding in last instance, was limited to questions of law, so that
it did not have full jurisdiction. The Court of Justice ruled that the Cour de
Cassation could not be considered a court or tribunal as required by Article 9
of the said directive.17 It is important to note that the Court of Justice In
Wilson referred to the ‘full jurisdiction test’ applied by the ECtHR in cases
concerning Art 6 ECHR, which will be discussed in the next section.18
9.1.2 Obligations stemming from the ECHR, CAT and ICCPR.
The Court of Justice’s rulings in Samba Diouf and Wilson are in line with the
ECtHR’s interpretation of the term ‘court or tribunal’ under Article 6 ECHR.
Under Article 6 (1) ECHR the starting point is that a body can only be con-
sidered a court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 6 (1) ECHR if it addresses
both questions of fact and questions of law.19 In Le Compte, Van Leuven and
De Meyere v Belgium the ECtHR considered that questions of fact and questions
of law
‘are equally crucial for the outcome of proceedings relating to “civil rights and
obligations“. Hence the right to a court and the right to a judicial determination
of the dispute cover questions of fact just as much as questions of law.’20
The ECtHR assesses the overall fairness of the procedure. It accepts that the
procedure does not need to be conducted at each of its stages before tribunals
13 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 57.
14 Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998
to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State
other than that in which the qualification was obtained [1998], OJ L 77/36.
15 Case C-506/04, Wilson [2006], para 60.
16 In this case: the Disciplinary and Administrative Committee in first instance the Disciplinary
and Administrative Appeals Committee in appeal.
17 Case C-506/04, Wilson [2006], paras 61-62.
18 Widdershoven states that the Court of Justice in Samba Diouf implicitly applied the ‘full
jurisdiction test’ by setting requirements to judicial review. Widdershoven 2011 under para 4.
19 ECtHR 7 November 2002, Veeber v Estonia, no 37571/97, para 70.
20 ECtHR (Plen) 23 June 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven, De Meyere v Belgium, no 6878/75, para 51.
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meeting the requirements of Article 6 (1) ECHR. Demands of flexibility and
efficiency, which are fully compatible with the protection of human rights,
may justify the prior intervention of administrative, professional or judicial
bodies which do not fully satisfy the requirements set by Article 6 ECHR in
every respect.21 If the proceedings before a certain body do not comply with
those requirements, no violation of Article 6 will be found if another remedy
is available which does provide the safeguards required by Article 6 (1) ECHR
and has full jurisdiction.22 Courts which only have jurisdiction to assess the
lawfulness of a decision do not comply with the full jurisdiction test. In
Zumtobel v Austria the Court considered for example that the Constitutional
Court which could inquire into the contested proceedings only from the point
of view of the conformity with the Constitution and could not examine all
the relevant facts, did not have full jurisdiction.23
The ECtHR found violations of Article 6 ECHR in cases where the domestic
courts or tribunals were precluded from determining a central issue in dispute
and had considered themselves bound by the prior findings of administrative
bodies.24 In Terra Woningen v the Netherlands for example the Dutch District
Court decided to set the rent for an apartment owned by the applicant at the
legal minimum on the ground that the Provincial Executive had designated
the area as one where soil cleaning was required. The Court did not go into
the question whether the Provincial Executive acted correctly in making this
decision. According to the ECtHR the court, by doing so, deprived itself of
jurisdiction to examine facts which were crucial for the determination of the
dispute. It therefore found a violation of Article 6 ECHR.25 In Chevrol v France
a violation of Article 6 ECHR was found because the French Conseil d’Etat
considered itself to be bound by an opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
concerning the applicability of a treaty between France and Algeria. It was
‘thereby voluntarily depriving itself of the power to examine and take into
account factual evidence that could have been crucial for the practical re-
solution of the dispute before it’.26
The ECtHR’s case-law under Article 13 ECHR indicates that in asylum cases
an independent body should review both facts and law. According to the ECtHR
‘the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent and
21 ECtHR (Plen) 23 June 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven, De Meyere v Belgium, no 6878/75, para 51.
22 See for example ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v United Kingdom, no 19178/91, para 40.
23 ECtHR 21 September 1993, Zumtobel v Austria, no 12235/86, para 30. See also ECtHR 7
November 2002, Veeber v Estonia, no 37571/97, para 71, ECtHR 20 June 2002, Koskinas v
Greece, no 47760/99, para 30.
24 ECtHR 21 July 2011, Sigma Radio Television, nos 32181/04 and 35122/05, para 157, ECtHR
31 July 2008, Družstevní Záložna Pria and others v the Czech Republic, no 72034/01, para 111.
See also ECtHR 28 June 1990, Obermeier v Austria, no 11761/85.
25 ECtHR 28 November 1998, Terra Woningen v the Netherlands, no 20641/92, paras 52-55. See
also ECtHR 24 November 2005, Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria, no 49429/99.
26 ECtHR 13 February 2003, Chevrol v France, no 49636/99, para 82.
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rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing
a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3’.27 It is hard to imagine that
‘rigorous scrutiny’ can be provided by an authority, which is only competent
to rule on points of law. The ECtHR’s case-law under Articles 3 and 13 ECHR
which will be discussed in section 9.2.2, clearly shows that the national author-
ity must review the facts underlying the decision on the claim based on
Article 3 ECHR.28
Furthermore it may be derived from the subsidiary role of the ECtHR and
the UN Committees that national courts should assess the facts underlying a
claim based on the principle of refoulement.29 The ECtHR has stated in its case-
law that it ‘is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and must be cautious
in taking on the role of a first instance tribunal of fact, where this is not
rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case’30 Likewise,
the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee have con-
sidered in many cases that it is for the courts of the State parties to the Conven-
tion, and not the Committee, to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular
case.31
9.1.3 Subconclusion: limitation of judicial review to points of law?
It follows from the Court of Justice’s judgments in Samba Diouf and Wilson
that a court or tribunal as required by Article 39 PD should review both points
of law and points of fact. This view is supported by the ECtHR’s case-law under
Article 6 ECHR, which requires a court or tribunal to have ‘full jurisdiction’.
Furthermore a judicial review which is limited to points of law only cannot
be considered a rigorous scrutiny as required by the ECtHR in refoulement cases.
A system in which the facts are established by the administrative authorities
27 See for example ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 50. See also Council
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, September
2005, guideline no 5 (2).
28 The view of the ComAT on this issue is not clear. In ComAT 6 December 2006, S.P.A. v
Canada, no 282/2005, para 7.4 and ComAT 15 November 2007, L.Z.B. v Canada, no 304/2006,
para 6.6 the ComAT seems to accept that national courts only review the legality of asylum
decisions. However, in a more recent case the Committee required a judicial review of the
merits, rather than merely of the reasonableness, of decisions to expel an individual where
there are substantial grounds or believing that the person faces a risk of torture. ComAT
8 July 2011, Nirmal Singh v Canada, no 319/2007, para 8.9.
29 Bruin 2003, Wildhaber 2002, p 3.
30 ECtHR 21 February 2002, Matyar v Turkey, no 23423/94, para 108, where the ECtHR also
stated that it is not it’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the
domestic courts. See also Wildhaber 2002, p 2 , where he states that ‘European control is
a fail-safe device designed to catch the ones that get away from the rigorous scrutiny of
the national bodies’.
31 See for example ComAT 6 December 2006, S.P.A. v Canada, no 282/2005, para 7.6 and HRC
18 November 1993, Kindler v Canada, no 470/1991, para 6.6. See also Bruin 2003, p 574.
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and cannot be reviewed by a court or tribunal should therefore be considered
contrary to Article 39 PD.
9.2 THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS
The Court of Justice considered in Samba Diouf that Article 39 PD read in the
light of the EU right to effective judicial protection requires that the reasons
which led the competent authority to reject the asylum application as
unfounded, should be the subject of a ‘thorough review’ by the national
court.32 The Court of Justice has thus brought the intensity of judicial review
within the scope of the EU right to an effective remedy and with regard to
this aspect limited the procedural autonomy of the Member States.33
In this section it will be examined what a ‘thorough review’ should actually
entail. Does it require that the national court substitute its own assessment
of the facts for that of the determining authority? Or is a reasonability test
of the determining authority’s establishment of the facts, including its credibil-
ity assessment, sufficient? These questions will be addressed taking into
account the Court of Justice’s case-law in other fields of EU law as well as the
ECtHR’s case-law under Articles 3 and 13 ECHR in non-refoulement cases and
with regard to the ‘full jurisdiction’ test under Article 6 ECHR.
This section addresses the required intensity of the judicial review of two
elements of the asylum decision: (1) the establishment of the facts and (2) the
question whether, on the basis of these facts, the asylum seeker qualifies for
protection following the criteria of the Qualification Directive. The intensity
of review of these two elements may differ in theory. The Dutch courts for
example are of the opinion that a limited (marginal) judicial review needs to
be applied to the establishment of the facts, while a more rigorous judicial
review should be applied to the qualification question.34 However in practice
these two aspects of the asylum decision often overlap.35 In the case-law of
national and international courts they have regularly not been clearly dis-
tinguished. Therefore the required intensity of judicial review of both aspects
will be assessed together.
In most asylum cases, fact-finding is difficult due to a lack of evidence.
In many asylum cases the establishment of the facts consists for a large part
32 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 56.
33 See also Widdershoven 2011, under para 3.
34 See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 January
2003, no 200206297/1.
35 For example the questions whether it is plausible that an asylum seeker attracted the special,
negative attention of the authorities of the country of origin may be regarded a factual
question, but also a qualification question. The same applies to the question whether the
alleged discrimination would cause such a severe restriction of the means of existence that
it would disable the asylum seeker to function socially.
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of an assessment of the credibility of the asylum applicant’s statements.36
Some courts may be of the opinion that the determining authority is better
equipped to evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of an asylum
account than the court.37 Therefore the determining authority should be
granted wide discretion and judicial review should be limited to the reason-
ableness of its decision. The Dutch Council of State for example has considered
that the determining authority has a margin of appreciation in assessing the
credibility of the asylum account.
It [the decision making authority] assesses the credibility of the asylum account
on the basis of extended interviews and a comparison with all it knows of the
situation in the country of origin on the basis of country reports and other objective
sources and the research done, and the considerations made before in connection
with the interviews of other asylum seekers in a comparable situation. This over-
view enables him to make this assessment in a comparing and therefore objective
way. The court is not capable to assess the credibility in a comparable manner.
That does not mean that the minister’s considerations are not subjected to a judicial
review. The standard in the assessment that has to be made is, however, not the
judge’s own opinion on the credibility of the asylum seekers narrative, but the
question whether there is ground for the opinion that the minister […] reasonably
could not have come to his opinion about the credibility of the narrative. This is
irrespective of the fact that the process of decision-making should meet the demands
of due process and motivation as required by law, and that the judge must assess
the decision by these standards.38
However some judges think differently on the intensity of the judicial review
required in asylum cases. A judge of the English Court of Appeal for example
considered that the court should subject the State Secretary’s decision to
rigorous examination. In this judge’s opinion this examination must include
consideration of the underlying factual material to see whether it compels a
different conclusion to that arrived at by the Secretary of State. He stated:
[T]his is not an area in which the Court will pay any especial deference to the
Secretary of State’s conclusion on the facts. In the first place, the human right
involved here – the right not to be exposed to a real risk of Article 3 treatment –
is both absolute and fundamental: it is not a qualified right requiring a balance
to be struck with some competing social need. Secondly, the Court here is hardly
less well placed than the Secretary of State himself to evaluate the risk once the
36 See section 8.5.
37 See also Schuurmans, who states that a reasonableness test is (also) advocated for cases
where it is inherently difficult to objectify the facts, as in asylum cases. Schuurmans 2008,
p 9.
38 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 January 2003, no 200206297/1.
This text is translated from Dutch into English by the author. See also UNHCR, Improving
Asylum Procedures, s 16, p 49-50.
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relevant material is before it. Thirdly, whilst I would reject the applicant’s con-
tention that the Secretary of State has knowingly misrepresented the evidence or
shut his eyes to the true position, we must, I think, recognise at least the possibility
that he has (even if unconsciously) tended to depreciate the evidence of risk and,
throughout the protracted decision-making process, may have tended also to
rationalise the further material adduced so as to maintain his pre-existing stance
rather than reassess the position with an open mind. In circumstances such as these,
what has been called the ’discretionary area of judgment’ – the area of judgment
within which the Court should defer to the Secretary of State as the person primar-
ily entrusted with the decision on the applicant’s removal ... – is decidedly a narrow
one.39
This judge is of the opinion that the court is as well placed as the determining
authority to evaluate the risk of refoulement on the basis of the facts. Further-
more this judge mentioned two other reasons why judicial scrutiny of the facts
should be rigorous: the fact that an absolute and fundamental right, the pro-
hibition of refoulement is involved and the risk that the determining authority
does not approach the case open-mindedly.
As will be shown in section 9.2.2.2, the ECtHR has accepted that, as a general
principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess the facts and, more
particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an
opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned.
However this does not withhold the ECtHR from making its own credibility
assessment if necessary.40 Before turning to the ECtHR’s case-law concerning
the intensity of judicial review under the right to an effective remedy and the
right to a fair trial the relevant case-law of the EU Courts will be examined.
9.2.1 The EU Court’s case-law
As was mentioned above the Court of Justice considered in Samba Diouf that
the EU right to effective judicial protection requires a thorough judicial review
by a national court of the reasons underlying the decision to reject the asylum
decision.41 Such reasons for rejection may include issues relating to the estab-
lishment of the facts, notably the fact that the applicant’s asylum account is
considered to be implausible. This would imply that the requirement of a
‘thorough judicial review’ also applies to the evaluation of the evidence and
the credibility assessment made by the determining authority.
39 Court of Appeal 28 January 2000, R. v Home Secretary, ex parte Turgut [2000] Imm LR 306.
This consideration was cited in ECtHR 6 February 2001, Bensaid v the United Kingdom, no
44599/98, para 28.
40 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 52.
41 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 56.
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How the term ‘thorough judicial review’ must be interpreted, cannot be
derived from the case-law concerning national decisions in other fields of EU
law. The Court of Justice has directly addressed the required intensity of
judicial review by the national courts in a very limited number of cases.
Generally it is assumed that the intensity of judicial review falls within the
procedural autonomy of the Member States.42 It should be remembered how-
ever that the way in which national decisions are reviewed by the national
court may not render the exercise of a right granted by EU law impossible or
excessively difficult.43
Some indications for the requirements regarding the intensity of judicial
review which follow from the EU right to an effective remedy may be derived
from the case-law concerning appeals against decisions of the EU Institutions
before the EU Courts. In such cases the General Court (like the former CFI) has
exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts. The Court of Justice only assesses points
of law and examines whether the clear sense of the evidence is distorted.44
Arguably the General Court and the Court of Justice in this case-law show
the level of intensity of judicial review which is required in order to guarantee
effective judicial protection. A method of judicial review applied by a national
court which is much more restrictive than the method applied by the General
Court in similar cases may lead to a violation of the EU right to an effective
remedy.45
The Court of Justice has recognised that the case-law concerning the in-
tensity of judicial review of decisions of the EU Institutions may be considered
relevant for the national context.46 In Upjohn the Court of Justice held with
regard to the principle of effectiveness that the national courts are not required
to apply a more extensive judicial review than that carried out by the Court
of Justice in similar cases. As a result the national court was not required to
substitute its assessment of the facts and, in particular, of the scientific evidence
relied on in support of the decision for the assessment made by the national
determining authority.47 It is questionable whether the reasoning in Upjohn
can be applied a contrario, meaning that the national courts are not allowed
to apply a less rigorous judicial review than the EU Courts in similar cases.48
This does not follow from the judgment in Upjohn. Some authors derived from
42 Schuurmans 2008, p 30. Delicostopoulos 2003, p 602.
43 Case C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd [1999], para 32, Case C-467/01, Eribrand [2003], para 62. See
also Schuurmans 2008, pp 30 and 32.
44 Schuurmans 2008, p 16. See for the jurisdiction of the General Court Art 256 TfEU.
45 See also Schuurmans 2008, p 34.
46 Tridimas states: ‘Upjohn illustrates a tendency to view Community and national authorities
as part of one and the same constitutional structure and subject them to equivalent standards
of accountability.’ Tridimas 2006, p 449.
47 Case C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd [1999], paras 35-37. See Schuurmans 2008, p 16 and Jans and
others 2007, p 91.
48 Schuurmans 2008, p 32.
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the judgment in Upjohn that judicial review on the merits is not required by
EU law and that a legality review should be considered sufficient.49 Never-
theless it should not be ruled out that the intensity of judicial review applied
by the EU courts may be relevant in order to establish the minimum level of
intensity of judicial review which the national courts are required to apply
in similar cases according to the right to an effective remedy.50
It is contended here that in particular the case-law of the CFI and the Court
of Justice concerning the intensity of judicial review of the establishment of
the facts in cases concerning complex assessments should be considered
relevant. Complex assessments by the EU Institutions take place in various
fields of law and can have a different character.51 They may for example
concern medical issues or complex economic assessments as in the cases of
Pfizer and Tetra Laval which will be extensively discussed in this section.52
Asylum cases and EU decisions involving complex assessments have in
common that it is difficult to find the facts objectively.53 In asylum cases this
is due to the general lack of (documentary) evidence. In cases involving
complex assessments this is a result of the fact that the decision is based on
(often contradicting) scientific data or experts reports. In both sorts of cases
it is accepted (with regard to asylum cases at least by some national courts)
that because of the difficulties in establishing the facts, determining authorities
should enjoy discretion and that judicial review should be limited.54 The
determining authorities are considered to be better placed to establish and
evaluate the facts than the court, because they have the specific expertise
necessary for this task.55
The Court of Justice’s settled case-law entails that, where an EU authority
is required to make complex assessments in the performance of its duties, it
has wide discretion, which also applies, to some extent, to the establishment
49 Jans states:’ From this judgment it can be deduced that any form of ‘normal’ judicial review
is, in principle permissible. Community law generally only requires a legality review, a
merits review is not usually required.’ Jans and others 2007, pp 93-94. See also Delicosto-
poulos 2003, p 602.
50 Schuurmans 2008, pp 16 and 32. Schuurmans recognises however that such a violation
will not easily be established. She also notes on p 34 that a very limited review of fact-
finding may involve the risk of the courts making an error in reviewing the facts and
evidence, for which the Member State may be held liable.
51 Schuurmans states that ‘an assessment of the facts is complex, for example, where complica-
ted economic or social assessments must be made, or where an assessment is otherwise
based on specific scientific data.’ Schuurmans 2008, p 19.
52 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] and Case C-12/03 P, Commission
v Tetra Laval [2005]. See also Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008, p 953.
53 Schuurmans 2008, p 27.
54 See for criticism on the limited judicial review of technical issues Barbier de la Serre and
Sibony 2008, p 894.
55 Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008, p 955, Schwartze 2004, p 95, Craig 2006, p 469.
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of the factual basis of its action.56 The EU judicature must restrict itself to
examining the accuracy of the findings of fact and law made by the authority
concerned and to verifying, in particular, that the action taken by that authority
is not vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers and that it did not
clearly exceed the boundaries of its discretion.57 In cases involving complex
assessments the EU Courts thus apply a limited judicial review of the fact
finding by the EU Institutions. How can the case-law concerning this limited
review be relevant for the interpretation of the required ‘thorough judicial
review’ in asylum cases?
The CFI’s case-law concerning cases involving complex assessments shows
that in practice this limited form of judicial review is rather rigorous.58
Furthermore the EU Courts have tested the EU Institutions’ decisions against
procedural safeguards. The Court of justice may use this method of judicial
review as a source of inspiration for the interpretation of the term ‘thorough
judicial’ review in asylum cases. Arguably judicial review which offers a lower
intensity of judicial review than the limited review performed by the EU-Courts
in cases involving complex assessments cannot be considered a thorough
judicial review. One must be very cautious to apply the case-law concerning
complex assessments directly to asylum cases. However, it is possible to draw
some general guidelines from this case-law which should be considered
relevant for asylum cases.59
Here below first of all the method of review of the facts in cases involving
complex assessments will be addressed. The final part of this section will
examine the judicial review by the EU Courts of the procedural guarantees
offered during the proceedings.
Judicial review of the facts in cases involving complex assessments
In cases involving complex assessments judicial review by the General Court
of the way in which the EU Institutions assessed and evaluated the facts is
limited. The EU judicature is not entitled to substitute its assessment of the
facts for that of the EU institutions.60 Instead, it must confine itself to ascertain-
56 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], para 168 and Case 138/79, SA
Roquette Frères [1980], para 25. See also Schuurmans 2008, p 19. See for criticism on this
case-law Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008, p 956-957.
57 Case C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd [1999], para 34.
58 Schuurmans 2008, p 25.
59 The intensity of judicial review that national courts are required to supply is influenced
directly by the degree of discretion Member States enjoy in their implementation of the
EC measure in question. Ward 2007, p 175. Also the importance of the interests at stake
may influence the required intensity of judicial review. Schuurmans 2008, p 33.
60 See for example Case C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd [1999], para 34 and Case T-201/04, Microsoft
[2007], para 88. Barbier de la Serre and Sibony explain the fact that EU Courts shows
reluctance to ask for an expert report in cases involving complex assessments from a fear
that relying on expert evidence will lead them to substitute their appreciation to that of
the EU Institution. Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008, pp 953-955.
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ing whether the exercise by the institutions of their discretion in that regard
is vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers or whether the institutions
clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (a reasonableness test).61 This
does not mean however, that the review by the EU judicature does not closely
examine the fact-finding.62 Several authors have argued that although the
wording of the reasonableness test has remained the same, the EU Courts have
entered into more rigorous scrutiny of the facts.63 The Courts have shown
to be more readily prepared to accept a manifest error.64 In this section two
judgments will be examined in which the EU Courts have applied the in-
tensified reasonableness test. These cases do not necessarily represent the view
of the EU Court in general.65 However they have been mentioned in literature
as leading cases,66 which should be considered to provide important guidance
for national administrative proceedings.67
Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council
The first striking example of an intensive review applied by the Court of First
Instance in the context of the reasonableness test is the judgment in Pfizer,
which was already discussed in section 8.6.1 on expert reports. In this case
a regulation was contested, by which the authorisation of an additive in
feeding stuffs (viginiamycin) was withdrawn. The Council took the view that
the use of viginiamycin, which was produced by Pfizer, involved a risk to
human health. Therefore it was necessary to withdraw the authorisations
relating to the use of the product. The Council had drawn attention in its
arguments to the fact that the decision to withdraw the authorisation of a
certain additive was based on extremely complex scientific and technical
assessments, over which scientists had widely diverging views. Pfizer argued
that the contested regulation should be annulled, since the Community institu-
tions had made errors in the analyses of the risks to human health and their
application of the precautionary principle. In its view the Community Institu-
61 See for example Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], para 169.
62 Schuurmans 2008, p 30.
63 Craig 2006, pp 446-447. Craig describes the early case-law by the Court of Justisce regarding
judicial review of fact and discretion in pp 439-444. See also Schuurmans 2008, p 20 and
Schwartze 2004, p 100.
64 Craig 2006, p 447, Schuurmans 2008, p 20.
65 Craig shows that judicial review of fact in recent cases concerned with common policies,
State aids and structural funds are more far-reaching than the early case-law, but is still
significantly less intensive than in the risk regulation and merger cases like Pfizer and Tetra
Laval. Craig 2006, p 458
66 Craig considers Pfizer and Tetra Laval to be ‘prominent examples’ of the EU Court’s modern
approach. Craig 2006, p 447.
67 Schuurmans uses Pfizer and Tetra Laval because these cases in her view include the court’s
specification of how it reviews an opinion of the facts by the administration. She states
that decisions in cases like Tetra Laval appear to be formulated in such a manner that they
may be used as a guideline for future cases. Schuurmans 2008, p 25.
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tions made errors in their analysis of the various items of scientific evidence,
amongst others by disregarding part (the conclusion) of an expert opinion
which was in favour of Pfizer.
The CFI recognised that the Council enjoyed broad discretion in taking the
decision68 and that therefore judicial review of the findings of fact had to
be limited to the reasonableness test.69 However the CFI set out rather detailed
requirements against which expert evidence should be tested. These require-
ments follow from the principles of excellence, transparency and independ-
ence.70 The CFI held for example that the competent Community institution
must prepare for the expert the factual questions which need to be answered
before it can adopt a decision and assess the probative value of the opinion
delivered by the committee.71 Furthermore it set out the conditions in which
the Community Institution may disregard (part of’) an expert opinion.
Subsequently the Court reviewed the reasons why the Community Institutions
chose to use certain (parts of) expert reports and to disregard others in detail.
Furthermore it tested whether the Institution took into account the fact that
certain expert reports had methodological limitations and were therefore of
less value. The CFI concluded that the Community institutions did not make
manifest errors when they made findings in respect of the relevant facts.72
Commission v Tetra Laval
In Tetra Laval the Court of Justice indicated specifically what the reasonableness
test of the facts in cases involving complex assessments actually entails. The
Court considered that the fact that a decision must be subject to a limited form
of judicial review, does not mean that the Community judicature must refrain
from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information. Not only must
the Community judicature establish whether the evidence relied on is factually
accurate, reliable and consistent, but also whether that evidence contains all
the information, which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn
68 The Council enjoyed a broad discretion in this case for three reasons: the case concerned
the common agricultural policy, the Community institutions had to determine the level
of risk deemed unacceptable for society and the Community authority was required to
make complex assessments in the performance of its duties.
69 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], paras 166-169 and 323.
70 See also section 8.6.1.
71 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], para 198.
72 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], para 311. See on this case also Craig
2006, pp 447-452.
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from it.73 This consideration was also used by the CFI and the General Court
in later cases concerning other fields of EU law.74
In Tetra Laval the Court of Justice rejected the Commission’s complaint
that the CFI had exceeded the limits of its power of review.75 The Court con-
cluded that the CFI did not err in law when it set out the tests to be applied
in the exercise of its power of judicial review or when it specified the quality
of the evidence, which the Commission is required to produce in order to
demonstrate that the requirements set by Community legislation are satis-
fied.76
The Commission had declared the merger of Tetra Laval BV with another
company incompatible with the common market as the new entity would
obtain a dominant position in the PET market.77 The CFI held that the
Commission had committed manifest errors of assessment in its findings as
to leveraging and the strengthening of Tetra’s dominant position and therefore
annulled the contested decision. It took into account that the Commission
admitted that its forecast in the contested decision with regard to the increase
in the use of PET for packaging UHT milk was exaggerated. Furthermore it
found that the evidence produced by the Commission was unfounded by
stating that, of the three independent reports cited by the Commission, only
one contained information on the use of PET for milk packaging. It also
showed that the evidence produced by the Commission was unconvincing
by pointing out that the increase forecast in the report relied on by the Com-
mission was of little significance and that the Commission’s forecast was
inconsistent with the undisputed figures in other reports. According to the
73 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005], para 39. Costello states that with this
requirement, the Court of Justice emphasised the need for intensive review. Costello 2006,
p 31.
74 See Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing [2007], para 57 (State Aid), Case T-284/08, People’s
Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 55 (EU measures freezing the funds
of persons or organisations suspected of involvement in terrorist activities), Case T-187/06,
Schräder v CPVO [2008], para 61 (Intellectual Property) and Case T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences
Ltd v Commission [2011], para 153 (Agriculture).
75 The Commission argued before the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance required
it, when adopting its decision, to satisfy a standard of proof and to provide a quality of
evidence in support of its line of argument, which are incompatible with the wide discretion,
which it enjoys in assessing economic matters.
76 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005], paras 42-45. See with regard to this case
also Craig 2006, pp 453-457.
77 The Commission’s decision was based on Art 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) no 4064/89
of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1989] OJ L 395/
1, corrected version in OJ L 257/13, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97
of 30 June 1997 OJ L 180/1. This provision states that a concentration which creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared
incompatible with the common market. The regulation gives a rather detailed list of
circumstances, which the Commission has to take into account in its assessment.
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CFI, the Commission’s analysis was incomplete, which made it impossible to
confirm its forecasts, given the differences between those forecasts and the
forecasts made in other reports.78
In the context of asylum cases the Court of Justice’s considerations in Tetra
Laval regarding the intensity of judicial review of prospective analysis are
interesting.79 The Court of Justice stressed that in case of a prospective
analysis a judicial review of the evidentiary assessment performed by the EU
Institution is all the more necessary.80 According to the Court a prospective
analysis of the kind necessary in merger control must be carried out with great
care. The reason for that is that it does not entail the examination of past events
– for which often many items of evidence are available, which make it possible
to understand the causes – or of current events, but rather a prediction of
events which are more or less likely to occur in the future. The prospective
analyses makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with
a view to ascertaining which of them are the most likely. However the chains
of cause and effect are dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish.
That being so, the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission in
order to establish that it is necessary to adopt a decision declaring the con-
centration incompatible with the common market is particularly important.
After all, that evidence must support the Commission’s conclusion that, if such
a decision were not adopted, the economic development envisaged by it would
be plausible.
One may argue that asylum cases also involve a prospective analysis: does
the asylum seeker have a well-founded fear of persecution or does he run a
real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, if expelled to his
country of origin. The argument that decisions involving prospective analysis
require a more strict judicial review, may therefore also be used in asylum
cases. Costello states that ‘the asylum process, with ‘essays in prediction’ at
its core, is similarly fraught’, and that the reasoning in Tetra Laval ‘suggests
that a strict standard of review should be demanded as a matter of EC law’.81
It should be noted that in asylum cases also the chains of cause of past events
are ‘dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish’. Often is it not
78 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005], para 46. Schwartze writes that the Court’s
thorough and detailed analysis of all the facts and legal arguments used in the Commission’s
decisions, despite the complexity of the issue, was especially remarkable because, usually,
an issue’s high complexity results in significant administrative discretion and reduced
judicial review. Schwartze 2004, p 99. Schwartze mentions two other merger cases in which
the CFI concluded that the Commission made manifest errors in the establishment of the
facts: Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] and Case T-342/99, Airtours
v Commission [2002]. The Airtours judgment is also mentioned by Craig as a prominent
example of the modern approach by the EU Courts. Craig 2006, pp 452-453.
79 Costello remarks that the Court’s reasoning here has a striking, if unexpected, parallel with
the asylum context. Costello 2006, p 31.
80 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005], para 39.
81 Costello 2006, p 31.
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exactly clear by whom or for what reason applicants were subjected to (threats
of ) persecution or serious harm in their country of origin. This could be a
further argument for a thorough judicial review of the fact-finding in asylum
cases.
Judicial review of the procedural guarantees offered during the proceedings
The EU Courts have recognised that a limited judicial review should be (partly)
compensated by procedural guarantees granted during the administrative
proceedings, such as the right to be heard and the right to know the reasons
for the decision.82 Schwartze notes that ‘today, allowing the administration
discretionary powers appears permissible only if discretion is exercised in strict
observance of procedural guarantees.’83 In Technische Universität München
the CFI held that in cases entailing complex technical evaluations, where the
Commission has a power of appraisal in order to be able to fulfil its tasks:
Respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative
procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include,
in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and im-
partially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person
concerned to make his views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision.
Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements upon
which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.84
The CFI thus only considers itself able to perform its judicial review effectively
when certain procedural guarantees in the administrative phase have been
respected.85 In Technische Universität München the procedural guarantees in
this sense included rules on investigation, the right to be heard, and the duty
to state reasons for the decision.86 Also in later cases in which a limited
judicial review was applied the CFI referred to the importance of procedural
82 See for example Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1990], para 14, Case T-13/99,
Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002], para 171, Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing [2007],
para 58, Case T-228/02, Organization des Modhahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2007], paras
154-155 and Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and
Commission [2005], paras 326-327. See also Schwartze 2004, pp 94-96, Ponce 2005, p 583 and
Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008, pp 955-956, who state that the EU Courts ‘generally
prefer to limit their review and compensate the applicant with increased procedural
guarantees, thereby avoiding the technical issue and imposing a rule the application of
which they can control easily on their own’.
83 Schwartze 2004, pp 95-96.
84 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1990], para 14.
85 See also Schuurmans 2008, p 28. She states that: ‘by setting clear and strict requirements
on the administration’s investigation of the facts and the statement of reasons underlying
the factual assessment, the Community courts are able to guarantee that their test of
reasonableness actually provides legal protection’.
86 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1990], paras 22-26. See also Schwartze 2004,
p 95.
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guarantees including the obligation to state reasons, the obligation for the
competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant
elements of the individual case87 and the right to a fair hearing.88
Subconclusion: EU Courts’ case-law
The Court of Justice ruled in Samba Diouf that Article 39 PD requires ‘thorough’
judicial review of the reasons for rejecting an asylum claim. The Court has
not addressed the question whether such review requires the national court
or tribunal to carry out its own assessment of the facts or allows a reasonability
test of the determining authority’s establishment of the facts. It was argued
in this section that the EU Courts’ case-law with regard to complex assessments
may provide guidance in finding an answer to this question. Asylum cases
and EU decisions involving complex assessments have in common that it is
difficult to find the facts objectively and that therefore the determining author-
ity is considered to be better placed to establish and evaluate the facts than
the court. The Court of Justice has itself recognised in Upjohn that the intensity
of review carried out by the EU Courts is to a certain extent normative for the
intensity of the review which carried out by national courts in similar cases.
On the basis of the EU Courts’ judgments concerning EU decisions involving
complex assessments it is impossible to define exactly the level of intensity
of judicial scrutiny of the assessment of the facts which should be applied in
asylum cases. It can certainly not be derived from this case-law that national
courts are obliged to substitute their assessment of the facts underlying the
asylum claim for that of the determining authority. In cases involving complex
assessments the EU institutions have wide discretion which also applies, to
some extent, to the fact-finding. As a result the EU judicature restricts itself
to examining the accuracy of the findings of fact and to verifying, in particular,
that the action taken by that authority is not vitiated by a manifest error. This
section showed however that in practice, in particular in the cases of Pfizer
and Tetra Laval, this limited form of judicial review turns out to be rather
rigorous. The General Court establishes whether the evidence relied on is
factually accurate, reliable and consistent and whether that evidence contains
all the information, which must be taken into account in order to assess a
complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions
drawn from it. In Tetra Laval the Court of Justice held that judicial review of
the evidentiary assessment by an EU institution is all the more necessary in
cases requiring a prospective analyses in which the chains of cause or dimly
discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish. This consideration may also
be considered relevant for asylum cases, because in these cases the causes of
87 Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing [2007], para 58, Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA
v Council [2002], para 171, Case C-16/90, Nölle [1991], para 13.
88 Case T-228/02, Organization des Modhahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 154-155.
See further section 10.2.2.4.
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future as well as past events are often difficult to establish. Furthermore the
EU Courts have held that a limited form of judicial review, such as that applied
in cases involving complex assessment, should be compensated by procedural
guarantees granted during the administrative proceedings.
It is argued here that a form of judicial review which offers a lower in-
tensity of review than the limited review performed by the EU-Courts in cases
involving complex assessments cannot be considered a thorough judicial
review. It should be remembered in this context that EU fundamental rights
are involved in asylum cases, which require a high level of procedural pro-
tection. On the basis of the case-law concerning complex assessments it is
contended that the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD should
at least establish whether the evidence relied on in the asylum decision is
factually accurate, reliable and consistent, whether that evidence contains all
the information, which must be taken into account in order to assess the risk
of refoulement and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn
from it. Furthermore this court or tribunal should ensure that the procedural
rights of the applicant guaranteed by the Procedures Directive have been
respected. As will be shown in section 9.2.2, such (minimum) level of intensity
of judicial review would also comply with the requirement of ‘close and
rigorous’ scrutiny which follows from Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
9.2.2 Obligations stemming from the ECHR, CAT and ICCPR
More specific guidelines for the intensity of judicial review of the facts in
asylum cases may be derived from the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of the
Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee. Two strands
of case-law should be considered important. First of all the case-law regarding
the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial which directly
addresses the level of intensity of judicial review which should be applied
by the national court, should be examined. The case-law concerning Articles 3
and 13 ECHR sets out standards as to the intensity of judicial review required
in asylum cases specifically. The case-law under Article 6 ECHR, which concerns
the intensity of judicial review in other sorts of administrative cases is also
of importance. It is relevant to know whether this case-law sets higher stand-
ards as to the required level of intensity of judicial review than the case-law
under Articles 3 and 13 ECHR. If that is the case, those higher standards may
inspire the EU right to an effective remedy, even if applied in asylum cases.89
Secondly the case-law which reveals the way in which in particular the
ECtHR itself reviews non-refoulement cases should be addressed. It is contended
that the subsidiary role of the ECtHR precludes that the review performed by
89 See further section 4.3.2.
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the national courts in non-refoulement cases be (much) more limited than the
review performed by those bodies.90 It would undermine the subsidiary role
of the ECtHR if asylum applicants would feel obliged to complain before that
court, because the national court gives fewer guarantees for conformity of
deportations with Article 3 than the ECtHR.91 The ECtHR would then become
‘an appeal tribunal from the asylum and immigration tribunals of Europe’.92
In that context it is important to note that the ECtHR itself seems suggest
that the standard of review performed by the Court itself is normative for the
standard of review, which is constituted by the national courts. The ECtHR uses
the same term ‘rigorous scrutiny’ for the standard of review which it applies
itself in Article 3 cases, as well as for the standard of review it requires
domestic courts to apply in Article 3 cases.93 Furthermore in Smith and Grady
v the United Kingdom the ECtHR explicitly established a link between the stand-
ard of review applied by the court itself and that which should be applied
by the national courts. In that case it considered that in the cases of Soering
v the United Kingdom and Vilvarajah v the United Kingdom ‘the Court found that
the test applied by the domestic courts in applications for judicial review of
decisions by the Secretary of State in extradition and expulsion matters coincided
with the Court’s own approach under Article 3 of the Convention’ (emphasis added).
Therefore Soering v the United Kingdom and Vilvarajah v the United Kingdom
could be contrasted to the applications in Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom,
in which the national court did not test the contested decision against the
requirements set by Article 8 ECHR.94 In Soering and Vilvarajah the Court did
not find a violation of Article 13 ECHR while it did in Smith and Grady.
In this section first the case-law regarding the right to an effective remedy
and the subsidiary role of the supervising bodies will be discussed, as this
case-law specifically concerns asylum cases. Finally the requirements under
Article 6 ECHR will be briefly discussed.
90 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 68-69. See with regard to the case-law concerning the
subsidiary role of the ECtHR and the UN Committees as a source of inspiration also section
4.3.1.
91 Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 68.
92 This is according to former President of the ECtHR Costa exactly what the ECtHR is not.
See Statement Issued by the President of the ECtHR concerning Requests for Interim
Measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court), 11 February 2011, available at www.echr.coe.int.
See also High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights,
Izmir 26-27 April 2011, Izmir Declaration, p 3.
93 Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 63-64. He states that the fact that the Court uses the term ‘rigorous
scrutiny ’ both for its own scrutiny and for the scrutiny it requires from domestic courts,
suggests that these should be identical.
94 ECtHR 27 December 1999, Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom, no 33985/96, para 138.
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9.2.2.1 Intensity of judicial review under the right to an effective remedy
According to the ECtHR the effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning of
Article 13 imperatively requires ‘close scrutiny by a national authority and
independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial
grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3’.95 These
requirements follow from the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3
ECHR and the irreversible nature of the damage which may result if the risk
of torture or ill-treatment materialises.
In M.S.S v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR concluded for the first time that
the standard of judicial review applied by a national court did not comply
with the requirements of close and rigorous scrutiny. The judgment concerned
the extremely urgent procedure before the Belgian Aliens Appeal Board, in
which the execution of an expulsion measure could be stayed. In this procedure
the Aliens Appeal Board verified that the administrative authority’s decision
relied on facts contained in the administrative file, that in the substantive and
formal reasons given for its decision it did not, in its interpretation of the facts,
make a manifest error of appreciation, and that it did not fail to comply with
essential procedural requirements or with statutory formalities required on
pain of nullity, or exceed or abuse its powers.96
The ECtHR considered that the extremely urgent procedure had to comply
with the requirements concerning the scope of the scrutiny following from
Article 13 ECHR. ‘The contrary would amount to allowing the States to expel
the individual concerned without having examined the complaints under
Article 3 as rigorously as possible.’97 According to the ECHR the extremely
urgent procedure did not comply with the requirement of rigorous scrutiny
for several reasons. First of all, as was also recognised by the Belgian Govern-
ment, this procedure reduced the rights of the defence and the examination
of the case to a minimum. The examination of the complaints under Article 3
by the Aliens Appeal Board could, according to the ECtHR, not be considered
‘thorough’. The examination was limited to verifying whether the persons
concerned had produced concrete proof of the irreparable nature of the damage
that might result from the alleged potential violation of Article 3.98 Thereby
the burden of proof was increased to such an extent as to hinder the ex-
amination on the merits of the alleged risk of a violation. Furthermore the
95 See for example ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09,
para 293 and ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 50.
96 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 141.
97 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 388.
98 In some judgments the Aliens Appeal Board considered that general information submitted
by the applicant did ‘establish no concrete link showing that the deficiencies reported would
result in Greece violating its non-refoulement obligation vis-à-vis aliens who, like the appli-
cant, were transferred to Greece’. See ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and
Greece, no 30696/09, para 148.
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Aliens Appeals Board did not always take into account new material submitted
by the applicant.99
It follows from this judgment that the national authority in the meaning
of Article 13 ECHR should examine the alleged risk of a violation of Article 3
ECHR on the merits, including the evidence underlying the asylum decision.
It cannot limit its examination to the compliance with procedural requirements
and the existence of manifest errors.
In several cases against the United Kingdom the ECtHR held that that the
appeal against an extradition order, a deportation order or a refusal to grant
asylum provided by the British court did meet the requirements of Article 13
ECHR.100 The British national court could review the exercise of the Secretary
of State’s discretion on the basis that it is tainted with illegality, irrationality
or procedural impropriety. Irrationality was determined on the basis of the
Wednesbury principles, administrative principles set out in the United
Kingdom’s case-law. The test in an extradition or expulsion case would be
that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made an order for return in
the circumstances.
In its judgments the ECtHR stressed that, although the domestic courts
would not reach findings of fact for themselves, the judicial review by the
English court was careful, detailed and rigorous. In Soering v the United King-
dom the Court considered that ‘it was satisfied that the English courts can
review the “reasonableness” of an extradition decision in the light of the kind
of factors relied on by Mr Soering before the Convention institutions in the
context of Article 3’.101 The ECtHR was of the opinion that an application for
judicial review arguing “Wednesbury unreasonableness” on the basis of much
the same material that he adduced before the court in relation to his treatment
while staying in death row ‘would have been given “the most anxious
scrutiny” in view of the fundamental nature of the human right at stake.’
Therefore Article 13 ECHR had not been violated.102
In Vilvarajah v the United Kingdom the ECtHR took into account that the
English courts had stressed their special responsibility to subject administrative
99 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 389-390.
100 ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, ECtHR, 30 October
1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87;
13448/87, ECtHR 2 May 1997, D v the United Kingdom, no 30240/96, ECtHR (Adm) 7 March
2000, T.I. v United Kingdom, no 43844/98, ECtHR 6 February 2001, Bensaid v the United
Kingdom, no 44599/98, ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99. See
also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 66-68.
101 ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para 121.
102 ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para 122.
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decisions in asylum cases to the most anxious scrutiny where an applicant’s
life or liberty may be at risk.103 It stated:
While it is true that there are limitations to the powers of the courts in judicial
review proceedings the Court is of the opinion that these powers, exercisable as
they are by the highest tribunals in the land, do provide an effective degree of
control over the decisions of the administrative authorities in asylum cases and
are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 13.104
The ECtHR based its conclusion that the judicial review of asylum cases in
England is in fact a rigorous one on several decisions by the House of Lords
and other national courts. In Soering v the United Kingdom for example the ECtHR
referred to a judgment by the House of Lords, in which Lord Bridge stated
that within the limitations of the Wednesbury principles the court must ‘be
entitled to subject an administrative decision to the most rigorous examination
to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue
which the decision determines’.105 If ‘an administrative decision under chal-
lenge is said to be one which may put the applicant’s life at risk, the basis
of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.’ Lord Temple-
man argued in the same judgment that ‘where the result of a flawed decision
may imperil life or liberty a special responsibility lies on the court in the
examination of the decision-making process.’106 In Vilvarajah v the United
Kingdom the Court referred to a case in which the High Court judge quashed
the decision on the ground that the Secretary of State, in reaching his decision
‘took into account matters which ought not to have been taken into account
and failed to take into account matters he should’.107
103 In ECtHR 8 July 2003, Hatton and others v the United Kingdom, no 36022/97, para 140, the
ECtHR stated that: ‘the scope of the domestic review in Vivarajah, which concerned immigra-
tion was relatively broad because of the importance domestic law attached to the matter
of physical integrity. It was on this basis that judicial review was held to comply with the
requirements of Article 13.’ See also ECtHR 6 February 2001, Bensaid v the United Kingdom,
no 44599/98, paras 55-56 and ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99,
paras 37 and 77-79.
104 ECtHR 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87; 13164/87;
13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 126.
105 House of Lords 19 February 1987, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514,
cited in ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para 35.
106 Furthermore, according to the British government a court would have jurisdiction to quash
a challenged decision to send a person to a country where it was established that there
was a serious risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, on the ground that in all the circum-
stances of the case the decision was one which no reasonable Secretary of State could make.
ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para 35.
107 ECtHR 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87; 13164/87;
13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 91. The ECtHR also mentioned a case in which the
judges stressed that in refugee cases the court is entitled to and should, subject administrat-
ive decisions to rigorous examination. See also ECtHR 6 February 2001, Bensaid v the United
Kingdom, no 44599/98, para 28.
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The ECtHR has thus accepted that the national authority in the meaning
of Article 13 ECHR does not reach findings of fact for itself. However, if follows
from M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece that the national authority does need to enter
into a thorough examination of the evidence underlying the asylum claim.
This also follows from the fact that in the cases against the United Kingdom
it was only after the ECtHR established that the review performed by the British
courts was in fact a rigorous one, that it deemed the complaints under
Article 13 ECHR unfounded. By assessing the actual test performed by the
British courts in detail, the Court underlined the importance it attached to a
rigorous review of Article 3 cases. It is however not possible on the basis of
this case-law to define precisely the minimum level of intensity of judicial
review which should be applied in refoulement cases.108 In order to get a better
understanding of the meaning of a ‘rigorous scrutiny’ it is therefore useful
to take a look at the way the ECtHR itself reviews refoulement cases. This will
be done in section 9.2.2.2.
The Committee against Torture’s view
The view of the Committee against Torture with regard to the required in-
tensity of review of asylum decision has not been consistent. In several cases
against Canada the Committee accepted a very limited form of judicial
review.109 However in its more recent view in Singh v Canada as well as in
its Concluding Observations regarding Canada the Committee was more strict.
It held that a State party ‘should provide for judicial review of the merits,
rather than merely of the reasonableness, of decisions to expel an individual
where there are substantial grounds or believing that the person faces a risk
of torture’.110 In Singh it considered that Article 22 CAT was violated because
judicial review by the Canadian Court did not include a review on the merits
of the complainant’s claim that he would be tortured upon return. The
Canadian Federal Court, the only judicial body to which the applicant had
access, could only quash a decision of the Immigration Refugee Board ‘if
108 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 68, where he states that the ECtHR has ‘never stated that
the former British review system constitutes the bottom line of what is still acceptable’.
He states that there is some room for the view that a judicial review that applies a marginal
review on the assessment of credibility still constitutes a rigorous scrutiny in the sense of
Strasbourg case-law.
109 See for example ComAT 6 December 2006, S.P.A. v Canada, no 282/2005, para 7.4, where
it considered that the judicial review procedure, while limited to appeal on points of law,
did examine whether there were any irregularities in the asylum determinations. The
applicant complained before the Committee that judicial review available to her was an
extremely narrow remedy, available only on technical legal grounds. See also ComAT 15
November 2007, L.Z.B. v Canada, no 304/2006, para 6.6, where it considered that the appeal
by the Federal Court is not a mere formality and that the court may, in appropriate cases,
look at the substance of a case.
110 ComAT 8 July 2011, Nirmal Singh v Canada, no 319/2007, para 8.9. See also ComAT Con-
cluding Observations on Canada, 7 July 2005, CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, para 5 (c).
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satisfied that: the tribunal acted without jurisdiction; failed to observe a prin-
ciple of natural justice or procedural fairness; erred in law in making a de-
cision; based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact; acted, or failed to
act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or acted in any other way that
was contrary to law’.111 The standard that the Court applied to the credibility
of the findings of the Immigration Refugee Board was that of “patent reason-
ableness”.112 In the case of Singh the Federal Court concluded that the de-
cision was not patently unreasonable, largely on grounds of the delay in
claiming refugee status after arrival to the country and failure to provide
credible or trustworthy evidence as to the complainant’s background informa-
tion in India.113
In its Concluding Observations regarding the Netherlands of May 2007
the Committee recommended that the appeal procedures entail an adequate
review of rejected applications and permit asylum applicants to present facts
and documentation which could not be made available, with reasonable
diligence, at the time of the first submission.114 This implies that the national
court is supposed to review the facts, including new evidence.
9.2.2.2 The subsidiary role of the ECtHR, ComAT and HRC in asylum cases
This section addresses the intensity of review applied by the ECtHR and (briefly)
the UN Committees. In this section it will be shown that generally the ECtHR
applies a rigorous scrutiny of the facts and evidence relevant to the claim of
a risk of refoulement. However the ECtHR has not always been consistent in this
respect, paying more deference to the assessment of the risk of refoulement by
the national authorities in some (recent) cases. The Committee against Torture
and particularly the Human Rights Committee generally do not interfere in
the establishment of the facts by the State authorities. In some cases the Com-
mittee against Torture has concluded that the applicant’s asylum account
should be considered credible, while the State authorities did not. The reason
111 ComAT 8 July 2011, Nirmal Singh v Canada, no 319/2007, para 8.8.
112 The applicant contended that the Federal Court had established jurisprudence that if the
Immigration Refugee Board decided a refugee claimant is not credible, than their story
could not be a base for stopping their deportation, even when there is substantial evidence
of an error in judgment. The complainant quoted cases where the Federal Court had
consistently decided that the decisions of the Immigration Board are discretionary and that
the Court should not intervene except if the immigration officer exercises his discretion
pursuant to improper purposes, irrelevant considerations, with bad faith, or in a patently
unreasonable manner. He maintained that when the judicial recourse is futile and in cases
where there are substantial grounds to intervene the Court does not even hear the case
and that this is not a recourse that is effective and efficient following the recognised
principles of international law.
113 ComAT 8 July 2011, Nirmal Singh v Canada, no 319/2007, para 2.10.
114 ComAT Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/NET/CO/4,
para 7.
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for that seems to be that in those cases the State authorities failed to take into
account important facts or evidence, notably medical reports.
Rigorous scrutiny of claims of refoulement by the ECtHR
According to the ECtHR’s standing case-law the ECtHR itself applies a ‘rigorous
scrutiny’ to claims of a risk of refoulement:
The Court’s examination of the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of
Article 3 (art. 3) at the relevant time must necessarily be a rigorous one in view
of the absolute character of this provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the
fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of
Europe.115
In Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands the ECtHR considered that in assessing an
alleged risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in respect of aliens facing ex-
pulsion or extradition, ‘a full and ex nunc assessment is called for’.116
In many judgments the ECtHR did not pay deference to the asylum decision
made by the national authorities. Instead it established itself whether the
applicant’s personal situation was such that his expulsion or extradition would
contravene Article 3 of the Convention.117 In those judgments the ECtHR
assessed the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account and the facts and
evidence in the case.118 In R.C. v Sweden for example there was a dispute
between the parties as to the facts of the case and the credibility of the appli-
cant’s asylum account. The ECtHR acknowledged that it is often difficult to
establish, precisely, the pertinent facts. It accepted that ‘as a general principle,
the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more
particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an
opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual con-
115 ECtHR 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87; 13164/87;
13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 108. See also ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v
Italy, no 37201/06 where the Court considered that it ‘has frequently indicated that it applies
rigorous criteria and exercises close scrutiny when assessing the existence of a real risk
of ill-treatment in the event of a person being removed from the territory of the respondent
State by extradition, expulsion or any other measure pursuing that aim’.
116 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136.
117 In several cases the ECtHR mentioned ‘the need to examine all the facts of the case’. See
for example ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 113. However,
the ECtHR does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States
honour their obligations under the Geneva Convention. See ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011,
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, para 286.
118 These include cases, in which the Court concluded that Art 3 had been violated (see for
example ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99 , ECtHR 5 July 2005,
Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02 and ECtHR 26 July 2005, N v Finland, no 38885/02) but
also cases, which were declared manifestly unfounded (see for example ECtHR (Adm) 16
March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden, no 38865/02 and ECtHR (Adm) 8 March 2007, Collin and
Akaziebie v Sweden, no 23944/05).
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cerned.’119 Nevertheless, the Court did not share the conclusion of the
Government that the information provided by the applicant was such as to
undermine his general credibility. The ECtHR thus replaced its own assessment
of the credibility of the asylum account for that of the Swedisch (administrative
and judicial) authorities.
In most asylum cases, the Court assesses the credibility of the applicant’s
asylum account on the basis of the information (for example reports of inter-
views), which came to light during the national asylum procedure and the
statements made by the applicant during the proceedings before the ECtHR.120
In Said v the Netherlands the ECtHR considered that it ‘must proceed, as far as
possible to an assessment of the general credibility of the statements made
by the applicant before the Netherlands authorities and during the present
proceedings’.121 In N v Finland, the Court went as far as to appoint two of
its members as delegates in order to take oral evidence from the applicant,
his wife, and several other persons. Based on this assessment the Court con-
cluded that the applicant’s account of his background in the DRC had, on the
whole, be considered sufficiently consistent and credible.122 The Court noted
that the position of the Court did not contradict in any respect the findings
of the Finnish courts. Neither was there any indication that the initial asylum
interview was in any way rushed or otherwise conducted in a superficial
manner.123
In many cases the Court included country of origin information124 or other
information in its assessment which it had obtained of its own motion.125
The Court considered:
In its supervisory task under Article 19 of the Convention, it would be too narrow
an approach under Article 3 in cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extra-
dition if the Court, as an international human rights court, were only to take into
account materials made available by the domestic authorities of the Contracting
119 ECtHR 9 March 2010, R.C. v Sweden, no 41827/07, para 52.
120 See for example ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, ECtHR
(Adm) 6 September 2007, M. v Sweden, no 22556/05 and ECtHR (Adm) 17 January 2006,
Bello v Sweden, no 32213/04.
121 ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02, para 50.
122 ECtHR 26 July 2005, N. v Finland, no 38885/02, paras 152-156. See also ECtHR 9 October
1988, Hatami v Sweden, no 32448/96, para 25.
123 ECtHR 26 July 2005, N. v Finland, no 38885/02, para 157.
124 See for example ECtHR 8 April 2008, Nnyanzi v the United Kingdom, no 21878/06, para 63.
125 The Court stated in many judgments that it assesses the existence of a risk of ill-treatment
in breach of Art 3, including the conditions in the proposed receiving country in the light
of all the material placed before it, or, if necessary, material obtained of its own motion
(proprio motu). See for example ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom,
no 45276/99, para 60 and ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 119.
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State concerned, without comparing these with materials from other reliable and
objective sources.126
When assessing the facts and evidence underlying the case and subsequently
the risk of refoulement the ECtHR takes into account whether a proper assessment
of the asylum claim took place in the national context. However, the fact that
the national asylum procedure was fair and entailed a rigorous scrutiny of
the risk of refoulement does not prevent the ECtHR from carrying out its own
assessment of the facts, evidence or credibility of the asylum account.127 In
Nasimi the Court took into account that the authorities conducted several
interviews with the applicant, that it was concluded in two instances that the
applicant was not credible and that the bodies concerned gave detailed reasons
as to why they reached that conclusion. The Court also deemed it important
that the authorities were obliged to consider essentially the same factors as
are relevant to the Court’s assessment under Article 3 of the Convention.
However in this case the ECtHR did assess the credibility of the applicant
itself.128 In J.E.D. v the United Kingdom the Court took amongst others into
account that the authorities had due regard to the arguments submitted by
the applicant as well as to the past and current situation in the receiving
country and that the Secretary of State carefully evaluated the evidence, which
the applicant submitted in support of his renewed asylum request. Having
regard to these factors and to its own careful examination of the arguments
and materials submitted by the applicant, the Court considered the complaint
under Article 3 ECHR manifestly ill-founded.129 The Court declared both
Nasimi and J.E.D. inadmissible.
In several cases the Court attached weight to the fact that national author-
ities had knowledge and experience in the assessment of asylum applications
submitted by certain groups of asylum applicants. This did not mean however
that the ECtHR did not apply a rigorous scrutiny by itself.130 In Vilvarajah the
Court considered for example:
The Court also attaches importance to the knowledge and experience that the United
Kingdom authorities had in dealing with large numbers of asylum seekers from
126 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136. See also ECtHR
12 May 2010, Khodzayev v Russia, no 52466/08, para 96.
127 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 66. He states that in the ECtHR’s assessment thoroughness
of the national asylum procedure is one factor, but the crucial issue is not a procedural
one, but the substance: was the assessment right?
128 ECtHR (Adm) 16 March 2004, Nasimi v Sweden, no 38865/02.
129 ECtHR (Adm) 2 February 1999, J.E.D. v .the United Kingdom, no 42225/98. See also ECtHR
(Adm) 26 October 2000, Damla and others v Germany, no 61479/00 and ECtHR (Adm) 31
May 2001, Katani v Germany, no 67679/01.
130 Spijkerboer notes that both in Vilvarajah and in Cruz Varas, it was only mentioned after
the full assessment of the risk of a treatment in violation of Art 3 ECHR by the Court. See
also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 64-66.
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Sri Lanka, many of whom were granted leave to stay, and to the fact that the
personal circumstances of each applicant had been carefully considered by the
Secretary of State in the light of a substantial body of material concerning the
current situation in Sri Lanka and the position of the Tamil community within
it.131
It should thus be concluded that the ECtHR has in many cases applied a
rigorous scrutiny in claims under Article 3 ECHR, and that it does not hesitate
to assess the credibility of an asylum account or to gather evidence of its own
motion.132 This applies even if the asylum claim was properly assessed by
the national determining authority and courts. It follows from the subsidiary
role of the court that the national courts should perform a judicial scrutiny,
which is at least as rigorous as the ECtHR’s review.
Although generally the ECtHR has taken this very active approach, its case-
law regarding the intensity of judicial review is not entirely consistent.133
In its judgment in Husseini v Sweden and several other recent judgments the
ECtHR seems to apply a more distant review. In Husseini the ECtHR considered
that the Swedish Migration Board and the Aliens Appeals Board
conducted a thorough examination of the applicant’s case, which entailed that the
applicant was heard three times. Before both instances the applicant was assisted
by appointed counsel. The national authorities had the benefit of seeing, hearing
and questioning the applicant in person and of assessing directly the information
and documents submitted by him, before deciding the case. The Court finds no
reason to conclude that their decisions were inadequate or that the outcome of the
proceedings before the two instances was arbitrary. Furthermore, there are no
indications that the assessment made by the domestic authorities was insufficiently
supported by relevant materials or that the authorities were wrong in their con-
clusion that there were no substantial grounds for finding that the applicant would
risk being persecuted upon return to Afghanistan.134
131 ECtHR 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom. nos. 13163/87; 13164/87;
13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 114. See also ECtHR (Plen) 20 March 1991, Cruz Varas
and others v Sweden, no 15576/89, para 81 and ECtHR (Adm) 22 June 2004, F. v United
Kingdom, no 17341/03 and EComHR 8 April 1993, M.P.G. v Sweden, no 20981/92.
132 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 64-66.
133 In ECtHR (Adm) 26 October 2000, Damla v Germany, no 61479/00 and ECtHR (Adm) 22
September 2005, Kaldik v Germany, no 28526/05 the ECtHR concluded that nothing in the
file suggested that the assessment of evidence by the national authorities was arbitrary.
This seems to point in the direction of a marginal scrutiny by the Court. The ECtHR in
this decision used a standard text block which is normally used in cases concerning Art
6 ECHR, which implies that the assessment of the facts and the taking of evidence and
its evaluation can only be reviewed by the ECtHR in exceptional circumstances. See also
ECtHR (Adm) 14 September 2000, Chentiev and Ibragimov, no 21022/08; 51946/08.
134 ECtHR 13 October 2011, Husseini v Sweden, no 10611/09, paras 86-87.
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The ECtHR thus assessed the procedural guarantees offered in this case instead
of performing a rigorous scrutiny of the facts itself.135 Potentially this and
similar recent judgments reflect a new approach of the ECtHR, which is intended
to ensure that the ECtHR does not act as a fourth instance court, in conformity
with the Izmir Declaration.136 However the ECtHR still does enter into a
rigorous scrutiny if the State authorities did not carry out an adequate assess-
ment137 or if it finds it necessary for some other reason. In J.H. v the United
Kingdom for example the ECtHR first established that the State authorities
conducted a thorough examination of the applicant’s case138 but proceeded
with its own ‘overall examination of the applicant’s case’.139
The potential new approach of the ECtHR does not detract from the con-
clusion made above that the rigorous scrutiny performed in the refoulement
cases discussed above serves as a model for the rigorous scrutiny which should
be applied by the national courts.140 Possibly the supposed new approach
even entails that the ECtHR will check the intensity of judicial review performed
by the national courts more rigorously than before.141
The UN Committees’ subsidiary role
The Committee against Torture pays more deference to the findings of the
State authorities. It has stressed many times that it is not an appellate, quasi-
judicial or administrative body and that therefore it must give considerable
weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party.142 While
assessing a case, the Committee determines whether the State party’s review
of the complainant’s case was deficient in this respect.143 In many cases the
Committee against Torture followed the assessment made by the authorities
of the State and declared the complaint unfounded.144 In a view concerning
a complaint against the Netherlands, the Committee considered for example:
135 See also ECtHR 20 October 2011, Samina v Sweden, no 55463/09, paras 54-55 and ECtHR
(Adm) 22 November 2011, Sibomana v Sweden, no 32010/09.
136 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Declaration,
Izmir: 27 April 2011.
137 See ECtHR 8 November 2011, Yakubov v Russia, no 7265/10
138 ECtHR 20 December 2011, J.H. v the United Kingdom, no 48839/09, para 58.
139 ECtHR 20 December 2011, J.H. v the United Kingdom, no 48839/09, para 66.
140 See with regard to Damla also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 64, supra footnote 35.
141 In several recent judgments such as ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and
Greece, no 30696/09, ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09 and ECtHR (GC)
23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09, the ECtHR under Art 13 ECHR
performed a strict review of the procedural safeguards in place.
142 See for example ComAT 3 July 2011, T.D. v Switzerland, no 375/2009, para 7.7. See also
ComAT General Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 9 (a).
143 ComAT 21 November 2003, A.R. v the Netherlands, no 203/2002, para 7.6, ComAT 15 May
2008, M.J.A.M.O. e.a. v Canada, no 293/2006, para 10.5. The ComAT referred to its General
Comment No 1 (1997), A/53/44, para 9.
144 See for example ComAT 14 May 2003, A.A v the Netherlands, no 198/2002 and ComAT 11
May 2004, A.K. v Australia, no 148/1999.
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The relevant evidence regarding the complainant’s history in Turkey, together with
his activities inside and outside Turkey, has been considered by the Dutch author-
ities. The Committee is not in a position to challenge their findings of fact, nor to
resolve the question of whether there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s
account. Consistent with the Committee’s case law, due weight must be accorded
to findings of fact made by government Authorities.145
Nevertheless, the Committee against Torture stressed in some cases that it
has the power of free assessment of the facts arising in the circumstances of
each case.146 It must assess the facts and evidence in a given case, once it
has been ascertained that the manner, in which the evidence was evaluated
was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.147 In Dadar, the
Committee against Torture considered that the argument submitted by the
State party that the Committee is not a fourth instance, cannot prevail over
the absolute prohibition enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention.148 Therefore
the Committee sometimes does evaluate evidence and assess the credibility
of the asylum account itself. It has in some cases indeed reached a different
conclusion than the national authorities on these issues.
The Committee does not explain in its views why it is of the opinion that
the manner, in which the evidence was evaluated was clearly arbitrary or not.
However it is striking that in many of the cases in which the Committee
concluded differently with regard to the credibility of the applicant’s asylum
account than the State authorities, the State authorities had failed to take into
account important facts or evidence.149 In particular in many of those cases
medical reports had not been taken into account as evidence in the national
procedure or the applicant’s medical problems could, according to the Commit-
tee, explain inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements.150
145 ComAT 14 May 2004, S.G. v the Netherlands, no 135/1999, para 6.6.
146 See for example ComAT 3 July 2011, T.D. v Switzerland, no 375/2009, para 7.7. See also
ComAT General Comment No 1(1997), A/53/44, para 9 (b).
147 ComAT 6 December 2006, S.P.A. v Canada, no 282/2005, para 7.6 and ComAT 12 May 2003,
G.K. v Switzerland, no 219/2002, para 6.12. In ComAT 15 May 2008, M.J .A.M.O. e.a. v Canada,
no 293/2006, para 10.5 the ComAT also required that the domestic courts clearly violated
their obligations of impartiality.
148 ComAT 5 December 2005, Dadar v Canada, no 258/2004, para 8.8.
149 Wouters 2009, p 492. See also Nowak and McArthur 2008, p 223. They state that ‘the more
efforts the domestic authorities have made to establish the relevant evidence and to take
all available information fully into account, the more the Committee attaches importance
to the findings and risk assessment of domestic authorities’.
150 See for example ComAT 16 December 1998, Halil Haydin v Sweden, no 101/97, paras 6.6
and 6.7 ComAT 25 May 2002, Chedli Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, no 185/2001, para 10,
ComAT 17 December 2004, Enrique Falcon Ríos v Canada, no 133/99, paras 8.4-8.5, ComAT
22 January 2007, C.T. and K.M. v Sweden, no 279/2005, para 7.5 and ComAT 22 January
2007, V.L. v Switzerland, no 262/2005, para 8.8.
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Also the Human Rights Committee generally respects the assessment of
the facts by the national authorities.151 In Kindler, an extradition case, the
Human Rights Committee for example ‘reiterates its constant jurisprudence
that it is not competent to re-evaluate the facts and evidence considered by
national courts. The Committee may verify whether the author was granted
all the procedural safeguards provided for in the Covenant’.152 Wouters states
that the Human Rights Committee allows itself a prominent role in the assess-
ment of facts and evidence only when there is bad faith, abuse of power or
other arbitrariness on the part of the State.153 There are very few cases in
which the Human Rights Committee concluded that Articles 6 or 7 ICCPR
would be violated upon return.154 Hamida v Canada is a rare example of a
case in which the Committee assessed the facts and evidence itself and came
to another conclusion as to the credibility of the applicant’s account than the
State authorities.155 In some cases the Human Rights Committee concluded
that expulsion of a person would violate Article 7 ICCPR because insufficient
procedural guarantees had been offered by the State authorities,156 further
analysis should have been carried out157 or because the State authorities failed
to comment on the applicant’s fairly detailed account on why a risk of refoule-
ment in his opinion existed.158
The deferent position of the UN Committees vis-à-vis the examination of
the asylum claim by the State authorities can be explained by their concern
to maintain their subsidiary role. It does not mean that they are of the opinion
that national courts should not be in the position or are not required to apply
a rigorous scrunity to the facts in an asylum case. Furthermore if necessary
in the light of the seriousness of the case, the Committee against Torture and
the Human Rights Committee do enter into an assessment of the relevant
evidence and the credibility of the asylum account. The prohibition of refoule-
ment thus prevails over the need to ensure the subsidiary role of the UN
Committees.
151 Wouters 2009, p 397.
152 HRC 18 November 1993, Kindler v Canada, no 470/1991, para 6.6. See also HRC 6 December
2002, Zheludkova v Ukraine, no 726/1996, para 5.3, HRC 20 August 2004, Perterer v Austria,
no 1015/2001, para 10.5.
153 Wouters 2009, p 397. He refers among others to HRC 3 April 2007, P.K. v Canada, no 1234/
2003, para 7.3, where the Committee considered that ‘it is generally for the courts of States
parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it is found
that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice’.
154 Wouters 2009, p 367.
155 HRC 13 April 2010, Hamida v Canada, no 1544/2007, para 8.7.
156 HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani v Canada, no 1051/2002, para 10.7.
157 HRC 9 May 2011, Pillai v Canada, no 1763/2008, para 11.4.
158 HRC 9 December 2004, Byahuranga v Denmark, no 1222/2003, para 11.3.
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9.2.2.3 The right to a fair trial
When assessing whether a court or tribunal complies with the ‘full jurisdiction’
requirement, the ECtHR tests whether the court considered the submissions
of the applicant ‘on their merits, point by point, without ever having to decline
jurisdiction in replying to them or in ascertaining various facts’.159 The ECtHR
applies this test on a case by case basis,160 carrying out an examination of
both the case file and the relevant provisions of national law.161
Article 6 (1) ECHR does not necessarily require a judicial body to substitute
its own decision for that of the administrative authorities; on certain conditions
it may pay deference to the administrative decision. The ECtHR considered that
in assessing the sufficiency of the judicial review available to the applicant
‘it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject-matter of the
decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at,
and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of
appeal.’162 These three factors, to which the ECtHR referred in many cases,
will be addressed separately in this section.
The subject-matter of the decision
The ECtHR finds that in areas of law in which the administrative authorities
exercise discretion or where special knowledge or experience is needed to take
a decision, judicial bodies may limit their review to an assessment of the
reasonableness of the decision.163 They do not need to substitute their own
findings of fact for those of the administrative authorities and are therefore
not obliged to hold a full court hearing on both facts and law.164 Examples
of areas of law in which administrative authorities, according to the ECtHR,
159 See for example ECtHR 21 September 1993, Zumtobel v Austria, no 12235/86, para 32.
160 See for example ECtHR 31 July 2008, Družstevní Záložna Pria and others v the Czech Republic,
no 72034/01, para 107, ECtHR 4 October 2001, Potocka and others v Poland, no 33776/96,
para 54, ECtHR 21 September 1993, Zumtobel v Austria, no 12235/86, para 32 This makes
it difficult to establish the exact purport of judgments and the precise contents of the Court’s
doctrine. See the Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens with ECtHR 26 April 1995, Fischer
v Austria, no 16922/90, para 15.
161 Judge Martens stated that the test requires a scrutiny of the complete file that can reasonably
only be made by an experienced lawyer completely conversant with Austrian law and
Austrian legal practice and style of litigation. Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens with
ECtHR 26 April 1995, Fischer v Austria, no 16922/90, para 18.
162 ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no19178/91, para 45
163 In ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no19178/91 the ECtHR deemed
sufficient that the decision by the Housing and Planning Inspector could have been quashed
by the British High Court if it had been made by reference to irrelevant factors or without
regard to relevant factors; or if the evidence relied on was not capable of supporting a
finding of fact; or if the decision was based on an inference from facts which was perverse
or irrational in the sense that no inspector properly directing himself would have drawn
such an inference (see para 44).
164 See ECtHR (GC) 28 May 2002, Kingsley v the United Kingdom, no 35605/97, para 53.
290 Chapter 9
typically exercise discretion are town and country planning165 and environ-
mental protection.166 These specialised areas of the law involve the exercise
of discretion involving a multitude of local factors inherent in the choice and
implementation of policies.167 Furthermore the issues to be determined in
such areas require a measure of professional knowledge or experience.168
In cases in which no specialised knowledge is required to take the decision
and the factual findings cannot be said ‘to be merely incidental to the reaching
of broader judgments of policy or expediency which it was for the democratic-
ally accountable authority to take’, limited judicial review is not allowed under
Article 6 ECHR.169 Tsfayo v the United Kingdom for example concerned the
decision by a local authority to refuse a claim for backdated housing and
council tax benefit. The reason for the refusal was that the applicant had failed
to show “good cause” for her delay in making the claim. According to national
case-law the concept of “good cause” involved an objective judgment as to
whether the individual claimant with his or her characteristics, such as
language and mental health, did what could reasonably have been expected
of him or her. The applicant challenged the decision before the Housing Benefit
and Council Tax Review Board (HBRB). This body was directly connected to
the local authority which refused the claim. The applicant gave evidence to
the HBRB as to the moment she realised that anything was amiss with her claim
for housing benefit. The HBRB found her explanation to be unconvincing and
rejected the claim. The court before which the HBRB’s decision could be
appealed did not have jurisdiction to rehear the evidence or substitute its own
views as to the applicant’s credibility; it only assessed whether the decision
was unreasonable or irrational. According to the ECtHR the dispute in this case
concerned a ‘simple question of fact’ namely whether there was “good cause”
for the applicant’s delay in making a claim. No specialist expertise was
required to determine this issue, nor did the facts fall within the scope of the
authorities’ discretionary power.170 As the HBRB lacked independence and
essential procedural guarantees, while the intensity of the judicial review before
the High Court was limited, Article 6 ECHR had been violated.171 Article 6
ECHR thus requires that simple questions of fact should, in contrast with
complex policy assessments, be subjected to full judicial review.
165 ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no19178/91, para 47. See also ECtHR
(GC) 18 January 2001, Jane Smith v the United Kingdom, no 25154/94 and ECtHR (GC)
18 January 2001, Chapman v the United Kingdom, no 27238/95.
166 ECtHR 28 July 2005, Alatulkkila v Finland, no 33538/96, para 52.
167 ECtHR 28 July 2005, Alatulkkila v Finland, no 33538/96, para 52.
168 ECtHR 27 October 2009, Crompton v the United Kingdom, no 42509/05, para 73.
169 ECtHR 27 October 2009, Crompton v the United Kingdom, no 42509/05, paras 73 and 77.
170 ECtHR 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v the United Kingdom, no 60860/00, para 46.
171 ECtHR 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v the United Kingdom, no 60860/00. See also ECtHR 27
October 2009, Crompton v the United Kingdom, no 42509/05, para 77.
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The manner in which the disputed decision was arrived at
When examining the sufficiency of the review performed by the national court,
the ECtHR takes into account the guarantees offered during the administrative
proceedings. In several cases the ECtHR found that the proceedings before the
administrative body did not fully comply with the requirements of Article 6
(1) ECHR, but could nevertheless be qualified as ‘quasi-judicial’. In Bryan v the
United Kingdom the ECtHR pointed at the uncontested safeguards attending
the procedure before the Housing and Planning Inspector, namely
the quasi-judicial character of the decision-making process; the duty incumbent
on each inspector to exercise independent judgment; the requirement that inspectors
must not be subject to any improper influence; the stated mission of the Inspectorate
to uphold the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality [..]. Further, any
alleged shortcoming in relation to these safeguards could have been subject to
review by the High Court.172
In Kingsley v the United Kingdom the ECtHR took into account that a hearing
took place, that the applicant could call evidence, consider the various elements
of the case against him and comment on the way the proceedings should take
place and that the applicant was represented by counsel.173 In the Tsfayo v
the United Kingdom case mentioned above, in which a violation of Article 6
ECHR was found, the ECtHR put much weight on the fact that the determining
authority (the HBRB) was not merely lacking in independence from the execut-
ive, but was directly connected to one of the parties to the dispute. According
to the ECtHR the safeguards built into the HBRB procedure were not adequate
to overcome this fundamental lack of objective impartiality.174 The notion
that the overall fairness should be assessed thus also comes to the fore when
assessing whether the intensity of judicial review was sufficient in the light
of Article 6 ECHR.
The content of the dispute
Finally the ECtHR assesses whether, in spite of the limited jurisdiction of the
court, the grounds of appeal submitted by the applicant were adequately
addressed by the national court. In Bryan v the United Kingdom for example
the ECtHR considered that the applicant’s submissions ‘went essentially to
questions involving “a panoply of policy matters such as development plans,
and the fact that the property was situated in a green belt and a conservation
area”’. According to the ECtHR the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain
the grounds of the applicant’s appeal and his submissions were adequately
172 ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no19178/91, para 46.
173 ECtHR (GC) 28 May 2002, Kingsley v the United Kingdom, no 35605/97, para 54. In this case
the ECtHR found a violation of Art 6 ECHR because the court could not quash the im-
pugned decision and remit the case for a new decision by an impartial body.
174 ECtHR 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v the United Kingdom, no 60860/00, para 47.
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dealt with point by point.175 The case Crompton v the United Kingdom con-
cerned a dispute regarding the level of compensation which had to be offered
to the applicant following his discharge from the army. The level of compensa-
tion was decided on by the Army Board, a body composed of members of
the armed forces, which could not be considered independent. The ECtHR found
that the High Court had sufficiency of review to remedy the lack of independ-
ence of the Army Board, although the court could not substitute its own view
as to an appropriate award in the circumstances of the case. The ECtHR found
it sufficient that the court could and did examine both method of calculation
of the compensation and the base figures used for the calculation. In the
applicant’s case it found the base figure to be inaccurate and required the
Army Board to review the calculation.176 It should be concluded that Article 6
ECHR requires that the grounds for appeal are addressed on the merits by a
court or tribunal.
9.2.3 Subconclusion: thorough review of the assessment of the facts
On the basis of the examination of the EU Court’s and the ECtHR’s case-law
it is not possible to define exactly the level of intensity of judicial review, which
should be offered by the ‘thorough’ review required by Article 39 PD. It should
be concluded however that the Member States do not have full discretion to
determine how intense judicial scrutiny of an asylum decision must be. The
term ‘thorough’ already suggests that national courts cannot pay much defer-
ence to the determining authority’s assessment of the asylum claim. Further-
more both the case-law of the EU Courts and the ECtHR show that a review
of an asylum decision which limits itself to a pure reasonableness test, does
not comply with the right to an effective remedy.
It may be derived from the EU Courts’ case-law in case involving complex
assessments that the right to an effective remedy requires, even in cases in
which the determining authority has wide discretion, that a court carries out
a meaningful examination of the facts and evidence. It must examine whether
the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent and whether
that evidence contains all the information, which must be taken into account
in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substanti-
175 ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no19178/91, para 47. The court paid
deference to the inspector’s decision and concluded that the inspector did not act irrational
in concluding that the building erected without permission by Brian was objectionable and
had to be demolished. See also ECtHR 4 October 2001, Potocka and others v Poland,
no 33776/96, para 58.
176 ECtHR 27 October 2009, Crompton v the United Kingdom, no 42509/05, paras 78-79. See also
ECtHR 26 April 1995, Fischer v Austria, no 16922/90, para 34, ECtHR 21 September 1993,
Zumtobel v Austria, no 12235/86, para 32, EComHR 9 December 1997, Wickramsinghe v the
United Kingdom, no 31503/96.
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ating the conclusions drawn from it. A limited form of judicial review must
be compensated by an intensive review of the procedural guarantees offered
in the administrative phase, such as the right to be heard or the duty to state
reasons. It is hard to imagine that a judicial review which is less intensive than
the limited review carried out by the CFI/General Court in cases involving
complex assessments can be considered ‘thorough’.
The ECtHR’s case-law makes clear that the need to prevent irreparable harm,
requires rigorous scrutiny by an independent authority of a claim of a risk
of refoulement. It follows from the ECtHR’s judgments in M.S.S v Belgium and
Greece and the many cases against the United Kingdom that the national
authority in the meaning of Article 13 ECHR must enter into a thorough ex-
amination of the facts and evidence underlying the asylum claim. This should
also be derived from the high level of intensity of the review the ECtHR itself
carries out in refoulement cases. Notably the ECtHR, if necessary, replaces its
own assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account for that
of the determining authority and gathers (country of origin) information of
its own motion. The subsidiary role of the ECtHR would be seriously under-
mined if judicial scrutiny by the national court gives fewer guarantees for
conformity of an asylum decision with Article 3 ECHR than the ECtHR’s own
review.177 The Committee against Torture has confirmed in its recent view
in Singh v Canada and in its Concluding Observations with regard to Canada
that a very limited review of the facts of an expulsion decision, including the
credibility of the applicant’s asylum account (patent unreasonableness) is not
allowed.
Under Article 6 ECHR national courts are not allowed to apply a reasonable-
ness test to simple questions of fact, which do not fall within the scope of the
administrative authorities’ discretion and for which no special knowledge or
experience is required. In such cases the court must have jurisdiction to rehear
the evidence or to substitute its own views. It is contended here that the
assessment of the credibility of the asylum applicant cannot be considered
‘a simple question of fact’.178 Therefore it cannot be argued on the basis of
this case-law that the EU right to an effective remedy requires national courts
or tribunals in the meaning of Article 39 PD to substitute their own findings
of fact for that of the determining authority. The ECtHR has held under Article 6
ECHR that when the dispute concerns the exercise of discretionary judgment
by the administrative authorities, the proceedings before these authorities offer
important procedural guarantees, the national court may limit its review to
a reasonableness test. However, the grounds of appeal must be addressed on
their merits and point by point by this court. This also applies to the review
177 Spijkerboer 2009-II, p, 68.
178 See section 8.5. See also the ECtHR’s own recognition that the national authorities who
had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the applicant are best placed
to assess the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account.
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of findings of fact.179 It should thus be concluded that Article 6 ECHR does
set important standards as to the intensity of judicial review. However these
standards do not seem to require a higher level of intensity of judicial review
than the rigorous scrutiny required by Articles 3 and 13 ECHR in asylum cases.
How the Member States guarantee the required minimum level of intensity
of judicial review falls within their procedural autonomy. They may choose
a solution which fits best in their administrative law system and their views
on the division of powers between the legislator, administration, and judiciary.
The national courts are not obliged to replace their own assessment of the facts
or evidence underlying the asylum claim for that of the determining authority.
They may also choose to focus on the quality of the asylum decision and to
put much weight on the observance of procedural guarantees during the
administrative phase.
9.3 THE RELEVANT MOMENT IN TIME: EX TUNC OR EX NUNC REVIEW?
A final important question relating to the standard of judicial review is whether
the national court should or may restrict itself to a review of the contested
decision and its underlying facts or whether it should take into account facts
or circumstances or evidence which emerged or were submitted after the
issuing of an asylum decision.180 UNHCR noted in 2010 that in some Member
States there are no restrictions on the right to submit new elements and evid-
ence during the appeal stage,181 while such restrictions do exist in other
Member States.182
Article 39 PD does not require the national court or tribunal to take into
account facts or evidence which were submitted during the appeal stage.
Article 32 PD does give Member States the possibility to examine further
representations by the applicant or the elements of a subsequent asylum
application in the framework of the examination of the decision under review
or appeal, ‘insofar as the competent authorities can take into account and
consider all the elements underlying the further representations or subsequent
179 ECtHR 25 October 1995, Bryan v the United Kingdom, no 19178/91, para 47.
180 Spijkerboer notes that ‘the issue of which moment in time is relevant is related to the
position of courts vis à vis the administration. If the position of courts is not to decide on
the merits of asylum claims, but to decide on the legality of the administrative decision,
then an ex nunc assessment is problematic, because courts may take into account evidence
of which the administration could not have been aware. Only if courts are competent to
assess the substantive merit of an asylum application themselves, would an ex nunc
assessment be a plausible option’. Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 53.
181 Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany with regard to regular rejections, Italy and the United
Kingdom.
182 Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany with regard to applications rejected as irrelevant or
manifestly unfounded, the Netherlands and Slovenia. UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures,
s 16, pp 55-56.
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application within this framework’. Article 32 PD also gives the option of a
special procedure for subsequent asylum applications, which can be applied
after the administrative decision or a final decision on the previous asylum
application has been taken. A subsequent application for asylum shall be
subject first to a preliminary examination as to whether, after the decision on
the previous asylum application has been reached, new elements or findings
relating to the examination of whether he qualifies as a refugee have arisen
or have been presented by the applicant.183 Only if new elements or findings
have been presented which significantly add to the likelihood of the applicant
qualifying as a refugee, the Member States are obliged to further examine the
application in conformity with the guarantees laid down in Chapter II of the
directive.184 Member States may decide to further examine the application
only if the applicant concerned was, through no fault of his/her own, incapable
of asserting the new elements or finding in the previous procedure, in parti-
cular by exercising his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to
Article 39.185 The Member States may thus require asylum applicants to raise
new facts and evidence during the appeal stage if the national court is
competent to take into account such facts and evidence.
In this section it is argued on the basis of the case-law of the Court of
Justice and the ECtHR that the EU right to effective judicial protection requires
that the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD perform an ex nunc
assessment of a claim of a risk of refoulement and takes into account evidence
which was submitted after the first decision on the asylum application. In the
light of the principle of procedural autonomy Member States may chose how
they guarantee that such an ex nunc assessment is carried out. One possible
option is that the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD takes into
account relevant new facts and evidence in the appeal against the negative
decision on the asylum claim. Another option is that Member States allow
asylum applicants a full consideration on the merits of a subsequent asylum
application on the basis of relevant new facts or evidence. The decision on
this application should then be open to review by the national court or tribunal
in the meaning of Article 39 PD. Systems in which relevant new facts and
evidence cannot be taken into account by the court in the context of the appeal
in a first or a subsequent asylum procedure should be considered contrary
to EU law.
183 Art 32 (3) PD.
184 Art 32 (4) PD. According to Art 32 (5) PD Member States may, in accordance with national
legislation, further examine a subsequent application where there are other reasons why
a procedure has to be re-opened.
185 Art 32 (6) PD.
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9.3.1 The Court of Justice’s case-law
The Court of Justice has not yet addressed whether a ‘thorough review’ by
the national court or tribunal should include new facts and evidence submitted
during the appeal stage. The only judgment which addresses the relevant
moment in time of the assessment of the existence of a fear for persecution
is Salahadin Abdullah. This case concerned the withdrawal of refugee status.
In a procedure in which the refugee status is withdrawn the refugee may rely
on a reason for persecution other than that accepted at the time when refugee
status was granted. The Court of Justice considered in Salahadin Abdullah that
Article 4 (4) QD requires determining authorities to take into account acts or
threats of persecution connected to this other reason of persecution. The Court
seems to be of the opinion that this applies even if the acts or threats of per-
secution occurred in the country of origin before the asylum application was
lodged, but were not mentioned by the applicant in the asylum procedure.186
This implies that if the Member State authorities intend to withdraw a refugee
status an ex nunc assessment needs to take place. This judgment does not
address the question whether a court should take into account facts or evidence
submitted after the decision by the determining authority. However the judg-
ment may indicate that an applicant’s statements, in particular those regarding
previous persecution, cannot be excluded from the assessment of the risk of
future persecution or serious harm on the sole ground that the applicant could
and should have submitted them earlier.
A judgment which is particularly relevant for the question whether national
courts should take into account new facts or evidence in their examination
of the appeal against the rejection of the asylum application, is Orfanopoulos
and Oliveiri. In this case the Court of Justice addressed the standard of judicial
review of expulsion measures against EU citizens on public policy grounds.187
The Court has held that in order to expel an EU citizen under the exception
based on reasons of public policy, the competent national authorities must
assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the measure or the circumstances which
gave rise to that expulsion order prove the existence of personal conduct
constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy. The Court
recognised in Orfanopoulos and Oliveiri that in practice, circumstances may arise
between the date of the expulsion order and that of its review by the competent
court, which point to the cessation or the substantial diminution of the threat
which the conduct of the person ordered to be expelled constitutes to the
requirements of public policy. According to the Court derogations from the
principle of freedom of movement for workers must be interpreted strictly,
186 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 97.
187 Case C-482/01, Orfanopoulos [2004], paras 77-82. See also Case C-467/02, Cetinkaya [2004],
para 47.
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and thus the requirement of the existence of a present threat must, as a general
rule, be satisfied at the time of the expulsion. For that reason a national practice
whereby the national courts may not take into consideration, in reviewing
the lawfulness of the expulsion of an EU citizen, factual matters which occurred
after the final decision of the competent authorities, which may point to the
cessation or the substantial diminution of the present threat to public policy,
is liable to aversely affect the right to freedom of movement to which nationals
of the Member States are entitled and particularly their right not to be sub-
jected to expulsion measures save in the extreme cases provided for by EU
law. According to the Court that is particularly so, if a lengthy period has
elapsed between the date of the expulsion order and that of the review of that
decision by the competent court. The principle of effectiveness thus requires
courts to perform an ex nunc review of the threat to public policy posed by
an EU citizen against whom an expulsion measures was taken.188
Asylum cases and cases in which an EU citizen will be expelled for reasons
of public policy have two important things in common. First of all it needs
to be established at the time of expulsion whether there is a present threat: in
asylum cases it concerns a present threat of refoulement, in cases of EU citizens
a present threat of a person to the requirements of public policy. Furthermore
in both sorts of cases a fundamental EU right is at stake. In Orfanopoulos the
Court of Justice held that the effective exercise of the freedom of movement
requires an ex nunc assessment of the present threat by the national court. It
is not such a big step to argue in analogy with this judgment that the effective
exercise of the EU right to asylum and the EU prohibition of refoulement requires
an ex nunc assessment by the national court of the present threat (the real risk)
of refoulement. This would imply that developments which took place after
the rejection of the asylum claim by the determining authority should be taken
into account by the national court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD.
The need for an ex nunc assessment of the risk of refoulement by the national
court is, as will be explained in section 9.3.2, confirmed by the ECtHR’s case-law.
It cannot be derived from Orfanopoulos however that Member States are
not allowed to choose for a system, explicitly allowed by the Procedures
Directive in which new elements or findings are considered during a sub-
sequent asylum procedure. The procedural rules governing this subsequent
proceedings may however not undermine the effectiveness of the EU right to
asylum and the prohibition of refoulement. This means that the applicant may
not be expelled until the national court has ruled on the appeal in the sub-
sequent procedure.189 Furthermore evidence or grounds which support the
existence of a risk of refoulement should not be excluded from the assessment
of this risk for the sole reason that they could have been submitted earlier in
188 The Court of Justice refers to the principle of effectiveness in para 80 of the judgment.
189 See further Chapter 6.
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the procedure.190 Finally the total duration of the asylum procedures may
not violate the right to good administration191 or undermine the effectiveness
of the remedy required by Article 39 PD.192
9.3.2 Obligations stemming from the ECHR, the CAT and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-refoulement requires the ECtHR to carry out a ’full and ex
nunc assessment’ of the case. In cases in which the applicant has not yet been
expelled, the material point in time for the examination of the risk of refoule-
ment is that of the Court’s consideration of the case. The ECtHR stated that ‘even
though the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on
the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which
are decisive. Such ex nunc assessment also entails that evidence or information
that has come to light after the final decision taken by the domestic authorities
should be taken into account.193 In Salah Sheekh the Court considered that
in assessing an alleged risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in respect of
aliens facing expulsion or extradition, a full and ex nunc assessment is called
for as the situation in a country of destination may change in the course of
time.194
In practice the Court indeed takes account of recent information, among
others country of origin information.195 It also includes new statements or
evidence adduced by the applicant in its assessment. In Hilal for example the
Court took into account statements made by the applicant’s wife, during
asylum proceedings which started after the applicant had lodged a complaint
190 The exclusion from the assessment of evidence which supports the existence of a real risk
of refoulement on pure procedural grounds undermines the effectiveness of the absolute
prohibition of refoulement.
191 See Art 23 (2) PD which requires that the asylum procedure is concluded as soon as possible.
The Court of Justice considered in Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and
others [2011], para 98 that the Member State in which the asylum seeker is present must
ensure that it does not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of that applicant
have been infringed by using a procedure for determining the Member State responsible
for the examination of the asylum claim which takes an unreasonable length of time.
192 Art 47 of the Charter requires a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.
193 See for example ECtHR 5 July 2005, Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02, para 48.
194 ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136. See also ECtHR
17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 112 and ECtHR 10 February 2011,
Dzhaksybergenov v Ukraine, no 12343/10, para 36. The ComAT also takes into account changes
in the situation in the country of origin which occurred after the complaint had been lodged.
See for example ComAT 8 July 2011, Chahin v Sweden, nr 310/2007, paras 9.4 and 9.6 and
ComAT 1 July 2011, Jahani v Switzerland, no 357/2008, para 9.4.
195 See for example ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, no 25904/07, para 119, where
the Court considered: ’As regards the general situation in a particular country, the Court
has often attached importance to the information contained in recent reports from inde-
pendent international human-rights-protection organisations […].’
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before the Court.196 Furthermore it included in it’s assessment several docu-
ments which were submitted by the applicant to the British Secretary of State
after the first decision on the asylum request. These documents were looked
at by the Secretary of State and the national courts, but were not considered
relevant because, according to them, there was an ‘internal flight solution’,
where the applicant could safely live.197
The ECtHR has not explicitly considered that national courts should, like
the ECtHR itself, include new facts or circumstances in their review of an asylum
or expulsion decision. However in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR did
take into account in its assessment of the effectiveness of the extremely urgent
procedure before the Aliens Appeals Board that the Aliens Appeal Board did
not always take into account materials submitted by applicants after their
interviews with the Aliens Office. According to the ECtHR this was one of the
reasons why these applicants were prevented from establishing the arguable
nature of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. In this case the
applicant could be transferred to Greece right after the Alien Appeal Board’s
decision. There was thus no opportunity to submit new evidence in a later
stage.
Furthermore, one may argue in the light of the subsidiary role of the ECtHR
that the fact that the Court assesses claims under Article 3 ECHR ex nunc obliges
national courts to do the same. Otherwise applicants would be obliged to lodge
a complaint before the ECtHR in order to have the new evidence or facts
assessed.198 The ECtHR’s case-law does not exclude however, that States may
choose to oblige an applicant to submit a new application on the basis of the
new facts, while the decision on this application including the assessment of
the new facts and circumstances will be tested by the national court.199
196 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Hilal v the United Kingdom, no 45276/99, para 66.
197 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 56. It should be noted however that the ECtHR sometimes
holds the fact that statements and/or evidence are submitted at a late stage of the procedure
against the applicant. See further sections 8.5 and 8.6.
198 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, p 57. The Netherlands Government seems to be of the opinion
that the ECtHR’s case-law requires a full and ex nunc assessment by the national court.
It refers to this case-law in the explanation with a bill which requires an ex nunc assessment
by the national courts in asylum cases. TK 2008–2009, 31 994, no 3, p 6. The ComAT and
HRC often ensure their subsidiary role by refusing to include these new facts and circum-
stances in their assessment. Instead they grant the State authorities an opportunity to
evaluate the new evidence in a new asylum procedure and declare the complaints before
the Committees inadmissible. See for example ComAT 2 May 1995, A.E. v Switzerland, no
24/1995 and HRC 10 August 2006, Dawood Khan v Canada, no 1302/2004.
199 Note that the ECtHR took into account in Bahaddar that the applicant could lodge a fresh
application to remedy the violation of Art 3 ECHR and therefore did have an effective
remedy at his disposal. ECtHR 19 February 1998, Bahaddar v the Netherlands, no 25894/94.
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9.3.3 Subconclusion: the relevant moment in time
The Procedures Directive allows the national courts or tribunals of the Member
States to take into account facts and evidence submitted after the decision by
the determining authority, but does not require them to do so. The new facts
or evidence may, according to Article 32 of the directive also be assessed in
a subsequent asylum procedure. This gives the determining authority the
opportunity to first assess the risk of refoulement in the light of these new facts
or evidence. Both options seem to comply with the case-law of the Court of
Justice and the ECtHR, provided that at one stage of the procedure, before the
expulsion of the applicant, the national court or tribunal reviews the asylum
decision while taking into account all relevant available facts and evidence.
Furthermore the examination of new facts or evidence in a subsequent asylum
procedure should not lead to considerable delays in the processing of the case.
Both the Court of Justice’s judgment in Orfanopoulos and Oliveiri and the
ECtHR’s case-law make clear that the assessment of an actual, present threat
at the moment of expulsion requires an ex nunc assessment by the national
court. The absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement prohibits that
relevant facts or evidence cannot be taken into account by the national court
on the sole ground that they should have been submitted earlier in the pro-
cedure. This may be derived from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Salahadin
Abdullah but also from the EU principle of effectiveness. The effectiveness of
the EU prohibition of refoulement would be seriously undermined if facts or
evidence supporting the existence of a risk of refoulement were excluded from
the national court’s assessment, only because they were submitted in a later
stage of the procedure.200 Furthermore the subsidiary role of the ECtHR would
be endangered if applicants are obliged to lodge a complaint before the ECtHR
in order to have the risk of refoulement examined in the light of all available
facts evidence, including those submitted in a later stage of the asylum pro-
cedure.
9.4 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
National rules and practice regarding the standard of judicial review depend
on the vision on the division of roles. The EU legislator, the EU Courts and
also the ECtHR are, in the light of the procedural autonomy of the Member
States, hesitant to set requirements with respect to the standard of review by
national courts. However, the Court of Justice in Samba Diouf has brought the
scope and intensity of judicial review within the scope of the EU right to an
effective remedy. This right requires a thorough judicial review of the reasons
200 See further section 8.6.
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which lead the determining authority to reject the asylum claim as
unfounded.201 In this chapter it was examined how the term ‘thorough’
judicial review should be interpreted. The following conclusions were drawn
in this regard:
Scope of judicial review
· It follows from the Court of Justice’s judgments in Samba Diouf and Wilson
that a court or tribunal as required by Article 39 PD should review both
points of law and points of fact.202 This view is supported by the ECtHR’s
case-law under Article 6 ECHR, which requires a court or tribunal to have
‘full jurisdiction’.203 A judicial review which is limited to points of law
only also cannot be considered a rigorous scrutiny as required by the ECtHR
in refoulement cases.204
· A system in which the facts are established by the administrative author-
ities and cannot be reviewed by a court or tribunal should therefore be
considered contrary to Article 39 PD.
Intensity of judicial review
· It should be derived from the EU Courts’ and the ECtHR’s case-law that the
thorough judicial review demanded by Article 39 PD requires as a mini-
mum that the national court or tribunal assesses the claim of a risk of
refoulement on its merits. It should carefully examine the facts and evidence
underlying the asylum claim. A reasonableness test in which wide dis-
cretion is afforded to the determining authority’s fact-finding, including
the assessment of the applicant’s credibility is not allowed.
· National courts are not obliged to replace their own assessment of the facts
for that of the determining authority. They may choose to focus on the
quality of the asylum decision and the procedural fairness of the asylum
procedure.
· The EU Courts have shown in cases involving complex assessments that
a limited form of judicial review should entail an assessment whether the
evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, whether
that evidence contains all the information, which must be taken into
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable
of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.205 Furthermore the EU
Courts make sure that procedural guarantees were strictly observed during
201 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], paras 56 and 61.
202 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 57, Case C-506/04, Wilson [2006], para 60.
203 See for example ECtHR (Plen) 23 June 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven, De Meyere v Belgium,
no 6878/75, para 51.
204 The ECtHR mentioned the requirement of a rigorous scrutiny amongst others in ECtHR
11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no 40035/98, para 50.
205 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005], para 39.
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the administrative procedure.206 Arguably the judicial scrutiny carried
out by the EU Courts shows the minimum level of intensity of judicial
review necessary in order to ensure the EU right to effective judicial pro-
tection. This level of intensity of judicial review may therefore considered
to be normative for judicial review by national courts in similar cases.207
· Asylum cases can be considered similar to cases involving complex assess-
ments, in the sense that it is in both kinds of cases difficult to find the facts
objectively. Therefore the thorough review required in asylum cases cannot
be less intensive than the limited form of judicial review in case concerning
complex assessments.
· The ECtHR made clear in M.S.S v Belgium and Greece and in several cases
against the United Kingdom that the national authority in the meaning
of Article 13 ECHR must enter into a thorough examination of the facts and
evidence underlying the asylum claim.208 This should also be derived
from the high level of intensity of the review the ECtHR itself has carried
out in refoulement cases.209 If national courts carry out a more limited
judicial review than the ECtHR that would undermine the subsidiary role
of the ECtHR.210
The relevant moment of time
· Article 39 PD interpreted in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy
requires that the national court should at one stage of the asylum pro-
cedure, before the expulsion of the applicant, review the asylum decision
on the basis of all relevant available facts and evidence. This includes all
relevant evidence which is submitted in a later stage of the asylum pro-
cedure (after the first administrative decision on the asylum application).
· The effectiveness of the EU prohibition of refoulement would be undermined
if relevant facts or evidence cannot be taken into account by the national
court on the sole ground that they should have been submitted earlier in
the procedure. This was derived from the Court of Justice’s judgment in
Orfanopoulos and Oliveiri and the ECtHR’s case-law, which show that the
assessment of an actual, present threat at the moment of expulsion requires
an ex nunc assessment by the national court.211
206 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1990], para 14.
207 See also Schuurmans 2008.
208 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 389-390 and
(among others) ECtHR (Plen) 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no 14038/88, para
121-122 and ECtHR, 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/
87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, para 125-126.
209 See for example ECtHR 26 July 2005, N. v Finland, no 38885/02 and ECtHR 5 July 2005,
Said v the Netherlands, no 2345/02.
210 See also Spijkerboer 2009-II, pp 68-69.
211 Case C-482/01, Orfanopoulos [2004], paras 77-82 and ECtHR 11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh
v the Netherlands, no 1948/04, para 136.
10 The use of secret information in asylum
cases
In some asylum cases (part of) the establishment of the facts is based on
evidence gathered by the authorities, which is not made available to the asylum
seeker concerned or his legal representative. This information may be kept
secret for several reasons. State-authorities may refuse to reveal the identity
and function of the sources of the information in order to protect those sources
or the international relations with the country of origin of those sources.1
Furthermore States may want to protect the methods they use for assessing
the credibility of individual asylum accounts. In some Member States legal
advisors may not have access to country of origin information relied on by
the determining authority.2 Finally information may be kept secret for national
security reasons.3 Member States generally do not disclose information regard-
ing investigations into terrorism or organised crime in asylum or expulsion
proceedings.
The fact that a person is involved in terrorism may lead to a risk of refoule-
ment upon return in his country of origin.4 Information concerning this per-
son’s terrorist activities may thus be relevant for the assessment of the risk
of refoulement. However, information regarding the danger of an asylum seeker
for national security of the State in which he claimed asylum cannot be
included in the question whether a person is in need of protection on the basis
of the EU prohibition of refoulement. The ECtHR ruled several times that the risk
of a violation of Article 3 ECHR upon expulsion cannot be balanced against
national security concerns. Therefore, national security concerns and evidence
substantiating such concerns cannot lead to the refusal of protection against
refoulement. Furthermore they cannot justify a limitation of the right to an
1 In the Netherlands the identity of some sources which provided information for country
of origin information reports or reports by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding an
asylum seeker’s life or activities in his country are kept secret.
2 The Commission mentions Lithuania and Spain as examples. Report from the Commission
to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 2005/85/EC
of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting
and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 8 September 2010, COM(2010) 465 final, p 8.
3 According to the Commission evaluation of the Procedures Directive of September 2010,
limitations to the right of access to the file for legal representatives (Art 16 PD) on national
security grounds are applicable in Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. Commission Report COM(2010) 465 final, p 8.
4 See for example ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06.
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effective remedy against a decision on the existence of a risk of refoulement.5
As the Court of Justice respects the ECHR when interpreting EU asylum law,
it should be assumed that the same applies to the EU prohibition of refoulement.
National security concerns may play a role in the decision whether a person
may be excluded from an EU refugee or subsidiary protection status. According
to EU law a person may be excluded from such a status, because there are
serious reasons for considering that he committed a serious crime or because
of his current involvement in terrorist or other criminal activities.6 Secret
evidence substantiating such serious reasons or such involvement may thus
be used in the assessment of a person’s EU right to an asylum status and affect
his procedural rights.7 As decisions regarding the exclusion of a person from
an asylum status fall outside the scope of this study, they will not be speci-
fically addressed in this chapter.8 However the conclusions drawn in this
chapter are also relevant for these decisions.
For the person concerned it is very difficult to challenge a decision, which
is based on secret information or on information of which the sources are not
known to him. It is therefore often argued that the right to adversarial proceed-
ings and the principle of equality of arms are violated in these cases. Some-
times also the court reviewing the decision does not get access to (all) the
information underlying the challenged decision, which affects the effectiveness
of judicial review. Under EU law several other rights and principles play a
role in cases concerning secret information such as the right of access to the
file, the right to be heard and the duty to state reasons, which are all inter-
linked.9
A separate chapter on the issue of the use of secret evidence is included
in this book, because in the case-law regarding this issue the three basic notions
discussed in section 4.5 clearly come to the fore. The most apparent aspect
in cases concerning secret information is that the interests of the party con-
cerned to adversarial proceedings and equality of arms must be balanced
against the interests of the State and/or third parties to keep certain informa-
tion secret. Secondly it is accepted particularly in the case-law of the ECtHR
that limitations to the right to adversarial proceedings may be justified, as long
as they are counterbalanced by using compensation techniques such as special
advocate proceedings. The question whether the Convention has been violated
thus depends on the fairness or effectiveness of the procedure seen as a whole.
Finally, the nature of the case seems to determine the level of procedural
guarantees required in a case.
5 See ECtHR (GC) 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy, no 37201/06 and ECtHR (GC) 25 October
1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93.
6 Artt 12 (2), 14 (4a) and 17 QD.
7 See for example Bliss 2000, pp 120-123.
8 See section 1.5.
9 See also section 4.2.
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In this chapter it will be argued that although EU legislation, in particular
the Procedures Directive, allows for the use of secret information in asylum
cases, the Member States’ discretion is limited by the EU right to be heard,
the duty to state reasons and the right to effective judicial protection. The
explicit possibility left open by the Procedures Directive to withhold relevant
information to the national court deciding the appeal against a negative asylum
decision clearly infringes the right to effective judicial protection and should
therefore be considered void.
The two main sources addressed in this chapter are the case-law of the
Court of Justice and Court of First Instance/General Court and that of the
ECtHR. The EU Courts addressed the use of secret evidence mainly in com-
petition cases and cases regarding EU sanctions for persons and entities
included in terrorist lists. The ECtHR has ruled on this issue in very different
cases, regarding civil rights and obligations, criminal charges, secret sur-
veillance, detention and expulsion. It will be shown that the case-law of these
courts on the one hand show clear parallels and at the same time complement
each other. In this chapter an attempt is made to derive from this case-law
one set of procedural standards for asylum cases in which secret evidence is
used.
10.1 THE USE OF SECRET INFORMATION UNDER EU LAW
Article 41 of the Charter includes ‘the right of every person to have access
to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality
and of professional and business secrecy’. The right of access to the file had
already been recognised as a general principle of EU law by the EU Courts.
According to the EU Courts the right of access to the file is ‘one of the pro-
cedural safeguards intended to protect the rights of the defence and to ensure,
in particular, that the right to be heard can be exercised effectively’.10 The
right of access to the file is also linked to the obligation to state reasons and
the right to an effective remedy as well as to the principles of equality of arms
and adversarial proceedings. In all proceedings in which sanctions are imposed
the rights of the defence must be respected in administrative as well as appeal
proceedings.11
10 Case T-53/03 BPB v Commission [2008], para 31, Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission [2007],
para 197 and Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 69.
11 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 40, Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries
v Commission [1995], para 69, Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran
v Council [2006], para 94.
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EU asylum legislation
Article 16 PD explicitly accepts that the asylum applicant and his legal repres-
entative, and in cases concerning national security, also the court or tribunal
examining the appeal against a negative asylum decision, may be refused
access to (part) of the file underlying the asylum decision. This suggests that
the asylum decision may be (partly) based on secret information. Article 16
(1) PD provides that the legal representative may be refused access to informa-
tion in the asylum seeker’s file, where disclosure of information or sources
would jeopardise national security, the security of the organisations or per-
son(s) providing the information or the security of the person(s) to whom the
information relates or where the investigative interests relating to the exam-
ination of applications of asylum by the competent authorities of the Member
States or the international relations of the Member States would be com-
promised. In these cases, access to the information or sources in question shall
be available to the authorities (a court or tribunal) which provide the effective
remedy required by Article 39 PD. The access of the court or tribunal to this
information may however be precluded in cases of national security.
Article 4 QD does not mention the use of evidence which is not or partly
disclosed to the asylum applicant. Noll states however that the the examining
authorities’ obligation to assess the relevant elements of the asylum claim in
cooperation with the applicant laid down in Article 4 (1) QD, may imply that
classified investigative material which cannot be shared with the applicant
must be excluded from the basis for a decision in the case.12
The EU Courts case-law
The EU Courts have applied the right of access to the file and its related rights
and principles in cases concerning several, very different fields of EU law. In
all these cases, the EU Courts seems to apply the same standards. The case-law
developed under the right of access to the file in one field of EU law should
therefore be considered relevant for other fields of EU law, including asylum
law.13 The CFI for example referred in its judgments concerning EU measures
freezing the funds of persons or organisations suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities to its earlier case-law in competition law cases. Violations
of the right of access to the file and the rights of the defence are assessed on
12 Noll 2005-II, p 7.
13 See also Craig who states with regard to Case T-42/96, Eyckeler [1998], which concerned
customs decisions: ‘The ease with which the CFI reasoned by analogy from competition
to customs, signifies the generalization of access to the file as an aspect of the right to be
heard, irrespective of the subject-matter area in question, and this is in accord with the
formulation in the Charter of Fundamental Rights’. Craig 2006, p 367.
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a case by case basis,14 which gives the EU Courts the opportunity to take the
nature of the case into account.15
Most of the case-law which will be discussed below concerns decisions
of the EU institutions which were reviewed by the CFI or the General Court
and (in some cases) eventually by the Court of Justice. In asylum cases it is
the national courts which are confronted with decisions which are (partly)
based on confidential information. It may be assumed that the CFI’s case-law
regarding the right of access to the file is also relevant for national courts
dealing with decisions based on confidential information.16 The EU rights and
principles applied in these cases such as the rights of the defence and the right
to an effective remedy also apply in the national context. Furthermore as will
be shown in section 10.2.1.4 that the Court of Justice seems to apply similar
standards to procedures before the EU courts and the national courts.
The EU Courts have recognised in their case-law that the right of access
to the file is not absolute. EU Institutions may refuse to disclose documents
containing business secrets, internal documents, and information which should
remain confidential in order to protect the sources that provided these docu-
ments or this information or for reasons of national security. In those situations
the interests in not disclosing relevant information must be balanced against
the rights of the defence.
The EU Courts sometimes refer to the case-law of the ECtHR when address-
ing the right of access to the file and the rights of the defence.17 Furthermore
the CFI and the Court of Justice have indicated that national procedures in
which confidential information plays a role must comply with the requirements
following from Article 6 ECHR.18 The references to the ECtHR’s case-law are
however quite random and incomplete. Nonetheless there exist clear parallels
between the EU Courts’ case-law and that of the ECtHR. It is conceivable that
14 The CFI states in Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 33: ‘According to the case-law,
an infringement of the rights of the defence cannot be founded on a general argument but
must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case’.
15 See for example Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 68, where it considered
that the principles following from the case-law concerning the right of access to the file
in competition cases also apply to concentration cases examined under Regulation 4064/89,
‘even though their application may reasonably be adapted to the need for speed, which
characterises the general scheme of that regulation’.
16 In her opinion with Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 61, A.G. Sharpston stated that the
pragmatic solution found by the CFI in a case in which confidential evidence was used
and the CFI’s rules of procedure, cannot constitute any binding precedence for a national
court. However she considered ‘that they provide helpful practical guidance as to the
approach to be taken, which must conform with the rules applicable to that court in so
far as they do not conflict with any higher norm’.
17 See for example Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council
and Commission [2008], para 344 and Case T-228/02, Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], paras 119 and 158.
18 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], paras 44-48 and Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para
166
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in the future the ECtHR’s case-law will help the EU Courts to fill in some of
the existing gaps in their jurisprudence concerning the use of confidential
information. Section 10.3 will address the ECtHR’s case-law quite extensively,
in order to understand which minimum standards are set by this Court.
The case-law which will be addressed in this chapter is divided into two
parts. Section 10.2.1 discusses the case-law concerning economical issues,
mostly competition law. Section 10.2.2 examines the case-law regarding EU
measures freezing the funds of persons and entities suspected of involvement
in terrorist activities. Confidential information may also play a role in other
fields of EU law such as customs decisions or civil service cases. I chose to limit
this chapter to competition cases and terrorism cases. In competition cases
the EU Courts developed a comprehensive body of case-law concerning the
right of access to the file. In terrorism cases, as in asylum cases, the limitation
of the right of access to the file for reasons of national security plays an im-
portant role.
10.1.1 Competition cases and the protection of business secrets
In competition cases the EU Courts have set out the general principles with
regard to cases in which the protection of confidential information on the one
hand and the rights of the defence of the parties concerned on the other hand,
collide. Such cases concern for example the imposition by the Commission
of a fine on one or more companies for participating in a concerted practice
and/or abusing their dominant position or the refusal to give permission for
a merger. The Commission’s decisions are often (partly) based on information
provided by other companies.19 Those companies may wish to remain anony-
mous or request the Commission to ensure the confidentiality of documents
containing business secrets. The EU Courts have held that in such cases the
right to confidentiality must be balanced against and reconciled with the rights
of the defence, in particular the right of access to the file and the right to be
heard.
The case-law which will be discussed in this section mostly concerns
decisions by the Commission and their review by the CFI and subsequently
the Court of Justice.20 Two cases however (Varec and Mobistar) regard pre-
liminary questions concerning the required review of confidential information
by national courts. These cases will be addressed in section 10.2.1.4. In both
sorts of cases similar principles are used by the EU Courts. Furthermore some
19 See for the special problems which characterise the production of evidence in competition
cases the opinion of A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission
[2007], paras 52-59.
20 For the purpose of gathering relevant case-law I used Barents 2007, pp 568-589.
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references will be made to the Commission Notice on the rules for access to
the Commission file in certain competition cases (the Commission Notice).21
10.1.1.1 The right of access to the file
In competition cases the legality of the use of confidential information is
usually addressed under the right of access to the file and the right to be heard.
The purpose of providing access to the file in competition cases is to enable
the addressees of statements of objections to examine evidence in the Commis-
sion’s file so that they are in a position effectively to express their views on
the conclusions reached by it in its statement of objections on the basis of that
evidence.22 The right of access to the file is justified by the need to ensure
that the undertakings in question are able properly to defend themselves
against the objections raised in that statement.23 The party concerned must
be able during the administrative procedure to make know its views on the
truth and relevance of the facts, charges and circumstances relied on by the
Commission.24
When taking a decision aversely affecting a party the EU Institutions are
obliged to provide access to the file to this party.25 The ‘file’ consists of all
information relevant to the defence of the interests of the party concerned.26
It thus includes both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.27 The rights of
the defence of the party concerned have been infringed only if the non-dis-
closure of the documents in question might have influenced the course of the
procedure and the content of the decision to the applicant’s detriment.28 The
Commission is allowed to preclude from the administrative procedure evidence
which has no relation to the allegations of fact and of law in the statement
of objections and which therefore has no relevance to the investigation.29 In
21 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Artt
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Artt 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 139/2004 [2005] OJ C-325/7 (Commission Notice on the rules for access to
the Commission file). See for the procedure before the Commission also Commission
decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition
proceedings [2001] OJ L 162/21.
22 See for example Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1999], para 75.
23 See for example Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 65,
24 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 69.
25 See also Erlandsson 1998, pp 145-146.
26 See for example Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail [1991], para 17 (anti-dumping case).
27 Erlandsson 1998, p 146. According to the Commission Notice on the rules for access to
the Commission file the parties will in principle be granted to all documents making up
the Commission’s file. This file consists of all documents which have been obtained,
produced and/or assembled by the Commission Directorate for Competition, during the
investigation.
28 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 78.
29 This is also called the objective link criterion. See for example Joined Cases C-204/00 P
etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 126.
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order to ascertain whether the non-disclosure of a document could have
harmed the defence during the administrative procedure, a distinction should
be made between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.30
Inculpatory evidence
The right of access to the file is not an end in itself, but is intended to protect
the rights of the defence.31 Therefore the Commission is under no obligation
to disclose to the undertakings concerned the inculpatory evidence upon which
it does not rely in its decision in support of the complaints.32 ‘A document
can be regarded as a document that incriminates an applicant only where it
is used by the Commission to support a finding of an infringement in which
that party is alleged to have participated.’33 In BPB the CFI considered for
example that the information provided by an anonymous informant, which
was not disclosed to the undertaking concerned, was a factor triggering the
Commission’s investigations. However, no objection in the statement of ob-
jections or the contested decision was based solely on the information provided
by this informant. For that reason, and because the confidentiality of the
information was justified, the rights of the defence and the principle of equality
of arms had not been violated.34
Inculpatory documents that have not been communicated to the under-
takings concerned during the administrative procedure are not admissible as
evidence. Therefore they must be excluded as evidence, if the Commission
relied on them in its decision.35 The decision must only be annulled if the
other evidence underlying the decision does not meet the required standard
of proof.36 The party concerned must show that the result at which the Com-
mission arrived in its decision would have been different if the document(s)
which were not communicated to it, had to be disallowed as evidence.37 A
document containing incriminating evidence does not automatically need to
be excluded if only part of the information included in it must remain con-
fidential (see further section 10.2.1.3.).38
30 Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 130.
31 Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1999], para 76.
32 Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line and others v Commission
[2003], para 377.
33 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 32.
34 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], paras 32-38.
35 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 41, Case C-62/86, AKZO [1991], paras 21 and
24 and Case 107/82, AEG [1983], paras 24-25.
36 Case 107/82, AEG [1983], para 30.
37 Case C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission [2010], para 13. See also Case T-410/03, Hoechst
v Commission [2008], para 146, Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 45 and Erlands-
son 1998, p 172.
38 Case C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission [2007], para 44. See differently Case
107/82, AEG [1983], paras 23-24.
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Exculpatory evidence
The party concerned must have access to documents which are or might be
capable of substantiating its defence. However, according to the CFI the rights
of the defence have only been infringed, if it has been established that the non-
disclosure of the documents in question
might have influenced the course of the procedure and the content of the decision
to the applicant’ s detriment. The possibility of such an influence can therefore
be established if a provisional examination of some of the evidence shows that the
documents not disclosed might ‘in the light of that evidence’ have had a significance
which ought not to have been disregarded.39
Thus the undertaking concerned must ‘establish not only that it did not have
access to certain exculpatory evidence, but also that it could have used that
evidence for its defence’.40 The CFI in some cases granted the undertaking
access to non-confidential versions of the non-disclosed documents and invited
it to show how the non-disclosure of these documents could have harmed
its defence.41 The CFI and (in appeal cases) the Court of Justice examine
whether a document, which is relevant and therefore should have been dis-
closed to the undertaking concerned, was of use to this undertaking’s
defence.42 In this examination the strength of the (disclosed) evidence relied
on by the Commission and that of the positions of the party concerned are
taken into account.43 The CFI concluded in many cases that the evidence could
not have been capable of substantiating the undertaking’s defence and that
39 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 78. See also Case
C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission [2010], para 23, Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals
v Commission [1999], para 80 and Case T-161/05, Hoechst v Commission [2009], para 166.
40 Case C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission [2010], para 24. See also Joined Cases C-204/00 P
etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 133. Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission
[2008], para 55 and Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 146.
41 See for example Case T-52/03, Knauf Gips v Commission [2008], para 68, Case T-410/03,
Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 150 and Case T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission
[1991], para 56.
42 See for example Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 87,
where the CFI concluded that some documents which were not disclosed to the undertaking
concerned were capable of substantiating its defence. See also Case C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips
v Commission [2010], para 25.
43 In Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 86 the CFI takes into
account the ‘weakness of the documentary evidence’ relied on by the Commission and
the ‘strong positions held by the applicant’. The CFI found a violation of the rights of the
defence. In Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004],
paras 156-164, the Commission relied on direct evidence. The applicants had not stated
precisely what evidence was distorted by the CFI and had not demonstrated the errors
which lead to that distortion. No violation was found.
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therefore no violation of the rights of the defence occurred.44 If an infringe-
ment of the rights of the defence has been established, the decision must be
annulled.
According to the EU Courts it cannot be for the Commission alone to decide
which documents are useful for the defence of the undertaking.45 This follows
from the principle of equality of arms, which presupposes that in a competition
case the knowledge which the undertaking concerned has of the file used in
the proceeding is the same as that of the Commission.46 In Imperial Chemical
Industries the CFI considered that where difficult and complex economic ap-
praisals are to be made, the Commission must give the advisers of the under-
taking concerned the opportunity to examine documents which may be rel-
evant so that their probative value for the defence can be assessed. This is
particularly true in proceedings where documents may just as easily be inter-
preted in a way favourable to the undertakings concerned as in an
unfavourable way.47 The CFI considered that
in such circumstances any error made by the Commission’s officials in categorizing
as “neutral” a given document which, as an item of irrelevant evidence, will not
then be disclosed to the undertakings, must not be allowed to impair their
defence.48
Obligation to request for access to the file?
It seems to follow from the CFI’s case-law that the Commission is obliged to
ensure of its own motion that the rights of the defence are respected and thus
that the party concerned has access to the documents included in the investiga-
tion file.49 The undertaking is thus not required to request the Commission
to be granted access to the file.50 When the undertaking does request access
to documents which were not communicated to it, it must specify which
44 See for example Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004],
paras 158-164, Case T-151/07, Kone v Commission [2011], paras 152-156 and Case T-191/06,
FMC Foret v Commission [2011], paras 300-314.
45 See for example Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004],
para 126 and Case 107/82, AEG [1983], para 24
46 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 93.
47 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], paras 91-92 and 111.
48 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 92.
49 See for example Case T-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v Council [1991], para 17, where the CFI
held that ‘in performing their duty to provide information, the Community institutions
must act with all due diligence by seeking [..] to provide the undertakings concerned, as
far as is compatible with the obligation not to disclose business secrets, with information
relevant to the defence of their interests, choosing, if necessary on their own initiative, the
appropriate means of providing such information’.
50 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 96. See Erlandsson 1998,
p 166.
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documents it wishes to have access to and for what reasons.51 The CFI held
that the Commission is not required to make available, of its own initiative,
documents which are not in its investigation file and which it does not intend
to use against the parties concerned in the final decision. An undertaking
which learns during the administrative procedure that the Commission has
documents which might be useful for its defence and wishes to inspect them
must make an express request to the Commission for access to those docu-
ments. If the applicant fails to make such request during the administrative
procedure, his right to do so is barred in any action for annulment brought
against the final decision.52
Access to the file in practice
According to the Commission Notice access to the file may be provided in
several ways: by means of an electronic data storage device, through copies
of the accessible file in paper, sent to the parties by mail, by inviting the parties
to examine the accessible file on the Commission’s premises or a combination
of those methods.53
10.1.1.2 The right to confidentiality
The EU courts have accepted that the confidentiality of the following documents
or information may be justified in competition cases:
· documents containing other companies’ business secrets
· internal documents of the Commission
· other confidential Information disclosed to the Commission subject to an
obligation of confidentiality, such as information enabling complainants
to be identified.54
51 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 33. The CFI held that the applicant may not
demand access, in a general and abstract way, to documents or information which have
not been communicated to it without stating how the inculpatory evidence relied upon
by the Commission in the contested decision was determined by those documents or that
information.
52 Case T-186/06, Solvay v Commission [2011], para 227, Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95
to T-32/95, T-34/95 to T-39/95, T-42/95 to T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95
to T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and others v Commis-
sion [2000], para 383.
53 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 44.
54 See for example Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 145, Case T-53/03, BPB
v Commission [2008], para 36 and Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 66. The
Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file also states that access
to internal documents, business secrets of other undertakings and other confidential
information will be refused. See also Art 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parlia-
ment, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43.
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Protection of business secrets
Article 41 of the Charter explicitly mentions that business secrets must be
respected.55 The EU Courts have also recognised the protection of business
secrets as a general principle of EU law.56 According to the Commission a
business secret is information about an undertaking’s business activity, dis-
closure of which could result in serious harm to the same undertaking.57 The
protection of business secrets helps the Commission to achieve the objectives
of competition law. It should make it easier for the Commission to obtain
information from third undertakings.58 The Court of Justice held in AKZO that
a third party who has submitted a complaint may not in any circumstances
be given access to documents containing business secrets.59 However in later
cases the EU Courts accepted that the right to confidentiality must be balanced
against the rights of the defence (see further section 10.2.1.3).
Internal Commission documents
Internal documents are not to be communicated to the parties concerned unless
the circumstances of the case are exceptional and the parties concerned make
out for the need to do so. According to the CFI the restriction on access to
internal documents is justified by the need to ensure the proper functioning
of the institution concerned.60 The Commission Notice states that internal
documents can be neither inculpatory or exculpatory. The restriction of access
to internal documents therefore does not prejudice the proper exercise of the
parties’ rights of the defence.61
55 See also Art 339 TfEU, which requires the members of the institutions of the Union, the
members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union, even after their
duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of
professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations
or their cost components.
56 See for example Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 98 and
for the national context Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 49.
57 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 18. Examples of
information that may qualify as business secrets are: technical and/or financial information
relating to an undertaking’s know-how, methods of assessing costs, production secrets and
processes, supply sources, quantities produced and sold.
58 Erlandsson 1998, p 148.
59 Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK v Commission [1986], para 28. The Court
states that any other solution would lead to the unacceptable consequence that an under-
taking might be inspired to lodge a complaint with the Commission solely in order to gain
access to its competitors business secrets.
60 Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 165, Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined
Cases T-134/94, T-136/94, T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94,
T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94, NMH Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999], paras
35-36.
61 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 12.
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Other confidential Information
The CFI has held that ‘in the case of information supplied on a purely voluntary
basis, accompanied by a request for confidentiality in order to protect the
informant’s anonymity, an institution which accepts such information is bound
to comply with such a condition’.62 According to the CFI ‘the Commission’s
ability to guarantee the anonymity of certain of its sources of information is
of crucial importance with a view to ensuring the effective prevention of
prohibited anti-competitive practices.’63 The EU Courts have recognised ‘that
an undertaking holding a dominant position on the market might adopt
retaliatory measures against competitors, suppliers or customers who have
collaborated in the investigation carried out by the Commission.’ Therefore
third-party undertakings which submit documents to the Commission in the
course of its investigations and consider that reprisals might be taken against
them as a result can do so only if they know that account will be taken of their
request for confidentiality.64
10.1.1.3 Confidentiality versus access to the file
It follows from the above that the Commission may face a dilemma: should
it keep certain information confidential and therefore refrain from using it
as evidence, or should it disclose the information with a risk of seriously
harming the interests of the company which provided the information.65 The
Commission has recognised that in proceedings under Articles 81 and 82 of
the former EC Treaty the qualification of a piece of information as confidential
is not a bar to its disclosure if such information is necessary to prove an alleged
infringement or could be necessary to exonerate a party. In that case the need
to safeguard the rights of the defence of the parties may outweigh the concern
to protect confidential information of other parties. The Commission assesses
whether those circumstances apply to any specific situation, taking into
account: the relevance of the information, whether the information is indis-
pensable, the degree of sensitivity involved and the preliminary view of the
seriousness of the alleged infringement. When the Commission intends to
disclose information the person or undertaking in question gets the opportunity
to provide a non-confidential version of the information. The non-confidential
information must have the same evidential value as the confidential version.66
According to the EU Courts, the rights of the defence must be balanced
against the right of other economic operators to the protection of their confi-
62 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 36.
63 Case T-53/03, BPB v Commission [2008], para 36.
64 Case C-310/93 P, BPB and Britisch Gypsum v Commission [1995], para 26. See also Commission
Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 19.
65 See also Erlandsson 1998, p 158.
66 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file. paras 24 and 25.
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dential information and their business secrets.67 If an inculpatory or
exculpatory document contains genuine business secrets or cannot be disclosed
for one of the other reasons mentioned above, a solution must be sought in
which the right of confidentiality and the rights of the defence are re-
conciled.68 The communication of a non-confidential version or a summary
of the document is the most important solution proposed by the CFI. Further-
more the Commission may provide a list of documents contained in the
Commission’s file, before granting access to (non-confidential versions) of those
documents.
Non-confidential versions or summaries
According to the CFI the Commission can protect the business secrets or other
confidential information of third parties by deleting the sensitive passages from
the copies of the documents sent to the applicant.69 This could also imply
that the identity of the source of the information is not disclosed. A non-
confidential summary must be sufficiently precise.70 According to the
Commission Notice ‘the non-confidential versions and the descriptions of the
deleted information must be established in a manner that enables any party
with access to the file to determine whether the information deleted is likely
to be relevant for its defence and therefore whether there are sufficient grounds
to request the Commission to grant access to the information claimed to be
confidential’.71
The CFI held in several cases that the provision of non-confidential versions
of evidence underlying the contested decision did not infringe the rights of
the defence. However, the weight of the evidence may be reduced because
of the fact that certain information is not communicated to the undertaking
concerned. In Endemol , a concentration case, the Commission provided non-
confidential summaries of some independent television producers’ replies to
the Commission’s questionnaires. These summaries concealed the identity of
those producers. The CFI noted that the replies to the questionnaires contained
only the views of the third parties on the likely consequences of the concentra-
tion. ‘The non-confidential summaries made those views clear. It was thus
67 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 98. See for the national
context Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 51 and Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 40.
68 See for example Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 67.
69 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 102. It is not clear
whether such non-confidential summaries must be provided by the Commission of its own
motion, or on the party’s request. In Case C-310/93 P, BPB and British Gypsum v Commission
[1995], para 31 the party’s complaint that no non-confidential summaries were provided
by the Commission was dismissed, because it had not been established that such summaries
were requested by the party concerned or that such a request would have been justified.
70 See Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 154.
71 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 38.
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not necessary to know the identity of the third parties in question in order
to be able to challenge the views expressed.’72
In Salzgitter Mannesmann the Court of Justice held that the CFI rightly
allowed a document as incriminating evidence, while the identity of the author
and the person who transmitted it to the Commission were not disclosed to
the party concerned. The Court referred to the following three circumstances.
First of all it pointed at the fact that the CFI in assessing the credibility of the
document took into account the anonymous origin of that document. According
to the CFI the credibility of that document was necessarily reduced by the fact
that the context in which it was drafted was largely unknown and because
the Commission’s assertions in that regard could not be verified. Secondly
the CFI held that evidence of anonymous origin cannot in itself establish the
existence of an infringement of EC competition law. In this case the anonymous
statements were supported by other evidence and they were only of ancillary
importance. Finally the Court took into account that the party concerned was
given opportunity to comment on the document and to put forward its argu-
ments on the probative value of that document in the light of its anonymous
origin.73
In Hoechst the CFI held that the non-confidential version of relevant docu-
ments in the form made available to the undertaking concerned bore ‘a close
relationship to a failure to disclose’ those documents. The Court took into
account that the documents consisted of 101 pages virtually all of which were
blank and marked ‘Business secrets’. No summary of the content of the docu-
ments was provided during the administrative proceedings. Only a list setting
out the date, sender and addressee of the documents and where appropriate
the subject-matter were mentioned.74 In Alrosa some third party observations
submitted to the Commission were essential for the Commission’s decision
as it changed its initial position on the basis of them. Alrosa only received
a summary of the Commission’s conclusions drawn from these observations
and non-confidential summaries of the observations themselves. The non-
confidential version of the third party observations requested by Alrosa were
supplied at a moment when it was impossible for Alrosa to provide an effect-
ive reply to them. According to the CFI Alrosa was therefore not given the
opportunity to fully exercise its right to be heard.75
72 Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], paras 71-72.
73 Case C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission [2007], paras 46-50. These three
conditions were also mentioned by A.G. Geelhoed in paras 62-65 of his opinion in this
case.
74 Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 152. The Court did not find a violation
of the right of access to the file because the documents concerned could not have changed
the Commission’s conclusions.
75 Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission [2007], paras 196-203.
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List of documents
If protecting a third company’s business secrets or other sensitive information
by preparing non-confidential versions of all the documents in question proves
difficult, the Commission could send to the party concerned a list of documents
contained in the Commission’s file.76 Then the party concerned can request
access to specific documents on the list. Those documents or, if necessary non-
confidential versions of them, should be provided to the party concerned. The
purpose of having a list as proposed by the CFI is that the information con-
tained in it ‘should provide to the applicant information sufficiently precise
to enable it to ascertain, with knowledge of the facts, whether the documents
described were likely to be relevant for its defence’.77In several cases the
Commission sent the party concerned a list of documents contained in the
Commissions file. In Endemol the CFI held that the table of the file contents
presented by the Commission did not infringe the rights of the defence. In
that case the Commission had prepared a summary list of all 279 documents
which made up the file. That list gave first of all a breakdown of the docu-
ments by type (annual reports, internal notes, requests for information and
so forth). Secondly, the list indicated, for each document or group of docu-
ments, whether it was accessible to the companies concerned, partially access-
ible to them, confidential or not relevant.78
10.1.1.4 Judicial review
In appeals against Commission decisions in competition cases the General
Court (like the former CFI) may request the Commission to submit its file
including all confidential evidence.79 In order to enable the CFI to determine
whether it is conducive to proper conduct of the procedure to order the
production of certain documents, the undertaking should identify the docu-
ments requested and provide the Court with at least minimum information
indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the procedure.80
The Commission may request the Court not to disclose the confidential in-
formation to the applicant undertaking.81
76 See also the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 45.
77 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 104, See also Case
T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 154.
78 Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission 1999], para 78.
79 Art 24 of the Statute of the Court of Justice states that ‘the Court of Justice may require
the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information which the Court
considers desirable. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal. Protocol (No 3) on the Statute
of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2008], OJ C 115/210.
80 Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998], para 93.
81 See for example the CFI’s Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined Cases T-134/94, T-136/94,
T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and
T-157/94, NMH Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999], para 37, where the CFI considered
that the Commission’s obligation to submit all relevant documents to the Court does not
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The Court first of all carries out a comparative and provisional analysis
of the probative value of the documents that were not disclosed and of the
evidence that the Commission regards as sufficient to lead to the findings made
in its decision.82 During this procedure the Court does not disclose the docu-
ments concerned to the applicants.83 In its analysis the Court establishes
whether the non-disclosure of the documents in question might have influenced
the course of the procedure and the content of the decision to the applicant’s
detriment.84 Documents which are not relevant to the applicant’s defence
are left out of the Court’s file. They remain wholly extraneous to the proceed-
ings and are not taken into consideration by the Court.85
In some cases the Court examines whether the (partial) non-disclosure of
the relevant evidence is justified.86 During this examination the Court guar-
antees the confidentiality of the evidence submitted by the Commission.87
If the confidentiality is not justified, the Court will disclose the confidential
evidence to the parties concerned.88 If confidentiality is justified, a non-con-
fidential version of the evidence may be made available to the applicant.
The Court then assesses according to the principles set out above whether
the rights of the defence are infringed and whether the decision should be
annulled. Where a document is not at all disclosed to the applicant, the Court
intend to enable the applicants to peruse the files of the institution concerned as they see
fit. Its sole purpose is to assist the Court in the exercise of its power of review of the legality
of the contested measure by placing the whole of the administrative file at its disposal.
82 Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 132,
83 Art 67 (3) of the Consolidated Version of the Rules of Court of the General Court (2010/
C 177/02) [2010], OJ C 177/37.
84 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 78. See also the CFI’s
Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined Cases T-134/94, T-136/94, T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/
94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94, NMH Stahlwerke and
others v Commission [1999], para 40.
85 See for example the CFI’s Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined Cases T-134/94, T-136/94,
T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and
T-157/94, NMH Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999], para 33 and Case T-410/03,
Hoechst v Commission [2008], paras 169-171.
86 See for example Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 69 and Case T-36/91,
Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 102. This also follows from Art 67
(3) of the Consolidated Version of the Rules of Court of the General Court (2010/C 177/02)
[2010], OJ C 177/37, which states that ‘where it is necessary for the General Court to verify
the confidentiality, in respect of one or more parties, of a document that may be relevant
in order to rule in a case, that document shall not be communicated to the parties at the
stage of such verification.’ In Case T-44/00, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2004],
paras 81-99 the Court did not assess whether the non-disclosure of the names of the sources
of relevant information was justified.
87 See Art 67 (3) of the Consolidated Version of the Rules of Court of the General Court (2010/
C 177/02) [2010], OJ C 177/37.
88 See for example CFI’s Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined Cases T-134/94, T-136/94,
T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/
94, NMH Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999].
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does not take that document into account.89 The Court examines whether
the decision can be based on the non-confidential evidence. If during the
administrative proceedings the applicant only had access to a non-confidential
version of a document, the Court examines whether this amounts to an in-
fringement of the rights of the defence.90 Where possible exculpatory docu-
ments were not disclosed to applicant, the rights of the defence are violated
and the decision will be annulled.
An infringement of the rights of the defence which occurred during the
administrative procedure cannot be regularised during the proceedings before
the Court of First Instance or the Court of Justice.91 According to the Court
of Justice the belated disclosure of documents in the file does not put the
undertaking back into the situation it would have been in, if it had been able
to rely on those documents in presenting its written and oral observations
to the Commission.92 The CFI notes in this regard that it carries out a review
solely in relation to the pleas raised and which cannot therefore be a substitute
for a thorough investigation of the case in the course of the administrative
procedure. If during the administrative procedure the applicant had been able
to rely on documents which might exculpate it, it might have been able to
influence the Commission’s assessment. The Court cannot therefore rule out
the possibility that the Commission would have found the infringement to
be shorter and less serious and would, consequently, have fixed the fine at
a lower amount.93
Application to procedures before national courts
The Court of Justice answered two questions of national courts relating to the
meaning of the right of access to the file and the rights of the defence before
them.94 In Mobistar the national court asked the Court of Justice whether EU
law required it to have at its disposal all the information necessary for the
merits of the case to be duly taken into account including the confidential
information on the basis of which the national authority adopted the decision
which is the subject-matter of the appeal.95 In Varec the national court wanted
89 Art 67 (3) of the Consolidated Version of the Rules of Court of the General Court (2010/C
177/02) [2010], OJ C 177/37 states that the General Court shall take into consideration only
those documents which have been made available to the lawyers and agents of the parties
and on which they have been given an opportunity of expressing their views.
90 See for example Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission [1999], para 72.
91 See for example Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004],
para 104 and Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 108.
92 Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1999], paras 78-79.
93 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], paras 108 and 113.
94 The Varec judgment concerned the review by a national court of a decision taken by a
contracting authority in the context of a contract award procedure. Mobistar regarded a
dispute concerning a decision fixing the set-up costs payable by a receiving mobile telephone
operator for number transfer or portability from one operator to another.
95 Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 19.
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to know whether EU law required the appeal authority to ensure confidentiality
and observance of the business secrets contained in the files communicated
to it by the parties concerned, including the determining authority, whilst at
the same time being entitled to apprise itself of such information and take
it into consideration.96
The Court of Justice held in both cases that national courts should have
at their disposal all the information necessary in order to decide in full know-
ledge of the facts on the merits of the appeal, including confidential informa-
tion.97 However it considered in Varec that, in the context of national (judicial)
review of a decision taken by a contracting authority in relation to a contract
award procedure ‘the adversarial principle does not mean that the parties are
entitled to unlimited and absolute access to all of the information relating to
the award procedure concerned, which has been filed with the body re-
sponsible for the review.98 It recognised that in some cases it may be necessary
for certain information to be withheld from the parties in order to preserve
the fundamental rights of a third party or to safeguard an important public
interest.99 Here the Court referred to the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6
ECHR.100
Like in competition cases against the Commission discussed above, the
Court held that the principles of the protection of confidential information
and of business secrets must be observed in such a way as to reconcile it with
the right to effective legal protection and the rights of the defence of the parties
to the dispute.101 A national body reviewing a decision which is (partly)
based on confidential information, must therefore decide ‘to what extent and
by what process it is appropriate to safeguard the confidentiality and secrecy
of that information, having regard to the requirements of effective legal pro-
tection and the rights of defence of the parties to the dispute.’ This implies
an objective review of the question whether information is genuinely business
sensitive.102 If this body is a court, the procedure must comply with the
requirements of fair trial.103
96 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 21.
97 Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 40, Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 53.
98 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 51.
99 The Court recognised that operators must be able to communicate any relevant information
to the contracting authorities in the procurement process, without the fear that the author-
ities will communicate to third parties items of information whose disclosure could be
damaging to them. Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], paras 36 and 43.
100 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 47. The Court refers to Rowe and Davis v the United
Kingdom and V. v Finland, both cases concerned complaints under the criminal limb of Art 6
ECHR.
101 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 52, See also C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 40.
102 See Von Papp 2009, p 996.
103 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 55, see also Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 43.
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Having regard to the extremely serious damage which could result from improper
communication of certain information to a competitor, that body must, before
communicating that information to the dispute, give the economic operator con-
cerned an opportunity to plead that the information is confidential or a business
secret.104
The Court of Justice thus applies principles which are similar to those applied
in the context of appeals against Commission decisions in competition cases
before the EU Courts. However, it does not refer extensively to its case-law
in these cases and it does not provide much guidance to the national court
as to how the rights of the defence and the right to confidentiality must be
reconciled.105
It is interesting to note that in her opinion in Varec AG Sharpston did
propose more detailed criteria which were based on the CFI’s practice in
competition cases in which confidential evidence played a role, notably its
orders in the Steel beems cases.106 She stated that although neither the prag-
matic solution adopted by the CFI or the rules of procedure of the CFI
can constitute any binding precedent for a national court, [..] they provide helpful
practical guidance as to the approach to be taken, which must conform with rules
applicable to that court, in sofar as they do not conflict with any higher norm.107
According to the AG the principles applied must be the following:
a) ‘A party may not refuse to communicate evidence to the review body on the
ground of business secrecy
b) A party communicating evidence to the review body may ask for it to be treated
as confidential, in whole or in part, vis-à-vis another party
c) All principal parties should have access to all evidence relevant to the outcome
of the review, in a form adequate to enable them to comment on it
d) The review body should take care not to use any evidence withheld from one
or more principal parties in any way which could infringe those parties’ rights
to a fair hearing and to equality of arms.’108
The AG is furthermore of the opinion that this assessment needs to be done
on a case by case basis and must seek to assure the greatest protection of each
interest (confidentiality of business secrecy and the right to a fair hearing)
104 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 54.
105 See also Von Papp 2009, p 995.
106 In particular the Order of 10 December 1997 in Joined Cases T-134/94, T-136/94, T-137/94,
T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94, NMH
Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999].
107 These higher norms include EU legislation as interpreted in the light of the right to the
protection of business secrets and the right to a fair hearing.
108 Opinion of A.G. Sharpston of 25 October 2007 with Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 62.
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which is achievable without impairing the substance of the other, and to strike
as fair a balance as is possible between the two.109
10.1.1.5 Subconclusion: the use of secret information in EU competition cases
In competition cases the EU Courts attach great importance both to the rights
of the defence and to the protection of confidential information, in particular
business secrets. They have recognised that the disclosure of business secrets
or other confidential information may cause an undertaking serious harm.
On the other hand they have accepted that the refusal to communicate evidence
to the undertaking which is the object of a Commission decision (for example
to impose a fine) may harm the rights of the defence. The fact that a relevant
document has not been disclosed to the undertaking concerned, has severe
consequences. Inculpatory documents which were not communicated to the
undertaking should be excluded as evidence. The rights of the defence are
infringed when exculpatory documents have not been disclosed which might
have influenced the course of the procedure and the content of the decision
to the applicant’ s detriment. The undertaking must be able to assess itself
whether information is relevant to its defence. It should substantiate before
the CFI that the documents may have changed the Commission’s conclusions.
In several cases the undertaking did not succeed in doing so. In its assessment
the CFI took into account the strength of the (disclosed) evidence relied on by
the Commission and that of the undertaking’s positions.
The Commission does not necessarily need to choose between the protection
of confidential information and the rights of the defence. According to the
EU Courts in competition those two interests must be balanced against each
other. A compromise, such as the provision of non-confidential versions of
documents are permissible. Such summaries must provide sufficiently precise
information enabling the party concerned to determine whether the information
deleted is likely to be relevant for its defence and to express its views on it.
When reviewing competition decisions in which it is claimed that the rights
of the defence have been infringed, because confidential information has not
been disclosed to the undertaking concerned, the General Court plays an active
role. It assesses whether the information concerned could be relevant for the
undertaking’s defence. In some cases it examines whether the (partial) non-
disclosure of the relevant information is justified. Finally it rules whether the
rights of the defence have been infringed because possible exculpatory evidence
has not been disclosed. It also decides whether, after exclusion of the
inculpatory evidence not disclosed to the undertaking, the remaining non-
confidential evidence is sufficient to support the decision.
Also in proceedings before national courts ruling in similar cases, the
protection of business secrets must be observed in such a way as to reconcile
109 Opinion of A.G. Sharpston of 25 October 2007 with Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 63.
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it with the right to effective legal protection and the rights of the defence of
the parties to the dispute. Therefore the national court should be able to review
evidence which has not been disclosed to the party concerned and assess
whether the non-disclosure is justified.
10.1.2 EU sanctions and the protection of national security
Since 11 September 2001 the EU has taken measures to combat terrorism. It
has engaged in sanctions freezing the funds and assets of persons who commit
and/or facilitate terrorist acts and those of groups and entities owned, con-
trolled or acting on behalf of such persons (henceforth EU sanctions).110 EU
sanctions are often based on information which is not disclosed to the person
or entity concerned. The information may be provided to the EU Institutions
by Member States or third countries, on the condition that this information
would remain confidential. This information or other information underlying
the EU sanction is usually kept confidential in the interest of the security and
the conduct of the international relations of the Member States and/or the
European Union.
In most cases which have been judged by the CFI and the General Court
the party concerned complained about a total lack of reasons for the decision,
the fact that the evidence underlying the decision had not been notified to
it and that therefore it did not get the opportunity to defend itself. In their
case-law regarding EU sanctions, the EU Courts usually refer to three principles
in particular: the right to be heard, the obligation to state reasons and the right
to an effective remedy. The requirements derived from these three principles
will be discussed in sections 10.2.2.2 – 10.2.2.4. The Court of Justice’s case-law
in Kadi will be used as point of departure. However, the CFI’s case-law with
regard to procedural requirements, of which the judgment in PMOI I is leading,
is much more detailed and will thus be discussed extensively in this sec-
tion.111
The general principles used in EU sanction cases and in competition cases
are the same. As was stated in the introduction to this chapter, the CFI in EU
sanction cases referred to relevant case-law in competition cases. However,
there are also some important differences between the EU Courts’ approach
in these cases. This section will show that the limitations to the rights of the
defence allowed in EU sanction cases seem to be more far-reaching than in
competition cases. The reason for this potentially relates to the nature of the
110 Koedooder & de Lang 2009, p 313.
111 Tridimas and Gutierrez-Fons state that in Kadi the Court of Justice was preoccupied with
asserting the rule of law and the existence of judicial review over Community action dictated
by the UN Security Council. The CFI however was preoccupied with the detailed require-
ments of procedural rights. Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, p 730.
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case and the grounds for not disclosing relevant evidence. Furthermore the
fact that the scope of judicial review of (autonomous) EU sanctions on the EU
level is rather limited, as a result of a division of tasks between the national
and EU level (see for explanation under 9.2.2.1), may play a role.
The case-law concerning EU sanctions is much less developed than in
competition cases, as until now most EU sanctions have been annulled because
of the complete absence of a statement of reasons and a total lack of a hearing.
The EU Courts therefore have not yet addressed the question how the rights
of the defence must be balanced against the protection of the safety and the
conduct of the international relations of the Member States and/or the Euro-
pean Union.
10.1.2.1 Legal framework and scope of judicial review
Before turning to the examination of the case-law of the EU Courts, some
remarks will be made regarding the relevant legal framework and possibility
of judicial review of EU sanctions. There are two strands of EU sanctions112:
those designated to give effect to resolutions issued by the United Nations
Security Council113 and autonomous EU sanctions.114The EU sanctions are
based on several common positions.115 Lists of persons and entities suspected
of involvement in terrorism are drawn up by the Council.116 Those lists are
regularly reviewed.117 The common positions are given effect by the adoption
112 Murphy 2010, p 301.
113 See for example Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council
and Commission [2008], Case T-318/01, Othman v Council and Commission [2009] and Joined
Cases C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P, Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission [2009].
114 See for example Case T-228/02, Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], Case T-47/03,
Sison v Council [2007].
115 Common Position 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism (2001/930/
CFSP) [2001, OJ L 344/90, Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the
application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP) [2010], OJ L 344/93
(Common Position 2001/931/CFSP), Common Position 2002/402/CFSP of 27 May 2002
concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida
organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with them repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/
154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP (2002/402/CFSP) [2002], OJ L 139/4 (Common Position
2002/402/CFSP).
116 See Annex 1 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against
certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and
the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export
of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending
the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan
[2002] OJ L 139/9 (Council Regulation No 881/2002).
117 According to Art 6 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP the list must be reviewed at least
every six months. Also the list annexed to Council Regulation No 881/2002 is regularly
reviewed.
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of Council regulations.118 According to the Court of Justice the legal basis
for the sanctions could be found in Articles 60, 301 and 308 of the former EC
Treaty.119 Since the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the sanctions
are based on Article 75 TfEU.
Both the procedure for imposing EU sanctions based on UN Security Council
resolutions and the procedure for taking autonomous EU sanctions take place
on two levels: the UN level and the EU level or the national level and the EU
level. As a result the task of the EU Courts in EU sanction cases is limited. It
will be argued below that this may explain why in EU sanction cases the scope
of the obligation to state reasons and the right to be heard seems to be more
limited than in competition cases. I will now briefly describe both procedures
and the possibilities for judicial review of the decisions taken on both levels.
The required scope and intensity of judicial review will be addressed in section
10.2.2.4 concerning the right to effective judicial protection.
EU sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions
The EU sanctions which give effect to UN Security Council resolutions are
preceded by a Security Council decision to place a person or entity on the
terrorist list.120 Following this decision the Council draws up a list of sus-
pected terrorists and subsequently issues a regulation which is applied to the
individual included in the list.121
Little is known about the procedure of listing individuals suspected of
terrorist activities at the UN level. Suspects must be identified based on in-
formation provided by States and regional organisations. Individuals do not
have the opportunity to be heard before or after the listing and they have no
right to appeal the decision to place them on the UN list.122 Furthermore the
Security Council does not communicate the reasons and evidence justifying
his appearance on the list to the person concerned.123
118 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism
[2001] OJ L 344/70, which implements Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Council
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, which implements Common Position 2002/402/CFSP.
119 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], paras 158-236. See also Murphy 2010, pp 301-304,Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008,
pp 664-679 and Eckes 2007, p 1121.
120 See Art 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Art 7 (1) of Council Regulation No
881/2002.
121 Koedooder &. de Lang 2009, p 319.
122 Koedooder &. de Lang 2009, pp 316-317. See also Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P,
Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008], paras 319-325.
123 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 325. Tzanou and El Droubi mention that in Othman the Court of First Instance
seems to endorse the applicant’s view that the Security Council’s decision to include him
in the terrorist list is a political decision, taken in a wholly non-judicial manner, without
any regard to the rules of evidence or of fairness. Tzanou & El Droubi 2010, p 1240.
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In Kadi the Court of Justice held that EU sanctions which are directly based
on Security Council resolutions can be reviewed by the EU Courts and should
comply with EU fundamental rights, such as the rights of the defence and the
right to an effective remedy.124 The EU Courts also review the question
whether the evidence adduced against the persons concerned justifies the
inclusion of their names on the EU terrorist list. The EU Courts do not review
the legality of the Security Council decision itself.125
Autonomous EU sanctions
Autonomous EU sanctions are based on information of the Member States.
According to Article 4 (1) of Common Position 2001/931 the list in its annex
shall be drawn up on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant
file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority in
respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it
concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an
attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and
credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such deeds.
The term “competent authority” shall mean a judicial authority, or, where
judicial authorities have no competence in the area covered by this provision,
an equivalent competent authority in that area.
Before imposing an EU sanction, the EU institutions must decide first of
all whether a national decision as mentioned in Article 4 (1) of Common
Position 2001/931 (henceforth also: national decision) has been taken. Secondly
they must assess whether it is (still) justified to include the person or entity
concerned in the EU terrorist list.126 When performing this second assessment
the EU institutions enjoy broad discretion.127 As a result the review by the
CFI of this decision is limited.128 The CFI has stressed however that it does
review the Council’s interpretation of the relevant facts and that review of
the observance of certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental import-
ance.129
124 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 326.
125 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 286. See on this issue also Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, pp 679-702.
126 See for example Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008],
para 51.
127 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 159 and
Case T-49/07, Fahas v Council [2010], para 57.
128 The CFI stressed that this limited review applies, especially, to the Council’s assessment
of the factors as to appropriateness on which decisions to freeze funds are based. Case
T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 159
129 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], paras 138-139.
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The Council should generally refrain from testing the legality of the
national decision underlying the EU sanction. In the PMOI I case the CFI con-
sidered:
[I]t is not for the Council to decide whether the proceedings instigated against the
party concerned and resulting in that decision as provided for by national law of
the Member State were correctly conducted or whether the fundamental rights of
the party concerned were respected by the national authorities. That power belongs
exclusively to the national courts or as the case may be to the European Court of
Human Rights.130
Also where the EU sanction is based on a national decision concerning in-
vestigations or prosecutions, rather than on a conviction or a sentence, the
Council should
defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the competent national
authority, at least where it is a judicial authority, both in respect of the issue of
whether there are “serious and credible evidence or clues’ on which the decision
is based and also in respect of recognition of potential restrictions on access to that
evidence or those clues legally justified under national law.131
This follows from the duty of sincere cooperation which is currently laid down
in Article 4 (3) TEU. The CFI only allows the possibility of review of the national
decision on the EU level, if the national decision is not taken by a competent
authority in the meaning of Article 4 (1) of Common Position 2001/931.132
This may also apply if the national decision is a decision to investigate or
prosecute (and thus not a conviction and sentence) taken by an authority which
is not a judicial authority133 and which is not subject to judicial review on
the national level.134
As a result the CFI generally only reviews whether the Council’s burden
proof is met and the rights of the defence are respected with regard to two
aspects of the decision to impose an EU sanction: the establishment that there
is (1) a national decision which (2) justifies the inclusion in the EU terrorist
130 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 121 and
Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 168.
131 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 124,
Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 171 and Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin
Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 133.
132 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 125 and
Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 172.
133 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 124 (‘at
least where it is a judicial authority‘) and Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 171.
See also Gattini 2009, p 239.
134 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 145.
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list and thus the imposition of an EU sanction.135 It does not engage in the
question whether the person or entity concerned can be considered to be
involved in terrorism. It is for the national determining authority and courts
to examine the (confidential) evidence underlying the national decision and
to ensure that the rights of the defence are respected in the procedure which
lead to the decision mentioned in Article 4 (1) of Common Position 2001/
931.136 In this context the CFI referred to the ECtHR’s judgment in Tinnally
v the United Kingdom concerning the rights of the defence under Article 6 ECHR,
which will be discussed in section 10.3.137
10.1.2.2 The right to be heard
The general principles developed in cases regarding other fields of EU law
also apply to EU sanctions.138 As was mentioned above, the right to be heard
has a rather limited purpose in the context of EU sanctions. In the view of the
CFI, in case of an initial decision to freeze funds, the right to be heard requires,
in principle, first, that the party concerned be informed by the Council of the
specific information or material in the file which indicates that a national
decision has been taken in respect of it by a competent authority of a Member
State, and also, where applicable, any new material which has not yet been
assessed by a competent authority at the national level.139 Secondly the party
concerned must be placed in a position in which it can effectively make known
its view on the information or material in the file. In the case of a subsequent
decision to freeze funds, observance of the right to be heard similarly requires,
first, that the party concerned be informed of the information or material in
the file which, in the view of the Council, justifies maintaining it in the dis-
puted lists, and also, where applicable, of any new material which has not
yet been assessed by a competent authority at the national level. Secondly it
must be afforded the opportunity effectively to make known its view on the
matter.140
According to the CFI the right to be heard does not give the party concerned
the right to a formal hearing: it is sufficient that it has the opportunity to
135 See for example Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], para 146.
136 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], paras 145-146.
137 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 166. See for criticism on this case-law Spaventa
2009, pp 1256-1260.
138 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 91-93.
139 Tridimas and Gutierrez-Fons state that the ‘CFI appears to leave itself here sufficient margin
of manoeuvering to intervene in exceptional circumstances’. They state that it is not clear
however whether it is open to the applicant to argue in all cases that the national proceed-
ings was defective. Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, pp 712-713.
140 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 126.
See also Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, p 709.
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submit written observations.141 The CFI held that the Council is not obliged
to spontaneously grant access to the documents in its file. It is only on the
request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access
to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue.
It is only obliged to communicate sufficiently precise information, enabling
the entity concerned to make its point of view on the evidence adduced against
it by the Council known to advantage.142
Possible limitations to the right to be heard
Both the Court of Justice and the CFI have accepted that far-reaching limitations
of the right to be heard may be justified in procedures concerning EU sanctions.
These limitations regard the moment in the procedure at which the hearing
takes place as well as the disclosure of evidence.
As to the moment of the hearing both Courts held that EU authorities are
not obliged to hear the party concerned (and therefore to notify the evidence
adduced against it) before imposing an EU sanction. A measure freezing the
funds or a person or entity must by its very nature take advantage of a surprise
effect and apply with immediate effect.143 Therefore the party concerned does
not need to be heard before its name is included on the terrorist list.144 These
considerations do not apply to subsequent decisions to impose an EU sanction.
Therefore such a decision needs to be preceded by the possibility of a further
hearing.145
Secondly the Court of Justice and the CFI accepted that ‘overriding con-
siderations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations of
the Community and of its Member States may militate against the communica-
tion of certain matters to the persons concerned and, therefore, against their
being heard on those matters’.146 According to the CFI such restrictions are
141 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 93.
142 Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], para 97. According to the CFI it would be
excessive to require spontaneous communication of the matters in the file, given that when
a fund-freezing measure is adopted it is not certain that the entity concerned intends to
check, by means of access to the file, the matters of fact supporting the allegations made
against it by the Council.
143 The Council and the Member States have pointed at the fact that the party concerned could
have taken advantage of the time period allowed to it to submit its comments to transfer
those funds out of the Union. Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran
v Council [2006], para 81.
144 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], paras 338-341.
145 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 131.
See also Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], paras 38-43
where the CFI held that the Council did by no means establish that the right to be heard
could not be respected because a decision had to be taken urgently.
146 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 342 and Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], para 133.
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consistent with the constitutional traditions of the Member States and the
ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 ECHR.147 The refusal to disclose evidence
applies, in the view of the CFI, above all to the ‘serious and credible evidence
or clues’ on which the national decision to instigate an investigation or
prosecution is based, in so far as they may have been brought to the attention
of the Council. However, the CFI also finds it
conceivable that the restrictions on access may concern the specific content or the
particular grounds for that decision, or even the identity of the authority that took
it. It is even possible that, in certain, very specific circumstances, the identification
of the Member State or third country in which a competent authority has taken
a decision in respect of a person may be liable to jeopardise public security, by
providing the party concerned with sensitive information which it could misuse.148
Possible compensation for the absence of a hearing
If the evidence has not been disclosed to the party concerned during the
administrative proceedings this evidence must be notified to this party, in so
far as reasonably possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as possible
after the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds. A hearing does not
need to be conducted immediately after the decision ‘in the light of the possi-
bility that the parties concerned also have immediately to bring an action
before the CFI, which also ensures that a balance is struck between observance
of the fundamental rights of the persons included in the disputed list and the
need to take preventive measures in combating international terrorism.’149
Unlike in competition cases, in cases concerning EU sanctions the absence of
a hearing during the administrative phase can thus be compensated during
the appeal phase.150 During the appeal the Court can use techniques which
accommodate the rights of the defence and concerns legitimating non-dis-
closure of evidence.151 If the evidence underlying the contested decision is
not disclosed to the EU Courts compensation of an infringement of the rights
of the defence during the appeal phase is not possible.152
In Kadi II the General Court held with regard to EU sanctions based on
UN Security Council resolutions that it is not sufficient that a person’s rights
of defence have been ‘observed’ only in the most formal and superficial sense.
The person concerned must, on the basis of the information provided to him,
147 The CFI here referred to the judgments in Chahal (which did not concern Art 6 ECHR) and
Jasper. Both cases will be discussed in section 10.3.
148 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 136.
149 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 129-130.
See also Case T-390/08 Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], para 98.
150 This also follows from Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v
Council and Commission [2008], para 337.
151 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 344. See further section 10.2.2.4.
152 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 182.
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be able to launch an effective challenge to the allegations against him so far
as his alleged participation in terrorist activities is concerned. Here the Court
referred to the ECtHR’s judgment in A and others v the United Kingdom, which
will be discussed in section 10.3.4.
Application to specific cases
As was mentioned before, in most of the cases before the Court of Justice and
the CFI the party concerned did not have access to the evidence underlying
the contested decision and a violation of the right to be heard was found. In
some cases the Council even refused to inform the applicant of the identity
of the Member State which was the author of the national decision underlying
the EU sanction.153 In Kadi the Court of Justice considered that the applicable
EU legislation on which the EU sanction was based did not provide for a
procedure for communicating the evidence justifying the inclusion of the names
of the persons concerned in the terrorist list and for hearing those persons,
either at the same time as that inclusion or later. Furthermore it took into
account that the Council at no time informed the appellants of the evidence
adduced against them that allegedly justified the inclusion of their names for
the first time in the list. The Court concluded that
because the Council neither communicated to the appellants the evidence used
against them to justify the restrictive measures imposed on them nor afforded them
the right to be informed of that evidence within a reasonable period after those
measures were enacted, the appellants were not in a position to make their point
of view in that respect known to advantage.154
Therefore, the appellants’ rights of the defence, in particular his right to be
heard, were not respected.155
In Kadi II the person concerned was provided with a summary statement
of reasons which set out the allegations against him. According to the General
Court however the procedure followed by the Commission, in response to
the applicant’s request, did not grant him even the most minimal access to
the evidence against him. ’The applicant was refused such access despite his
express request, whilst no balance was struck between his interests, on the
153 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 209.
154 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], paras 345-348. See also Case T-318/01, Othman v Council and Commission [2009], paras
82-85.
155 See also Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras
160-162 and Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], paras
36-37, where the CFI held that the right to be heard was violated because the Council
adopted a subsequent decision to impose an EU sanction without first informing the
applicant of the new information or new material in the file, which in its view, justified
maintaining it on the list.
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one hand, and the need to protect the confidential nature of the information
in question, on the other.’156 The General Court found that
in those circumstances, the few pieces of information and the imprecise allegations
in the summary of reasons appear clearly insufficient to enable the applicant to
launch an effective challenge to the allegations against him so far as his alleged
participation in terrorist activities is concerned.157
The Court mentioned as an example the allegation, not otherwise substantiated
and thus irrefutable, that the applicant was a shareholder in a Bosnian bank
in which planning sessions against a United States facility in Saudi Arabia
may have taken place. The Court considered that its conclusion is consistent
with the ECtHR’s judgment in A and others v the United Kingdom.158
The approach of the General Court applied in Kadi which concerned EU
sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions seems to be different than
that in several cases concerning autonomous EU sanctions. In those cases the
CFI did not seem to set very high standards as regards the right to be heard.
This difference may be explained by the fact that in cases regarding auto-
nomous EU sanctions it is up to the national courts to ensure the rights of the
defence with respect to the allegations of involvement in terrorist activities,
while at the UN level no judicial review of the decision to place a person on
a terrorist list takes place.
In Sison I the CFI considered that the Council should have communicated
the national decisions to Sison as they were official acts adopted at the end
of public judicial proceedings to which the applicant had been a party. It was
thus not necessary to keep those decisions confidential.159 In the PMOI II
judgment however the CFI found with regard to one of the two subsequent
decisions to impose an EU sanction that the right to be heard had not been
violated. It took first of all into account that the Council communicated to the
applicant a number of documents from the file. As regards the documents,
which were not notified to the applicant, the Council explained that it was
not in a position to forward them to the applicant, because the State which
had provided them had not consented to their disclosure. Furthermore the
CFI referred to the fact that the applicant had challenged neither that refusal
to communicate certain incriminating documents, nor the reasons put forward
to justify it. Secondly the CFI held that the Council placed the applicant in a
position to make its case properly regarding the evidence incriminating it,
an opportunity of which it in fact availed itself on several occasions.160 In
Bank Melli Iran the CFI ruled that the obligation to inform the party of the
156 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 173.
157 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 174.
158 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], paras 175-176.
159 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 212.
160 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], paras 91-92.
334 Chapter 10
evidence adduced against it to justify the proposed sanction had been met
because sufficient reasons were given for the contested decision. Those reasons
were in fact confined to one short paragraph and contained only general
allegations. The Council’s obligations under the right to be heard were thus
also very limited.161
In PMOI II the CFI also indicated that the Council’s duty to show that it took
into account the submissions of the party concerned is limited. The party
concerned complained that the Council had not sought in any way to respond
to the criticism levelled at it and that it had taken no account at all of the
exculpatory material produced by it. The CFI held that the rights of the defence
had not been violated on this ground. It derived from the Council’s letters
and the fact that the applicant’s submission had been communicated to the
delegations of the Member States before the decision had been adopted, that
due account was made of the applicant’s submissions. Moreover it stated that
the Council was not obliged to reply to the applicant’s observations in the
light of the documents submitted by the applicant, if it thought that they did
not warrant the conclusions that the applicant claimed to infer from them.
The fact that the statement of reasons did not address the applicant’s sub-
missions, but was rather a word-for-word repetition of the initial statement
of reasons ‘in itself means only that the Council maintained its point of view’.
In the absence of any other relevant evidence, as was the case here, ‘such
similarity of texts does not establish that the Council failed, when assessing
the case, to afford proper consideration to the arguments put forward by the
party concerned in arguing its case.’ According to the CFI the Council did give
a specific reply to the applicant’s main argument.162
10.1.2.3 The obligation to state reasons
In Kadi the Court of Justice reiterated its case-law regarding the obligation
to state reasons.163 It follows from this judgment and the CFI’s case-law that
in principle the requirements following from the obligation to state reasons
recognised by the EU Courts in other fields of EU law, also apply to EU
measures freezing funds.164 The Council had argued in the PMOI I case that
the material conditions regarding the obligation to state reasons in the fight
161 Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran [2009], paras 95-104. See also Case T-49/07, Fahas v Council
[2010], para 49.
162 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], paras 94-96. See also Case
T-49/07, Fahas v Council [2010], para 49.
163 The Court however put most weight on the right to be heard and the right to an effective
remedy and did not find a separate violation of the statement of reasons. Joined Cases
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008], para 350,
where the Court states that the infringement of the rights of the defence had not been
remedied in the course of the actions before the Community judicature.
164 See also Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran [2006], para 109.
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against terrorism are not the same as those existing in other areas, such as
competition.165 The Court of Justice and the CFI, which expressly referred
to the case-law concerning the obligation to state reasons in other fields of
EU law, did not agree with the Council.
The CFI addressed the obligation to state reasons more elaborately in the
PMOI I case and subsequent case-law. The CFI considered that the obligation
to state reasons constitutes an essential principle of EU law which may be
derogated from only for compelling reasons. According to the CFI the statement
of reasons for a decision to impose an EU sanction which is based on a national
decision must show first of all that the conditions for taking the decision, set
out in Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931, are met. It must therefore
indicate which national decision underlies the decision imposing the EU
sanction. If the Council based its decision on information communicated by
the Member States, which has not been assessed by a national authority, it
must indicate why it considers that this information justifies the inclusion of
the person concerned on the list.166 Secondly the decision must include the
actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its
discretion, that such a measure must be adopted in respect of the party con-
cerned.167 Subsequent decisions to freeze funds must indicate the actual and
specific reasons why, after a re-examination, the Council considered that there
were still grounds for the EU sanction.168
Possible limitations to the statement of reasons
The CFI has recognised that exceptions to the obligation to indicate the actual
and specific reasons for the EU sanction are allowed under exceptional circum-
stances. First of all it has considered that a detailed publication of the com-
plaints put forward against the parties concerned might conflict with the
overriding considerations of public interest concerning the security of the EU
and its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations. Moreover
it may jeopardise the legitimate interests of the persons and entities in question,
in that it would be capable of causing serious damage to their reputation. In
such a situation, the Court finds, exceptionally, that only the operative part
of the decision and a general statement of reasons need be in the version of
the decision to freeze funds published in the Official Journal. The actual,
165 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 83.
166 Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, pp 716-717. According to them this formulation appears
to suggest that the Council is under an obligation to show that it was satisfied that the
national authority assessed the evidence.
167 Case T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], para 60.
168 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 217. If the grounds of a subsequent EU sanction
are in essence the same as those already relied on when a previous decision was adopted,
a mere statement to that effect may suffice, particularly when the party is a group or entity.
See also Case T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], para 60 and Case T-253/04, KONGRA-GEL
and others v Council [2008], para 97.
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specific statements of reasons for that decision must however be formalised
and brought to the knowledge of the parties concerned by any other appro-
priate means.169
Secondly the CFI has held that the overriding considerations concerning
the security of the Community and its Member States, or the conduct of their
international relations, may preclude disclosure to the parties concerned of
the specific and complete reasons for the initial or subsequent decision to freeze
their funds. The considerations regarding the restrictions of the right to a fair
hearing (set out in section 10.2.2.2) also apply to the restriction of the obligation
to state reasons. Furthermore the CFI drew inspiration from Article 30(2) of
Directive 2004/38/EC and the case-law applicable to that provision.170 This
provision states that ‘the persons concerned shall be informed, precisely and
in full, of the public policy, public security or public health grounds on which
the decision restricting the freedom of movement and residence of a citizen
of the Union or a member of his family taken in their case is based, unless
this is contrary to the interests of State security’. According to the Court of
Justice’s case-law the State concerned must, when notifying an individual of
such a restrictive measure give him a precise and comprehensive statement
of the grounds for the decision, to enable to take effective steps to prepare
his defence.171 The CFI has not explained how the obligation to state reasons
can be reconciled with the protection of overriding considerations of public
interest.
Possible compensation for a lack of reasons
The statement of reasons must in principle be notified to the person concerned
at the same time as the decision adversely affecting him or at the very least
as swiftly as possible after that decision.172 In Kadi the Court of Justice did
not seem to exclude that the infringement of the obligation to state reasons
be remedied during the appeal before the EU Courts.173 As was pointed out
in section 4.4.3 it is the EU Courts’ standing case-law that the failure to state
the reasons cannot be remedied by the fact that the person concerned learns
169 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 147.
170 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 147.
Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC,
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77.
171 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 148-150.
172 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 336.
173 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 350. See for critique: Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, p 700. They state that
if process rights are to have any meaning, it is difficult to see how the requirement of
reasoning can be complied with retrospectively.
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the reasons for the act during the proceedings before the EU Courts. The CFI
has followed this case-law in cases concerning EU sanctions and has held that
the possibility of regularising the total absence of a statement of reasons after
an action has been started might prejudice the right to a fair hearing. The
reason for that is that the applicant would have only the reply in which to
set out his pleas contesting the reasons which he would not know until after
he had lodged his application. The principle of equality of the parties before
the EU Courts would accordingly be affected. In KONGRA-GEL the CFI held that
the Council did not comply with the obligation to state reasons, by providing
a statement of reasons after the adoption of the decision imposing the EU
sanction and after the appeal before the CFI had been lodged. According to
the Council it provided the statement as soon as reasonably possible after the
contested decision in the light of the guidance provided by the PMOI I judg-
ment. According to the CFI the Council’s argument was based on the mistaken
premise that the statement of reasons can be provided after the action before
the EU Courts has commenced.174
Application to specific cases
In several cases the CFI annulled the EU sanction because the decision did not
comply with the requirement to state reasons. Sometimes the CFI based its
annulment of the EU sanction solely on this ground.175 In some cases there
was a complete absence of a statement of reasons. In Sison I the CFI concluded
that the contested decision did not comply with the obligation to state reasons
for they do no more than state […] that it is ‘desirable’ or that it has been ‘decided’
to adopt an up-to-date list of the persons, groups and entities to which Regulation
(EC) No 2580/2001 applies. Such general and formulaic wording is tantamount
to a total failure to state reasons.176
The CFI held in this case that the decision should have mentioned at the very
least the national court judgments on which the decision was based.177
Furthermore it ought to have indicated, subject to their possibly being of a
confidential nature, the main reasons why the Council took the view, in the
174 Case T-253/04, KONGRA-GEL and others v Council [2008], para 100. See also Case T-256/07,
People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 90 and Case T-341/07, Sison v Council
[2009], para 182.
175 Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008, p 721. They mention KONGRA-GEL, PKK and AL-Aqsa.
In their view the severe limitations on the right to a hearing recognised by the CFI and
the fact that it may be reduced to no more than the right to be notified of the evidence
at the time when the decision is adopted, it is difficult to see what it adds to the requirement
to give reasons.
176 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 216. See also Case T-327/03, Stichting Al Aqsa
v Council [2007], para 55.
177 See also Case T-327/03, Stichting Al Aqsa v Council [2007], paras 60-64 and Case T-228/02,
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 166.
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exercise of its discretion, that the applicant was to be the subject of such a
decision on the basis of those judgments.178
In later cases in which the Council did state reasons for the EU sanction,
the CFI seems to be satisfied rather easily. In Melli Bank the CFI deemed suffi-
cient a statement of reasons which was in its own words ’exceptionally con-
cise’.179 In the PMOI II case the CFI found that the Council sent to the applicant
‘a statement clearly and unambiguously explaining the reasons which, in its
opinion, justified the applicant’s continued inclusion in the list at issue [..].’
It took into account that the statement contained specific examples of acts of
terrorism as referred to in the relevant EU provisions for which the applicant
was said to be responsible. Apparently the Council did not need to explain
why these acts made the freezing of funds necessary.180 Furthermore the CFI
referred to the fact that the decision stated that, because of those acts, a de-
cision had been taken by a competent authority of the United Kingdom to
proscribe the applicant as an organisation concerned in acts of terrorism and
that that decision was subject to review under the applicable United Kingdom
legislation and that it was still in force.181 In the same judgment the CFI held
however that the statement of reasons with regard to a later decision to con-
tinue the EU sanction was obviously insufficient as it did not make it possible
to grasp how far the Council took into account a new national decision, in
which it was held that the organisation concerned was no longer concerned
in terrorism.182 Moreover the CFI took into account that the decision did not
explain the actual specific reasons why the Council took the view in spite of
this decision that the continued inclusion of the applicant in the terrorist list
remained justified.183
178 Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 217. See also Case T-253/04, KONGRA-GEL and
others v Council 2008], para 98.
179 Joined Cases T-246/08 and T-332/08, Melli Bank v Council [2009], paras 146-151. See also
Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], paras 12 and 84-85.
180 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 90. See also Case
T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], paras 65-66 and Case T-49/07, Fahas v Council [2010],
para 57, where the CFI held that having regard to the broad discretion enjoyed by the
Council with regard to taking EU sanctions, the Council does not need to state in what
way the freezing of the applicant’s funds may in concrete terms contribute to the fight
against terrorism or prove that the applicant might use his funds to commit or facilitate
act of terrorism in the future.
181 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 90. See also Case
T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], para 64.
182 The national authority held that there was such a lack of evidence that the decision to
proscribe the organisation could be defined as unreasonable and perverse. Case T-256/07,
People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 90. See also Case T-341/07, Sison v
Council [2009], para 184.
183 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 90. See also Case
T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], paras 177-185.
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10.1.2.4 The right to an effective remedy
As was already stated in section 10.2.2.1 decisions imposing EU sanctions may
be subjected to judicial review by the EU Courts.184 The CFI has addressed
the scope of judicial review in cases regarding autonomous EU sanctions
extensively in the PMOI I case. The CFI is of the view that it must first of all
ensure that the legal conditions for imposing the EU sanction are fulfilled. The
judicial review of the lawfulness of the decision in question extends to the
assessment of the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying it and to the
evidence and information on which that assessment is based. Secondly the
Court must ensure that the right to a fair hearing is observed and that the
requirement of a statement of reasons is satisfied. In this context it must
examine whether the overriding considerations relied on exceptionally by the
Council in disregarding those rights are well founded.185 The restrictions
imposed by the Council on the right of the parties concerned to a fair hearing
must be offset by a strict judicial review which is independent and impartial.
According to the CFI judicial review is, in cases concerning EU sanctions, ‘all
the more imperative because it constitutes the only procedural safeguard
ensuring that a fair balance is struck between the need to combat international
terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights.’186 It follows from these
considerations that the CFI reviews whether the refusal to communicate certain
evidence to the party concerned is justified.187 The General Court derived
from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Kadi that the same extent of judicial
review must be applied in cases regarding EU sanctions based on UN Security
Council resolutions. It considered in this regard:
It is obvious from [..] the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kadi and from the
reference made there to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
in Chahal v. United Kingdom [..] that the Court of Justice intended that its review,
‘in principle [a] full review’, should extend not only to the apparent merits of the
contested measure but also to the evidence and information on which the findings
made in the measure are based.188
184 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 343 and Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], para 156.
185 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 153-154.
186 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 155.
See also Case C-550/09, E and F [2010], para 57.
187 See for example Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], paras 212 and 223.
188 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 135. The General Court derived this from
the Court of Justice’s judgment in Kadi.
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The EU Courts have made it very clear that the evidence underlying the con-
tested decision must be sent to them.189 The CFI held in the PMOI III case that
the Council is not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on information or
material in the file communicated by a Member State, if the said Member State
is not willing to authorise its communication to the Community judicature whose
task is to review the lawfulness of that decision.190
If the Council does refuse to send the relevant confidential evidence the Court
is not able to conduct its judicial review.191
The General Court has recognised that in cases regarding autonomous EU
sanctions the Council enjoys broad discretion in its assessment of the matters
to be taken into account for the purpose of imposing EU sanctions. As a result
the intensity of judicial review is limited. The EU Courts may not, in particular,
substitute their assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying
the adoption of such measures for that of the Council.192 However the Court
also held that
that does not mean that the Court is not to review the interpretation made by that
institution of the relevant facts [..]. The Community judicature must not only
establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent,
but must also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the relevant information
to be taken into account in order to assess the situation and whether it is capable
of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.193
189 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 155,
where the CFI held that it must be able to review the lawfulness and the merits of the
measures to freeze funds ‘without it being possible to raise objections that the evidence
and information is secret or confidential. See also for example Case T-47/03, Sison v Council
[2007], para 202.
190 Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 73.
191 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 351.
192 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 159.
Here the CFI referred to the ECtHR’s case-law in Leander v Sweden and Al-Nashif v Bulgaria.
In other judgments concerning EU sanctions in which the same consideration is used, the
CFI referred to its standing case-law concerning the intensity of judicial review in other
fields of EU law, such as Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing [2007]. See for example Case
T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], paras 138-139 and Case T-284/08,
People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], para 55.
193 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 142. The General Court referred by analogy
to Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing [2007], a State aid case. With regard to the intensity
of judicial review performed by the EU Courts see also section 9.2.1.
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The existence of a national decision on which the EU sanction should be based,
is for example subjected to (more) rigorous review.194 The Court pays more
deference to the EU Institution’s assessment of the factors as to appropriateness
on which decisions to freeze funds are based.195 The General Court held that
these standards for the intensity of judicial review also apply to cases regarding
EU sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions.196 It even held that
the principle of a full and rigorous judicial review of such measures is all the
more justified given that such measures have a marked and long-lasting effect
on the fundamental rights of the persons concerned.197
Possible limitations to the right to an effective remedy
It follows from the EU Courts’ case-law that also during appeal overriding
considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations
of the EU and of its Member States may militate against the communication
of certain matters to the parties concerned.198
Possible compensation for limitations to the rights of the defence during the appeal
In Kadi the Court of Justice stated that if certain evidence cannot be com-
municated to the parties during the appeal phase
it is none the less the task of the Community judicature to apply, in the course
of the judicial review it carries out, techniques which accommodate, on the one
hand, legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of information
taken into account in the adoption of the act concerned and, on the other, the need
to accord the individual a sufficient measure of procedural justice.199
The Court has not further explained what kind of techniques could be applied.
It only referred to the ECtHR’s case-law in Chahal v the United Kingdom, in which
such techniques were mentioned for the first time. It concerned the use of
special advocates who act on behalf of the party to which certain information
is not disclosed and who can examine and comment on this information. After
194 See for example Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008],
where the CFI held that the information provided by the Council did not enable either
the applicant or the Court to verify that the contested decision was adopted on the basis
of a national decision in the meaning of Art 1 (4) of Common Position 2001/93. In Case
T-341/07, Sison v Council [2009], paras 107-115 the CFI held that the national judgments
on which the contested decision was based did not constitute national decisions in the
meaning of Art 1 (4) Common Position 2001/931.
195 Case T-256/07, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran [2008], para 138.
196 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 139.
197 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 151.
198 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], paras 342-344.
199 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 344.
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the judgment in Kadi the ECtHR further addressed such techniques as applied
in the United Kingdom. This case-law will be discussed below in section 10.3.4.
Apparently the Court of Justice finds that it should apply such techniques if
necessary to compensate the limitations of the party’s right of the defence.
The CFI has also mentioned such techniques, but it has not ruled on the ques-
tion whether they can or should be applied by it.200
Application to specific cases
Because of the strict relationship between the right to be heard, the obligation
to state reasons and the right to an effective remedy, the EU Courts found a
violation of the right to an effective remedy in all cases in which those first
two rights had been infringed. According to the Court the applicants were
not able to defend their rights with regard to the evidence underlying the
decision in satisfactory conditions before the Court.201 In the Bank Melli Iran
and Fahas cases, in which the right to be heard and the obligation to state
reasons were not violated, the CFI did not find a violation of the right to an
effective remedy.202
In most cases the Council had taken the opinion that confidential evidence
underlying the EU sanction could not be disclosed to the EU Courts. The EU
Courts have criticised this ‘fundamental position’ adopted by the Council.203
In PMOI III the CFI considered that the Council had not explained why the
production of relevant information or material in the file would violate the
principle of confidentiality, whereas their production to the members of the
Council, and thus to the governments of the 26 other Member States, did
not.204 In cases in which the confidential evidence was not disclosed to the
EU Court the violation of the applicant’s right to be heard was not remedied
200 See for example Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council
[2006], para 158, Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 205, where it considered that
‘the question whether the applicant and/or his lawyers may be provided with the evidence
and information alleged to be confidential, or whether they may be provided only to the
Court in accordance with a specific procedure which remains to be defined so as to safe-
guard the public interest at issue whilst affording the party concerned a sufficient degree
of judicial protection, is a separate issue on which it is not necessary for the Court to rule
in the present action’.
201 See for example Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council
and Commission [2008], para 349, Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple
d’Iran v Council [2006], para 158, Case T-47/03, Sison v Council [2007], para 165, Case
T-318/01, Othman v Council and Commission [2009], para 86 and Case T-327/03, Stichting
Al Aqsa v Council [2007], para 64,
202 Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran [2009], para 106, Case T-49/07, Fahas v Council [2010], paras
59-62.
203 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 350.
204 Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran v Council [2008], paras 72 and 76.
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during the appeal proceedings before these Courts.205 Furthermore the EU
Courts found that they were not able to undertake the review of the lawfulness
of the contested decision.206
10.1.2.5 Subconclusion: the use of secret information in EU sanction cases
The outright refusal of the Council to state reasons for decisions concerning
EU sanctions and to disclose any evidence underlying these decisions to the
parties concerned and the EU Courts, lead to a series of annulments of such
decisions. In their judgments the EU courts made clear that also in cases con-
cerning measures aiming at combating terrorism, EU fundamental rights, such
as the rights of the defence and the right to an effective remedy must be
respected. Limitations to these rights are only acceptable in exceptional situ-
ations. The Courts stressed the importance of judicial review of EU sanctions,
as it constitutes the only procedural safeguard ensuring that a fair balance
is struck between the need to combat international terrorism and the protection
of fundamental rights. Therefore all the evidence underlying the contested
EU sanction must be send to the EU Courts.
The case-law of the EU Courts in the field of EU sanctions is still developing,
and there are still few cases in which the EU Courts have applied the obligation
to state reasons, the right to be heard and the right to an effective remedy to
decisions in which the Council attempted to comply with these principles.
Therefore it is not easy to draw conclusions as to the scope of the limitations
allowed to these principles by the EU courts. The EU Courts have for example
not yet addressed possible methods, such as the provision of non-confidential
versions of documents, which aim to reconcile the interests of the Council and
the Member States to keep certain information confidential and the rights of
the defence. However, the CFI’s judgment in PMOI indicates that the scope of
exceptions for the right to be heard and the obligation to state reasons is
wide,207 wider than in competition cases. First of all the right to be heard
and potentially the obligation to state reasons do not need to be complied with
205 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 350.
206 See for example Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council
and Commission [2008], para 351, Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple
d’Iran v Council [2006], para 166, Case T-284/08, People’s Modjahedin Organization of Iran
v Council [2008], para 76. See differently Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran [2009], para 106,
where the CFI held that it was in the position fully to carry out its review.
207 See also Tridimas & Gutierrez-Fons 2008 pp 717-718. They state that the scope for exceptions
which are recognised as conterminous for both the right to a hearing and the obligation
to state reasons is vast. Furthermore they point at the fact that the fact that limitations to
those rights may be justified in the interests of the conduct of the international relations
of the EU and its Member States ‘may provide vital breathing space for the political
decision-makers where evidence emanates from intelligence provide by third states.’
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during the administrative procedure. Unlike in competition cases, the right
to be heard may be exercised only during the appeal procedure before the
EU Courts. Secondly at least in cases regarding autonomous EU sanctions the
General Court does not seem to set very strict requirements as to the detail
of the statement of reasons and the evidence which should be provided to
the party concerned. In some cases the General Court seemed to be satisfied
with a very concise statement of reasons and very limited access for the parties
concerned to the Council’s file. In cases regarding EU sanctions based on UN
Security Council resolutions the Court has set stricter requirements. The
General Court ruled that the information provided to the person concerned
must be sufficiently specific, so that this person can contest the allegations
against him. In such cases the General Court follows the ECtHR‘s judgment
in A and others. The difference in approach between the two sorts of cases may
be explained by the fact that in autonomous EU sanction cases it is up to the
national courts to assess the evidence substantiating the allegations of involve-
ment in terrorism and guaranteeing procedural rights of the party concerned,
while no judicial review exists on the UN level.
A reason to allow more limitations to procedural rights in EU sanction cases
than in competition cases may be that the EU Courts deem national security
of the EU and its Member States and their relations with third countries worthy
of more protection than the interests of businesses in protecting their secrets.
The EU Court have however not explicitly stated this in their judgments.
Another explanation may be that the task of the Council and the EU Courts
in autonomous EU sanction cases is rather limited: the core of the case is
decided on the national level. The rights of the defence should thus essentially
be ensured by the national administrative authorities and courts.
10.2 THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The use of secret information has been addressed by the ECtHR, the Committee
against Torture, the Human Rights Committee and UNHCR. The body of case-
law under the ECHR provides by far the most developed standards and will
therefore be discussed at length in this section. First of all however a brief
overview will be given of the views of the other supervising bodies.
The Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee have
addressed the use of secret information in cases concerning national security
in a few views in individual cases. In Agiza v Sweden the Committee against
Torture considered that national security concerns might justify some adjust-
ments to be made to the particular process of review. However, the mechanism
chosen must continue to satisfy the requirements of effective, independent
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and impartial review.208 In Agiza a violation of the procedural requirements
under Article 3 CAT had occurred as no such review was available.209
The Human Rights Committee considered in Ahani v Canada, which also
concerned a person who was to be expelled for national security reasons, that
in the circumstances of national security involved, it was not persuaded that
the procedure before the Canadian Federal Court in which the reasonableness
of the security certificate was assessed, was unfair to the author. Nor did the
Committee ‘discern on the record any elements of bad faith, abuse of power
or other arbitrariness which would vitiate the Federal Court’s assessment [..]’.
The Committee took into account that, in the Canadian Federal Court’s
“reasonableness” hearing on the security certification, the author was provided
with a summary redacted for security concerns reasonably informing him of
the claims made against him. Furthermore the Committee noted that the
Federal Court was conscious of the “heavy burden” upon it to assure through
this process the author’s ability appropriately to be aware of and respond to
the case made against him, and the author was able to, and did, present his
own case and cross-examine witnesses.210 The Committee did find a violation
of Article 13 ICCPR regarding the appeal against the deportation order before
the Canadian Supreme Court. The reason was that the Supreme Court did
not grant the applicant enhanced procedural protections, including provision
of all information and advice the Minister intended to rely on, receipt of an
opportunity to address the evidence in writing and to be given written reasons
by the Minister, because he had not made out a prima facie risk of refoulement.
Such guarantees were provided in another, similar case before the Supreme
Court in which a prima facie case risk was apparent.211
208 In its Concluding Observations on New Zealand of 19 May 2009, CAT/C/NZL/CO/5,
ComAT expressed its concerns with regard to the continued issuance of security-risk
certificates under the Immigration Act, which could lead to a breach of Art 3 of the Conven-
tion, as the authorities may remove or deport a person deemed to constitute a threat to
national security, without having to give detailed reasons or disclose classified information
to the person concerned.
209 ComAT 20 May 2005, Agiza v Sweden, no 233/2003, para 13.8
210 The procedure before the Federal Court is described as follows in para 2.3 of the judgment.
The Court assessed whether the Ministers’ certificate was “reasonable on the basis of the
information available”. It examined the security intelligence reports in camera and heard
other evidence presented by the Solicitor-General and the Minister, in the absence of the
plaintiff. The Court then provided the author with a summary of the information, required
by statute to allow the affected person to be “reasonably” informed of the circumstances
giving rise to the certification while being appropriately redacted for national security
concerns, and offered the author an opportunity to respond. The evidence taken into account
by the Court in its decision included information gathered by foreign intelligence agencies
which was divulged to the Court in camera in the author’s absence on national security
grounds. The Court also heard the author testify on his own behalf in opposition to the
reasonableness of the certificate.
211 HRC 15 June 2004, Ahani v Canada, no 1051/2002.
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In two complaints before the Committee against Torture against Sweden
a report was drawn up by the Swedish embassy in Ankara in which it was
concluded that part of the applicants’ asylum account was not true and/or
documents provided by them were not authentic. Both reports were based
on information obtained from anonymous sources and the applicants com-
plained that they were therefore unable to effectively challenge the findings
contained in the reports. In one case the Committee against Torture refused
to take the report into account because it had been submitted by the State
authorities after the national proceedings had been concluded. As a result ‘the
applicant had not had an opportunity either to contest the information pro-
vided therein or to challenge the investigator whose name has not been
revealed before the domestic authorities’.212 In the other case the Committee
did not deem the applicants’ complaint regarding the use of anonymous
sources well-founded. Instead it considered that the applicants had failed to
disprove the State’s findings regarding the authenticity of the documents
adduced by them.213 The Committee thus seems to accept that information
provided by anonymous sources is included in the assessment of the credibility
of an asylum account.
Finally UNHCR addressed the use of secret information in proceedings in
which a person is excluded from refugeeship on the basis of Article 1F of the
Refugee Convention. According to UNHCR such exclusion should not be based
on sensitive evidence that cannot be challenged by the individual concerned.
It accepts however that ‘exceptionally, anonymous evidence (where the source
is concealed) may be relied upon, but only where this is absolutely necessary
to protect the safety of witnesses and the asylum-seeker’s ability to challenge
the substance of the evidence is not substantially prejudiced’. Furthermore
UNHCR states that ‘secret evidence or evidence considered in camera (where
the substance is also concealed) should not be relied upon to exclude. Where
national security interests are at stake, these may be protected by introducing
procedural safeguards which also respect the asylum-seeker’s due process
rights’.214
It should be concluded that the supervising bodies mentioned above find
that expulsion measures based on national security should be subjected to
judicial review. They accept however that national security reasons or other
interests of the State may limit the procedural guarantees offered in asylum
or deportation proceedings. It does not follow from these view to what extend
212 ComAT 21 November 2008, E.J. et al. v Sweden, no 306/2006.
213 ComAT 2 May 2007, E.R.K. and Y.K. v Sweden, nos 270/2005 and 271/2005, paras 2.7, 5.4
and 7.5. The applicants only stated with regard to the Embassy report that the discrepancies
in the documents were merely “alleged formal errors” and that they lack the means and
necessary legal expertise to make any further comments.
214 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses:
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/03/05)
4 September 2003, para 36.
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procedural safeguards may be limited. The ECtHR’s case-law discussed in the
next section provides for much more guidance on this point.
10.2.1 The ECtHR’s case-law on secret evidence
The ECtHR has addressed the use of confidential information in complaints
under several provisions of the Convention and in very different sorts of cases.
Usually the Court examines in such complaints whether the right of adversarial
proceedings (and sometimes the right to equality of arms) has been complied
with. The right to adversarial proceedings has been recognised under Articles
5 (4), 6 (1) civil and criminal limb, 8, 9, 13 and Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR.215
Cases falling within the scope of Articles 5 (4), 6 (1) civil limb and 8 ECHR often
concern measures, which are intended to protect the national security of the
State. Examples are detention of persons suspected of being involved in
terrorist activities, secret surveillance of persons, the issuing of certificates by
the State relating to a person’s danger for national security, which may result
in a person losing or not obtaining a job or the expulsion or non-admission
of persons on national security grounds. In these cases (some of) the evidence
underlying the decision to take such measures are not disclosed to the person
concerned for national security reasons. In criminal cases evidence may not
be disclosed to the accused in order to protect witnesses or the State’s interest
in keeping secret police methods of investigation of crime.
The case-law of the ECtHR only concerns the guarantees which should be
offered during the (appeal) proceedings before a national court (art. 5 and 6)
or a national independent authority (art. 13). This is thus different than the
case-law of the EU Courts examined in the previous sections, which also
regarded the guarantees required during the administrative proceedings before
the EU institutions.
The ECtHR has recognised that the national court or independent authority
dealing with an appeal against a decision may need to afford a wide margin
of appreciation to the executive in matters of national security. However this
does not mean that as soon as the executive has chosen to invoke the term
“national security” the decision may escape any review by the court or inde-
pendent authority.216 Under Article 6 ECHR the ECtHR held that the right to
215 This follows from the fact that Art 1 of Protocol 7 requires that the expulsion of an alien
lawfully resident is ‘in accordance with the law’. The phrase ‘in accordance with the law’
has a similar meaning throughout the Convention and its Protocols. Under Artt 8 and 9
the Court held that the right to adversarial proceedings flows from this requirement. See
ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. and others v Bulgaria, no 1365/07, para 73. This section will not
further address Art 9 ECHR and Art 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR.
216 See for example with regard to Art 13 ECHR: ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria,
no 50963/99, paras 94 and 137. The ECtHR considered with regard to Art 5 ECHR that
‘national authorities cannot do away with effective control of lawfulness of detention by
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submit a dispute to a court or tribunal in order to have a determination of
questions of both fact and law cannot be displaced by the ipse dixit of the
executive.217 Also under Articles 8, 9 and 13 ECHR the Court has held that
a national independent authority must be able to review whether invoking
national security as the basis for measures against a person is reasonable and
not arbitrary.218 The existence of a meaningful and independent review of
measures is a necessary guarantee against arbitrariness and abuse of power.219
In several cases the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 (1), 8, or 13 ECHR
because the national court or independent authority could not review the
decision that the person concerned was a danger to national security, did not
examine relevant facts and evidence and in some cases confined itself to ‘a
purely formal examination’.220
According to the Court the limits of the notion of national security
should not be stretched beyond its natural meaning.221 In C.G. v Bulgaria
the ECtHR held that drugs offences are not capable of impinging on the national
security of Bulgaria or could serve as a sound factual basis for the conclusion
that, if not expelled, the applicant would present a national security risk in
the future.222 The same was considered with regard to allegations of human
trafficking in Raza v Romania.223 In several cases the ECtHR was impeded to
the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism
are involved.’ See also ECtHR 26 July 2011, Liu v Russia, no 29157/09, para 88.
217 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 77. See also ECtHR 30 October 2001, Devlin v the United Kingdom, no
29545/95, para 31 and ECtHR 19 March 2002, Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94,
para 28.
218 ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, paras 124 (Art 8) and 137 (Art 13).
See under Art 9 ECtHR 12 February 2009, Nolan and K. v Russia, no 2512/04, para 71.
219 See for example ECtHR (Adm) 1 March 2005, Haliti v Switzerland, no 14015/02 , where the
ECtHR held ‘qu’on ne se trouve pas dans une situation dans laquelle il n’existait aucune
garantie contre l’arbitraire et l’abus du pouvoir d’appréciation laissé aux organes apparte-
nant à l’exécutif de l’Etat.’ See also ECtHR 8 June 2006, Lupsa v Romania, no 10337/04, paras
38 and 42, ECtHR 26 July 2011, M. and Others v Bulgaria, no 41416/08, para 102.
220 See for example ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99 and ECtHR 26 July
2011, Liu v Russia, no 29157/09 (Artt 8 and 13 ECHR), para 89, ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G.
v others v Bulgaria, no 1365/07, paras 47 and 50 (Art 8 and Art 1 of Prot. 7), ECtHR 8 June
2006, Lupsa v Romania, no 10337/04, para 41 (Art 8), ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and
McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92 and 21322/92, paras 75 and 77
(Art 6).
221 ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. v others v Bulgaria, no 1365/07, para 43.
222 ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. v others v Bulgaria, Appl. no 1365/07, para 43.
223 ECtHR 11 February 2010, Raza v Romania, no 31465/08, para 53. In Guliyev v Lithuania the
Court concluded that no objective materials verified by the domestic courts had been
presented to the ECtHR to demonstrate that the domestic authorities had good reasons
to suspect the applicant of being a threat to national security. ECtHR 16 December 2008,
Gulijev v Lithuania, no 10425/03, para 46. See also under Art 9: ECtHR 12 February 2009,
Nolan and K. v Russia, no 2512/04, para 72.
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assess whether the measure could be justified in the light of national security
because the State failed to provide it with relevant documents.224
It is important to remember that national security concerns cannot justify
expulsion of a person to a country where he runs a real risk of refoulement.225
Secret evidence substantiating that a person poses a risk to national security
therefore cannot play a role in the rigorous scrutiny required in Article 3 ECHR
cases. In A v the Netherlands in which the ECtHR found that the expulsion of
the applicant would violate Article 3, secret evidence had been used by the
national authorities to justify the refusal of an asylum status. This evidence
had not been included in the assessment whether expulsion of the applicant
would infringe Article 3 ECHR. The ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 13
ECHR reiterating that the right to political asylum is not explicitly protected
by either the ECHR or its Protocols. It considered that the secret materials did
not, as such, concern the applicant’s fear of being subjected to ill-treatment
in Libya but whether he was posing a threat to the Netherlands national
security. The fact that this information was disclosed (with the applicant’s
permission) to the national courts which also reviewed the decision regarding
the risk of refoulement did not, in the ECtHR’s view, compromise the inde-
pendence of those courts.226
As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter secret evidence may
also be used by national authorities in order to assess the credibility of the
asylum seeker or establish the facts. The ECtHR has ruled in two asylum cases
in which the Government relied on country of origin information provided
by anonymous sources.227 These cases will be further discussed in section
10.3.4.
In a way asylum cases in which secret information is used to establish the
facts are comparable to criminal cases. In both sorts of cases the national court
or authority must review the facts rigorously. In expulsion or other cases falling
within the scope of Article 8 the situation is different. In such cases secret
evidence is used in order to justify an interference with the right to family
life. National authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when deciding
whether national concerns exist and whether they justify the interference with
the right to private or family life. National courts may therefore pay deference
224 See for example ECtHR 11 February 2010, Raza v Romania, no 31465/08, para 53.
225 ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93, para 151, where
the ECtHR considered that in Art 3 cases, ‘given the irreversible nature of the harm that
might occur if the risk of ill-treatment materialised and the importance the Court attaches
to Article 3 [..], the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 [..] requires independent
scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 [..] This scrutiny must be carried out without regard to what the person
may have done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security
of the expelling State’.
226 ECtHR 20 July 2010, A v the Netherlands, no 4900/06, para 160.
227 ECtHR 22 September 2011, H.R. v France, no 64780/09, para 61 and ECtHR 2 June 2011,
Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, paras 233-234.
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to those decisions. It may therefore be expected that the ECtHR will follow its
case-law concerning criminal cases under Article 6 in asylum cases in which
secret evidence is used in the assessment of the risk of refoulement. As will
be pointed out in section 10.3.2 the ECtHR has already applied the guarantees
required by the criminal limb of Article 6 (1) to detention and administrative
cases, taking into account the nature of the case.
10.2.2 The right of adversarial proceedings: level of procedural protection.
The ECtHR has recognised that all procedures governed by Articles 5 (4),228
6,229 8230 and 13231 ECHR must be adversarial and that in those proceedings
the principle of equality of arms must be respected.232 The principle of
adversarial proceedings entails that the parties to a trial have knowledge of
and are able to comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed.233
The principle of equality of arms ‘requires each party to be given a reasonable
opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a
228 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 204.
229 In some cases under Art 6 the ECtHR examined the complaints regarding the use of secret
evidence under the right of access to court. See for example ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly
and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92 and 21322/92 and ECtHR 19
March 2002, Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94.
230 In Art 8 cases the right to adversarial proceedings is usually derived from the ‘quality of
law criterion’ which follows from the requirement that an interference with the right to
family or private life must be ‘in accordance with the law’. In ECtHR 19 October 2010,
Özpinar v Turkey, no 20999/04, the Court took into account the lack of adversarial proceed-
ings in the proportionality test under Art 8.
231 See ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, para 123, where the Court held
under Art 8 that ‘even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and
the rule of law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human
rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body
competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence’. In para 137, under
the complaint regarding Art 13 the ECtHR also stated that there must be some form of
adversarial proceedings.
232 Trechsel notes that in the ECtHR’s case-law, the right to adversarial proceedings is not
always clearly separated from the principle of equality of arms. Trechsel 2005, p 90.
233 ECtHR (GC) 22 January 1996, Lobo Machado v Portugal, no 15764/89, para 31. In criminal
cases the right to an adversarial trial means ‘that both prosecution and defence must be
given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and
the evidence adduced by the other party’. See ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the
United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 21. Harris and others also considered the requirement
that the prosecution must disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession
for or against the accused, whether or not they use it in the proceedings, to be a part of
the right to adversarial proceedings. See Harris, O’ Boyle & Warbrick 2009, p 254. Trechsel
states with regard to criminal cases that the right to adversarial proceedings applies
irrespective of whether the material of the other party concerns the establishment of the
facts, legal argument on the merits or procedural issues. Trechsel 2005, p 90.
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substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.’234 The general requirements
derived from both principles seem to be the same for all cases (civil, criminal
or other) governed by the ECHR.235 As will be further explained below the
specific application of those principles may however differ according to the
nature of the case. Practically all case-law examined below addressed the issue
of non-disclosure of evidence under the right to adversarial proceedings and
not under the right to equality of arms.236 Therefore in further sections refer-
ence will be made to the right to adversarial proceedings only.
Relevance of the nature of the case
The level of procedural protection under the right to adversarial proceedings
depends on the nature of the case. Arguably the highest level of protection
is offered in criminal cases falling within the scope of Article 6 (1) and (3)
ECHR. The ECtHR decided to apply these high standards also in some cases
falling within the scope of the civil limb of Article 6 and even other provisions
of the Treaty. In A and others v the United Kingdom the ECtHR considered that
because a suspicion of terrorism was the reason for the detention and
in view of the dramatic impact of the lengthy – and what appeared at the time
to be indefinite – deprivation of liberty on the applicants’ fundamental rights,
Article 5 § 4 must import substantially the same fair trial guarantees as Article 6
§ 1 in its criminal aspect.237
In Pocius v Lithuania and Aksoy v Turkey, both cases falling within the scope
of the civil limb of Article 6 ECHR the Court also applied these guarantees while
referring to the circumstances of the case. In Pocius the applicant had contested
being implicated in criminal activities as a ground for listing his name in an
operational records file, as a result of which the applicant’s permit to keep
and carry a firearm had been revoked.238 The Aksoy case concerned disciplin-
234 ECtHR 27 October 1993, Dombo beheer v the Netherlands, no 14448/88, para 33. See also
section 4.3.7.
235 In ECtHR 27 January 1997, Nideröst-Huber v Switzerland, no 18990/91, the ECtHR explicitly
considered that the requirements derived from the right to adversarial proceedings are
the same in both civil and criminal cases. See also Van Kempen 2009, p 437.
236 Trechsel states that access to documents is the issue which falls to be considered under
the heading of the right to adversarial proceedings. He notes however that the ECtHR does
not always follow a clear and consistent approach and often combines or mixes the right
to adversarial proceedings and the right to equality of arms. Trechsel 2005, p 101.
237 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 217.
238 ECtHR 6 July 2010, Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 53. See also ECtHR 6 July 2010,
Užukauskas v Lithuania, no 16965/04, para 47.
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ary proceedings against a nurse who was working for a military academy for
medicine in Turkey.239
With regard to Article 5 (4) ECHR, the Court held that this provision ‘does
not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the
context, facts and circumstances. According to the Court the Article 5 (4)
procedure does not always need to meet the standards required under the
civil and criminal limb of Article 6 ECHR. However, it must have a judicial
character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of
liberty in question. The procedure must be adversarial and must ensure
equality of arms. In detention on remand cases the detainee must have the
opportunity to effectively contest the basis of the allegations against him, which
means amongst others that he must have access to documents in the case-file
which form the basis of the prosecution case against him.240 In remand cases
as well as other cases in which a suspicion against the detainee is the ground
for detention (like in A and others) and/or the detention has great impact on
the detainee, Article 6 ECHR standards are incorporated into Article 5 (4)
ECHR.241 It may thus be assumed that in other kinds of detention cases, lower
standards may apply.
The lowest standards seem to apply to cases concerning secret surveillance
and the use of secret information for screening job candidates who would have
access to sensitive information, governed by Article 13 ECHR. In these cases
the ECtHR accepted that a remedy must be ‘as effective as can be’. According
to the ECtHR it is inherent in any system of secret surveillance or secret checks
that there would be a restricted scope for recourse. Such a system can only
function if the individual concerned remained unaware of the measures
affecting him.242 In those cases the Court did not find a violation of Article 13
ECHR although the available remedies only had limited effectiveness.243
Level of procedural protection under Article 3 ECHR
The Court suggests in Chahal that the procedural safeguards under Article 3
are stronger than those derived from Article 13 in Klass v Germany and Leander
v Sweden. It considered in Chahal that:
239 ECtHR 31 October 2006, Aksoy v Turkey, no 59741/00, para 27. Also in other cases the Court
referred to the important consequences of a measure for the applicants, without that
explicitly leading to higher procedural guarantees. See for example ECtHR 19 March 2002,
Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94, para 27 and ECtHR 13 December 2007, Dagtekin
v Turkey, no 70516/01, para 34.
240 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 203-204.
241 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 217.
242 ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v Sweden, no 9248/81, paras 78 and 84 and ECtHR (Plen)
6 September 1978, Klass v Germany, no 5029/71, para 69. See also ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-
Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, paras 136-137.
243 ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v Sweden, no 9248/81, para 84 and ECtHR (Plen) 6 September
1978, Klass v Germany, no 5029/71, paras 70-72.
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it must be borne in mind that these cases concerned complaints under Articles 8
and 10 of the Convention […] and that their examination required the Court to
have regard to the national security claims which had been advanced by the
Government. The requirement of a remedy which is “as effective as can be” is not
appropriate in respect of a complaint that a person’s deportation will expose him
or her to a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 […], where the issues
concerning national security are immaterial.244
This consideration obviously refers to the fact that Article 3 ECHR is absolute
and that national security issues cannot play a role in the assessment whether
a person’s expulsion violates this provision. However, it may also be derived
from this consideration that a remedy which is “as effective as can be” will
never be sufficient in cases concerning Article 3 ECHR. Instead a rigorous
scrutiny must take place.245 The ECtHR has never explicitly addressed the
level of procedural protection which should be guaranteed in asylum cases
in which the assessment of the risk of refoulement was partly based on secret
evidence. Therefore it remains to be seen which standards apply in such cases
and whether for example, taking into account the serious interests at stake
for the person concerned, the highest standards developed under the criminal
limb of Article 6 (1) ECHR apply.
Limited application of the requirement of a remedy which is ‘as effective as can be’
In Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, the ECtHR also distinguished cases regarding the ex-
pulsion of aliens on national security grounds falling within the scope of
Article 8 ECHR from the cases concerning secret surveillance and the use of
secret information for screening job candidates. It considered that in expulsion
cases reconciling the interest of preserving sensitive information with the
individual’s right to an effective remedy is obviously less difficult than in secret
surveillance cases.246 In none of the later expulsion cases the Court applied
the ‘as effective as can be’ criteria. It may therefore be assumed that in expulsion
cases stricter procedural guarantees are required under Articles 8 and 13 than
in cases concerning secret surveillance or secret checks.247
Finally in Tinnelly and others v the United Kingdom the ECtHR considered
that the requirement of a remedy which is ‘as effective as can be’ cannot apply
to civil cases falling within the scope of Article 6 (1) ECHR. The Court stressed
in this respect ‘that the requirements of an “effective remedy” for the purposes
of Article 13 of the Convention are less strict than those of Article 6 (1). For
this reason, the Government’s assertion that the access enjoyed by the appli-
244 ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93, para 150.
245 ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93, para 151.
246 ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, para 137.
247 The level of protection guaranteed under Artt 8 and 13 ECHR in expulsion cases seems
to be the same.
354 Chapter 10
cants was as effective as could be in the circumstances cannot be sustained’.248
Article 6 (1) ECHR thus offers more protection than Article 13. It does not
directly follow from the case-law whether and if so with regard to which
aspects the civil limb of Article 6 (1) ECHR offers less protection than its crim-
inal limb with regard to the use of confidential information.
10.2.3 Limitations of the right to adversarial proceedings
In all sorts of cases, the ECtHR has recognised that the right to adversarial
proceedings may be limited in special circumstances. In criminal cases the
ECtHR held that the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an
absolute right. There may be reasons, such as the need to preserve the funda-
mental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public inter-
est, which justify a limitation of this right.249 Under the civil limb of Article 6
the Court has held that a limitation of the right of access to court is not
compatible with the Convention if it does not pursue a legitimate aim.250
In Al-Nashif the Court considered in its ruling under Articles 8 and 13 that
certain limitations on the type of remedies available to the individual may
be justified where national security considerations are involved. Nevertheless,
the remedy must remain effective in practice as well as in law.251
The ECtHR has identified several interests which may justify limitations
of the right to adversarial proceedings. In Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom
the ECtHR recognised with regard to sources providing (country of origin)
information for the purpose of the assessment of asylum cases, that ‘where
there are legitimate security concerns, sources may wish to remain anony-
mous’.252 Similarly the ECtHR has considered that the need to protect witnesses
at risk of reprisals may justify a limitation of the right to adversarial proceed-
ings.253 The same applies to the need to keep secret police methods of investi-
gation of crime.254 In van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands, a criminal
case, the ECtHR accepted that it was necessary to preserve the anonymity of
an agent deployed in undercover activities for his own or his family’s pro-
248 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinelly & sons Ltd and others and McElduff and others v the United
Kingdom, no 20390/92 and 21322/92, para 77.
249 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96,
para 45.
250 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 72.
251 ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, paras 123 and 137.
252 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para
233.
253 ECtHR 20 February 1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, para 70.
254 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 45 and ECtHR
6 July 2010, Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 52.
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tection and so as not to impair his usefulness for future operations.255 In
Mirilashvili v Russia, also a criminal case, the ECtHR considered that the aim
of organising criminal proceedings in such a way as to protect information
about the details of undercover police operations could legitimise the limitation
to the right to adversarial proceedings.256
Furthermore the ECtHR has accepted under several provisions that limita-
tions may be justified in order to protect national security.257 In A and others
for example, which concerned the indefinite detention of persons suspected
of involvement in terrorist activities, the Court pointed at the fact that ‘the
activities and aims of the al’Qaeda network had given rise to a “public emerg-
ency threatening the life of the nation”’. According to the ECtHR it had therefore
to
be borne in mind that at the relevant time there was considered to be an urgent
need to protect the population of the United Kingdom from terrorist attack and
[..] a strong public interest in obtaining information about al’Qaeda and its asso-
ciates and in maintaining the secrecy of the sources of such information [..].258
Necessity of non-disclosure
In cases falling within the criminal limb of Article 6 (1) or in which the
standards accepted under that provision were applied, the Court stated that
only such measures restricting the rights of the defence which are ‘strictly
necessary’ are permissible.259 If a less restrictive measure can suffice then
that measure should be applied.260 ‘Relevant and sufficient’ reasons must
255 ECtHR 18 March 1997, Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands, nos 21363/93, 21364/93,
21427/93 and 22056/93, para 57. See also ECtHR (Adm) 17 September 2005, Haas v Germany,
no 73047/01, where anonymous informants risked becoming the victim of acts of revenge
abroad, where German authorities could only protect them to a very limited extent.
256 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para 202.
257 See for example under Art 5 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United
Kingdom, no 3455/05, under Art 6 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others
v the United Kingdom, Appl. nos. 20390/92 and 21322/92 and under Artt 8 and 13 ECtHR
20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99.
258 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 216-217.
See also for example ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United
Kingdom, nos 20390/92 and 21322/92, para 76, where the Court stated that it was mindful
of the security considerations at stake in that case and the need for the authorities to display
the utmost vigilance in the award of contracts for work involving access to vital power
supplies or public buildings situated in town centers in Northern Ireland. The Court has
also accepted that State secrets should only be disclosed to persons who possess the
appropriate authorisation. ECtHR 6 July 2010, Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 54.
However, the State must be able to prove that it is necessary to keep them secret. See for
example ECtHR 24 April 2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 62.
259 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96,
para 45 and ECtHR 6 July 2010, Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 52.
260 ECtHR 18 March 1997, Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands, nos 21363/93, 21364/93,
21427/93 and 22056/93, para 58.
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be adduced by domestic authorities for the use of anonymous witnesses in
criminal cases.261 In A and others v the United Kingdom the ECtHR considered
that ‘it was essential that as much information about the allegations and
evidence against each applicant was disclosed as was possible without com-
promising national security or the safety of others’.262 This case-law pre-
supposes a very strict test. It does not follow from the ECtHR’s case-law whether
such a strict test also applies to civil cases decided under Article 6 (1) ECHR.
Under Articles 8 and 13 ECHR the ECtHR has held that ‘there must be some
form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to
review the reasons for the decision, if need be with appropriate procedural
limitations on the use of classified information’ (emphasis added).263 This also
suggests that limitations of the right to adversarial proceedings, such as the
non-disclosure of evidence should be necessary.264
Assessment of the necessity of non-disclosure by the national court
The ECtHR has held under Articles 6 (1) and 5 (4) ECHR that the national court
should decide whether it is justified to refuse disclosure of evidence to the
party concerned.265 The Court found a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR in
several criminal cases in which State authorities (such as the public prosecutor
or the security service) alone assessed the necessity of keeping relevant in-
formation secret.266 In Mirilashvili v Russia the ECtHR made clear that the mere
involvement of a court in the decision whether evidence should be disclosed
261 See for example ECtHR 20 February 1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, para 71.
262 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 218.
263 ECtHR 6 December 2007, Liu and Liu v Russia, no 42086/05, para 59 and ECtHR 2 September
2009, Kuashal and others v Bulgaria, no 1537/08, para 29.
264 In ECtHR 11 February 2010, Raza v Romania, no 31465/08, para 55 the ECtHR considered
that ‘even in indisputable national security cases, such as those relating to terrorist activities,
the authorities of countries which have already suffered from and are currently at risk of
terrorist attacks have chosen to keep secret only those parts of their decision whose dis-
closure would compromise national security or the safety of others [..], thus illustrating
that there exist techniques which can accommodate legitimate security concerns without
fully neglecting fundamental procedural guarantees such as the publicity of judicial de-
cisions’.
265 According to Van Dijk and others the Court attaches great importance to the fact that the
need for disclosure is under constant assessment of the judge, who may monitor throughout
the trial the fairness or otherwise of the disclosed evidence’. Van Dijk a.o. 2006, p 588. See
also ECtHR 24 April 2007, V. v Finland, no 40412/98, para 77.
266 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no
28901/95, paras 63-66, ECtHR 19 June 2001, Atlan v the United Kingdom, no 36533/97, para
44 and ECtHR 24 June 2003, Dowsett v the United Kingdom, no 39482/98, para 44. In these
cases the prosecution decided during the applicants’ trial, without notifying the judge, to
withhold certain relevant evidence on grounds of public interest. In ECtHR 24 September
2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 57 the Court observed that it has considered the
power of the Head of the State Security Bureau to uphold and lift the confidentiality of
documents inconsistent with the fairness of lustration proceedings including with the
principle of equality of arms.
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to a party is not sufficient.267 In this case the Court found that the decision-
making process was seriously flawed because the domestic court did not
analyse amongst others whether the disclosure of the materials withheld from
the applicant would, at least arguably, have harmed any identifiable public
interest.268 Finally in several criminal cases, the fact that the national court
did review the necessity of the non-disclosure of confidential information, was
taken into account in the Court’s ruling that Article 6 (1) ECtHR had not been
violated.269
In criminal cases the fact that evidence was not revealed to the court of
first instance, which as a result could not examine the necessity of the non-
disclosure of this evidence to the applicant, can sometimes be compensated
during appeal proceedings.270 In Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom the
ECtHR took into account that
given the extend of disclosure to the applicants of the withheld material by the
Court of Appeal,271 the fact that the court was able to consider the impact of the
new material on the safety of the applicant’s conviction in the light of detailed
argument of their defence council and the fact that the undisclosed material was
found by the court to add nothing of significance to what had already been dis-
closed at trial […] the failure to place the undisclosed material before the trial judge
was in particular circumstances of the case remedied by the subsequent procedure
before the Court of Appeal.272
By contrast in Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom the Court did not find the
procedure before the appeal court sufficient to remedy the unfairness of the
procedure at first instance. The Court took into account the fact that the Court
of Appeal had fewer investigating powers than the court of first instance and
the possibility that the Court of Appeal was influenced by the jury’s verdict
267 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para 197.
268 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, paras 206-208.
269 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96,
para 47 and ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95,
para 56.
270 See also Summers 2007, p 120.
271 The Court of Appeal had disclosed to the applicant’s a summary of the information con-
tained in one document and it gave an account of the events which had resulted in the
fact that the undisclosed material had not been placed before the trial judge.
272 ECtHR 7 June 2007, Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom, no 15187/03, para 44. See also
ECtHR 16 December 1992, Edwards v the United Kingdom, no 13071/87, paras 36-39. In this
case the Court of Appeal examined the transcript of the trial including the applicant’s
alleged confession and considered in detail the impact of the new information on the
conviction. The applicant’s representatives had every opportunity to seek to persuade the
court that the conviction should not stand in view of the evidence of non-disclosure.
Furthermore it was open to counsel for the applicant to make an application to the Court
of Appeal – which they chose not to do – to call witnesses.
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of guilty into underestimating the significance of the undisclosed evidence.273
The ECtHR held that the fact that the Court of Appeal did not examine the non-
disclosed material cannot in itself amount to a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR,
in the situation that no deficiencies were found in the first instance pro-
cedure.274
Arguably also under the civil limb of Article 6 (1) ECHR the executive cannot
decide on its own on the necessity of confidentiality of information. This
follows from the fact that the ECtHR has held that an applicant’s right to submit
a dispute to a court or tribunal in order to have a determination of questions
of both fact and law cannot be displaced by the ipse dixit of the executive.275
The Court has not considered yet whether Article 13 ECHR requires (in
expulsion measures) that an independent authority rules on the necessity of
the non-disclosure of evidence. In most expulsion cases decided under Articles
8 and 13 the national court had not received the confidential documents and/or
had not reviewed the facts, let alone the necessity of the limitations of the right
to adversarial proceedings. It may however be expected that the Court does
not accept that it is left up to the full discretion of the executive authorities
to decide whether national security concerns justify the refusal to disclose
documents to the applicant. Such discretion could lead to arbitrariness and
would not be in line with the ECtHR’s case-law which implies that the national
court should assess whether national security reasons justify limitations to
the right to family life.
Examination of confidential evidence by the national court
The national court should assess whether invoking national security as a
justification for a certain measure has a reasonable basis in the facts or reveals
an interpretation of “national security” that is unlawful or contrary to common
sense and arbitrary.276 Furthermore it must examine the necessity of the non-
disclosure of the evidence. This presupposes that the court receives all the
relevant evidence from the State.277 The ECtHR has made clear that the con-
273 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, para
65 and ECtHR 19 June 2001, Atlan v the United Kingdom, no 36533/97, para 45. See also
Trechsel 2005, p 93. In ECtHR 24 April 2007, V. v Finland, no 40412/98, para 79, the ECtHR
held that the appeal could not remedy the defects during the proceedings in first instance,
amongst others because there was no possibility of making informed submissions to the
court on behalf of the accused as the applicant received the requested information only
after the relevant time-limit for the appeal had elapsed.
274 ECtHR 11 January 2011, McKeaown v the United Kingdom, no 6684/05, para 54.
275 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 77. In ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para
203 the ECtHR distinguished the case from Tinnelly when considering that the decision
to withhold certain documents was taken not by the prosecution unilaterally.
276 ECtHR 26 July 2011, Liu v Russia, no 29157/09, para 88.
277 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, paras
63-66.
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fidential information used by the State authorities should be disclosed to the
national court (Articles 5 and 6 ECHR) or independent authority (Article 13
ECHR) hearing the case. If the court has not received all confidential information
in the case-file it is not in the position to monitor the need for (non-) disclosure,
but it is also not able to review the facts.278 In Tinnelly v the United Kingdom
for example the Court considered that any substantive review of the grounds
motivating the issues of a national security certificate would have been
impaired because the court assessing the case did not have sight of all the
materials on which the Secretary of State based his decision.279
Assessment of secret evidence by the ECtHR
In criminal cases in which the identity of witnesses was not disclosed to the
applicant, the ECtHR has assessed itself whether the reasons for such non-
disclosure were ‘relevant and sufficient’.280 In criminal cases where evidence
has been withheld from the defence of public interest grounds the ECtHR does
not consider it to be its role to decide whether or not such non-disclosure was
strictly necessary. As a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the
evidence before them. The ECtHR has noted that in many cases it was not even
placed in the position to perform a balancing test, as the information concerned
was not revealed to it.281 The ECtHR thus pays deference to the national
decision whether certain evidence should be kept confidential for national
278 See for example ECtHR 24 April 2007, V. v Finland, no 40412/98, para 78, where the ECtHR
considered that the courts did not, any more than the defence or the public prosecutor,
have knowledge of the contents of the telephone metering information and they were not
therefore in a position to monitor the relevance to the defence of the withheld information.
The ECtHR furthermore held that in case of a plea of incitement, the court’s duty to examine
this plea and ensure the overall fairness of the trial requires that all relevant information
(also information not included in the persecution file) be openly put before the court or
tested in an adversarial manner. See ECtHR 4 November 2010, Bannikova v Russia, no 18757/
06, para 64.
279 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 75. See for cases under Artt 8 and 13 ECHR for example ECtHR 8 June
2006, Lupsa v Romania, no 10337/04, para 41 and ECtHR 6 December 2007, Liu and Liu v
Russia, no 42086/05, paras 61 and 63, where the Court considered that ‘the domestic courts
were not in the position to assess effectively whether the decision had been justified, because
the full material on which it had been based was not made available to them’.
280 See for example ECtHR 20 February 1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, para 71
and ECtHR (Adm) 17 September 2005, Haas v Germany, no 73047/01, where the Court found
that the domestic authorities adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to keep witnesses’
identities secret. In that case anonymous informants risked becoming the victim of acts
of revenge abroad, where German authorities could only protect them to a very limited
extent.
281 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95,
para 53, ECtHR 24 June 2003, Dowsett v the United Kingdom, no 39482/98, para 43 and ECtHR
6 July 2010 Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 53.
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security reasons.282 Instead, the ECtHR ensures that, as far as possible, ‘the
decision-making process complied with the requirements to provide adversarial
proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to
protect the interests of the accused’.283
In Mirilashvili v Russia the Court held that in situations involving “national
security” considerations for withholding documentary evidence, the Court
has applied a less exacting standard than in cases concerning the use of anony-
mous witnesses. The Court considered however that ‘that standard of scrutiny
should not be applied automatically; the Court retains the power to assess
independently whether the case involved national security considerations.’284
In a few cases regarding Article 6 ECHR the Court did indeed examine (at least
marginally) whether the non-disclosure of evidence was justified. The Court
has held with regard to lustration proceedings in general that, ‘unless the
contrary is shown on the facts of a specific case, it cannot be assumed that
there remains a continuing and actual public interest in imposing limitations
on access to materials classified as confidential under former regimes’.285
It is for the Government to prove the existence of a such an interest in main-
taining documents secret.286 Furthermore in Aksoy v Turkey the Court con-
sidered that the case-file did not contain any element which could justify the
non-disclosure of the documents on national security grounds or for other
relevant reasons.287 In A. and others v the United Kingdom on the other hand
the Court concluded that on the material before it, the Court had ‘no basis
to find that excessive and unjustified secrecy was employed in respect of any
of the applicants’ appeals or that there were not compelling reasons for the
lack of disclosure in each case.’288
282 This is in line with the Court’s opinion that the State’s enjoy a wide margin of appreciation
in their assessment whether national security justifies certain measures against a person,
such as expulsion measures (see section 10.3.1). Summers states that the reason for the
ECtHR’s deference is that the Court is not interested in acting as a Court of fourth instance.
Summers 2007, p 118.
283 See for example ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95,
para 53, ECtHR 24 June 2003, Dowsett v the United Kingdom, no 39482/98, para 43 and ECtHR
6 July 2010 Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 53. Trechsel notes that the words ‘as far
as possible’ are somewhat vague, especially if read in conjunction with the refusal to
ascertain whether the non-disclosure was ‘strictly necessary’. Trechsel 2005, p 93. Van Dijk
and others state that in this regard it seems crucial whether the defence is informed, can
make submissions and can participate in the decision-making process’. Van Dijk a.o. 2006,
p 588.
284 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Mirilashvili v Russia, no 6293/04, para196.
285 ECtHR 24 April 2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 56.
286 ECtHR 14 June 2011, Mościcki v Poland, no 52443/07, para 44.
287 ECtHR 31 October 2006, Aksoy v Turkey, no 59741/00, para 28. The Court was able to assess
the documents withheld to the applicant, as they were sent to the Turkish High Court six
years after the (national) proceedings against the applicant were concluded.
288 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 219.
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No cases were found in which the ECtHR addressed its own role in the
assessment whether the non-disclosure of evidence to the applicant was
justified under Articles 6 (1) civil limb and 13 ECHR. In many expulsion cases
under Article 13 the State did not send the confidential evidence to the ECtHR,
sometimes in spite of its request to do so.289
10.2.4 Confidentiality versus the right to adversarial proceedings
If there is an interest which legitimises a limitation to the right to adversarial
proceedings, this interest and the right to adversarial proceedings must be
balanced against each other. In Tinnelly v the United Kingdom the Court ex-
amined for example under Article 6 (1), civil limb
whether there existed a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
concerns for the protection of national security invoked by the authorities and the
impact which the means they employed to this end had on the applicants’ right
of access to a court or tribunal.290
In A and others v the United Kingdom the Court held that the important public
interests of the State to maintain the secrecy of the sources of the information
about al’Qaeda and its associates had to be balanced against the applicants’
right under Article 5 (4) to procedural fairness.291
It follows from the ECtHR’s case-law that the State’s interest to protect the
national security of the State weighs heavily and may justify important limita-
tions to the right to adversarial proceedings. Less weight may be attached to
other State interests such as the prosecution or prevention of crimes which
do not affect national security. In C.G. v Bulgaria the Court considered:
While actions taken in the interests of national security may, in view of the sensitiv-
ity of the subject-matter and the serious potential consequences for the safety of
the community, attract considerably less in terms of guarantees than might other-
wise be the case, an expulsion designed to forestall lesser evils such as
run-of-the-mill criminal activities may have to be reviewed in proceedings providing
a higher degree of protection of the individual.292
289 See for example ECtHR 11 February 2010, Raza v Bulgaria, no 31465/08, para 5 and ECtHR
16 December 2008, Gulijev v Lithuania, no 10425/03, para 45.
290 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 77. See also in the criminal context: ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000,
Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 45.
291 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 216-217.
292 ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. and others v Bulgaria, no 1365/07, para 45.
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In several cases the Court stressed the need for procedural safeguards while
referring to what was at stake for the applicant.293 In this section it will be
explained how the balance between interests in keeping information con-
fidential and the right to adversarial proceedings should be struck in practice.
It was already pointed out in sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.3 that national security
concerns can never justify that evidence underlying the contested decision
is withheld from the national court or independent authority. The court must
be informed of the reasons grounding the contested decision and it should
assess the merits of the case, including the existence of a threat to national
security.294 This assessment by the court or independent authority is not
sufficient. Certain procedural guarantees must be offered to the person con-
cerned. The right to adversarial proceedings also requires that the person
concerned is (in some way) informed of the decision and the reasons for it.295
In Raza the ECtHR regarded the complete concealment from the public of the
entirety of a judicial decision in an expulsion case in which (according to the
government) national security issues were at stake, not warranted.296
The need for compensation
When performing a balancing test it should be assured that the right to
adversarial proceedings of the applicant be sufficiently guaranteed. In this
light in several cases under various provisions of the Convention the ECtHR
has addressed possibilities for compensation of limitations of the right to
adversarial proceedings, notably the use of special advocates. In its assessment
whether the right to adversarial proceedings has been infringed, the Court
further takes into account the weight of the confidential evidence and the
specificity of the open material in the case at hand. The issues of compensation
and weight of confidential evidence will be discussed below.
293 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 217-218,
ECtHR 24 April 2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 59, ECtHR 31 October 2006, Aksoy
v Turkey, no 59741/00, para 27 and ECtHR 19 October 2010, Özpinar v Turkey, no 20999/04,
para 78.
294 See for example under Art 6 (1), civil limb ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and
others v the United Kingdom, nos. 20390/92 and 21322/92, para 77, ECtHR 19 March 2002,
Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94, and under Artt 8 and 13 ECHR: ECtHR 20
June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99.
295 See ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. v others v Bulgaria, no 1365/07, para 46, where the ECtHR
considered that lacking even outline knowledge of the facts which had served as a basis
for this assessment, the first applicant was not able to present his case adequately in the
ensuing appeal to the Minister of Internal Affairs and in the judicial review proceedings.
See also ECtHR 8 June 2006, Lupsa v Romania, no 10337/04, para 58. See under Art (6) (1)
civil limb also ECtHR 19 March 2002, Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94, para 27.
296 ECtHR 11 February 2010, Raza v Romania, no 31465/08, para 53.
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In criminal cases and in cases in which the Court applied the guarantees
flowing from the criminal limb of Article 6 ECHR,297 the ECtHR held that ‘in
order to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial any difficulties caused
to the defence by a limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced
by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities’.298 In the Grand Cham-
ber judgments Jasper v the United Kingdom and Fitt v the United Kingdom the
Court was satisfied that the decision-making procedure complied with the
requirement of adversarial proceedings, although the defence did not have
the opportunity to examine whether the evidence which was not disclosed
to it, could be used in its favour. The Court took into account that the national
court assessed whether the evidence had to be disclosed to the defence and
that this court stated that it would have ordered disclosure if this ‘did or might
help further the defence’. The national court was in a position to effectively
perform this assessment as it was fully versed in all evidence and issues in
the case. Furthermore the defence were able during the course of the hearing
to argue the case for disclosure and to hear the arguments of the prosecution
court’s reasons for not ordering complete disclosure. In Fitt the defence were
also provided with a summary of the witness statement which was kept
confidential.299 In these circumstances the Court did not find it necessary
that a special counsel would participate in the proceedings.300
It should be noted that in Jasper and Fitt a substantial minority of the Court
found that a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR occurred and that a special advocate
should be introduced in criminal proceedings in which confidential evidence
is used. In their opinion in Jasper the dissenters took into account that the
defence were not aware of the category of material which the prosecution
sought to withhold from them and were not informed of the reasons for the
judge’s decision that the material should not be disclosed. However also in
Fitt, where the defence were informed of the category of material which the
prosecution sought to withhold and received an edited summary of the
297 See ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para
218.
298 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 45, ECtHR (GC)
16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95, para 52, ECtHR 20 February
1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, paras 73-73.
299 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 47.
300 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, paras 47-49, ECtHR
16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95, paras 54-56. See also ECtHR
(GC) 11 January 2011, McKeaown v the United Kingdom, no 6684/05, where the ECtHR found
no violation of Art 6 (1) ECHR because evidence was disclosed to a disclosure judge, who
was fully aware of the issues in the case and concluded that none of the undisclosed
material was relevant to the defence and that he did not anticipate any circumstances which
would result in the material becoming of value to the defence. The Court of Appeal had
considered and rejected the applicant’s submission that fairness required that a special
counsel should have been appointed or that the disclosure judge should have been put
in the position to monitor the need for disclosure in the course of the proceedings.
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material, the dissenters were of the opinion that the unfairness created by the
defence’s absence from the ex parte proceedings301 could not be remedied
by the fact that the judge monitored the need for disclosure of the evidence
during the trial.302 In several other cases the Court did not accept the
domestic court’s decision that there was no need to disclose evidence to the
defence. It found a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR because potentially
exculpatory evidence was withheld from the applicant.303
Special counsels
The use of special counsels or special advocates as a technique to compensate
for limitations of the right to adversarial proceedings in cases in which evid-
ence is not disclosed to a party for national security reasons, was first men-
tioned by the ECtHR in the Chahal v the United Kingdom judgment. In this case
intervening parties drew the Court’s attention to a system applied in Canada
in such cases. The interveners described the system as follows:
[A] Federal Court judge holds an in camera hearing of all the evidence, at which
the applicant is provided with a statement summarising, as far as possible, the
case against him or her and has the right to be represented and to call evidence.
The confidentiality of security material is maintained by requiring such evidence
to be examined in the absence of both the applicant and his or her representative.
However, in these circumstances, their place is taken by a security-cleared counsel
instructed by the court, who cross-examines the witnesses and generally assists
the court to test the strength of the State’s case. A summary of the evidence
obtained by this procedure, with necessary deletions, is given to the applicant.304
In its assessment of the complaint under Article 5 (4) ECHR the Court attached
significance to the existence of such a system in Canada. In its view this
example ‘illustrates that there are techniques which can be employed which
301 In ex parte proceedings such as were applied in Jasper, Fitt and Edwards and Lewis, the judge
examined the evidence which the prosecution wanted to keep secret without the presence
of the defence counsel. There are three options in such proceedings: 1. the defence is
informed of the category of the materials held by the prosecution and is able to make
representations to the court, 2. the defence is not informed of the category of those materials
and 3. the defence is not informed of the fact that an ex parte application was made. See
ECtHR 22 July 2003, Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98,
para 34.
302 See the dissenting opinions of judges Palm, Fischbach, Vajić, Thomassen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska
and Traja, of judge Zupančič and of judge Hedigan with the Jasper and Fitt cases.
303 ECtHR 22 July 2003, Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98,
para 58. This judgment was confirmed by the Grand Chamber. ECtHR (GC) 27 October
2004, Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, ECtHR (GC)
16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, paras 63-65, where
it concerned evidence which could have been used to undermine the credibility of a key
prosecution witness.
304 ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93, para 144.
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both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources
of intelligence information and yet accord the individual a substantial measure
of procedural justice’.305 After the Chahal judgment the United Kingdom also
introduced a special counsel system.306 In several later cases under Articles
5 (4), 6 (1), 8 and 13 ECHR the Court again referred to the existence of special
techniques, without expressing itself on the question whether such system
would comply with those provisions.307
In A and others v the United Kingdom the ECtHR finally assessed the com-
patibility with Article 5 (4) ECHR of the special advocate procedure introduced
in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom the confidential evidence was
disclosed only to a special advocate who acted on behalf of the applicant.
During the closed sessions before the Special Immigration Appeal Commission
(SIAC) the special advocate could make submissions on behalf of the applicant
as regards procedural matters, including the need for (further) disclosure of
evidence as well as the substance of the case. From the moment the special
advocate had sight of the closed material, he could not have any further contact
with the applicant or his representative save with the permission of SIAC.308
The ECtHR ruled that it depends on the circumstances of the case, in par-
ticular the specificity of the information disclosed to the party concerned
whether the use of a special advocate would sufficiently compensate this
party’s lack of access to documents. It considered that ‘the special advocate
could perform an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure
and the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and
putting arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings.’309
However the Court also noted ‘that the special advocate could not perform
this function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with suffi-
cient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give
effective instructions to the special advocate.’310 The Court concluded in A
and others that the right to adversarial proceedings was infringed with regard
to several of the applicants. The Court’s considerations regarding the nature
of the (non)disclosed evidence will be addressed below.
305 ECtHR (GC) 25 October 1996, Chahal v the United Kingdom, no 22414/93, para 131.
306 Bonner 2006, p 54.
307 See for example ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, no 50963/99, paras 95-97 and
137, ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 78, ECtHR 19 March 2002, Devenney v the United Kingdom, no 24265/94,
para 28 and ECtHR 13 December 2007, Dagtekin v Turkey, no 70516/01, para 34. See also
ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 209
and 211.
308 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 215.
309 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 220.
310 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 220.
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Other compensation techniques
Apart from the use of special counsels, several other compensation techniques
were reviewed by the ECtHR. In Doorson v the Netherlands the Court found that
the limitations of the right to adversarial proceedings were sufficiently counter-
balanced as the anonymous witnesses were questioned by an investigating
judge, who was aware of their identity. The council for the defence was present
at this hearing and was put in the position to ask questions to the witnesses,
which were all answered.311
In several criminal cases the Court took into account that a non-confidential
summary of the relevant evidence was sent to the applicant and that the
applicant was able to contest the information contained in the summary.312
In Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom the extend of the disclosure to the
applicants of the withheld material by the Court of Appeal in a summary was
one of the factors which lead to the Court’s conclusion that the appeal proceed-
ings complied with Article 6 (1) ECHR.313 Also in Haliti v Switzerland, a case
decided under Articles 8 and 13 ECHR the ECtHR considered that the national
court disclosed documents to the applicant and that it provided summaries
of the relevant parts of the undisclosed information. Therefore, according to
the Court, the applicant was in a position to contest the allegations against
him.314
In Matyjek v Poland, in which the applicant faced lustration proceedings
(a criminal charge), the applicant had access to his case file (including con-
fidential information) after the institution of the lustration proceedings. How-
ever the applicant could consult the confidential documents only in the secret
registry of the lustration court and was not allowed to make copies of the
documents or to take notes out of the registry.315
[T]he accused’s effective participation in his criminal trial must equally include
the right to compile notes in order to facilitate the conduct of his defence, irrespect-
ive of whether or not he is represented by counsel […]. The fact that the applicant
could not remove his own notes, taken either at the hearing or in the secret registry,
in order to show them to an expert or to use them for any other purpose, effectively
prevented him from using the information contained in them as he had to rely
solely on his memory.316
311 ECtHR 20 February 1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, para 73.
312 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 47.
313 ECtHR 7 June 2007, Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom, no 15187/03, paras 43-44.
314 ECtHR (Adm) 1 March 2005, Haliti v Switzerland, no 14015/02.
315 Any notes the applicant took could be made only in special notebooks that were subsequent-
ly sealed and deposited in the secret registry. The notebooks could not be removed from
this registry and could be opened only by the person who had made them.
316 ECtHR 24 April 2007, Matyjek v Poland, no 38184/03, para 59. The Court also found a
violation of the principle of equality of arms in this case, because the State party did have
unrestricted access to the confidential documents. See also ECtHR 8 June 2010, Górny v
Poland, no 50399/07, para 37 and ECtHR 31 May 2011, Zawisza v Poland, no 37293/09, where
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It is important to note that the ECtHR held earlier in this judgment that in
lustration proceedings such as in the case at hand it cannot be assumed that
there remains a continuing and actual public interest in imposing limited access
to materials, unless the contrary is shown in a specific case.317 Therefore it
may be assumed that limitations to the right to adversarial proceedings were
addressed more critically by the ECtHR than in cases in which the non-dis-
closure was justified. However, this judgment does show that the right to
adversarial proceedings is seriously limited by the fact that a party cannot
make copies or notes of documents used in his case.
In Tinnelly v the United Kingdom the ECtHR rejected the State’s argument
that mechanisms, such as the Independent Commission for Police Complaints
and the statutory controls on the activities of the security services, which
assured the accountability of the police and the security services in the per-
formance of their intelligence gathering functions could compensate for the
limitations to the applicants’ right of access to court.318
Limited weight of information supplied by anonymous sources
In Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom and in H.R. v France, both asylum cases
decided under Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR considered that limited weight should
be attached to country of origin information, which was obtained by the State
from sources whose identity was not disclosed to the ECtHR. In these cases
the ECtHR did not mention the right to adversarial proceedings. However, it
may be assumed that the ECtHR did have the protection of this right in mind
when deciding this case. The ECtHR held that ’in the absence of any information
about the nature of the sources’ operations in the relevant area, it will be
virtually impossible for the Court to assess their reliability’.319 In Sufi and
Elmi the ECtHR found that the description of the sources relied on were vague
(“a diplomatic source”, or “a security advisor”). According to the ECtHR such
descriptions give no indication of the authority or reputation of the sources
or of the extent of their presence in the region concerned. In H.R. v France the
State authorities consulted Algerian lawyers on the consequences of the lifting
of the state of emergency in Algeria. The ECtHR considered that the French
Government did not give details concerning the circumstances of this consulta-
tion or the identity of the lawyers consulted. Therefore the ECtHR could not
assess their independence vis à vis the power in place or the reliability of their
statements.320
the restrictions with regard to taking notes and making copies of documents were also
applied to the applicant’s lawyers.
317 See further under section 10.3.3.
318 ECtHR 10 July 1998, Tinnelly and McElduff and others v the United Kingdom, nos 20390/92
and 21322/92, para 77.
319 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 233.
320 ECtHR 22 September 2011, H.R. v France, no 64780/09, para 61.
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The ECtHR generally exercises caution when considering information from
anonymous sources which is inconsistent with the remainder of the information
before it. However ‘where the sources’ conclusions are consistent with other
country information, their evidence may be of corroborative weight’.321 In
Sufi and Elmi very little other information was available to the ECtHR. Therefore
‘it was impossible for the Court to carry out any assessment of the sources’
reliability and, as a consequence, where their information is unsupported or
contradictory’. Therefore the ECtHR was unable to attach substantial weight
to it.322 In H.R. v France the ECtHR did not attach much if any weight to the
statements of the anonymous Algerian lawyers. It may be derived from this
case-law that national courts who do not know the sources of information
supporting the asylum decision, should attach limited weight to this informa-
tion. Asylum decisions cannot be based to a decisive extend on information
provided by anonymous sources alone.
The judgments in Sufi and Elmi and H.R are in line with the ECtHR’s case-
law concerning anonymous witnesses in criminal cases under Article 6 (1)
ECHR. In Doorson the Court considered ‘that even when “counterbalancing”
procedures are found to compensate sufficiently the handicaps under which
the defence labours, a conviction should not be based either solely or to a
decisive extent on anonymous statements.323 In Haas the Court was aware
that due to the non-disclosure of the informers’ identities, the defence lacked
information permitting it to test their reliability or cast doubts on their credibil-
ity. Furthermore the national Court of Appeal was precluded from forming
their own impression on the informers’ reliability. ‘However given that the
evidence obtained had been corroborated with further items of evidence, the
Court took the view that the rights of the defence were sufficiently
respected.’324
The weight and specificity of other evidence
In criminal cases under Article 6 (1) ECHR, the ECtHR takes into account the
weight of the non-disclosed evidence for the conviction in its assessment
whether the right to adversarial proceedings has been violated. In Jasper v the
United Kingdom and Fitt v the United Kingdom the ECtHR not only took into
account the guarantees in place in the procedure in which it was decided
whether evidence should be disclosed to the defence. An important reason
for its refusal to accept that a ‘special counsel procedure’ was necessary in
those cases, was that the material which was not disclosed in those cases did
321 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 233.
322 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 234.
323 ECtHR 20 February 1996, Doorson v the Netherlands, no 20524/92, para 73.
324 ECtHR (Adm) 17 September 2005, Haas v Germany, no 73047/01.
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not form part of the prosecution case whatever and was never put to the
jury.325 In Botmeh and Alami the ECtHR took into account that the undisclosed
material was found by the domestic court ‘to add nothing of significance to
what had already been disclosed at trial’.326
In Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom and Rowe and Davis v the United
Kingdom the Court did find a violation of Article 6 ECHR on the basis that
(potentially) relevant information was not disclosed to the defence. In Edwards
and Lewis the Court considered that the undisclosed evidence related or may
have related to an issue of fact decided by the trial judge, namely whether
the applicants had been the victim of improper incitement by the police. The
trial judge had reviewed the undisclosed material and had concluded that
he had heard nothing and seen no material which would have assisted the
defence in their argument that evidence should be excluded on the basis that
the applicant had been entrapped into committing the offence. The ECtHR held
that because the applicants were denied access to the evidence, it was not
possible for the defence representatives to argue the case of entrapment in
full before the judge. Moreover the non-disclosed evidence (potentially)
included allegations which may have undermined the applicants’ submissions
on entrapment. The applicant’s and their representatives were not informed
on the nature of the evidence and therefore could not defend themselves
against these allegations.327
In Rowe and Davis the Court found a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR on the
basis that evidence, which could have been used to undermine the credibility
of a key prosecution witness, was withheld by the prosecution from both the
defence and the trial judge at first instance, its non-disclosure on grounds of
public interest immunity subsequently being ordered by the Court of Appeal
following an ex parte hearing. According to the ECtHR the procedure before
the appeal court was not sufficient to remedy the unfairness caused at the trial
by the absence of any scrutiny of the withheld information by the trial
judge.328
325 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Jasper v the United Kingdom, no 27052/95, para 55, ECtHR
(GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 48. According to Harris
and others the Court was strongly influenced by the fact that the non-disclosed evidence
formed no part of the prosecution case and was not put to the jury. Harris, O’Boyle &
Warbrick 2009, p 255.
326 ECtHR 7 June 2007, Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom, no 15187/03, para 44.
327 ECtHR 22 July 2003, Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, nos 39647/98 and 40461/98,
para 58. This judgment was confirmed by the Grand Chamber. ECtHR (GC) 27 October
2004, Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, nos 39647/98 and 40461/98.
328 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, paras
63-65. See also the summary of this case in ECtHR 7 June 2007, Botmeh and Alami v the United
Kingdom, no 15187/03, para 38. The undisclosed information concerned amongst others
person(s) to whom any reward money had been paid for information given to the police
regarding the applicants.
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It seems to follow from Rowe and Davis and Edwards and Lewis that in
criminal cases inculpatory evidence and evidence which is potentially relevant
to a person’s defence should be disclosed. Unlike in Fitt and Jasper the ECtHR
did not follow the domestic court(s)’ ruling that the confidential material would
not assist the defence.329
Also in cases in which the requirements flowing from the criminal of Article 6
(1) ECHR were applied such as Pocius v Lithuania and A and others v the United
Kingdom the weight of the non-disclosed evidence for the outcome of the
proceedings was taken into account.330 In A and others the Court held that
the right to adversarial proceedings would be respected in two situations:
· The evidence was to a large extent disclosed and the open material plays
a predominant role in the determination
· All or most of the underlying evidence is not disclosed, but the allegations
in the open material are sufficiently specific. It must be possible for the
applicant to provide his representatives and the special advocate with
information with which to refute these allegations.
The judgment gives several examples of sufficiently specific allegations: the
allegation that a person attended a terrorist training camp at a stated location
between stated dates, detailed allegations about the purchase of specific
telecommunications equipment, possession of specific documents linked to
named terrorist suspects and meetings with named terrorist suspects with
specific dates and places.331 The ECtHR held also with regard to Article 8 ECHR
that the allegations against a person must be sufficiently specific.332
The procedural requirements under Article 5 (4) ECHR would not be satis-
fied when all or most of the evidence underlying the detention decision is not
disclosed and the open material consist purely of general allegations. With
regard to several applicants the Court found that the right to adversarial
proceedings had been infringed. Two applicants were accused of being
involved in fund-raising for terrorist groups linked to al’Qaeda. The link
between the money raised and terrorism was not disclosed. Therefore the Court
329 This may have to do with the fact that in Edwards and Lewis and Rowe and Davis the ECtHR
knew the nature of the evidence withheld from the defence while it did not in Fitt and
Jasper.
330 ECtHR 6 July 2010, Pocius v Lithuania, no 35601/04, para 56, where the Court considered
that the information contained in the non-disclosed operational records file was deemed
to be essential evidence of the applicant’s alleged danger to society. See under Art 8 ECHR,
ECtHR 16 December 2008, Gulijev v Lithuania, no 10425/03, para 44, where the Court took
into account that the “secret” report was not only used as evidence, but, according to the
information in the case file, it was also the sole ground for not granting the applicant a
temporary residence permit. See also ECtHR 4 November 2010, Bannikova v Russia,
no 18757/06, para 63.
331 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 220
332 ECtHR 26 July 2011, Liu v Russia, no 29157/09, para 90.
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did not consider that these applicants were in a position to effectively challenge
the allegations against them. The Court concluded the same with regard to
two other applicants. The open allegations concerning them were of a general
nature, principally that they were members of named extremist Islamist groups
linked to al’Qaeda.
In A and others the Court did not exclude that inculpatory evidence is not
disclosed to the detainee, as long as the open allegations are sufficiently
precise. The Court also does not address the issue of the potential non-dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence. The ECtHR seems to be less strict with regard
to the actual use of secret information in A and others than in criminal cases.
This may have to do with the strict standard of proof in criminal cases: a
person may only be convicted when a crime is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. A detention measure is justified where one of the conditions of Article 5
(1) is fulfilled.
10.2.5 Subconclusion: the use of secret information under international law
The ECtHR has addressed the use of secret evidence principally under the right
to adversarial proceedings and the principle of equality of arms. These prin-
ciples apply to all procedures governed by Articles 5 (4), 6, 8, 9, 13 and
Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR. The general requirements following from these
principles seem to be the same with regard to all these Articles. However the
level of procedural protection offered by these principles depends on the nature
of the case at issue. Arguably the highest level of protection is required in crim-
inal cases under Article 6 ECHR, while in cases concerning secret surveillance
and the screening of job candidates the remedy in the meaning of Article 13
only needs to be ‘as effective as can be’. It is argued here that in asylum cases,
in the light of the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement a high level
of procedural protection is required.
The ECHR has accepted that the right to adversarial proceedings and the
principle of equality of arms are not absolute and that there may be legitimate
reasons to limit them. Most of the cases assessed by the court concerned
measures aimed at protecting the national security of the State. In those cases
national security was often also the reason for not disclosing certain relevant
information to the parties involved in the proceedings. The ECtHR has accepted
that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their assessment which
measures are necessary to protect national security. It also recognised that
national security reasons may justify the non-disclosure of evidence to a person
affected by such a measure. However, the ECtHR also made clear that State’s
cannot escape judicial review when invoking national security as the basis
for a measure or for its refusal to communicate relevant evidence to the party
concerned. Sufficient guarantees must be in place to prevent arbitrariness and
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to ensure that the right to adversarial proceedings and the principle of equality
of arms are respected.
From the ECtHR’s case-law several minimum standards may be withdrawn,
which apply to all cases falling within the scope of Articles 5 (4), 6, 8, 9, 13
and Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR and therefore also to asylum cases:
· Limitations to the right to adversarial proceedings must pursue a legitimate
aim. Interests which may justify such limitations are the protection of
national security, the need to protect sources of information or witnesses
at risk of reprisals and the need to keep secret police methods of investiga-
tion of crime.
· The non-disclosure of relevant evidence should be necessary to pursue
this legitimate aim.
· The national court must receive the secret evidence. This court should
review whether the non-disclosure of evidence is necessary and review
on the basis of that evidence the facts and circumstances of the case.
Limited weight should be attached to evidence provided by anonymous
sources, whose reliability cannot be examined by the court.
· If a legitimate interest justifies the non-disclosure of the evidence to the
party concerned, the interest of the State to keep the evidence secret must
be balanced against the right to adversarial proceedings. When carrying
out this balancing test the nature of the case at issue must be taken into
account. Some form of adversarial proceedings must always be guaranteed.
Limitations of the right to adversarial proceedings should be compensated,
for example by using a special advocate who assesses and comments on
secret evidence on behalf of the party concerned or by using non-con-
fidential summaries.
· When assessing whether the right to adversarial proceedings has been
complied with the weight of the non-disclosed evidence and the specificity
of the open material should be taken into account. The right to adversarial
proceedings will generally not be violated if limited weight was attached
to the secret evidence underlying a decision. However, a person is not able
to effectively challenge allegations against him if the open material only
contains general allegations.
The ECtHR has not yet addressed the use of secret information in asylum cases.
It only made clear in Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom333 and H.R. v
France334 that limited weight should be attached to information provided
by anonymous sources, whose reliability and independence cannot be checked
by the Court. The ECtHR has not mentioned the right to adversarial proceedings
333 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07,
para 233.
334 ECtHR 22 September 2011, H.R. v France, no 64780/09, para 61.
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in those cases or addressed the level of procedural protection which should
be offered in refoulement cases. In the light of the potential severe consequences
for the person concerned of expulsion in violation with the prohibition of
refoulement, it may be argued that the same fair trial guarantees as those
required under the criminal limb of Article 6 (1) should apply. This would
mean in particular that limitations to the right to adversarial proceedings are
only allowed if they are ‘strictly necessary’. The ECtHR has applied the fair
trial guarantees in other non-criminal cases in the light of the serious nature
of the case. An example of such a case is A and others v the United Kingdom,
where the ECtHR pointed at ‘the dramatic impact of the lengthy – and what
appeared at the time to be indefinite – deprivation of liberty’.
In the conclusion I will address the question how the ECHR standards relate
to and should be incorporated into the relevant general principles of EU law.
As the case-law discussed in this chapter only concerns appeal proceedings
before national courts, it is most conceivable that it will inspire the interpreta-
tion of the EU right to effective judicial protection.
10.3 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
Article 16 PD provides the legal advisor or other counsellor who assists or
represents the asylum applicant with a right of access to such information in
the applicant’s file as is liable to be examined by the court providing an
effective remedy against the asylum decision, insofar as the information is
relevant to the examination of the application. This provision allows for
limitations to the applicant’s right of access to the file on several grounds. It
also provides that information may be withheld from the court mentioned
in Article 39 PD on national security grounds. On the basis of the case-law
of the EU Courts discussed in this chapter it should be expected that this
provision will be tested against and/or interpreted in the light of the rights
of the defence, including the right to be heard during the administrative phase
and the right to a reasoned decision (Article 41 of the Charter) and the right
to effective judicial protection (Article 47 of the Charter and Article 39 PD).
The extensive case-law of the ECtHR regarding the right to adversarial proceed-
ings and the use of secret evidence provides for important guidance as to the
interpretation of these EU rights. The following conclusions should be drawn:
The right of access to the file
· According to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR the rights
of the defence can only be infringed if documents which are relevant to the
case (inculpatory or exculpatory) are not disclosed to the party concerned.
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No access needs to be provided to information which could not have
influenced the course of the asylum proceedings.335
· In asylum proceedings secret evidence may regard the assessment of the
credibility of the asylum account or the risk of persecution or serious harm
upon expulsion to the country of origin (prohibition of refoulement).336
Legitimate aim and necessity of non-disclosure
· Limitations to the EU right to be heard during the administrative phase,
the right to a reasoned decision and the right to effective judicial protection
may be justified: the limitation must have a legitimate aim and it should
be necessary.337
· Article 16 (1) PD mentions several grounds which may justify the use of
secret information in asylum cases: the protection of the security of
organisations or of person(s) providing the information or the security of
the person(s) to whom the information relates, the investigative interests
relating to the examination of applications of asylum by the competent
authorities of the Member States and the international relations or the
national security of the Member States. On the basis of the case-law of the
Court of Justice and the ECtHR it may be expected that those grounds will
be accepted as legitimate aims for keeping information secret in asylum
cases.
· Arguably, in the light of the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoule-
ment evidence on which the assessment of the risk of persecution or serious
harm is based, may only be kept secret if this is ‘strictly necessary’. This
is the same test as that required by Article 6 ECHR in criminal cases.338
· It is not solely up to the administrative authorities, but also for the national
court in the meaning of Article 39 PD to decide whether non-disclosure
of evidence pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary.339 Furthermore
the use of secret evidence may not prevent the national court to review
thoroughly whether there is a risk of refoulement.340
335 Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1995], para 78. The ECtHR refers
to ‘the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence’ (emphasis added). See for example
ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, para 61.
336 Secret evidence may also be used in order to exclude a person from a refugee status or
subsidiary protection status (right to asylum). Exclusion from an asylum status falls outside
the scope of this study.
337 Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 68 and
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission
[2008], para 342. See for the ECtHR: ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom,
no 29777/96, para 45 and ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom,
no 3455/05, para 218.
338 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Fitt v the United Kingdom, no 29777/96, para 45.
339 ECtHR (GC) 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom, no 28901/95, para 63.
340 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011]. The required standard of judicial review of the establish-
ment and qualification of the facts is discussed in section 9.2.
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· The national court must receive all relevant information underlying the
asylum decision, including the evidence which was not disclosed to the
person concerned.341 Article 16 (1) PD which allows authorities to refuse
disclosure of relevant information to the national court on national security
grounds should thus be considered to be ad variance with the EU right
to effective judicial protection and should therefore be declared void.
The need for secrecy of information versus the right of access to the file
· The protection of secret information must be observed in such a way as
to reconcile it with the EU right to an effective remedy, the right to be heard
and the duty to state reasons. The conflicting interests of the parties con-
cerned must be balanced.342
· A total lack of disclosure of evidence is never allowed. The (asylum)
decision should state sufficiently precise reasons in order to enable the
applicant to effectively exercise his right to an effective remedy guaranteed
by Article 39 PD.343
· This does not mean however that all inculpatory or potential exculpatory
evidence must be fully disclosed to the asylum applicant. In this light the
ECtHR’s judgment in A and others provides for important guidance.344 It
follows from this judgment that the right to adversarial proceedings is not
violated where the evidence was to a large extent disclosed to the applicant
and the open material plays a predominant role in the determination or
when the allegations in the open material are sufficiently specific. A
negative asylum decision based on documents in which most or most
crucial information is not disclosed thus infringes the right to adversarial
proceedings.345
341 Case C-438/04, Mobistar [2006], para 40, Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 53, Case T-228/02,
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], para 155. See also the ECtHR’s
judgments under Artt 6 and 8 and 13 ECHR where the ECtHR held that substantive review
of the grounds motivating a decision is impaired when the court assessing a case does not
have sight of the material on which the decision is based.
342 Case C-450/06, Varec [2008], para 51, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and
Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008], para 344 and ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009,
A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, paras 216-217.
343 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 150-151.
344 See Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission [2010], para 176.
345 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 220.
The fact that the EU Courts seem to set rather limited requirements as regards the disclosure
of documents underlying EU sanction decisions and the reasoning of such decisions does
not mean that such limited requirements are also applicable in asylum cases. First of all
it should be questioned whether the case-law of the EU courts complies with the require-
ments set out by the ECtHR in A and others under the right to adversarial proceedings.
Furthermore the fact that national security of the Member States was involved, the nature
of EU sanction cases and the division of powers between the EU level and the national
level in such cases may have influenced the EU Courts case-law in that area.
376 Chapter 10
· It may further be derived from the EU Courts’ as well as the ECtHR’s case-
law that the weight which is attached to the confidential material for the
decision should be taken into account when assessing whether the rights
of the defence have been infringed in an asylum case.346 A decision that
an asylum account is not credible which is based only on the statements
of an anonymous source should for example be considered problematic.
· The Court of Justice as well as the ECtHR have recognised that the credibil-
ity of evidence of anonymous origin is necessarily reduced by the fact that
the context in which it was drafted is largely unknown and because admin-
istrative authority’s assertions in that regard cannot be verified.347
Using compensation techniques
· Special techniques, such as the use of special counsels, non confidential
summaries or a list of all the documents in the file, may be used in order
to compensate the use of secret information. Anonymous witnesses may
be questioned by an investigative judge.
· In EU sanction cases the EU Courts have referred to the special counsel
procedure mentioned by the ECtHR. So far the EU Courts have not applied
such techniques or assessed their compatibility with EU procedural rights.
It should be derived from the ECtHR’s judgment in A and others that a
special counsel who could test the non-disclosed evidence and put argu-
ments on behalf of the applicant during closed hearings could perform
an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the
lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing. However the Court also held that
the special counsel must be able to perform this function in a useful way.
This is only possible if the applicant is provided with sufficiently specific
information about the allegations against him (see above) in order to give
effective instructions to the special advocate.348
· The information disclosed in non-confidential summaries should be suffi-
ciently precise in order to put the person concerned in the position to
determine whether the deleted information is likely to be relevant for his
case and to express his view on it.349
· It may be derived from the EU right to be heard that the applicant must
be placed in the position to effectively respond to the information under-
lying the decision before the asylum decision is taken. Therefore compensa-
tion techniques such as non-confidential summaries and/or a special
counsel system should be provided to the asylum applicant already during
346 See for example Case C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Ma.nnesmann v Commission [2007], para 47,
ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 200.
347 Case C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission [2007], para 46, ECtHR 28 June 2011,
Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, para 233, ECtHR 22 Septem-
ber 2011, H.R. v France, no 64780/09, para 61.
348 ECtHR (GC) 19 February 2009, A. and others v the United Kingdom, no 3455/05, para 220.
349 Case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission [2008], para 154.
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the administrative phase. An infringement of the right to be heard and
the duty to state reasons cannot be compensated during the appeal
phase.350
350 Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission [2004], para 104 and
Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1999], paras 78-79. A.G. Bot suggests in
his opinion in Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Ireland, paras
76-78 that this may be different in asylum cases which are quasi-criminal in nature. In EU
sanction cases EU authorities are not required to hear the party concerned before the first
decision to freeze funds because this would undermine the effectiveness of the sanction.






11 Towards a common and fair European
asylum procedure?
This study started off by underlining the importance of adequate and fair
procedures for the effective exercise of rights granted under EU law. In the
following chapters it was shown that the EU Courts have recognised this
importance. The Court of Justice’s case-law concerning the EU right to an
effective remedy has considerably limited the procedural autonomy of the
Member States. There is no reason to believe that asylum procedures will
escape the influence of the Court of Justice. The need for procedural guarantees
is as great in asylum procedures as in any other field of EU law. As A.G. Bot
considered with regard to the applicability of the EU right to be heard in
asylum cases:
Indeed, in this type of procedure, which inherently entails difficult personal and
practical circumstances and in which the essential rights of the person concerned
must clearly be protected, the observance of this procedural safeguard is of cardinal
importance. Not only does the person concerned play an absolutely central role
because he initiates the procedure and is the only person able to explain, in concrete
terms, what has happened to him and the background against which it has taken
place, but also the decision given will be of crucial importance to him.1
This concluding chapter will make some final remarks with regard to the
methodology used for the purpose of this study. It will argue that this method-
ology is suitable not only to construct the meaning of the EU right to an effect-
ive remedy in the context of asylum, but also in other fields of EU law.
Furthermore this chapter will draw some conclusions as to the achieve-
ments of the Procedures Directive up to now and the potential impact it may
have in the future. It will be contended that asylum applicants are better off
with than without the Procedures Directive. Section 11.3 contains the full set
of procedural standards which were derived from the Procedures Directive
and Qualification Directive read in the light of the EU right to an effective
remedy. Section 11.4 stresses the important task of national courts and asylum
lawyers to apply the Procedures Directive and the EU right to an effective
remedy in practice and to (encourage the courts to) refer questions for pre-
liminary ruling to the Court of Justice.
1 Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case 277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Ireland,
para 43.
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This chapter will finally glance into the future. The process of harmon-
isation of asylum procedures is still ongoing. At the moment of the conclusion
of this study a recast of the Procedures Directive was under negotiation and
a recast of the Qualification was adopted. Section 11.5 tests the recast proposal
and the new Qualification Directive against the conclusions drawn in this study
as to the requirements following from the EU right to an effective remedy
concerning each of the procedural topics discussed in the previous chapters.
11.1 EU PROCEDURAL LAW: COMMON PRINCIPLES, SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
The purpose of this study was to discover the meaning of the EU fundamental
right to an effective remedy for the legality and the interpretation of EU asylum
legislation, in particular the Procedures Directive. The meaning of the EU right
to an effective remedy in the context of asylum was derived from the EU
Courts’ case-law and of relevant sources of inspiration, in particular the ECtHR’s
case-law. This resulted in a set of procedural standards with regard to several
key issues of asylum procedures: the right to remain on the territory of the
Member State, the right to be heard and evidentiary issues.
The methodology used in this study in order to find the meaning of the
EU right to an effective remedy is based on the following assumptions:
· The EU right to an effective remedy encompasses common procedural
principles which are applicable in all fields of EU law. These principles
can be distilled from the case-law of the EU Courts’ case-law concerning
a specific procedural topic, irrespective of the material EU legislation at
issue. Furthermore these procedural principles are inspired by international
law, in particular the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case-law.
· When applying these common procedural principles to a specific field of
EU regard should be had to three basic notions:
1 The interests of the parties involved in the proceedings concerned must
be balanced against each other
2 The overall fairness of the procedure should be assessed
3 The subject matter of the procedure should be taken into account
The next sections will recapitulate how this method of deriving common
principles and applying them to a specific field of EU law works.
11.1.1 Common procedural principles
Article 47 of the Charter applies in its full extent to all cases falling within
the scope of EU law. This is also true for the procedural rights closely linked
to it, such as the right to be heard and the duty to state reasons. In all fields
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of EU law, whether it is competition, EU sanctions, equal treatment or asylum
similar aspects of EU or national procedures raise questions as to their com-
patibility with EU procedural rights. In all kinds of procedures parties may
claim that for example a lack of suspensive effect of the appeal, limitations
of the right to be heard, evidentiary rules or a limited scope or intensity of
judicial review undermines their right to an effective remedy and/or impeded
the effective exercise of their rights granted under EU law. The EU Courts’
judgments regarding such claims are relevant not only for the specific pro-
cedure at issue, but for all procedures in which EU law is invoked. From this
case-law procedural principles emerge which are applicable to all fields of
EU law. This is how the EU Courts’ judgments in for example competition, EU
sanction or equal treatment cases become relevant for the interpretation of
the EU right to an effective remedy in asylum cases.
A first sign that the Court of Justice will indeed treat asylum cases like
all other cases falling within the scope of EU law and apply the same EU
procedural principles is the judgment in Samba Diouf. The Court of Justice in
its judgment referred to its judgment in Wilson when addressing the scope
of judicial review, which should be performed by a court or tribunal in the
meaning of Article 39 PD. The Wilson case concerned the practice of the pro-
fession of lawyer in a Member State other than that in which the qualification
was obtained.2 Examples of procedural principles which were derived from
the EU Courts’ case-law in this study are:
· Interim protection must be provided by the national court if necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of EU law.
· The use of presumptions is permissible as long as the parties concerned
are able to submit evidence in order to rebut such presumption.
· Authorities are not allowed to accept only the best possible evidence in
support of a claim under EU law.
· A court or tribunal should review both points of fact and points of law.
· A court must receive all evidence underlying the contested decision, also
if (part of) this evidence was not disclosed to (one of) the parties concerned.
This court should assess whether the non-disclosure of evidence pursues
a legitimate aim and is necessary and whether the right to adversarial
proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed.
Often the procedural principles are of a rather general nature and cannot
directly be applied to any EU context. The specific meaning of these principles
or the level of protection offered by them varies according to the special
features of the field of EU law at issue and the individual circumstances of
the case. This is where the three basic notions introduced in section 4.5 of this
study come to the fore.
2 Case C-506/04, Wilson [2006].
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11.1.2 Specific applications: the three basic notions
In this study the ECtHR’s case-law and the views of UNHCR, the Committee
against Torture and the Human Rights Committee which specifically concerned
asylum procedures were used in order to determine how the procedural
principles distilled from the EU Courts’ case-law should be applied in the
asylum context. With regard to some of the issues discussed no case-law of
the EU Courts was available. In this situation the interpretation of the EU right
to an effective remedy was only based on the ECtHR’s case-law and the views
of other supervising bodies.
The three basic notions introduced in section 4.5 proved helpful to under-
stand the choices made by the EU Courts when applying procedural rights
in a particular case. Moreover they are useful to predict how the EU Courts
will interpret the EU right to an effective remedy or related procedural rights
and principles in a field of EU law or even a particular case. This will be
illustrated in the following sections.
11.1.2.1 Balancing of interests
The EU Courts balance the interests of the parties involved in a procedure when
assessing whether EU procedural rights have been infringed. A national pro-
cedural rule which limits a party’s procedural rights, such as the right of access
to court or the right to be heard, must serve a legitimate aim and should be
necessary and proportional. Therefore also in asylum cases, the Member State
must be able to justify a procedural rule which limits an applicant’s procedural
rights granted under EU law.
In this study, the balancing of interests performed by the EU Courts was
most visible in Chapter 10, which discussed their case-law concerning the use
of secret information in competition cases and EU sanction cases. The EU Courts
in these cases balance the right to be heard, the right to a reasoned decision
and the right to an effective remedy of the addressee of the decision against
the interest served with the non-disclosure of this information. These interests
include the protection of business secrets, the protection of witnesses or the
international relations or national security of the Member States.
It is relevant to note in the context of asylum procedures that both the
Court of Justice and the ECtHR have recognised that the procedural rights of
a party may be balanced against the Member States’ interest to process cases
efficiently.3 The efficiency of asylum procedures is one of the objectives of
3 See for example Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’ Iran v Council
[2006], para 141 and Case T-237/00, Reynolds v Parliament [2004], para 102, where the Court
of Justice held that the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a decision
must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available
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the Procedures Directive and (as will be set out below) the amended proposal
for the recast of the Procedures Directive.4 The Court of Justice recognised
in Samba Diouf that shorter time-limits in asylum procedures (accelerated
asylum proceedings) may be justified to ensure ‘that unfounded or inadmissible
applications for asylum are processed more quickly, in order that applications
submitted by persons who have good grounds for benefiting from refugee
status may be processed more efficiently’.5 The ECtHR likewise considered in
I.M. v France that Member States must have the means to cope with large
numbers of asylum applicants and that accelerated procedures may facilitate
the processing of clearly abusive or manifestly unfounded asylum applica-
tions.6
In the context of asylum the Member States’ interest to process asylum
claims efficiently and to prevent abuse may thus play a significant role. How-
ever it is conceivable that this interest may never prevail over the interest of
both the Member States and the asylum applicant in good quality decisions.7
11.1.2.2 The overall fairness of the procedure
The case-law discussed in this study also confirms that in the context of the
EU right to an effective remedy the overall fairness of the asylum procedure
should be examined. A limitation to a procedural right may be compensated
by using compensation techniques. A lack of procedural guarantees in one
stage of the procedure may be redressed in a later stage of the procedure and
vice versa. In this study it was established for example that both the EU Courts
and the ECtHR accepted that a limited form of judicial review may be (partly)
compensated by procedural guarantees in the administrative phase, in parti-
cular the right to be heard and the right to know the reasons of the decision.8
The Court of Justice has held that in EU sanction cases in which secret evidence
is used, the absence of a hearing during the administrative phase can be
compensated during the appeal phase.9 Furthermore both the Court of Justice
and the ECtHR have ruled that a limitation of the right to adversarial pr-
oceedings can and must be compensated by using compensation techniques
for making the decision. See also ECtHR 12 November 2002, Döry v Sweden, no 28394/95,
para 41.
4 See recital 3 Preamble PD which refers to the Tampere Conclusions which called for
common standards for fair and efficient asylum procedures and recital 11 Preamble PD which
states: ‘It is in the interest of both Member States and applicants for asylum to decide as
soon as possible on applications for asylum.’
5 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], para 65.
6 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 142.
7 See ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, para 147.
8 See sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2.3.
9 Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006], paras 129-130,
Case T-390/08 Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009], para 98 and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008], para 337.
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such the appointment of a special advocate or the provision of non-confidential
summaries. Section 9.3 argued that the lack of an ex nunc examination of the
asylum decision by the court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 PD may
be compensated by a subsequent asylum procedure, in which all relevant new
facts and evidence are assessed by the determining authority and may be
reviewed by the court or tribunal deciding on the appeal.
Several minor deficiencies in the asylum procedure may reinforce each
other and lead to a lack of an effective remedy. Some procedural defects will
directly lead to a breach of the right to an effective remedy. The clearest
example discussed in this study is the lack of an appeal with automatic
suspensive effect against the rejection of the asylum claim. The applicant may
be expelled before the appeal court has reached its decision and as a con-
sequence may be exposed to irreparable harm in his country of origin.10 This
deficiency cannot be compensated, for example by a higher appeal with
automatic suspensive effect.
The Court of Justice and the national courts should thus assess the com-
patibility of a procedural rule with the EU right to an effective remedy while
having regard to the guarantees offered in the asylum procedure taken as a
whole.
11.1.2.3 The subject matter of the procedure
Even though the Court of Justice recognised the Member States’ interest in
efficient asylum procedures, that does not mean that it will allow that Member
States systematically provide for less procedural guarantees in asylum cases
than in other cases falling within the scope of EU law. To the contrary: both
the Court of Justice’s case-law and the ECtHR’s case-law have made clear that
the nature of the fundamental rights at stake in asylum cases, notably the
absolute prohibition of refoulement, requires a high level of procedural pro-
tection. The Court of Justice has considered that the assessment of the extent
of the risk of refoulement ‘must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and
care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person
and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of
the Union’.11
Similarly the ECtHR under Article 13 ECHR obliges States to provide for
important procedural guarantees in asylum cases, in view of the importance
which the Court attaches to Article 3 ECHR and the irreversible nature of the
damage which may result if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materialises.
As was shown in this study Articles 3 and 13 ECHR require a remedy with
10 See Chapter 6.
11 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla [2010], para 90.
See also A.G. Bot’s opinion in Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Ireland, para 43.
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automatic suspensive effect12 and rigorous scrutiny of the risk of refoulement
in the administrative phase as well as by an independent authority.13 The
ECtHR’s case-law shows that States should be flexible when applying
evidentiary rules in asylum cases, not expecting the asylum applicant to submit
a perfectly substantiated and consistent asylum account.14 The ECtHR imposes
a positive obligation on the State to gather certain evidence and expects it to
assume the burden of proof in specific situations, for example where the
applicant has submitted medical evidence of past torture.15 Furthermore the
ECtHR in asylum cases demands an ex nunc review by an independent authority
on the merits of the risk of refoulement.16
The case-law of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR thus indicates that, given
the fundamental rights at stake in asylum cases, the standard of procedural
protection offered should rather be higher than lower than that offered by
general administrative law in a Member State.
Specific procedural position of the person concerned.
Not only the rights at stake for the party concerned but also his particular
procedural position influences the level of procedural protection which should
be offered. The Court of Justice has accepted that the weak position of con-
sumers and dismissed pregnant workers may warrant special procedural
guarantees, such as ex officio application of EU law and extended time-limits.17
The Court took into account that these persons lack legal expertise and may
therefore be required to pay high lawyers fees or may experience difficulties
in obtaining proper advice.
The Court of Justice has not yet addressed the question whether special
procedural protection is also necessary in asylum cases. It may however be
expected that the Court of Justice also takes into account the difficult position
in which asylum applicants generally find themselves. It should be noted in
this context that the ECtHR has recognised that the weak procedural position
of asylum applicants warrants specific procedural guarantees in recent judg-
ments. It stressed the need for clear information on the asylum procedure and
for access to (free) legal assistance and interpretation services in asylum
procedures.18
12 See section 6.3.1.2.
13 See section 9.2.2.1.
14 See section 8.5
15 See section 8.3.1.
16 See Chapter 9.
17 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000], para 26
and Case C-63/08, Pontin [2008], paras 62 and 65.
18 See ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, paras 301, 304
and 319, ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09, paras 145 and 150 and ECtHR
(GC) 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09, para 204.
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It follows from the Court of Justice’s case-law that the compatibility of a
procedural rule with the EU right to an effective remedy should not only be
examined in the abstract. The application in a particular case of a procedural
rule, which is generally considered acceptable, may violate the EU right to an
effective remedy, taken into account the specific circumstances of the individual
asylum applicant concerned.19 National courts should thus examine in the
abstract as well as when taking account of the specific circumstances of the
case whether (the application of) a procedural rule is in conformity with the
EU right to an effective remedy.
11.1.3 Wider applicability of the methodology
The methodology applied in this study in order to discover the meaning of
the EU procedural rights is not only pertinent in the EU asylum context. It may
be used in any field of EU law in order to determine how the EU right to an
effective remedy should be interpreted.
In this study common principles were mainly derived from the case-law
concerning other fields of EU law than asylum law. This is not surprising as
asylum law has only recently become part of EU law. The Court of Justice’s
case law concerning asylum procedures is therefore still scarce. It may be
expected however that in the future this case-law will develop and will itself
provide for procedural principles which are relevant to other fields of EU law.
Then lawyers working for example in the field of competition law may derive
procedural principles from the Court of Justice’s judgments concerning asylum
procedures and apply them to their specific field. The Court of Justice’s judg-
ment in Samba Diouf already made clear that the intensity of judicial review
is an aspect of the EU right to an effective remedy. This is relevant not only
for national courts reviewing asylum decisions, but also for national courts
ruling in other cases falling within the scope of EU law.20
The method used in this study is furthermore suited to find the meaning
of the EU right to an effective remedy with regard to all thinkable procedural
issues. In the asylum context for example it may be used to define the meaning
of this right for the application of short time-limits for decision-making or
appeal proceedings (accelerated asylum proceedings) or the right to legal
assistance.
19 See for example Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011], paras 66-68.
20 See also Widdershoven 2011, under para 3.
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11.2 THE PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE: UGLY CREATURE OR IMPORTANT STEP
FORWARD?
The Procedures Directive played a central role in this study as it provides for
minimum standards for many of the procedural issues discussed. There are
two ways of looking at the Procedures Directive. First of all the directive may
be regarded as an ugly creature. A very complex piece of EU legislation which
is the clear result of long and difficult negotiations between Member States,
who were unwilling to give up their national solutions for dealing with asylum
procedures in an effective manner. A directive which contains more derogation
provisions than minimum standards and as a result fails to harmonise the
asylum procedures in the Member States. And most importantly a directive
which leaves significant protection gaps and consequently creates the risk of
violations of international as well as European Law.21
Indeed the Commission and UNHCR in their research concerning the imple-
mentation of the Procedures Directive ascertained that there were still major
differences between the asylum procedures of the Member States.22 As a result
asylum applicants still have very different prospects of finding international
protection depending on where in the EU their applications are examined.23
Both the Commission and UNHCR were also concerned about the level of
protection offered by those asylum procedures. The Commission noted in 2009
in the proposal for the recast of the Procedures Directive which will be dis-
cussed below:
Contributions received by stakeholders in response to the Green Paper consultation
have pointed to the proliferation of disparate procedural arrangements at national
level and deficiencies regarding the level of procedural guarantees for asylum
applicants which mainly result from the fact that the Directive currently allows
Member States a wide margin of discretion. Consequently, the Directive lacks the
potential to back up adequately the Qualification Directive and ensure a rigorous
examination of applications for international protection in line with international
and Community obligations of Member States regarding the principle of non-
refoulement.24
21 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law
and Practice, Geneva: March 2010, p 91.
22 See for example Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the application of Directive 2005/85/EC, 8 September 2010, COM (2010) 465 final and
UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, p 91.
23 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member
States for granting and withdrawing international protection, summary of the impact
assessment, 21 October 2009, COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009) 1377, p 2.
24 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international
protection (Recast), COM (2009) 554, explanatory memorandum, p 2.
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UNHCR stated in 2010:
There are many areas in which individual’s rights are not respected, not only
because of non-observance of the APD [the Procedures Directive], but also in the
context of the application of its provisions, in line with the low minimum standards
it sets.25
In spite of the fact that the Member States are bound by the guarantees con-
tained in the Procedures Directive the ECtHR has recently found violations of
the right to an effective remedy in asylum cases with respect to Belgium,26
Bulgaria,27 the Czech Republic,28 France,29 Greece30 and Italy.31 The viola-
tions were caused by (a combination of) a wide variety of procedural short-
comings, ranging from the lack of access to the asylum procedure, the lack
of information about the asylum procedure, the absence of free legal aid and/
or interpretation services, the limited nature of the personal interview, the
lack of a rigorous scrutiny of the claim of refoulement, the speed or the long
duration of the procedure, the lack of a remedy with automatic suspensive
effect and the limited intensity of judicial review.
Furthermore, in some Member States there is strong political pressure to
adopt more restrictive migration policies and legislation. This also results in
a lowering of procedural guarantees for asylum procedures. In the Netherlands
for example the right to a remedy with suspensive effect was limited and does
no longer apply with regard to subsequent asylum procedures in which the
applicant failed to submit new facts or circumstances.32 The Dutch Govern-
ment also aims to reduce the number of subsequent asylum procedures by
restricting free legal aid in such procedures.33 In November 2011 French
Interior Minister Claude Gueant announced reforms to the asylum system in
France, including a reduction in the asylum budget and a shortening of the
time frame during which asylum applications have to be made. Furthermore
the number of safe countries of origin would be expanded.34 Belgium intro-
25 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, p 91.
26 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09.
27 ECtHR 11 October 2011, Auad v Bulgaria, no. 46390/10 and ECtHR 26 July 2011, M. ao v
Bulgaria, no 41416/08.
28 ECtHR 23 June 2011, Diallo v Czech Republic, no 20493/07.
29 ECtHR 2 February 2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09.
30 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09.
31 ECtHR (GC) 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, no 27765/09.
32 Besluit van de Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel van 8 februari 2011, WBV 2011/1, houden-
de wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, Staatscourant 17 February 2011, No
2838.
33 Gedoogakkoord VVD-PVV-CDA, 30 september 2010, www.rijksoverheid.nl.
34 European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), weekly bulletin, 9 December 2011,
www.ecre.org and Réaction de Forum réfugiés au discours de C. Guéant du 25 novembre
2011, La hausse de la demande d’asile légitime était prévisible, www.forumrefugies.org.
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duced a list of safe countries of origin in November 2011. Asylum applicants
originating from these countries have to rebut the presumption of safety in
their individual case, in a fifteen-day asylum procedure.35
It may be concluded that the Procedures Directive has not lead to
harmonisation of asylum procedures and that a fair common European asylum
procedure is still far away.
11.2.1 The Procedures Directive’s potential
It is contended here however, that the adoption of the Procedures Directive
should nevertheless be regarded as an important step forward. In spite of all
its shortcomings the directive does provide for important standards for asylum
procedures. More importantly the directive has brought national asylum
procedures within the scope of EU law. Consequently asylum procedures fall
within the reach of the Charter and general principles of EU law.
This study has shown that the EU right to an effective remedy laid down
in Article 47 of the Charter and recognised by the Court of Justice as a prin-
ciple of EU law, may set important limits to the Member States’ discretion
under the Procedures Directive and potentially provides for additional safe-
guards. Moreover, this right is an important tool for interpretation of the
directive’s provisions and may be used to fill in (protection) gaps. The potential
impact of the EU right to an effective right of an effective remedy in the field
of asylum procedures should therefore not be underestimated.
The EU right to an effective remedy may provide an answer to some of
the main deficiencies in the Procedures Directive identified by UNHCR and
NGO’s. It was concluded in this study that the provisions of the directive read
in the light of the EU right to an effective remedy requires that the applicant
is allowed to stay on the territory of the Member State during first instance
and appeal proceedings. Moreover the applicant must have sufficient time
and opportunity to lodge an appeal against the rejection of the asylum claim.
The possibilities mentioned in Article 12 PD to derogate from the right to a
personal interview, may only be used in exceptional cases.
This study also contended that the EU right to an effective remedy reflected
in Article 39 PD contains several ‘hidden’ guarantees. This right requires a
thorough and (at one stage of the procedure) ex nunc judicial review which
entails as a minimum that the national court or tribunal assesses the claim
of a risk of refoulement on its merits, carefully examining the facts and evidence
underlying the asylum claim. Furthermore the right to adversarial proceedings,
35 Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, Wetsontwerp tot wijziging van de wet
van 15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging
en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen, No 1825/011, 24 November 2011. The proposal
was adopted by the Chamber and the Senate.
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which is incorporated by the right to an effective remedy demands that the
national court assesses whether the non-disclosure of evidence underlying
the asylum decision is justified. Limitations to the right to adversarial pro-
ceedings should be compensated, for instance by using non-confidential
summaries or special advocates. It was even argued that Article 16 (1) last
sentence PD, which allows Member States to withhold relevant information
to the national court deciding on the appeal against the asylum decision on
national security grounds must be considered ad variance with the EU right
to effective judicial protection and should therefore be declared void by the
Court of Justice.
Not only the Procedures Directive, but also the Qualification Directive may
contribute to the procedural protection of asylum applicants. The principle
of effectiveness requires that the clear rights for asylum applicants guaranteed
by this directive, most importantly the right to an asylum status for those in
need of international protection and the prohibition of refoulement, are effective-
ly protected. National procedural rules, including evidentiary rules may not
render the exercise of those rights impossible or excessively difficult. It was
concluded in Chapter 8 that Article 4 QD and the principle of effectiveness
set important standards with regard to the standard and burden of proof, the
use of presumptions and the assessment of the statements and evidence
submitted by the applicant.
11.2.2 Broader protection than the ECHR
The question may be raised whether the Procedures Directive and the fact
that asylum procedures are now governed by EU fundamental rights adds
anything to the protection regime which had already been developed under
the ECHR. In this study the ECtHR’s case-law was used as an important source
of inspiration for the EU right to an effective remedy and thus indirectly for
the interpretation of the Procedures Directive. In fact this study refers to a
larger number of judgments of the ECtHR than judgments of the EU Courts.
When approaching this question from a pure legal perspective one may
argue that the Procedures Directive provides for broader protection than
Articles 3 and 13 ECHR for two reasons. First of all the Procedures Directive
covers many procedural issues, such as the right to information, the right to
a personal interview, the right to reasoned decision on the asylum claim, the
right to (free) legal aid and interpretation services, special guarantees for
unaccompanied minors and the right to contact UNHCR, which at the moment
of the adoption of the directive had scarcely been addressed by the ECtHR in
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its case-law.36 Potentially inspired by the Procedures Directive, the ECtHR’s
took account of (a lack of) some of these rights in its assessment under
Article 13 ECHR in a few recent judgments, such as M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece
and I.M. v France.37
Secondly, it should be remembered that the scope of application of the
Procedures Directive and the EU right to an effective remedy is wider than
that of Article 13 ECHR. Most importantly the EU right to an effective remedy
reflected in Article 39 PD includes the right to a fair trial.38 The right to a fair
trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR does not apply to asylum procedures. In
this study the ECtHR’s case-law under Article 6 ECHR was used as a source of
inspiration for the EU right to a fair trial. This study shows that notably with
regard to the use of secret information and the right to an oral hearing before
a court or tribunal the ECtHR’s case-law provides for important guidance for
the interpretation of the EU right to a fair trial. Moreover the right to an effect-
ive remedy guaranteed in Article 39 PD applies to all asylum cases, irrespective
of the merits of the case or the procedure in which it was assessed.39 Article 13
ECHR applies only to cases of an arguable claim of refoulement. Finally the
Procedures Directive and the EU right to an effective remedy apply not only
to expulsion decisions which arguably violate the prohibition of refoulement,
but also to decisions to exclude a person from the right to an asylum status.
The ECHR does not include a right to an asylum status. Applicants who are
refused an asylum status, but will not be expelled,40 cannot appeal to
Article 13 ECHR.41
The Procedures Directive has thus made procedural rights for asylum
applicants more visible and provides for broader protection than Articles 3
and 13 ECHR.
36 See for example ECtHR 12 April 2005, Shamayev and others v Georgia and Russia, no 36378/02,
para 458 and (under Art 5 (1)) ECtHR 5 February 2002, Čonka v Belgium, no. 51564/99,
para 44.
37 ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no 30696/09, ECtHR 2 February
2012, I.M. v France, no 9152/09. The ECtHR in these cases referred to the relevant provisions
of the Procedures Directive in its description of relevant international and European law
or relevant international texts and documents.
38 See section 4.3.2.
39 It applies to manifestly unfounded and inadmissible cases, cases rejected in a standard
procedure, an accelerated or border procedure or a preliminary examination (in case of
a subsequent asylum procedure).
40 This applies for example to applicants who are refused an asylum status, because there
are serious reasons to believe that they committed a serious crime in their country of origin,
who face a real risk of persecution upon return. See Art 12 (2) PD.
41 See for example ECtHR 20 July 2010, A v the Netherlands, no 4900/06, paras 152-153.
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11.2.3 Supervision and practical support for the Member States
The fact that asylum procedures are now governed by EU law has also lead
to extra opportunities to supervise the fairness of Member States’ asylum
procedures. The Commission started infringement procedures against a number
of Member States for a failure to implement the Procedures Directive correct-
ly.42
Furthermore the development of CEAS lead to a strengthening of practical
cooperation between the Member States in the field of asylum. This cooperation
seeks first of all to increase convergence but also envisages to ensure the
ongoing quality of Member States’ decision-making procedures in that area.43
The most important measure taken in this context was the establishment of
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in 2010.44 The purpose of EASO
is ‘to facilitate, coordinate and strengthen practical cooperation among Member
States on the many aspects of asylum and help to improve the implementation
of CEAS’. EASO shall amongst others organise, promote and coordinate activities
relating to country of origin information and establish and develop training
for officials working in the field of asylum.45 Already before the establishment
of EASO, common EU Guidelines for the processing of country of origin informa-
tion46 as well as a common European asylum curriculum were developed.47
42 The Commission sent a letter of formal notice with regard to the implementation of the
Procedures Directive to Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In most cases the
Commission was satisfied with the information provided by the Member State. The Com-
mission issued a reasoned opinion with regard to Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Spain and
Sweden. Cases against Belgium and Ireland were referred to the Court of Justice, but were
closed before a judgment was rendered. See www.ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/
infringements/infringements_by_policy_asylum_en.htm (accessed on 19 March 2012).
43 See for example Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament , the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions,
Policy Plan on Asylum, An Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU, 17 June 2008,
COM(2008) 360 final.
44 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May
2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office [2010] OJ L 132/11 (Regulation 439/
2010).
45 Artt 4 and 6 of Regulation 439/2010.
46 European Union, Common EU Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI),
April 2008, ARGO project JLS/2005/ARGO/GC/03. These guidelines were developed by
a project group, formed by representatives of country of origin information desks from
immigration services of several Member States.
47 www.asylum-curriculum.eu/eacweb (accessed on 19 March 2012). The curriculum provides
for common vocational training for caseworkers, management officials and policy makers
working with asylum matters. The aim of the curriculum is to contribute to the implementa-
tion of a Common European Asylum System and to increase the quality of the asylum
process in Europe.
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EASO must also ‘provide effective operational support to Member States subject
to particular pressure on their asylum and reception systems’.48 Such pressure
may be characterised by the sudden arrival of a large number of third-country
nationals who may be in need of international protection and may arise from
the geographical or demographical situation of the Member State.49 EASO may
deploy Asylum Support Teams in Member States. These teams shall provide
expertise, in particular in relation to interpreting services, information on
countries of origin and knowledge of the handling and management of asylum
cases.50 Asylum Support Teams were sent to Greece and Luxembourg in 2011
and 2012.51
Finally EASO shall provide ‘scientific and technical assistance in regard to
the policy and legislation of the Union in all areas having a direct or indirect
impact on asylum so that it is in a position to lend its full support to practical
cooperation on asylum and to carry out its duties effectively’.52
It may be expected that the European Commission’s supervisory role
(although of a limited nature), practical cooperation and the support of EASO
indeed promote the fairness of the asylum procedures and enhance the quality
of asylum decisions.
11.2.4 Subconclusion: the Procedures Directive, an important step forward
It should be concluded that even though the Procedures Directive certainly
does not deserve a beauty prize, asylum applicants are better off with than
without it. The directive provides for important guarantees for asylum pro-
cedures and at the same time activated the EU right to an effective remedy
in asylum cases. The previous chapters of this study have shown that the
potential impact of the Procedures Directive via the EU right to an effective
remedy is more significant than many expected at the time of the adoption
of the directive.
11.3 A SET OF EU PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR ASYLUM PROCEDURES
The purpose of this study was to derive a set of EU procedural standards for
a number of key issues of asylum procedures from EU legislation and the EU
48 Art 2 Regulation 439/2010.
49 Art 8 of Regulation 439/2010.
50 Art 14 of Regulation 439/2010.
51 EASO Work Programme 2012, September 2011 and Operating Plan for the Deployment
of Asylum Support Teams to Luxembourg, 26 January 2012, both available at
www.ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/asylum/asylum_easo_en.htm (accessed 19 March
2012).
52 Art 2 (3) of Regulation 439/2010.
396 Chapter 11
right to an effective remedy and related procedural rights and principles. In
Chapters 6 to 10 conclusions were drawn as to the procedural guarantees
which should be offered with regard to the right to remain, the right to be
heard and evidentiary issues. The main procedural standards should be
summarised as follows:
The right to remain on the territory of the Member State during the asylum procedure
· An asylum applicant should be allowed to remain on the territory of the
Member State
1 Until the determining authority in first instance has carried out a close
and rigorous assessment of the asylum claim.
2 For the time necessary to avail himself of the effective remedy before
a court or tribunal in the meaning of Article 39 (1) PD.
3 During the course of the appeal proceedings, until rigorous scrutiny
of the claim of a risk of refoulement has been performed by the court
or tribunal.
· Automatic suspensive effect must be attached by law to either the appeal
itself or to a request for interim relief.
· The procedure in which interim relief may be granted by the national court
or tribunal on request must comply with important procedural guarantees,
such as the rights of the defence, a reasonable burden of proof and a
rigorous scrutiny of a claim of a risk of refoulement.
The asylum applicant’s right to be heard on his asylum motives
· In principle every asylum applicant should be heard in a personal inter-
view. Exceptions to this rule are only allowed in exceptional cases.
· If a personal interview is omitted the asylum applicant should be given
sufficient opportunity to substantiate his asylum claim, for example by
submitting written statements.
· The determining authorities should investigate whether dependent adults
have independent asylum motives which could best be explained in a
personal interview.
· Minor asylum applicants should in principle be interviewed if they wish
so and if their age and maturity permits. Only if an interview is not con-
sidered to be in the best interests of the child should an interview be
omitted.
· The conditions, under which interviews are conducted, must allow appli-
cants to present the grounds for their applications in a comprehensive
manner.
· The interviewer must ascertain that the applicant is actually able to under-
stand the language chosen for the interview and that he can express himself
effectively in this language.
· If the applicant does not understand the language of the interview a com-
petent and qualified interpreter should be provided free of charge. If no
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such interpreter is available the determining authority should take this
into account when examining the case.
· The interviewer must be competent and properly trained to interview
asylum applicants.
· Interviews should be conducted in a gender-sensitive manner.
· Minors should be heard in a child-friendly manner.
· The applicant should be granted the opportunity to comment on the report
of the personal interview, particularly if the determining authority intends
to reject the asylum application on the basis of the information contained
in the report. To that end the applicant should have timely access to the
report of the interview,
· Member States should at one stage of the administrative procedure hear
the asylum applicant on its main conclusions regarding the fact-finding,
credibility assessment and the assessment of the risk of refoulement as well
as important pieces of evidence on which these conclusions are based.
· An oral hearing should be held before the first instance court or tribunal
reviewing the negative decision on the asylum claim, in particular if this
court decides on the credibility of the applicant’s account and/or where
the applicant’s personal experiences play an important role.
· The applicant must be able to hear and follow the proceedings before the
court or tribunal and generally to participate effectively in them.
The burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment
· The standard of proof should not be set too high. It may be expected of
the applicant to show that there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ of future
persecution or that there are substantial grounds for believing that he faces
a real risk of serious harm.
· The determining authority should In the examination of the asylum claim
take into account all relevant indicators of a risk of refoulement.
· The burden of proof must shift from the applicant to the determining
authority if the applicant adduced evidence capable of proving that there
are substantial grounds for believing that there is a risk of refoulement. In
particular the burden or proof should shift if:
1 The applicant made plausible that he was persecuted or subjected to
serious harm in the past
2 The applicant substantiated that there is a risk of refoulement by sub-
mitting credible statements and/or documents
3 Country of origin information reports show that serious human rights
violations occur in the applicant’s country of origin
4 The applicant made plausible that he belongs to a group which is at
risk
· The applicant should not be expected to prove negative facts
· The duty to produce evidence should be shared between the applicant and
the determining authority.
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· The determining authority must gather precise and up-to-date country of
origin information
· The determining authority should direct that a medical expert report be
written if the applicant makes out a prima facie case as to the origin of the
scars on his body.
· The use of presumptions which are impossible or excessively difficult to
rebut is not allowed
· When assessing the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account, the
determining authority should focus on the core of the asylum account.
· Asylum applicants should be granted the opportunity to explain the alleged
deficiencies in the asylum account.
· As soon as the general credibility of the asylum applicant is established,
his statements should according to Article 4 (5) QD be accepted as facts,
without requiring further evidence.
· All relevant and reliable evidence should be taken into account in the
assessment of the asylum claim.
· Expert reports must fulfil the requirements of excellence, independence
and transparency.
· Country of origin information reports and medical reports are expert
reports, which should be accorded important weight in asylum cases.
· Member States cannot only rely on country of origin information provided
by their own Ministries but should also take into account reports issued
by reputable human rights organisations, UN agencies and authorities of
other States. The weight which should be attached to a country of origin
information report depends on the authority and reputation of the author,
the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were com-
piled, the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other
sources.
· The weight which should be accorded to a medical report depends on its
quality and conclusiveness.
Judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts
· The national court or tribunal which decides on the appeal against the
negative asylum decision should review both points of law and points of
fact.
· This court or tribunal should assesses the claim of a risk of refoulement on
its merits.
· It should carefully examine the facts and evidence underlying the asylum
claim. A reasonableness test in which wide discretion is afforded to the
determining authority’s fact-finding, including the assessment of the appli-
cant’s credibility is not allowed.
· The national court should at one stage of the asylum procedure, before
the expulsion of the applicant, review the asylum decision on the basis
of all relevant available facts and evidence. This includes all relevant
Towards a common and fair European asylum procedure? 399
evidence which is submitted in a later stage of the asylum procedure (after
the first administrative decision on the asylum application).
· Relevant facts or evidence cannot be excluded from the assessment by the
national court on the sole ground that they should have been submitted
earlier in the procedure.
The use of secret information
· Asylum applicants should in principle have access to documents which
are relevant to their case (inculpatory or exculpatory)
· The non-disclosure of evidence underlying the asylum decision should
have a legitimate aim and it should be strictly necessary.
· The national court deciding on the appeal against the negative asylum
decision should review whether non-disclosure of evidence pursues a
legitimate aim and is necessary.
· The national court must receive all relevant information underlying the
asylum decision, including the evidence which was not disclosed to the
person concerned.
· The protection of secret information must be observed in such a way as
to reconcile it with the EU right to an effective remedy, the right to be heard
and the duty to state reasons. The conflictting interests of the parties
concerned must be balanced.
· A negative asylum decision based on documents in which most or most
crucial information is not disclosed infringes the right to adversarial pro-
ceedings. The right to adversarial proceedings is not violated where the
evidence was to a large extent disclosed to the applicant and the open
material plays a predominant role in the determination or when the allega-
tions in the open material are sufficiently specific.
· The weight which is attached to the confidential material for the decision
should be taken into account when assessing whether the rights of the
defence have been infringed in an asylum case.
· The credibility of evidence of anonymous origin must be considered
reduced by the fact that the context in which it was drafted is largely
unknown and because the determining authority’s assertions in that regard
cannot be verified.
· Special techniques may be used in order to compensate the use of secret
information, such as the use of special counsels, non confidential summaries
or a list of all the documents in the file. Anonymous witnesses may be
questioned by an investigative judge.
· A special counsel who could test the non-disclosed evidence and put
arguments on behalf of the asylum applicant during closed hearings could
perform an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure
and the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing. The applicant must be
provided with sufficiently specific information about the allegations against
him in order to give effective instructions to this special counsel.
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· The information disclosed in non-confidential summaries should be suffi-
ciently precise in order to put the applicant in the position to determine
whether the deleted information is likely to be relevant for his case and
to express his view on it.
11.4 ENFORCING THE EU RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY IN PRACTICE
This study addressed procedural aspects of asylum procedures which have
so far not been decided by the Court of Justice. The conclusions drawn in this
study thus need confirmation, first by the national courts of the Member States
and ultimately by the Court of Justice. It is foremost up to the national courts
to interpret the Procedures Directive in the light of the EU right to an effective
remedy and to test the legality of the directive against this right. Whether the
questions raised in this study will ever be put before the Court of Justice
depends to a large extent on the national courts.53 In this respect the lawyers
who are assisting asylum applicants in the EU Member States also play an
important role. These lawyers may prompt the national courts to apply the
Procedures Directive and the EU right to an effective remedy and urge them
to refer questions for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice.
Reliance on and application of the EU right to an effective remedy is not
easy. This study shows that the EU Courts’ case-law concerning procedural
rights with regard to all fields of EU law is relevant also in the context of
asylum procedures. Solid general knowledge of EU law is therefore required
in order to be able to interpret this case-law and apply it to asylum procedures.
Furthermore it is difficult to disclose relevant case-law concerning the right
to an effective remedy and related procedural rights because of the fact that
this case-law concerns all fields of EU law as well as the fact that the EU Courts
have used various terms for the same procedural rights. Hopefully this study
will assist asylum lawyers and national courts to discover the potential of EU
(asylum) law and to apply this right in an individual case.
The number of preliminary rulings regarding asylum issues which have
been referred to the Court of Justice so far is still limited. Only one judgment
regarding the interpretation of the Procedures Directive was rendered by the
Court of Justice in the Samba Diouf case.54 Furthermore a few preliminary
rulings which (partly) concern the interpretation of the Procedures Directive
were pending before the Court at the moment this study was concluded.55
53 The crucial role of the national courts in guaranteeing EU fundamental rights was already
stressed in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 of this study.
54 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf [2011].
55 See notably Case C-277/11, M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Ireland con-
cerning the right to be heard in asylum cases and Case C-175/11, which concerns the
question whether a Member State is precluded from adopting administrative measures
which require that a class of asylum applications defined on the basis of the nationality
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The chance that all or even a significant part of the issues discussed in this
study will be decided by the Court of Justice in the coming years is thus rather
slim.
11.4.1 Incorporating case-law in EU legislation: the recast of the Procedures
Directive
A much faster and more effective way to enforce compliance with the EU right
to an effective remedy in asylum cases is by incorporating the Court of Justice’s
and ECtHR’s case-law concerning this right in EU legislation. This makes the
implications of the right to an effective remedy much more visible and better
enforceable.
The Commission recognised that ‘in the area of procedural asylum legis-
lation only legislative measures may ensure systemic and durable impacts on
the quality and efficiency of examination procedures’.56 In the context of the
second phase of the Common European Asylum System the Commission issued
recast proposals for the Procedures Directive in 2009 and 2011. In these pro-
posals the Commission indeed dedicated itself to raising the level of procedural
protection for asylum applicants. It is interesting to note that that both the
initial and the amended proposal for the recast of the procedures Directive
are, according to the Commission ‘informed by developing case-law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human
Rights, especially concerning the right to an effective remedy’.57 It may there-
fore be expected that the provisions of the proposals for the recast of the
Procedures Directive indeed reflect the conclusions drawn in this study as
to the requirements following from the EU right to an effective remedy. Sections
11.5.3-11.5.7 below will test this hypothesis. For this purpose use was made
of the amended proposal in the version discussed by the Council in the end
of January 2012, which contained the complete text of the proposal.58 Further-
more it is examined whether the recast of the Qualification Directive which
was adopted in December 2011, incorporates the Court of Justice’s and the
ECtHR’s case-law with regard to the burden and standard of proof and evident-
iary assessment.
or country of origin of the asylum applicant be examined and determined according to
an accelerated or prioritised procedure and the interpretation of the term court or tribunal
in the meaning of Art 39 PD.
56 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member
States for granting and withdrawing international protection, summary of the impact
assessment, COM(2009) 554, SEC(2009) 1377, of 21 October 2009, p 3.
57 P 4 of the amended proposal. See also p 6 of the Initial proposal.
58 Council of the European Union, document 5514/12, 31 January 2012, Asile 11, CODEC
143 (Council document 5514/12).
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First of all however sections 11.5.1 and 11.5.2 will briefly discuss the second
phase of CEAS and the recast proposals for the Procedures Directive and the
new Qualification Directive in general.
11.5 THE RECASTS OF THE PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE AND QUALIFICATION DIRECT-
IVE PUT TO THE TEST
The European Council in the The Hague Programme of 200459 and the Stock-
holm Programme of 200960 committed itself to establishing a common area
of protection and solidarity based on a common asylum procedure and a
uniform status for those granted international protection. The deadline for
the completion of the second phase of CEAS was initially 2010 and was later
changed to 2012.61
According to the Stockholm Programme CEAS should be based on high
protection standards. At the same time it must give due regard to fair and
effective procedures capable of preventing abuse. The second phase of CEAS
also seeks to achieve a higher level of harmonisation. The European Council
stated that it is crucial that individuals, regardless of the Member State in
which their application for asylum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level
of treatment as regards amongst others procedural arrangements and status
determination. ‘The objective should be that similar cases should be treated
alike and result in the same outcome.’62
In order to realise the second phase of CEAS the Commission issued pro-
posals for recasts of the asylum directives and regulations. The recast proposals
of the Procedures Directive63 and the Qualification Directive were introduced
by the Commission in 2009. An amended recast proposal for the Procedures
Directive was issued in June 2011.64 In March 2012 when this study was
59 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security
and Justice in the European Union [2005], OJ C 53/1.
60 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe
serving and protecting the citizen [2010], OJ C 115/1, para 6.2.1.
61 See also Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Borders, Migration and
Asylum, Stocktaking and the way forward, 3096th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting
Luxembourg, 9 and 10 June 2011, p 4.
62 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe
serving and protecting the citizen [2010], OJ C 115/1, para 6.2.
63 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international
protection (Recast), COM (2009) 554 (the initial proposal).
64 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing
international protection status (Recast) COM(2011) 319 final (the amended proposal).
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finalised, the recast of the Qualification Directive had been adopted. The
amended recast proposal for the Procedures was still being negotiated.65
11.5.1 The proposals for a recast of the Procedures Directive
The main objective of the initial proposal for a recast of the Procedures Direct-
ive was to ‘ensure higher and more coherent standards on procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection that would guarantee an
adequate examination of the protection needs of third country nationals or
stateless persons in line with international and Community obligations of
Member States.’66 Furthermore the proposal aimed at simplifying and con-
solidating procedural notions and devices and improving coherence between
asylum instruments.67 The proposal introduced a single asylum procedure
with the same minimum guarantees for refugee and subsidiary protection
claims. It contained detailed standards with respect to, for instance, the training
of the personnel examining applications and taking decisions on international
protection, the use of medico-legal reports and the examination of applications
of persons with special needs. It also deleted many of the possibilities included
in the current directive to derogate from procedural guarantees, such as the
right to a personal interview and the right to free legal aid. Furthermore the
proposal limited the number of situations in which the asylum proceedings
could be accelerated. Finally it provided for a right to an effective remedy with
automatic suspensive effect, which provides for a full and ex nunc examination
of both facts and points of law.
65 Also the recast proposals for the Dublin Regulation and Reception Conditions Directive
had not yet been adopted. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Recast), 3 December 2008,
COM(2008) 820 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
laying down standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast), 3 December 2008,
COM(2008) 815 final and Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast),
1 June 2011, COM(2011) 320 final.
66 P 4 of the initial proposal.
67 P 5 of the initial proposal.
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The proposal was welcomed by UNHCR68 and was generally supported
by the European Parliament.69 However, the discussions in the Council were
difficult and the Council was unable to reach a position. In order to boost the
work to achieve a Common European Asylum System the Commission issued
an amended recast proposal in June 2011.70 The amended proposal aims to
address the concerns of the Member States by recognising the need for flexibil-
ity, cost-effectiveness, simplification of rules and the prevention of abuse. The
Commission made changes in the amended proposal to ensure that the pro-
posal was ‘more compatible with the variety of legal systems and other ar-
rangements in different Member States’.71 This necessarily resulted in a lower
level of harmonisation than that envisaged by the initial proposal. Provisions
were inserted in the amended proposal in order to enable Member States to
deal with a large number of simultaneous asylum claims.72 In order to prevent
abuse of the asylum system, the amended proposal reintroduced amongst
others two grounds for applying an accelerated procedure.7374 Moreover
some of the procedural guarantees introduced in the initial proposal were
weakened.75
Denmark does not take part in the in the adoption of the recast of the
Procedures Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. The
United Kingdom and Ireland will not be bound by the recast of the directive
68 UNHCR comments on the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member States
for granting and withdrawing international protection (COM(2009)554, 21 October 2009),
UNHCR, Bureau for Europe, August 2010.
69 European Parliament legislative resolution of 6 April 2011 on the proposal for a directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast)
(COM(2009)0554 – C7-0248/2009 – 2009/0165(COD)).
70 P 1 of the amended proposal.
71 P 5 of the amended proposal. See for an overview of the changes the annex to the amended
proposal: Detailed Explanation of the Amended Proposal Accompanying the document
Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status (Recast).
72 See for example Art 6 (4) allowing an extension of the time-limit within which an asylum
application must be registered and Art 14 allowing the temporary involvement of personnel
of another authority than the determining authority in conducting interviews in the situation
of a large influx.
73 Art 31 (6) (e) and (g) which reintroduce the possibility to accelerate the proceedings if the
applicant has made inconsistent, contradictory, clearly false or obviously improbable or
insufficient representations and in cases of a threat to national security or public order.
74 P 5 of the amended proposal.
75 The proposal for example does no longer include a right to free legal assistance in first
instance proceedings, but only the right to free legal and procedural information (Art 20
of the amended proposal). It also states that the Member States should make ‘a thorough
report containing all substantial elements’ instead of a ‘transcript’ of the personal interview
(Art 17).
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and continue to be bound by the current Procedures Directive as long as they
have not notified their wish to accept this new measure.76
11.5.2 The recast of the Qualification Directive
In December 2011 a recast of the Qualification Directive was adopted.77 The
directive should be implemented in the Member States by 21 December 2013.78
On this date the current Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) will be
repealed.79 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark do not take part in
this directive.80
The new directive contains a number of changes in comparison with
Directive 2004/83/EC. It pays more attention to gender issues and children’s
rights.81 Moreover it contains more safeguards with regard to the application
of the internal flight alternative,82 requires effective and durable protection
against persecution or serious harm in the country of origin83 and it has
brought several provisions of the directive more in line with the Refugee
Convention.84 Furthermore persons eligible for subsidiary protection are now
granted the same secondary rights as persons who are recognised as refugees
according to the Qualification directive.85 As will be explained below in sec-
tion 11.4.5, the recast does not contain any major changes with regard to the
burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment.86
11.5.3 The right to remain on the territory of the Member State
With regard to the right to remain on the territory of the Member State during
the asylum procedure the amended proposal contains some improvements.
Most importantly Article 46 (5) provides that in principle:
76 Recitals 45 and 46 Preamble of the amended proposal.
77 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ
L 337/9.
78 Art 39 Directive 2011/95/EU.
79 Art 40 Directive 2011/95/EU.
80 Note that the United Kingdom and Ireland are bound to Directive 2004/83/EC.
81 See Artt 9 (2) (f) and 10 (1) (d) as regards gender issues and Recitals 18, 19, 28, 38 Preamble
and Art 2 (j), 9 (2) (f), 31 Directive 2011/95/EU.
82 Art 8 Directive 2011/95/EU.
83 Art 7 (2) Directive 2011/95/EU
84 Artt 9 (3) and 11 (3) Directive 2011/95/EU.
85 Art 20 (2) Directive 2011/95/EU.
86 Art 8 Directive 2011/95/EU concerning internal protection newly refers to Art 4 of the
directive. Art 4 QD remained unchanged.
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Member States shall allow applicants to remain in the territory until the time limit
within which to exercise their right to an effective remedy has expired or, when
this right has been exercised within the time limit, pending the outcome of the
remedy.
This provision guarantees that asylum applicants be granted the opportunity
to lodge an appeal against the negative asylum decision. Furthermore they
are effectively protected against refoulement until the decision by the court or
tribunal.
However, the proposal allows that Member States make an exception to
the rule that applicants are allowed (by law) to remain on the territory of the
Member State during the appeal proceedings87 in a large number of cases.88
It concerns cases rejected in an accelerated procedure,89 cases considered
manifestly unfounded90 or declared inadmissible on the ground that another
Member State has granted refugee status,91 cases which were discontinued
and of which reopening is rejected92 or cases in which the European safe third
country concept was applied.93 If the appeal has no automatic suspensive
effect a court or tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the
applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State, either upon request
of the concerned applicant or acting on its own motion. The applicant should
be allowed to remain in the territory pending the outcome of the procedure
to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory.94 According-
ly the amended proposal demands that the appeal itself or (in a limited num-
ber of situations) the request for interim relief have automatic suspensive effect.
The amended proposal thus complies with the requirement of a remedy with
automatic suspensive effect, which follows from the EU right to an effective
remedy as well as the ECtHR’s case-law.
The right to remain during first instance proceedings
The amended proposal also contains some positive changes with regard to
the right to remain on the territory during first instance asylum proceedings.
Exceptions to this right are allowed where a person makes a further (third)
asylum application after a final decision to consider a previous subsequent
application inadmissible or after a final decision to reject that application as
87 The proposal does not seem to allow exceptions to the rule that applicants should be
allowed to remain in the territory until the time limit within which to exercise their right
to an effective remedy has expired.
88 This exception does not apply to applications rejected in a border procedure. See Art 46
(6) of the amended proposal.
89 See Art 31 (6) of Council document 5514/12.
90 Art 32 (2) of Council document 5514/12.
91 Art 33 (2) (a) of Council document 5514/12.
92 Art 28 of Council document 5514/12.
93 Art 39 of Council document 5514/12.
94 Art 46 (7) of Council document 5514/12.
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unfounded.95 In the current directive the right to remain does not apply where
a subsequent asylum application is not further examined according to Articles
32-34 PD.
The amended proposal still allows Member States to derogate from the
right to remain where it will surrender or extradite a person to another Mem-
ber State, to a third country or to international criminal courts or tribunals.
The amended proposal newly clarifies that expulsion or extradition to the
country of origin of the applicant during first instance asylum proceedings is
not allowed.96 Another amelioration is that the amended proposal explicitly
provides with regard to both third and following asylum applications as well
as extraditions to a third country that expulsion or extradition during the
asylum proceedings is only allowed if the determining authority is satisfied
that this will not lead to direct or indirect refoulement.97
However as was argued in section 6.2 and is now also recognised in
Article 46 of the amended proposal, it follows from the EU right to an effective
remedy that a person cannot be expelled or extradited unless he has had
reasonable time and opportunity to appeal against the expulsion or extradition
before a court or tribunal. Further this appeal should automatically suspend
the expulsion or extradition. Therefore the exceptions to the right to remain
during first instance proceedings should not be used and could better be
deleted.
11.5.4 The asylum applicant’s right to be heard on his asylum motives
Also with regard to the right to a personal interview the amended proposal
contains several important improvements. The proposal reduces the Member
States’ discretion to hold a personal interview and allows the omission of an
interview only in two situations. The first is that the determining authority
is able to take a positive decision with regard to refugee status on the basis
of evidence available.98 This implies that the determining authority should
conduct a personal interview if it intends to refuse a refugee status and grant
a subsidiary protection status. Secondly a personal interview may be omitted
if the determining authority is of the opinion that the applicant is unfit or
unable to be interviewed owing to enduring circumstances beyond his/her
control. When in doubt, the determining authority must consult a medical
expert to establish whether the condition that makes the applicant unfit or
unable to be interviewed is temporary or of long-term nature. If the deter-
mining authority decides to omit the interview on this ground, it shall make
95 Art 9 (1) of Council document 5514/12.
96 Art 9 (2) of Council document 5514/12.
97 Artt 9 (3) and 41 of Council document 5514/12.
98 Art 14 (2) (a) of Council document 5514/12.
408 Chapter 11
reasonable efforts to allow the applicant to submit further information.99
Furthermore the amended proposal requires Member States to give the op-
portunity of a personal interview to dependent adults.
The proposal still leaves the Member States discretion to determine in
national legislation the cases in which an (un)accompanied minor shall be
given the opportunity of a personal interview. As was argued in section 7.1.2
this discretion is limited by Article 24 of the Charter. It follows from this
provision that a minor should in principle be given the opportunity to explain
its asylum motives in a personal interview, if the age and maturity of the child
permits.
Requirements as to the conduct of the interview
The proposal newly requires the determining authority, when conducting a
personal interview on the substance of an application for international pro-
tection, to ensure that the applicant is given an adequate opportunity to present
elements needed to substantiate the application in accordance with Article 4
QD as completely as possible.100 The proposal also contains extra guarantees
in order to ensure that personal interviews are conducted under conditions
which allow applicants to present the grounds for their applications in a
comprehensive manner. First of all it provides that the communication shall
take place in the language preferred by the applicant, unless there is another
language which he/she understands (in stead of ‘is reasonably supposed to
understand’) and in which he/she is able to communicate clearly.101
Secondly the proposal states that interviews should normally be conducted
by the personnel of the determining authority.102 This personnel should
receive proper training, which includes amongst others initial and follow-up
training concerning international human rights and the EU asylum acquis, issues
related to the handling of asylum applications from minors and vulnerable
persons with specific needs and interview techniques.103 Furthermore inter-
viewers shall receive basic training with regard to the awareness of con-
sequences of torture and of medical problems which could adversely affect
the applicants’ ability to be interviewed.104 Only in the situation of a large
influx of asylum applicants may the personnel of another authority than the
determining authority be temporarily involved in conducting interviews. Also
99 Art 14 (2) (b) of Council document 5514/12.
100 Art 16 of Council document 5514/12.
101 Art 15 (3) (c) of Council document 5514/12. The current directive requires that the interview
take place in a language which the applicant is reasonably be supposed to understand and
in which he/she is able to communicate.
102 Art 14 (1) of Council document 5514/12.
103 Art 4 (3) of Council document 5514/12 jo Art 6 (4) of Regulation 439/2010.
104 Art 4 (3)
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this personnel must receive proper training before they start interviewing.105
The person who conducts the interview must be competent (in stead of suffi-
ciently competent) to take account of the relevant personal and general circum-
stances surrounding the application.106
Thirdly the proposal pays more attention to the gender sensitivity of the
interview. It requires that the interviewer be competent to take account of the
applicant’s gender, sexual orientation and gender identity.107 It also states
that wherever possible, Member States should provide for an interviewer and
an interpreter of the same sex if the applicant concerned so requests, unless
the request is based on discriminatory grounds.108 Finally the proposal ex-
plicitly requires that interviews which (un)accompanied children should be
conducted in a child appropriate manner.109
The introduction of these extra guarantees help to ensure that the asylum
applicant is able to bring his asylum motives to the fore.
The asylum applicant’s right to be heard following the personal interview
According to the proposal Member States shall ensure that a thorough report
containing all substantial elements is made of every personal interview.110
Member States may provide for audio or audio-visual recording of the personal
interview. If they do so they must annex the recording of the personal inter-
view to the report.111
In line with the EU right to be heard the amended proposal provides the
applicant with an opportunity to comment on the report of the interview:
Member States shall ensure that the applicant has the opportunity to make com-
ments and/or provide clarifications with regard to any mistranslations or mis-
conceptions appearing in the report, at the end of the personal interview or within
a specified time limit before the determining authority takes a decision.112
The amended proposal also guarantees that, in order to make use of this
opportunity to make comments and clarifications, the applicant is fully
informed of the content of the report, with the assistance of an interpreter if
necessary. This does not necessarily mean however that the applicant has
access to the report and the recording of the interview before the decision on
the asylum application is taken. The directive allows that access to the report
105 Art 14 (1) of Council document 5514/12. This provision refers to Art 6(4)(a) to (e) of
Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 and in Article 18(5) of Council document 5514/12.
106 Art 15 (3) (a) of Council document 5514/12.
107 Art 15 (3) (a) of Council document 5514/12.
108 Art 15 (3) (b) and (c) of Council document 5514/12.
109 Art 15 (3) (e) of Council document 5514/12.
110 Art 17 (1) of Council document 5514/12.
111 Art 17 (2) of Council document 5514/12.
112 Art 17 (3) of Council document 5514/12.
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be granted at the same time as the decision is made, if the application is
determined in the framework of an accelerated procedure.113 This limitation
of access to the report of the interview may lead to infringements of the EU
right to be heard. This right is only complied with if the information provided
to the applicant is sufficiently detailed to put him in the position to comment
effectively on the content of the report.
Member States shall request the acknowledgement the applicant on the
content of the report, unless the interview is recorded and the recording is
admissible as evidence in appeal proceedings. Where an applicant refuses to
acknowledge the content of the report, the reasons for this refusal shall be
entered into the applicant’s file.114
The amended proposal does not provide for a right to be heard on the
determining authority’s conclusions regarding the fact-finding and the risk
assessment. It does state that during the personal interview the applicant must
be offered the opportunity to give an explanation regarding elements which
may be missing and/or any inconsistencies or contradictions in his/her state-
ments.115 This provision reflects the EU right to be heard. It is however ques-
tionable whether it is sufficient to enable the applicant to respond effectively
to the determining authority’s conclusions as to the credibility of the asylum
account, the assessment of the evidence and the existence of a risk of refoule-
ment upon return.
The right to a hearing before a court or tribunal
The amended proposal does not contain a right to an oral hearing before the
court or tribunal hearing the appeal against the negative asylum decision. It
was concluded however in section 7.4. that the right to an effective remedy,
read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, generally requires an oral hearing
before the (first instance) court or tribunal hearing the appeal against the
rejection of the asylum claim. This is particularly the case if the court is asked
to review findings of facts. It should be noted in this regard that, according
to the amended proposal, the appeal against the rejection of the asylum claim
must provide for a full examination of the facts.116
11.5.5 The burden and standard of proof and evidentiary assessment
Article 4 QD regarding the assessment of facts and circumstances has remained
unchanged. Therefore the conclusions regarding the burden and standard of
proof as well as evidentiary assessment drawn in Chapter 8 remain relevant.
113 Art 17 (5) of Council document 5514/12.
114 Art 17 (4) of Council document 5514/12.
115 Art 16 of Council document 5514/12.
116 Art 46 (3) of Council document 5514/12.
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The amended proposal for a recast of the Procedures Directive contains
some relevant new provisions, in particular with regard to the use of expert
reports, including country of origin information and medical reports. The
amended proposal provides that the personnel examining applications and
taking decisions have the possibility to seek advice, whenever necessary, from
experts on particular issues, such as medical, cultural, religious, child-related
or gender issues. Furthermore it requires that country of origin information
be obtained from the European Asylum Support Office.117
The amended proposal in line with the conclusions drawn in section 8.6.3,
recognises the importance of medical reports for the substantiation of past
torture or ill-treatment.118 It provides:
Member States shall subject to the applicant’s consent, arrange for a medical
examination of him/her concerning signs that might result from past persecution
or serious harm where the determining authority deems this to be relevant for an
assessment of the applicant’s request for international protection in accordance
with Article 4 of [the Qualification Directive].119
The examination shall be paid for by the Member State and must be carried
out by qualified medical professionals. In this context the proposal acknow-
ledges the authority of the Istanbul Protocol. It states that national measures
dealing with identification and documentation of symptoms and signs of
torture or other serious acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of
sexual violence, in asylum procedures should inter alia be based on this
protocol.120
Member States shall also, on the request of the applicant, permit a medical
examination to be arranged by the applicant at his own costs. Member States
may prescribe a reasonable deadline from the time the permission is given
within which the results of the medical examination shall be submitted to the
determining authority.121 The results of the medical examination shall be
117 See Regulation (EU) No 439/2010. ‘The Support Office should be a European centre of
expertise on asylum, responsible for facilitating, coordinating and strengthening practical
cooperation among Member States on the many aspects of asylum, so that Member States
are better able to provide international protection to those entitled, while dealing fairly
and efficiently with those who do not qualify for international protection, where appro-
priate.’ See recital 13 Preamble.
118 The Commission argued in the context of Art 18 of the amended proposal ‘that the Qualifi-
cation Directive already provides that facts relevant for the assessment of the application
for international protection need to be taken into account and that a medical examination
can be such a fact amongst others’.
119 Art 18 (1) of Council document 5514/12.
120 Recital 24 Preamble of Council document 5514/12.
121 Art 18 (2) of Council document 5514/12.
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assessed by the determining authority along with other elements of the applica-
tion.122
Sections 8.3.2 and 8.6.3 addressed the relevance of medical reports in
asylum cases and argued that the Member State is obliged to direct that an
expert medical report be obtained if the applicant submitted a medical cer-
tificate which makes out a prima facie case as to the origin of the scars on his
body.
11.5.6 Judicial review of the establishment and qualification of the facts
In Chapter 9 it was concluded on the basis of the case-law of the Court of
Justice as well as the ECtHR that the court or tribunal in the meaning of
Article 39 PD should (at one stage of the procedure) provide for an ex nunc
review of both points of fact and law. Furthermore it was argued that
Article 39 PD requires a thorough judicial review. This implies that the national
court or tribunal should as a minimum assess the claim of a risk of refoulement
on its merits and must carefully examine the facts and evidence underlying
the asylum claim. Article 46 (3) of the amended proposal is in conformity with
these conclusions. It states that the effective remedy provides for ‘a full ex-
amination of both facts and points of law, including an ex nunc examination
of the international protection needs’, at least in appeal procedures before a
court or tribunal of first instance. The terms ‘full examination’ and ‘ex nunc
examination’ still need interpretation. In this light the case-law discussed in
Chapter 9 and the conclusions drawn from this case-law are relevant.
11.5.7 The use of secret information in asylum cases
Chapter 10 of this study contended that Article 16 (1) last sentence PD which
allows Member States to withhold relevant information to the national court
deciding on the appeal against the asylum decision on national security
grounds should be considered void. In the amended proposal this sentence
has been deleted. As a result all information relevant to the asylum decision
should at least be disclosed to the court or tribunal reviewing the rejection
of the asylum claim.123 However the directive fails to require that the court
or tribunal reviewing the asylum decision decide whether the non-disclosure
of the evidence concerned is justified. Such requirement should be read into
the EU right to an effective remedy reflected in Article 46 of the amended
proposal.124
122 Art 18 (3) of Council document 5514/12.
123 Art 23 (1) (a) of Council document 5514/12.
124 See section 10.4.
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The proposal also provides for other extra procedural guarantees in cases
where disclosure of information or sources would jeopardise national security
or other interests of the State. The amended proposal states that Member States
should establish in national law procedures guaranteeing that the applicant’s
rights of defence are respected. The proposal explicitly mentions the option
of disclosing the secret information to a special counsel.125 The conclusions
drawn in Chapter 10 as to the procedural guarantees which should be put
in place in cases in which secret information is used are relevant for the
interpretation of this provision.
11.5.8 Subconclusion: the recasts put to the test
The amended proposal for a recast of the Procedures Directive does indeed
(partly) reflect the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR
concerning the right to an effective remedy as the Commission claimed. The
proposal contains higher procedural standards with regard to several important
procedural issues discussed in this study. Notably it grants a right to remain
on the territory of the Member State until the time limit for lodging an appeal
against the asylum decision has expired as well as a right to a remedy with
automatic suspensive effect. Moreover it extends the right to a personal inter-
view and provides important guarantees with regard to the circumstances
of the interview. Finally it ensures a full and ex nunc judicial review of the
negative asylum decision and abolishes the possibility to withhold relevant
information to the court or tribunal reviewing the asylum decision.
This does not mean however that an appeal to the EU right to an effective
remedy will become unnecessary in future asylum cases. To the contrary. Many
of the procedural standards mentioned above are phrased in general terms
and still need interpretation. For this purpose the EU right to an effective
remedy should remain an important tool. Furthermore it remains to be seen
whether the improvements proposed by the Commission will survive the
negotiations in the Council. If this is not the case, the procedural safeguards
concerned may be enforced by invoking the EU right to an effective remedy
before the national courts.
Finally the amended proposal for a recast of the Procedures Directive fails
to address some of the shortcomings of the current Procedures Directive found
in this study. The proposal for instance does not reduce Member States’
discretion to determine the cases in which an (un)accompanied minor shall
be given the opportunity of a personal interview. It also lacks a requirement
for the national court to review whether it is justified to refuse the disclosure
of information relevant to the asylum decision. Moreover the recast of the
125 Art 23 (1) (b) of Council document 5514/12.
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Qualification Directive fails to clarify important evidentiary issues, such as
the burden and standard of proof. Article 4 (5) concerning the benefit of the
doubt has remained unchanged.
11.6 TOWARDS FAIR ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN EUROPE
It does not seem to be realistic to expect that a common and fair European
asylum procedure will be established in the near future. Nevertheless EU law
should be taken seriously by determining authorities, national courts and
lawyers representing asylum applicants. The Procedures Directive and the
EU right to an effective remedy have the potential to raise the level of pro-
tection offered by the asylum procedures of the Member States and at the same
time to harmonise those procedures to a certain extent. It may turn out that
EU law sets different or higher standards for asylum procedures than the ECHR
and the ECtHR’s case-law. A one-sided focus on the ECHR is therefore no longer
justified. It is now time for professionals working in the field of asylum to
bring the Procedures Directive and the EU right to an effective remedy into
action. This study may serve as a source of inspiration for this purpose.
Samenvatting
EU asielprocedures en het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel
1 INLEIDING
Het toekennen van rechten aan personen is zinloos als zij die niet door middel
van adequate en eerlijke procedures kunnen afdwingen. Binnen het EU-recht
is dit algemeen erkend. Het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de Europese
Unie (het Handvest) kent de status van fundamenteel recht toe aan procedurele
rechten, namelijk het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel (artikel 47) en het
recht op behoorlijk bestuur (artikel 41). In het geval van asielprocedures kan
een gebrek aan procedurele waarborgen leiden tot een schending van de
rechten waar asielzoekers meestal een beroep op doen: het recht niet te worden
uitgezet of uitgeleverd naar een land waar zij het risico lopen het slachtoffer
te worden van ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen (het verbod van refoule-
ment) en het recht op asiel. Beide rechten zijn in het Handvest erkend als
fundamenteel recht (artikelen 18 en 19).
In 2005 werd Richtlijn 2005/85/EG betreffende minimumnormen voor de
procedures in de lidstaten voor de toekenning of intrekking van de vluchtelin-
genstatus (de Procedurerichtlijn of PR) aangenomen. Deze richtlijn bevat
minimumwaarborgen voor zowel de administratieve fase als de beroepsproce-
dure in asielzaken. UNHCR en NGO’s hadden veel kritiek op deze richtlijn.
Sommige bepalingen van de richtlijn zouden in strijd zijn met internationaal
recht. Het niveau van harmonisatie was bovendien laag als gevolg van de vele
uitzonderingsmogelijkheden die de richtlijn biedt en de vrijheid die de lidstaten
wordt gelaten om hun asielprocedure vorm te geven.In dit proefschrift wordt
echter betoogd dat de totstandkoming van de Procedurerichtlijn moet worden
gezien als een positieve ontwikkeling. Vele aspecten van asielprocedures vallen
nu binnen de reikwijdte van het EU-recht. Dit betekent dat EU grondrechten,
zoals het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel, op die procedures van toepassing
zijn en de vrijheid van de lidstaten beperken. Hierdoor zou de Procedurericht-
lijn asielzoekers wel eens veel meer procedurele waarborgen kunnen bieden
dan velen hadden verwacht toen de richtlijn werd aangenomen.
De vraag die in dit proefschrift centraal staat is: wat is de betekenis van
het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel voor (1) de rechtmatigheid en (2)
de interpretatie van EU regelgeving op het gebied van asielprocedures. Meer
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specifiek beoogt het proefschrift de betekenis van het EU recht op een effectief
rechtsmiddel vast te stellen voor de volgende belangrijke procedurele aspecten
van asielprocedures:
· Het recht om gedurende de asielprocedure (eerste fase en beroepfase) op
het grondgebied van de lidstaat te verblijven
· Het recht van de asielzoeker om te worden gehoord in de eerste fase en
in beroep.
· Bewijskwesties:
1 bewijsmaatstaf, bewijslast en bewijswaardering
2 rechterlijke toetsing van de vaststelling en waardering van de feiten
3 het gebruik van geheim bewijs
Het beoogde resultaat van deze exercitie is een reeks EU procedurele normen
voor deze aspecten.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal onderwerpen dat
van belang is om de betekenis van het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel
voor asielprocedures te kunnen vaststellen. Het besteedt aandacht aan het
Gemeenschappelijk Asielstelsel, gaat in op de rol van international verdragen
als bronnen van inspiratie voor EU grondrechten en introduceert het EU recht
op een effectief rechtsmiddel en gerelateerde procedurele rechten. Het eerste
deel wordt afgesloten met tussenconclusies en een uiteenzetting van de metho-
dologie voor de volgende hoofdstukken. Het tweede deel van het proefschrift
gaat in op de drie hierboven genoemde specifieke procedurele aspecten. Het
derde deel bevat een aantal conclusies en een blik op de toekomst.
DEEL I – Voorafgaande onderwerpen
2 HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK ASIELSTELSEL EN DE TOEPASBAARHEID VAN EU
GRONDRECHTEN
De Procedurerichtlijn maakt deel uit van het Gemeenschappelijk Asielstelsel
(GEAS). Dat geldt ook voor Richtlijn 2004/83/EG inzake minimumnormen voor
de erkenning van onderdanen van derde landen en staatlozen als vluchteling
of als persoon die anderszins internationale bescherming behoeft, en de inhoud
van de verleende bescherming (de Kwalificatierichtlijn of KR). Deze richtlijn
is van belang voor dit proefschrift omdat het asielzoekers die in aanmerking
komen voor internationale bescherming een recht op een asielstatus toekent
en een refoulementverbod bevat. Bovendien gaat artikel 4 van de richtlijn in
op een aantal bewijskwesties. Zowel de Procedurerichtlijn als de Kwalificatie-
richtlijn bevatten minimumnormen. Dit betekent dat lidstaten in beginsel voor
de asielzoeker gunstigere normen mogen hanteren dan door deze richtlijnen
is vereist. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de minimumnormen des-
ondanks in strijd kunnen zijn met EU grondrechten, zoals het recht op een
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effectief rechtsmiddel. Dit is het geval wanneer zij de lidstaten verplichten
of expliciet of impliciet toestaan om nationale wetten vast te stellen of te
handhaven die EU grondrechten schenden. Een dergelijke strekking van een
bepaling van de Procedurerichtlijn of de Kwalificatierichtlijn zou echter strijdig
zijn met een van de doelen van het GEAS, namelijk het waarborgen van de
grondrechten van derdelanders. Het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie
(het Hof van Justitie) zal daarom waarschijnlijk niet snel tot nietigverklaring
van een bepaling van de Procedurerichtlijn of de Kwalificatierichtlijn overgaan.
Het zal eerder geneigd zijn deze bepalingen in het licht van de EU grondrech-
ten uit te leggen.
De Procedurerichtlijn kent de lidstaten veel vrijheid toe om hun asielproce-
dure in te richten. Uit de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie blijkt echter
dat lidstaten zijn gebonden aan EU grondrechten wanneer zij gebruik maken
van een uitzonderingsmogelijkheid die de Procedurerichtlijn biedt of een vage
term uit de richtlijn interpreteren.
Het Hof van Justitie beantwoordt prejudiciële vragen over de rechtmatig-
heid en de interpretatie van EU regelgeving. De belangrijke rol van de nationale
rechter als EU rechter dient echter te worden benadrukt. De nationale rechter
heeft een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid om EU grondrechten te garanderen
en prejudiciële vragen aan het Hof van Justitie voor te leggen.
3 DE SUBSIDIAIRE ROL VAN INTERNATIONALE VERDRAGEN ALS BRONNEN VAN
INSPIRATIE VOOR EU GRONDRECHTEN
Internationale verdragen zijn belangrijke bronnen van inspiratie voor EU
grondrechten. In het kader van asielprocedures zijn de volgende verdragen
bijzonder van belang: het Vluchtelingenverdrag, het Europees Verdrag voor
de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM), het VN Antifolterverdrag, het Internationaal
Verdrag voor Burgerlijke en Politieke Rechten (IVBPR) en het Internationaal
Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind (IVRK). Het EVRM heeft op grond van
het Handvest en artikel 6 lid 3 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie
(EU-verdrag) bijzondere betekenis. Op basis van de jurisprudentie van het Hof
van Justitie is te verwachten dat het Hof zich bij de interpretatie van het EU
recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel in de asielcontext vooral zal laten inspireren
door de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens
(EHRM). Het zal waarschijnlijk minder waarde toekennen aan de niet-bindende
zienswijzen van andere toezichthouders, zoals de Hoge Commissaris voor de
Vluchtelingen van de Verenigde Naties (UNHCR) en de diverse VN-Comités.
In dit proefschrift wordt daarom het grootste gewicht gegeven aan de jurispru-
dentie van het EHRM.
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4 HET EU RECHT OP EEN EFFECTIEF RECHTSMIDDEL EN GERELATEERDE
RECHTEN
Het EU-recht kent verschillende procedurele rechten zoals het recht op een
effectief rechtsmiddel, het effectiviteitsbeginsel en het recht op behoorlijk
bestuur. Deze rechten zijn allemaal nauw met elkaar verbonden en overlappen
elkaar. In dit proefschrift worden deze procedurele rechten aangemerkt als
een categorie van normen. Per specifiek onderwerp wordt alle relevante
jurisprudentie met betrekking tot al deze rechten onderzocht.
Het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel is neergelegd in artikel 47 van
het Handvest en omvat mede het recht op een eerlijk proces. De interpretatie
van artikel 47 wordt, ook in de asielcontext, geïnspireerd door zowel artikel 6
als artikel 13 EVRM. Dat is bijzonder omdat het EHRM van oordeel is dat arti-
kel 6 EVRM zelf niet op asielprocedures van toepassing is. Verder kan ook de
jurisprudentie van het EHRM die betrekking heeft op de subsidiaire rol van
het EHRM (onder meer de verplichting tot uitputting van de nationale rechts-
middelen) van belang zijn voor de interpretatie van artikel 47 Handvest.
Het effectiviteitsbeginsel verbiedt nationale procedureregels die de uitoefe-
ning van door het EU-recht toegekende rechten uiterst moeilijk of praktisch
onmogelijk maken. Effectieve rechtsbescherming dient te worden geboden
door de nationale rechter. Indien nodig dienen de lidstaten daartoe nieuwe
rechtsmiddelen te introduceren. Het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel en
een eerlijk proces eist dat het rechtsmiddel toegankelijk is en dat het recht op
equality of arms en adversarial proceedings wordt gerespecteerd. Nauw gerelateerd
aan het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel zijn het recht om te worden
gehoord en het recht op een gemotiveerde beslissing. Deze beide rechten
worden gegarandeerd door het recht op behoorlijk bestuur van artikel 41
Handvest.
In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat uit de jurisprudentie van het Hof
van Justitie en het EHRM de volgende drie uitgangspunten (basic notions) naar
voren komen:
1 Wanneer wordt beoordeeld of EU procedurele rechten zijn geschonden
moeten (vaak) belangen tegen elkaar worden afgewogen.
2 Bij de beoordeling of een procedure eerlijk is, dient rekening te worden
gehouden met alle aspecten en instanties van deze procedure: het gaat om
de eerlijkheid van de procedure als geheel.
3 Het onderwerp van de procedure beïnvloedt het niveau van bescherming
dat in een procedure aan de betrokkene moet worden geboden: er dient
rekening gehouden te worden met de aard van de rechten die op het spel
staan en de bijzondere kenmerken van de betrokken partijen.
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5 METHODIEK
Om te kunnen bepalen wat de betekenis van het EU recht op een effectief
rechtsmiddel is voor een bepaald aspect van de asielprocedure wordt in dit
proefschrift de volgende methodiek gehanteerd. Met betrekking tot de meeste
procedurele onderwerpen die in het tweede deel van dit proefschrift worden
onderzocht, bevatten Artikel 41 en 47 Handvest geen specifieke normen.
Daarom wordt de betekenis van het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel
afgeleid uit de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie en bronnen van inspira-
tie, in het bijzonder de jurisprudentie van het EHRM. Het Hof van Justitie heeft
nog maar weinig uitspraken gedaan over asielprocedures. Het heeft echter
wel uitspraken gedaan over de betekenis van dit recht in zaken die betrekking
hadden op allerlei andere gebieden binnen het EU-recht. Uit deze uitspraken
aangevuld met de uitspraken van het EHRM over het betreffende onderwerp
worden in dit proefschrift algemene beginselen gedistilleerd. Deze beginselen
worden vervolgens toegepast op de asielcontext. Bij de toepassing van die
algemene beginselen op asielprocedures wordt rekening gehouden met de
specifieke kenmerken van asielprocedures. De drie hierboven genoemde
uitgangpunten komen daarbij van pas. De jurisprudentie van het EHRM en
de zienswijzen van de VN-comités en UNHCR die specifiek zien op waarborgen
in asielprocedures bevatten daarbij belangrijke richtsnoeren. De in dit proef-
schrift toegepaste methode is ook bruikbaar om de betekenis van het EU recht
op een effectief rechtsmiddel vast te stellen in de context van elke andere
procedure die door het EU-recht wordt beheerst.
DEEL II – Kernaspecten van asielprocedures
6 HET RECHT OP HET GRONDGEBIED VAN DE LIDSTAAT TE VERBLIJVEN
GEDURENDE DE BEHANDELING VAN HET ASIELVERZOEK
De effectiviteit van het EU verbod op refoulement zou ernstig worden onder-
mijnd wanneer de asielzoeker wordt uitgezet of uitgeleverd voordat hij de
kans heeft gehad zijn asielverzoek zorgvuldig te laten onderzoeken door de
beslissingsautoriteit en de nationale rechter. Voorbarige uitzetting kan tot
gevolg hebben dat de asielzoeker onherstelbare schade oploopt, namelijk
vervolging of ernstige schade in de zin van de Kwalificatierichtlijn. Uitzetting
tijdens de beroepsprocedure maakt de uitspraak van de rechter bovendien
ineffectief. Artikel 39 PR gelezen in het licht van het EU recht op een effectief
rechtsmiddel vereist daarom dat een asielzoeker op het grondgebied moet
kunnen verblijven:
· totdat de beslissende instantie het asielverzoek zorgvuldig heeft beoordeeld
· gedurende de periode die nodig is om beroep tegen de negatieve beslissing
in te stellen.
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· gedurende de beroepsprocedure totdat de nationale rechter grondig heeft
getoetst of er een risico op refoulement is bij uitzetting.
Aan het beroep bij de nationale rechter of aan een verzoek om een voorlopige
voorziening dient automatisch schorsende werking te worden verbonden. Deze
schorsende werking dient duidelijk te worden vastgelegd in regelgeving en
niet afhankelijk te zijn van praktische afspraken. Bovendien moet de procedure
waarin wordt geoordeeld over het verzoek om een voorlopige voorziening
belangrijke waarborgen bevatten. De rechten van de verdediging dienen te
worden gerespecteerd, de bewijslast van de asielzoeker moet redelijk zijn en
er moet een grondige toetsing plaatsvinden van het risico op refoulement.
7 HET RECHT VAN DE ASIELZOEKER OM TE WORDEN GEHOORD OVER ZIJN
ASIELMOTIEVEN
Asielzoekers moeten voldoende gelegenheid krijgen om hun claim dat hun
uitzetting het refoulementverbod schendt, te onderbouwen. Vaak zijn asielzoe-
kers zelf de belangrijkste bron van informatie in een asielprocedure en is er
geen ondersteunend bewijs. Een persoonlijk gehoor is van groot belang om
te kunnen voldoen aan het vereiste van een deugdelijk onderzoek van artikel 8
PR. Alleen in uitzonderlijke gevallen mag er daarom een uitzondering worden
gemaakt op het recht op een persoonlijk gehoor van artikel 12 PR. In het geval
van volwassenen wiens asielverzoek afhankelijk is van dat van de hoofdaan-
vrager moet worden onderzocht of zij zelfstandige asielmotieven hebben die
het best in een persoonlijk gehoor kunnen worden toegelicht. Artikel 24 van
het Handvest vereist dat de beslissingsautoriteit aan kinderen wiens leeftijd
en volwassenheid dat toestaat, de mogelijkheid biedt te worden gehoord over
hun asielmotieven.
De omstandigheden van het persoonlijk gehoor dienen zodanig te zijn dat
asielzoekers de gronden voor zijn asielverzoek uitvoerig uiteen kunnen zetten.
De communicatie tussen de asielzoeker, de eventuele tolk en de interviewer
dient goed te verlopen. Daartoe moeten de tolk en de interviewer voldoende
gekwalificeerd en getraind zijn. Gehoren van kinderen dienen op een kind-
vriendelijke wijze te worden uitgevoerd.
Het EU recht om gehoord te worden vereist verder mogelijk dat de asielzoe-
ker de mogelijkheid krijgt om te reageren op het rapport van het gehoor. Dit
geldt zeker als de beslissende instantie van plan is het asielverzoek af te wijzen
op basis van de informatie die in het rapport is opgenomen. Op enig moment
in de administratieve fase dient de asielzoeker in de gelegenheid gesteld te
worden zijn zienswijze te geven over de belangrijkste conclusies met betrekking
tot de feitenvaststelling, inclusief de beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid
van het asielrelaas, en de beoordeling van het risico op refoulement alsmede
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de belangrijkste bewijsstukken waarop die beoordeling is gebaseerd. Dat is
van bijzonder belang als de rechterlijke toetsing in beroep beperkt is.
Tenslotte volgt uit het EU recht op een eerlijk proces in beginsel dat de
asielzoeker in de beroepsfase wordt gehoord door de rechter. Dat geldt zeker
als er feitelijke kwesties, zoals de geloofwaardigheid van het asielrelaas aan
de orde zijn.
8 BEWIJSSTANDAARD, BEWIJSLAST EN BEWIJSWAARDERING
Elke bewijsregel die het praktisch onmogelijk of uiterst moeilijk maakt om
het recht op asiel of het recht op bescherming tegen refoulement uit te oefenen,
is in strijd met het EU-recht. Wanneer er geen EU regelgeving met betrekking
tot een bepaalde bewijsrechtelijke kwestie aanwezig is, moet een bewijsregel
aan dit effectiviteitsbeginsel worden getoetst.
In asielzaken gelden in beginsel dezelfde bewijsregels als in andere be-
stuursrechtelijke zaken. Artikel 4 KR staat lidstaten toe om de bewijslast bij
de asielzoeker neer te leggen. tegelijkertijd vereist het feit dat de integriteit
van de mens en de individuele vrijheden van personen in asielzaken op het
spel staat, dat de beoordeling van het risico op refoulement met oplettendheid
en voorzichtigheid wordt uitgevoerd. Het gebrek aan bewijs en de nadruk
die in veel asielzaken ligt op de beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid van
het asielrelaas vraagt van de beslissingsautoriteit dat hij een actieve, flexibele
en open houding aanneemt en zich concentreert op de kern van het asielrelaas.
In sommige gevallen mag van deze beslissingsautoriteit verwacht worden dat
hij de asielzoeker helpt met het vergaren van relevant bewijs of dat hij bepaal-
de tekortkomingen of fouten van de asielzoeker negeert. Er mogen geen
onrealistische bewijsrechtelijke vereisten aan de asielzoeker worden gesteld,
omdat anders zijn recht op asiel of het verbod op refoulement wordt onder-
mijnd. In dit proefschrift wordt onder meer het volgende betoogd met betrek-
king tot de bewijsstandaard, bewijslast en bewijswaardering in asielzaken.
De bewijsstandaard mag niet te hoog worden gesteld. Van asielzoeker mag
niet worden gevraagd te bewijzen dat zij bij terugkeer naar het land van her-
komst het slachtoffer zullen worden van vervolging of ernstige schade. Vol-
doende is dat aannemelijk is gemaakt dat er een redelijke mogelijkheid van
toekomstige vervolging is of dat er zwaarwegende gronden zijn om aan te
nemen dat de asielzoeker een reëel risico loopt op ernstige schade. Bij de
beoordeling van het risico op refoulement dienen alle relevante factoren, met
betrekking tot de individuele asielzoeker en de algemene situatie in het land
van herkomst, (in samenhang) te worden betrokken.
De bewijslast mag bij de asielzoeker worden gelegd. In een aantal situaties
dient de bewijslast echter te verschuiven naar de staat. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het
geval wanneer de asielzoeker aannemelijk heeft gemaakt dat hij in zijn land
van herkomst in het verleden is blootgesteld aan vervolging of ernstige schade.
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Hoewel de Kwalificatierichtlijn en de Procedurerichtlijn een individuele beoor-
deling van asielzaken vereisen, is het gebruik van presumpties toegestaan.
Een presumptie die onmogelijk of uiterst moeilijk te weerleggen is, is echter
in strijd met het EU-recht.
Bij de beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid van het asielrelaas van de
asielzoeker moet de beslissingsautoriteit zich concentreren op de kern van
het asielrelaas. Er mag geen doorslaggevend gewicht gegeven worden aan
kwesties die niet behoren tot de kern van het relaas, zoals het feit dat een
asielzoeker zich niet aan procedure verplichtingen heeft gehouden. Asiel-
zoekers dienen verder de mogelijkheid te krijgen om de aan hen tegengewor-
pen gebreken in het asielrelaas uit te leggen. Asielzoekers dienen op grond
van artikel 4 lid 5 KR het voordeel van de twijfel te krijgen als de algemene
geloofwaardigheid van hun asielrelaas is vastgesteld.
De beslissingsautoriteit mag bij de beoordeling van het asielrelaas geen
formalistische houding aannemen, door bepaald bewijs te vereisen of juist uit
te sluiten. Al het beschikbare relevante bewijs dient in de beoordeling van
het asielverzoek te worden betrokken.
Deskundigenrapporten dienen te voldoen aan de eisen van deskundigheid,
onafhankelijkheid en doorzichtigheid. Medische rapporten en landenrappor-
tages zijn deskundigenberichten waaraan groot gewicht toekomt in asielproce-
dures. Lidstaten moeten naast landeninformatie van hun eigen ministeries
ook rapporten van achtenswaardige mensenrechtenorganisaties, VN-organisaties
en de autoriteiten van andere lidstaten in hun beoordeling betrekken. Het
gewicht dat toekomt aan een landenrapport hangt af van de autoriteit en de
reputatie van de opsteller ervan, de grondigheid van het verrichte onderzoek,
de consistentie van de conclusies en eventuele ondersteuning door andere
rapporten. Het gewicht dat aan een medische rapportage moet worden toe-
gekend, hangt af van haar kwaliteit en overtuigingskracht. Echter, ook een
medische rapportage van een niet-deskundige kan de herkomst van littekens
prima facie aannemelijk maken.
9 RECHTERLIJKE TOETSING VAN DE VASTSTELLING EN DE BEOORDELING VAN
DE FEITEN
Uit de uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie in Samba Diouf volgt dat de rechterlij-
ke instantie die het beroep tegen een negatieve asielbeslissing behandelt, zowel
rechtsvragen als de feiten dient te toetsen. Een systeem waarin een administra-
tief orgaan de feiten beoordeelt en de rechter alleen rechtsvragen toetst is in
strijd met artikel 39 PR.
Uit Samba Diouf volgt ook dat de rechterlijke toetsing grondig moet zijn.
In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat dit betekent dat de rechterlijke instantie
tenminste de feiten en het bewijs dat aan de asielbeslissing ten grondslag ligt
zorgvuldig toetst. Een redelijkheidstoetsing, waarbij ruime beoordelingsvrijheid
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wordt gelaten aan de beslissingsautoriteit om de feiten, waaronder de geloof-
waardigheid van het asielrelaas, vast te stellen, is niet toegestaan. Nationale
rechters zijn echter niet verplicht om hun oordeel over de feiten in de plaats
te stellen van dat van de beslissingsautoriteit. Zij mogen ervoor kiezen zich
te concentreren op de kwaliteit van de asielbeslissing en de zorgvuldigheid
van de asielprocedure.
Artikel 39 PR gelezen in het licht van het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel
vereist verder dat de nationale rechter op enig moment in de asielprocedure,
voor de uitzetting van de asielzoeker, de asielbeslissing toetst op basis van
alle beschikbare relevante feiten en bewijs inclusief feiten en bewijs die na de
asielbeslissing zijn opgekomen of overgelegd. De effectiviteit van het EU
refoulementverbod zou worden ondermijnd als relevante feiten of bewijs
worden uitgesloten van de beoordeling van het risico op refoulement vanwege
het enkele feit dat zij eerder in de procedure naar voren hadden moeten
worden gebracht.
10 HET GEBRUIK VAN GEHEIME INFORMATIE IN ASIELPROCEDURES
In sommige asielzaken wordt informatie, zoals landeninformatie, die ten
grondslag ligt aan de asielbeslissing, niet beschikbaar gemaakt voor de asiel-
zoeker. Artikel 16 PR staat dit op een beperkt aan gronden (onder meer de
bescherming van de nationale veiligheid of de bescherming van bronnen) toe.
Deze bepaling geeft de lidstaten ook de mogelijkheid om gronden van natio-
nale veiligheid informatie te onthouden aan de rechterlijke instantie die het
beroep tegen de negatieve asielbeslissing behandelt.
Het recht op adversarial proceedings, het EU recht te worden gehoord en het
recht op een gemotiveerde beslissing geven partijen in beginsel het recht op
toegang tot al het relevante bewijs in hun zaak. Beperkingen van dit recht
kunnen echter gerechtvaardigd zijn. De beperking moet een legitiem doel
dienen en noodzakelijk zijn. Op basis van de jurisprudentie van het Hof van
Justitie en het EHRM mag verwacht worden dat de gronden voor beperking
van de toegang tot het dossier genoemd in artikel 16 PR kunnen worden
aangemerkt als legitieme doelen.
De nationale rechter moet toetsen of de geheimhouding van bewijs inder-
daad een legitiem doel dient en in staat worden gesteld om de asielbeslissing
grondig te toetsten. De nationale rechter moet daartoe al het relevante bewijs
in een zaak, inclusief het bewijs dat niet aan partijen beschikbaar is gesteld,
ontvangen. Artikel 16 lid 1 PR dat toestaat dat informatie om redenen van
nationale veiligheid aan de rechterlijke instantie wordt onthouden, is daarom
in strijd met het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel en moet nietig worden
verklaard.
Het belang van de Staat om bepaalde informatie in een asielzaak geheim
te houden, moet worden afgewogen tegen het recht van de asielzoeker op een
424 Samenvatting
effectief rechtsmiddel. Volledige geheimhouding van het bewijs dat aan een
beslissing ten grondslag ligt, is nooit toegestaan. Bovendien moet de motivering
van de asielbeslissing voldoende kenbaar zijn om een effectief beroep tegen
deze beslissing te kunnen indienen. Dat betekent niet dat al het relevante
bewijs de asielzoeker ter beschikking moet worden gesteld. Uit de uitspraak
van het EHRM in A en anderen tegen het Verenigd Koninkrijk volgt dat het recht
op adversarial proceedings niet is geschonden wanneer het grootste deel van
het bewijs openbaar is gemaakt en het openbare bewijs een doorslaggevende
rol speelde in de beslissing. Dat geldt ook wanneer de aantijgingen in het
openbare materiaal voldoende specifiek zijn om deze te kunnen weerleggen.
Bij de beoordeling of het recht op adversarial proceedings is geschonden,
dient rekening gehouden te worden met het gewicht dat aan het geheime
bewijs is toegekend. De geloofwaardigheid van bewijs uit anonieme bron is
noodzakelijkerwijs beperkt, omdat de context waarin het tot stand is gekomen
grotendeels onbekend is en de beweringen van de beslissingsautoriteit daarover
niet te verifiëren zijn.
Speciale technieken zoals het gebruik van speciale advocaten (special
advocates of special counsels), gecensureerde samenvattingen of een lijst van
documenten in het dossier kunnen worden gebruikt om beperkingen van
procedurele rechten door het gebruik van geheime informatie te compenseren.
Speciale advocaten hebben een veiligheidscheck ondergaan en treden namens
een partij op. Zij hebben toegang tot de geheime informatie en kunnen daar
namens hun cliënt op reageren. Zij moeten echter in staat zijn hun taak goed
uit te oefenen. Daartoe moet de betrokkene voldoende specifieke informatie
krijgen om effectief instructies aan de speciale advocaat te kunnen geven.
Informatie in gecensureerde samenvattingen moet voldoende specifiek zijn
om de betrokkene in staat te stellen om te bepalen of de verwijderde informatie
mogelijk relevant is voor zijn zaak en om zijn zienswijze daarover te geven.
DEEL III – Conclusies
11 NAAR EEN GEMEENSCHAPPELIJKE EN EERLIJKE ASIELPROCEDURE?
Een gemeenschappelijke en eerlijke asielprocedure voor de lidstaten van de
EU lijkt nog ver weg. Ondanks de totstandkoming van de Procedurerichtlijn
zijn er nog grote verschillen tussen de asielprocedures in de verschillende
lidstaten. Hierdoor zijn de kansen van asielzoekers op internationale bescher-
ming afhankelijk van de lidstaat waar zij hun asielverzoek indienen. Ook over
het niveau van bescherming dat door deze asielprocedures wordt geboden,
bestaan zorgen. Er bestaat een tendens binnen de lidstaten om de procedurele
rechten van asielzoekers te beperken in plaats van uit te breiden.
Dit proefschrift betoogt desalniettemin dat asielzoekers beter af zijn mét
de Procedurerichtlijn dan zonder. De richtlijn bevat veel belangrijke waarbor-
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gen voor asielzoekers en heeft het EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel
geactiveerd. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat de Procedurerichtlijn via
het recht op effectieve rechtsbescherming een belangrijke impact kan hebben
op de asielprocedures van de lidstaten. Het is in de eerste plaats aan de
advocaten van asielzoekers om de richtlijn en het EU recht op een effectief
rechtsmiddel in te roepen en aan de nationale rechter om ze toe te passen.
Dit is geen gemakkelijke opgave, omdat relevante rechtspraak over het EU recht
op een effectief rechtsmiddel betrekking kan hebben op alle rechtsgebieden
die binnen de reikwijdte van het EU-recht vallen. Er zijn nog maar weinig
prejudiciële vragen over de Procedurerichtlijn aan het Hof van Justitie voor-
gelegd. De kans dat het Hof de komende jaren zal oordelen over alle kwesties
die in dit proefschrift aan de orde zijn gesteld, is dus erg klein.
Een veel snellere en effectievere manier om naleving van het EU recht op
een effectief rechtsmiddel af te dwingen is door middel van de incorporatie
van de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie en het EHRM in EU regelgeving.
Op het moment dat dit proefschrift werd afgerond waren de onderhandelingen
voor een herschikking van de Procedurerichtlijn nog gaande. Een herschikking
van de Kwalificatierichtlijn is al aangenomen. Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit
proefschrift toetst het voorstel voor de herschikking van de Procedurerichtlijn
en de herschikte Kwalificatierichtlijn aan het EU recht op een effectief rechts-
middel. Het voorstel voor de herschikking van de Procedurerichtlijn weerspie-
gelt op een aantal punten inderdaad de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie
en het EHRM. Met betrekking tot een aantal procedurele kwesties die in dit
proefschrift worden besproken, gaat het niveau van bescherming omhoog.
Ook wanneer het herschikkingsvoorstel wordt aangenomen, blijft het EU recht
op een effectief rechtsmiddel echter een belangrijk interpretatiemiddel. Boven-
dien valt te bezien welke verbeteringen uit het herschikkingsvoorstel de
onderhandelingen uiteindelijk zullen overleven.
Het lijkt niet realistisch om te verwachten dat het in de nabije toekomst
komt tot een gemeenschappelijke en eerlijke asielprocedure. Toch moet het
EU-recht serieus genomen worden door beslissingsautoriteiten, nationale
rechters en advocaten die asielzoekers bijstaan. De Procedurerichtlijn en het
recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel hebben de potentie om het niveau van
bescherming dat door asielprocedures geboden wordt, te verhogen en tegelij-
kertijd deze procedures enigszins te harmoniseren. Mogelijk blijkt dat het EU-
recht meer of andere bescherming biedt dan het EVRM. Een eenzijdige gericht-
heid op het EHRM is daarom niet langer gerechtvaardigd. Het is nu tijd dat
professionals die in het asielrecht werkzaam zijn de Procedurerichtlijn en het
EU recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel in stelling brengen. Dit proefschrift kan
daarbij als inspiratiebron dienen.
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